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CHAPTER 1. 
111=211211,21LinstAracuant 
Kenya has been the focus of one of the most intense academic 
and policy debates an African political economy. The intensity 
derives from Kenya's role as a model of successful capitalist 
ievelopment, to be emulated by its fellow African nations. Kenyan 
rural development, in particular, has received extensive attention; 
it is depicted as a model of successful capitalist development 
involving and maintaining, rather than shunting aside and 
displacing, the African peasantry. Furthermore, the entire process 
has occurred with active state And international encouragement, 
alloying the prospect of repetition elsewhere. In addition to its 
status as a model of development policy, Kenya is considered a key 
case study in the theoretical debate over the development of 
capitalism within the African peasantry. Despite the groving and 
rich literature on the country, the theoretical and policy debates 
praising and criticizing the 'Kenyan model' continue unabated. 
This thesis examines the Kenyan model, focussing on the 
social transformation it has wrought within the Kenyan peasantry. 
Central to this transformation is the question of the degree and 
Likely outcome of any socio-economic differentiation occurring. 
Begardless of whether or not there vas significant differentiation 
in pre-colonial and pre-capitalist rural Kenya, market integration 
1 
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has undoubtedly differentia/17 affected the peasantry. A key 
question is the extent to which this has produced politically and 
economically significant differentiation in modern Kenya, and what 
the process of differentiation appears to be. A focus an process 
is essential to understand the likely trajectory of the 
transformation that has occurred. in turn allowing some projection 
of the future possibilities of the =del as a whole. 
By emphasizing the importance of differentiation, I do not 
intend to imply that equality is the sole, or even the most 
important, development goal. Growth, meeting 'basic human needs,' 
and economic diversification, among others, are also important. 
Socio-economic differentiation is crucial, however, because it 
affects future development potential. Peasant response to policy 
depends at least in part an their control of mobilizabIe resources; 
differentiation alters the pattern of such control. Resposne to a 
given policy may well be enhanced or circumscribed by past 
differentiation, regardless of how well the policy is designed and 
implemented. In this sense, peasant differentiation must be a 
central focus. Unlike differentiation among a landless working 
class, peasant differentiation affects productive capacity 
directly, so should be important even to analysts who place little 
value on socio-economic equality itself. 
Such a focus is thus crucial to addressing the policy debate 
regarding the future and replicability of the Kenyan development 
model. If the transformation underway is producing a large mass of 
landless, while maintaining the remaining peasants on small plots 
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of land relying on family labor, as some have suggested (Runt 
1984), this bodes ill for the model's prospects for creating growth 
with widespread rural benefits. If. an the other hand, the model 
continues to provide improved living conditions for a growing and 
increasingly wealthy middle peasantry, then the future is quite 
possibly bright (Collier and Lal 1986). Yet a third alternative is 
the classic capitalist rural development path of creating landed 
and landless classes, with the former becoming rural capitalists 
and employing the latter to produce agricultural coamodities for 
domestic and international markets. These are but three of a 
myriad of possible outcomes of the transformation underway. Mich 
is correct has profound implications for the future of the Kenyan 
model itself, and the place of the Kenyan case in theoretical 
debates over the development of capitalism in rural Africa. 
Understanding this transformation will help explain the 
current and likely future situation in Kenya, and allow an 
assessment of the Kenyan experiment both as a policy model and as a 
case study for theoretical exploration. After briefly presenting 
the debate over the nature of Kenyan model, this chapter delineates 
a theoretical framevork through which the transformation of the 
Kenyan peasantry will be analyzed, and suggests this fraaevork may 
have applicability well beyond Kenya itself. 
4 
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At the heart of Kanya's rural development model is what 
Clayton (1964) called an 'agrarian revolution. This 'revolution' 
consisted of the establishment of freehold land tenure and the 
direct insertion of Kenyan peasants into the market economy as 
petty commodity producers of high-value export crops. This began 
vith active state encouragement via the Seynnerton Plan for 
agricultural development of African areac in 1954, and expanded 
rapidly after political independence in 1963. 1 Kenyan smallholders 
vets encouraged to produce coffee, tea and pyrethrum for the 
international market, selling the crops through either state-
assisted cooperatives or state-controlled parastatal entities. 
Tho early results of this experiment, both in terms of 
peasant adoption of the new crops (previously denied them by 
colonial law) and overall growth in agricultural production. vers 
quite impressive. The annual increase in agricultural production 
from 1964 to 1972 vas 4.92. The 'semimonetary' (subsistence and 
Locally traded) agricultural sector grew at the slover rate of 3.72 
per annum, suggesting that the high overall growth reflected even 
more rapid growth of the agrarian revolution export crops (Peterson 
1986, 60). Much of this expansion has been in the smallholder 
sector, ehich increased its share of coffee production from 402 in 
1964 to well over 302 since 1977-78. Similarly and more 
1Por details on the Swynnerton Plan and related historical developments, see Chapter 3. 
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dramatically, smallholder tea production increased from virtually 
nil at independence to 32% of total production in 1977. Mile 
increases in large-scale tea estate acreage are legally frozen, 
smallholder production has more than doubled since 1977 (RazIewood 
1979, 44-45). 
This rapid growth slowed however. to 3.8% for 1972-1978. 
approxiaatelv identical to the population growth rate, and declined 
to 1.9% for 1978-1985, well below population growth. Thus, the 
early success has not been sustained, in spite of continued peasant 
adoption of the high-value export crops . 2 The continuing agrarian 
stagnation, especially in food production, is seen in the 2.7% 
growth rate of the seaimonetary sector for 1972-1982 and the 1% 
growth in maize production, the chief component of the 
isemiaonetary° sector in official statistics. from 1981 to 1986. 1 
This is reflected in growing and constant maize imports since the 
late 1970s, a declining caloric consumption per capita over the 
past 20 years. slightly increasing levels of child malnutrition. 
and projections of continued need to import maize at least through 
1990. 4 In this situation, many supporters of the model, in 
addition to its longer-term critics, have begun to ask what has 
gone awry. 
Alongside the impressive early growth and recent stagnation 
2See Peterson (1986, 60) for growth rates to 1982, and United Natiang (1985) for 1982-1985 data. Itanya, Central Bureau of Statistics (1985, 113; 1986. 104 and 107). 
4See Bunt, 1984, p. 41 for data on caloric intake, and Kenya, Central Bureau of Statistics and UNICEF (1983. Sec. 2. p. 29) for data an childhood aalnutrition and maize import projections. 
has been an unequal. distribution of benefits in rural areas. That 
inequality fixists is accepted by all. At issue is its extent. 
importance and future trends. Kitching, for instance, estimated 
the 'agrarian revolution' had in some way affected not more than 
one-third of all smallholder households, while Collier and La]. and 
Peterson argue the actual figure must be closer to two-thirds 
(Kitching 1980, 372-73; Collier and La]. 1986, 253; Peterson 1986, 
63). Two principal studies in the mid to late-1970s differed over 
the extent of absolute poverty in Kenya. ranging from 30% to 45%. 5 
while one analysis estimated that fully 22.4% of all rural 
households were without both off-farm income and signficant crop 
sales to supplement subsistence production (Thorbecke and Crawford 
1978, 62). 
The geographical spread of the agrarian innovations has also 
been unequal, based principally on natural ecological potential of 
each area for growing the high-value crops. Most analysts have 
assumed this has produced income inequality between districts, 
though Collier and Lal question the causal link between the 
agrarian revolution and regional inequality. Whatever the cause, 
significant differences in average rural income between districts 
are quite clear (Collier and La]. 1986, 257-67). 
Of greater importance than absolute poverty levels or 
geographical inequality is the question of socio-economic 
5The lower figure is from Collier and Lai (1980) and the upper from Thorbecke and Crawford (1978). Hunt (1984) provides a careful comparison of the two. 
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differentiation within the areas involved in the agrarian 
revolution. This, indeed is at the heart of the academic debate 
over Kenya. Analyzing the transformation of a peasantry requires, 
at the very least, raising the question of possible socio-economic 
differentiation occurring within it. While all accept that some 
differentiation has occurred in Kenya, analyses vary. Some argue 
that differentiation is minor and temporary, while others assert 
that the Kenyan peasantry has, in essence, been transformed into 
fully landed and landless classes. Lays (1971, 1974) suggested 
Kenya was undergoing a continual process of 'peasantization,' 
depicting the rural political economy as a largely undifferentiated 
*ass of peasants exploited by domestic and international capital. 
Cowen (1976, 1981) and Collier and Lal (1984, 1986) take completely 
different theoretical and methodological approaches to the 
question, but both conclude that the agrarian revolution to the 
mid-1970s benefitted a growing 'middle peasantry,' implying that 
•ocio-economic differentiation has been relatively slight. 
In contrast to these theorists, who view the Kenyan peasantry 
as largely undifferentiated. Kongstad and Rousted (1980) and 
Carlsan (1980) suggest the Kenyan peasantry has been demonstrably 
differentiated via state development policies and market 
integration, resulting in the establishment of 'rich, middle and 
poor' peasants, with only the first category, a small minority, 
fully benefitting from the development effort. Leo (1984) develops 
a similar but more complex five-fold typology in his analysis of 
the Rift Walley Settlement Schemes. Finally, &itching argues that 
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significant differentiation has occurred, but suggests that 
dividing the peasantry into clear categories is impossible due to 
the wide variety of economic circumstances and relationships within 
which Kenyan peasants exist. Arguments supporting more extreme 
differentiation have been offered by Njonjo (1981) and Hunt (1984). 
Njonjo (1981. 37) argues Kenyan 'peasants' are actually workers 
tied to 'patches of lend,' while Hunt (1984) views complete 
lendlessness as the principal Km= 'crisis' that is spreading 
rapidly and requires drastic policy changes to mend. 
This great divergence of opinion on the degree of 
differentiation in rural Kenya is based on analysts' different 
sources and interpretations of data, and different assumptions 
regarding what aspects of the rural political economy are most 
important for determining household income. Despite the wealth of 
studies undertaken, large-scale, thorough rural surveys of wealth, 
production, and income are quite rare. The only truly sy:temetic 
and reliable survey, the integrated Rural limey (IRS1), was 
conducted by the government in 1974-75. Lays' and Kitching's work 
was based an data available prior to that date, and they thus 
differ in their depiction of rural Kenya from later researchers. 
However, the diverging results of later analysts 	Carlsen vs. 
Runt vs. Collier and Lel -- clearly demonstrate the limit to which 
evidence Alone will and dispute. 
The two most recent analyses, those of Hunt (1984) and 
Collier and Lei. (1986), differ dramatically an the key issue of 
rural differentiation. Examining available income inequality, land 
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inequality and malnutrition levels from various surveys (though 
tRS1 was clearly the keystone of the evidence), Hunt concludes that 
inequality is rapidly increasing, leading her to nearly apocalyptic 
predictions regarding 'endlessness. Collier and Lal. (1986, 80-85), 
in a more recent work using the same data (Hunt, in fact, cites 
Collier and tale early work (19801 in her own analysis), dispute 
Hunt's conclusions. They note that while income and land 
inequality increased from the early 1960s to mid-1970s, inequality 
in consumption levels did not. They posit that consumption trends 
more accurately reflect permanent income, while the current income 
data, measured twice over ten years, each time for only a single 
year, reflect the income losses of innovators who have taken risks 
that have not paid off. They conclude from this elaborate 
examination and slight adjustment of the data that the middle-
income households are clearly increasing their share of total 
income, while it is impossible to state with any accuracy whether 
the poor and the rich are increasing or decreasing their shares. 
Settling this elaborate statistical dispute between the two most 
recent contributors to the Kenyan debate seems impossible. They 
essentially use the identical data, simply interpreting it 
differently. 
When data depicting current socio-economic status are either 
inadequate or open to varying interpretations, analysts may find 
that understanding the process of differentiation, rather than its 
absolute extent, is more fruitful. Where the time period over 
which differentiation is alleged to have occurred is short, as it 
10 
is in the Kenyan case. process is particularly important. Evident 
cross-sectional patterns of differentiation may not have fully 
developed in the relatively short time period considered, yet a 
clear process of differentiation may be well established. Collier 
and Lal suggest examination of process is particularly important in 
the case of Kenya (1986, 243). 
Scholars have suggested, either from abstract models or 
available survey data, a number of possible differentiation 
processes in Kenya. titching. Collier and Lal, Hunt. Carlsen, and 
Kongstad and Mewed all use the available survey data (culminating 
in Z3.S1) to develop hypotheses on the process of differentiation 
underway. Hunt focuses an control of land, assuming it is key to 
income and wealth in a peasant political economy. Kongstad and 
Konsted combine land control with labor process (hiring 
agricultural labor, using only family labor, or selling family 
labor power to others) to arrive at their three-fold typology of 
the Kenyan peasantry. Carlson relies on evidence of financial 
accumulation to develop a rather similar typology. Collier and 
Lal, and Kitching both suggest non-agricultural income is central 
to whatever differentiation exists. The former, however, use data 
on current remittances from urban to rural areas to argue that non-
agricultural income has an equalizing effect on rural household 
wealth, while the latter argues quite the opposite, using 
' historical material to suggest off-farm income is the Chief vehicle 
through which differentiation has occurred. 
All of these authors suggest possible processes of socio- 
U. 
economic differentiation based an abstract models and/or available 
survey data. I suggest neither approach is fully satisfactory. 
The inadequacy of available survey data makes a focus on process 
inevitable and essential; hypothesizing this process on the basis 
of standard assumptions regarding peasant political and economic 
behavior does not guarantee accuracy in understanding the actual 
processes underway. Coven's fine case study (1976, 1981) is 
exemplary in its attention to actual process, but his singular 
focus an cash crop production in isolation leaves him open to 
criticism from those who find other aspects of peasant activity 
equally important in determining overall levels of wealth. (Such 
criticism has been directed at him rather effectively an this point 
by Njonjo (1981)). Despite the plethora of studies of rural Kenya, 
none has adequately analyzed the overall, multi-sectoral process of 
rural differentiation on the micro-level scale necessary for 
accurats historical analysis. This thesis is an effort to do just 
that. 
zgAgiatjaiallisaal_AngLAgrUALlep;oducticat 
A Framework for ,&lyiji  
Directly examining the process of transformation and 
differentiation in rural Kenya requires a specific focus an peasant 
households. At first glance, peasant households may seem unlikely 
targets of investigation for the political scientist interested in 
African political economy and development modals. Yet they are 
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clearly the key production units with which the state and market 
must interact as development or underdevelopment transpires. All 
development policies targeted at the 'smallholder' agrarian sector 
depend on positive peasant response for their success. This 
response can only be understood via an accurate analysis of the 
structure and functioning of peasant households. 
Political scientists working within a broad political economy 
framework have increasingly examined the structure and functioning 
of non-governmental actors in the production process in order to 
better understand their relations with the state itself. In the 
study of advanced industrial societies, such endeavors are common. 
analyzing both the actual production units themselves -- capitalist 
firms -- and the units within which labor is organized. Las 
international political economy, Vernon (1971) and Moran (1974) 
have demonstrated the importance of understanding the structure and 
functioning of modern multinational conglomerates to understand 
both the behavior of the international political economy and the 
response of such conglomerates to a particular state's economic 
policies. I suggest similar efforts in Africa would be quite 
fruitful. 
The only political scientist of note to do this explicitly is 
Germ n Ryden (1980), whose work is seminal in expanding the 
discipline in this direction in Africa. 6 Ele, however, analyzes the 
6Se• Chapter 2 for my own analysis of Ryden's work, which I criticze chiefly for his lack of concrete empirical examination of peasant households to support his claims of the existence of a 'peasant mode of production.' 
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peasantry at a rather abstract level -- the 'peasant mode of 
production.' I suggest such analytical abstraction is premature 
without better detailed empirical investigation of the basic 
operating units in the peasant-dominated rural political economy: 
peasant households. Analytical abstractions such as modes of 
production and social classes may or may not be useful for 
analyzing social transformation in rural Africa in a given time and 
place. Asserting either of these actually exists and clearly 
operates, given our limited data on rural Africa. I find premature. 
Concrete alternatives to the household as the chief locus of 
analysis are also inadequate for our task. Indigenous 
organizations aggregating peasant households into social, economic 
and/or political entities clearly existed in pre-colonial Africa, 
but in many areas these have been significantly eroded by market 
integration. 7 	In most cases, such organizations no longer play a 
dominant role in orienting peasant response to state and market 
signals. Finally, focussing on individuals, rather than 
households, is inadequate because of the centrality of households 
throughout Africa as the chief allocators of land and often labor. 
Individual rationality, enshrined as the central explanatory 
assumption in neo-classical economics, is clearly important to any 
work in political economy. Understanding the outcome of rational 
decisions, however, requires understanding the politico-economic 
7Just a few of many works showing this to be the case, especially in East Africa, are: Kongstad and !toasted (1980). Bernstein (1977, 1979), Wilson (1977), Guyer (1984), Bukh (1979), and Watts (1983). 
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environment in which those decisions are made. In rural Africa, 
this necessitates a conscious focus on the household as the chief 
unit with which individuals identify and within which they pursue 
econoeic, social and political activities. 
Among those who have examined rural Africa. dispute continues 
to arise over the utility of the standard conceptualization of 
households as the chief units of the rural political economy. 
Guyer (1981) has questioned the utility of the term, arguing that 
its use often hides crucial relationships of conflict or 
cooperation between elders and juniors, men and women, and among 
doeestic groups in situations of extensive differentiation. For 
the Yoruba. Berry notes that Tx]ouseholds functioned not as 
homogenoeous or unitary agencies of resource allocation but rather 
as nodal points in a diaspora, as places where individuals came to 
participate in the operation of a farm or other rural enterprise or 
to draw on the resources of their kinsmen' (1985, 70). To both of 
these critics I concede the point. I focus an the household not as 
the knit of analysis, but as the locus of analysis. Households are 
not single units, acting as individual conscious entities. Within 
them are numerous individuals, with both conflicting And congruent 
interests. 
The recognition of conflictual relationships within 
households, however, does not belittle their importance. I accept 
Guyer 's definition of the African household as consisting of a 
'series of implicit or explicit contracts' (1281, 99) and add 
Whitehead's (1978) notion of the 'conjligal contract' as the most 
15 
important contract within a household. Long-term relations between 
men and women. young and old, strongly influence the ways in which 
individuals and households as units (cooperative activity can and 
does occur) mobilize resources in response to market and policy 
signals. Though immediate production often does not entail equal 
participation or interests of all household members, longer-term 
economic well-being is pursued within a self-conceptualization of 
oneself as a member of a given household. Rather than ignoring 
households, we should examine power relations within them, how 
market integration has Changed such relations, and how these 
changed relations in turn affect future market and policy response. 
Households, then, can be considered the principal production 
omits in a peasant political economy for several reasons. First. 
rural Africans generally identify themselves as members of a given 
household, however that may be defined, and cognitively place those 
around Chem in particular households. This identification is 
important in that recognized membership in a household yields an 
individual certain rights of access to resources in most African 
societies. Those outside normal ideals of household membership. 
particularly unmarried women, often lack access to minimum levels 
of crucial resources (see Balch 1979; Guyer 1984). Arguing 
households remain important does not imply such individuals are 
inconsequential. Their existence and the effects of their status 
are exceptions that prove the rule. Furthermore, such individuals 
will likely attempt to obtain recognized membership in a given 
household in order to obtain the resources they lack. Clearly, 
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selected individuals may be able to survive and even prosper 
without such status, but this pattern does not spear to be common 
(see Bukh, Guyer, and Kongstad and Nonsted). More immediately, 
household membership is crucial to individual. welfare. Birth and 
marriage assign people to households, strongly influencing their 
life-chances, as I will demonstrate in this study. Finally, 
households represent sources of social security, education funds. 
health care or other major needs that are not available from other 
sources in most of rural Africa. 
This study focuses on peasant households as the chief 
production units with which the state interacts in pursuit of 
development goals. The transformation of the Kenyan rural 
political economy is, at its heart, a transformation of the 
structure and functioning of peasant households. These households 
present the political scientist with a different problematic from 
that of analyzing firms, labor unions, or multinational 
corporations in fully capitalist societies. Peasant households to 
the political economist or the policy analyst are primarily 
production units. To rural Africans, however, the household is the 
principal location of survival and, they hope, economic advance. 
Immediate production and short-term agricultural profit are 
subordinated to the longer-term goal of overall economic advance -- 
what we can term household 'reproduction.' Understanding the 
process of socio-economic transformation of the rural political 
economy requires an analysis of changes in the reproduction 
processes of peasant households. 
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Edholm, et. al. (1978) identify three types of reproduction: 
social reproduction, reproduction of the labor force, and 
biological (human) reproduction. Social reproduction is the manner 
in which an entire economic and social system (mode of production) 
is reproduced. 8 Human reproduction refers to the specific 
mechanisms by which people are reproduced -- principally sexuality 
and control of fertility. Repruduction of the labor force involves 
the means by which the long-term subsistence of the working 
population is achieved. This includes human reproduction but is 
not as comprehensive, nor as abstract and vaguely defined, as 
social reproduction. In this trichotomy, peasant household 
reproduction can best be categorized as part of the reproduction of 
the labor force. African peasants are laborers. Like laborers 
everywhere, they seek economic survival and betterment. Their 
reproduction, then, is analytically part of the reproduction of the 
labor force as a whole. 
Unlike landless workers, however, peasants pursue 
reproduction at least in part via household agricultural 
production. Berry (1973) and Hill (1963) have clearly demonstrated 
that even in small-scale 'peasant' agriculture, capital 
accumulation can occur. This, indeed, is part and parcel of the 
process of agricultural development. Increased productivity and 
8See Friedman (1975) for the ultimate large-scale analysis of the concept of reproduction. Be argues for a concept larger than mode of production, which he asserts is too narrow for practical analysis. However, he leaves his central concept, the 'totality of social reproduction,' rather vaguely defined, making his analysis of little utility for empirical reserach. 
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capital accumulation may occur, at least to a limited extent, as 
peasants respond to market and policy changes. 9 Thus, as peasants 
pursue household reproduction. they both reproduce the labor force 
and engage in productive activities that may result in capital 
accumulation. increased or decreased agricultural productivity, and 
socio-economic differentiation based in the production process. 
The distinctions in a purely capitalist political economy between 
the reproduction of labor, the production process, and capital 
accumulation do not necessarily exist, at least initially, in a 
peasant political economny as it is integrated into a larger 
market. The household can be the location of all three activities, 
and household reproduction the process within which all three 
occur. 
Peasant household reproduction must be conceptualized as a 
complex and snati-dimensional process, involving more than simply 
its biological and economic aspects. In seeking economic 
betterment, peasants use all avenues and means at their disposal. 
It is thus often a political and social activity, in addition to 
being an economic and biological one. To capture this rather 
multi-dimensional nature of peasant reproduction and avoid purely 
economic or biological simplifications, I prefer to use the term 
the 'social reproduction' of the peasant household. 
The social reproduction of the peasant household can be 
9It must be stressed that such capital accumulation is usually quite limited and does not negate the likelihood of external agents -- whether they be the state, domestic capital, or international capital -- extracting capital from the peasantry. 
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defined as an identifiable social, economic and political process 
with a clear pattern of intra-household resource allocation by 
which peasants strive to maintain and if possible expand their 
household's level of well-being. This differs slightly from 
Bernstein, who refers to the 'cycle of reproduction' (1977, 82) of 
the peasant household, though does not clearly explain precisely 
how this cycle is to be identified. Be asserts all African 
peasants follow the same reproduction 'cycle,' the logic of which 
is what he (following Harz) terms 'simple reproduction' -- the 
struggle for subsistence. This is in contrast to the cycle of 
'extended reproduction' followed by capitalist entities, under 
which wealth is turned into capital. As with Ryden's analysis, I 
suggest such universalistic conceptualizations of the African 
peasantry are premature. The possibility of capital accumulation 
within the peasantry, as Berry has suggested, cannot be excluded a 
priori. It is crucial that we focus on patterns of intra-household 
resource allocation to delineate different possible models of 
social reproduction before making universal generalizations. 
Berry (1984) has argued quite persuasively that focussing on 
control and allocation of resources in rural Africa is crucial to 
understanding the African agrarian crisis generally. Ability to 
mobilize resources is crucial to peasant ability to respond to 
policy and market signals. Differential ability to do so is also 
central to identifying patterns of socio-economic differentiation 
more generally. By conceptualizing social reproduction of the 
peasant household as a pattern of resource mobilization and 
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allocation. I suggest es can find common patterns that vill be 
videspread, though not universal. This vill greatly assist us in 
understanding peasant response to policy, market and political 
stimuli. 
A focus on resource mobilization and allocation also alloys 
us to investigate, rather than assume as does Bernstein, what the 
actual cycle (to use his term) of reproduction is at a given time 
and place. The assumption that peasants always pursue only simple 
reproduction can be analyzed empirically by examining actual 
peasant households. I would suggest that all peasants pursue 
extended reproduction -- expanding their overall economic yell-
being -- to the extent they are able, relying on simple 
reproduction when they are so required. Rather than refer to a 
'cycle' of reproduction. I prefer to use the term process of 
(social) reproduction. Cycle implies, as does Bernstein, a lack of 
change from an initial starting point and the inevitability of a 
certain pattern that I prefer to leave open to investigation. 
Finally, I suggest that it is important to recognize social 
reproduction as a conscious process. In many cases, peasants 
engage in political and economic activities using a commonly-held, 
conscious strategy of reproduction. A given process of social 
reproduction can become a conscious modal that peasants employ in 
deciding hoe to mobilize and/or re-allocate their resources. Thus 
we can speak of models of social reproduction both as analytical 
abstractions and often as conscious strategies peasants pursue. 
Typically, a conscious model 'rill develop as a result of the 
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success of its earliest adherents. They will be emulated by other 
members of the community. Ultimately, as in the Kenyan case I 
discuss below, the model can even become a moral norm for 
acceptable social, political and economic behavior. 
The creation of a model of social reproduction, however, is 
far from a completely voluntaristic activity. A given model based 
an a distinct pattern of resource allocation will emerge as members 
of a community react to changes in the politico-economic 
environment around them. Significant changes in that environment 
necessitate changes in social reproduction models vhile 
simultaneously limiting peasants' range of possible responses. 
Reproduction strategies that are not adequately adapted to 
fundamital changes in a given politico-economic environment will 
not be successful and will not become models for emulation. Like 
any social norm, an established model will be resistant to 
fundamental change unless and until it is clear to all concerned 
that it is inadequate. 
Models of social reproduction can and do change. however. 
They change in response to fundamental changes in the politico-
economic environment in which peasants operate and/or from their 
own internal dynamics. Different peasant households will have 
differing abilities to apply a given model of social reproduction 
successfully. Significant socio-economic differentiation within a 
given community of structurally similar households can be the 
result. A process of social reproduction *ay, in the long term, 
result in some households achieving extended reproduction to such 
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an extent that they acquire surplus resources -- accumulated 
capital -- they cannot adequately employ within the confines of the 
given model. They will then begin experimenting with alternative 
production and reproduction patterns to WO their capacity more 
fully. The end result may well be the creation of a new model of 
social reproduction. Similarly, lack of adequate resources may 
force the less successful to forego a model of reproduction they 
desire to follow, shifting to a different one that allows than to 
continue to subsist, though quite possibly at a lower level of 
well-being. In both cases a transition from one model of social 
reproduction to others occurs. This transition, I suggest, may be 
part of a process of class formation. 
An analysis of social reproduction, then, must analyze 
differentiation occurring both within a given model of reproduction 
and as a reflection of transition from one model to another. 
Differentiation can occur within a single process of household 
reproduction, based on differential abilities to mobilize 
resources, or it can occur when certain households begin to 
reproduce themselves through a different process, raising the 
possibility that they may constitute a distinct class. I shall 
investigate differentiation arising from the model of household 
reproduction I identify, without applying pre-existent class 
categories or assuming standard reproduction processes that exist 
elsewhere. I am interested in examining differentiation and 
possible class formation from within the rural political economy -- 
and production and reproduction processes -- rather than class 
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formation arising from the effects of external forces such as state 
access. 
&maiming the social reproduction of the peasant household 
allows a direct focus an the process of transformation and 
differentiation occurring in the rural political economy. Such an 
analysis cannot be limited to particular aspects of peasant 
political and economic activity, assuming those to be determinant 
but must identify which activities constitute the pattern of Lure-
household resource allocation by which social reproduction is 
defined and achieved. This avoids making premature assumptions of 
which activities are most important for determining peasant 
political and economic behavior. Current production activities and 
response to new policy and market signals occur within the overall 
patterns of social reproduction. The latter, then, is crucial to 
understanding and predicting the former. 
A focus on social reproduction also avoids premature 
assumptions of the probable outcome of current differentiation, 
which can be discerned only by careful analysis of current social 
reproduction processes and likely transitions to new patterns. 
Ultimately, perhaps, this will assist in delineating rural classes 
in Africa based neither on pre-existing categories borrowed from 
other areas nor an influences completely external to the peasantry, 
but on the production and reproduction processes in the rural 
political economy itself. 
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4 Mcwiel tif Social gepmduction: 
Itrasistilas_Alaialt,_Loya 
The district of Zisii in the Western highlands has played a 
significant role in the history of Kenya's agrarian revolution. 
Situated in the fertile highlands above the Lake Victoria Basin, in 
Nyanza Province. Kisii was one of the first two districts in which 
Africans were allowed to grow coffee, a key crop in the agrarian 
revolution. Kisii has fully participated in the history of 
agrarian transformation since this beginning in 1933. In recent 
years it has faced to an extreme degree the problems occupying 
Kenya as a eholet record population growth, a slowdown in the 
expansion and value of export crop production, and unusually , high 
levels of malnutrition in the midst of a very high potential, 
intensively cultivated area. 
This study examines the process of social reproduction and 
its effects an response to development policy in Kisii. 10 I argue 
that the integration of Gusii society into the Kenyan political 
economy led to • particularly widespread process of social 
reproduction to which / apply the term 'straddling.' Cowen and 
Kinyanjui (1977) used straddling to refer to a state selariat who 
invest in agriculture and other private sector activities as they 
1°Kisii is the official and accepted name of the District, an administrative subdivision of a Province in Kenya. The word. I suspect, originated as a British mispronunciation of 'Gusii.' the name the people use for themselves and the area in which they live. I will follow current local English usage. using 'MAU' to refer to the district and 'Gain' to refer to the people and their customs. 
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dray revenue from the state in the form of wages. John Iliffe 
(1983) later expanded its meaning to refer to all simultaneous 
'modern sector (Iliffe's phrase) and agricultural activities, 
which he claims can be generalized to much of Southen and Eastern 
Africa. I maintain Iliffe's level of generalization but refer to a 
more specific process of intra-household resource allocation. 
The key elements of the straddling model are the combination 
within each household of some male-controlled non-agricultural 
income and economically significant agricultural production. 
Specifically, straddling as a process of social reproduction is 
characterized by the investment of non-agricultural income (almost 
solely men's in East Africa) in: a) household agriculture in order 
to raise the productivity and return to household land and unpaid 
family labor and b) education, to insure future levels of non-
agricultural income. In Kisii and elsewhere, straddling has become 
both a conscious process and a frame of reference within which 
household members' behavior is judged as socially acceptable. 
Men's off-farm income is the single most important element in 
straddling. Successful households include at least one adult man 
with access to significant off-farm income and a willingness to 
invest that in household agriculture and education. In recent 
years, virtually all households pursue the strategy; it is seen as 
the chief path to economic success. Not all adopted it at the same 
time or pursued it with the same success. As Kisii households have 
pursued this process over the past 40 years, significant 
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differences in household income and productivity have arisen, based 
principally an differential access to off-farm income. Those 
households with early high levels of off-farm income who reinvested 
that income in household agriculture and education today have 
expanded capability to mobilize all types of resources to meet 
market or policy opportunities. Those who do not have access to 
adequate off-farm income or do not invest that income in 
- agriculture and education have ever-increasing difficulty achieving 
simple reproduction. 
This process of differentiation is one that has occurred 
girjga the straddling model. To the point described in the 
previous paragraph, all, households were structurally similar -- 
i.e., pursuing the same model of social reproduction. As the more 
successful continue to invest in household agriculture, however. 
they have begun hiring significant amounts of agricultural labor 
(in part to replace highly educated household labor that has 
shifted to non-agricultural endeavors) and purchasing additional 
land to expand household agricultural production. This portends a 
transition in these households from straddling to a new process of 
social reproduction. 
Hired labor and purchased land can help overcome the most 
severe bottlenecks in agricultural production in Kisii (see Chapter 
6). Gaining enough wealth to break these bottlenecks at will 
alloys these households to increase agricultural productivity and 
revenue dramatically. This, in all likelihood, will allow re- 
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investment of agricultural profits in the growing farm enterprise 
or in non-agricultural business endeavors. In any case, the 
household at this point begins to transcend straddling, no longer 
investing off-farm income into agriculture in order to raise family 
labor productivity. Such a household begins to adopt some new type 
of reproduction process that may well -- though this remains 
unclear currently -- more closely resemble the model of a standard 
capitalist entity achieving extended reproduction. 
Conversely, the least successful operate at or near minimal 
subsistence. As a result either of a belated attempt to 'catch-up" 
to the more successful by rapid education, or of any one of many 
possble health or production-related crises, such poorer households 
have begun selling land and hiring themselves out to their 
neighbors as extremely low-paid agricultural labor. Their 
reproduction process begins to shift from straddling also. Without 
adequate family land and labor, they cannot pursue the straddling 
model. Instead, they begin to more closely resemble landless 
laborers. 
The probable outcome of this -- some division of the rural 
cc eunity into essentially landed and landless classes -- is clear. 
The ultimate characteristics of these classes is still quite 
uncertain. Whether the 'landless" will be completely so, or only 
effectively so (unable to engage in significant economic activity 
with what little land they have), and whether the landed fully 
become rural capitalists depends on reactions of these potential 
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classes to future changes in the politico-economic environment. 
This transition, however, signifies a transformation in the 
predominant model of social reproduction from straddling to two or 
more nev models. The point at which differentiation within a given 
reproduction process begins to transform the process itself is the 
point at which a moderate level of socio-economic differentiation 
may be translated into incipient class formation. In Kisii and 
much of Kenya we thus see both types of differentiation, that 
within a given model of social reproduction and that which 
represents a transformation of social reproduction processes and, 
hence, probable class formation. 
ethodoloy and Outline 
This analysis relies principally an a detailed case study of 
approximately 40 households in one area of Kisii, which I will call 
Bomvanda, the name of the clan (emit') resident there. 11 The 
households studied reside contiguously, though represent all three 
'sub-clans' (aaaiga) of Flamands. I found it impossible to 
identify a 'natural community' of households to demarcate from 
others in modern Usti. The settlement pattern is dispersed (no 
identifiable 'villages' exist), but extremely dense population 
liThe actual number of households depends on how one counts each household. I began with a cluster of 40 households, but soon discovered two that I thought of as separate households were not. Vhen analysing the data, I combined two other pairs of households into single units to make the historical analysis slimier, arriving at a final number of 36. 
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leaves no 'empty land between households or groups of households. 
No clear 'traditional' or official administrative divisions were 
found to correspond well with actual social and economic 
relationships. The households, then, were a group that used a 
common source of water and seemed to as to have muth greater social 
and economic interactions among themselves than they did with those 
beyond. At the boundaries of this group, however, interactions did 
-occur outside it. (And would, if I continued to expand the study, 
until ultimately it could have included all of Kisii. See Appendix 
A for a thorough discussion of the case study methodology.) 
This case study was combined with a survey of a random sample 
of 305 households from three different administrative divisions 
(Locations) in tisii, representing different *gra-ecological areas 
of the district. (See Appendix 13 for a discussion of the survey 
methodology.) This was undertaken to allow comparative analysis of 
the case study with a broader cross-section of the district. The 
principal theoretical results, however, and the creation of the 
straddling model, arise from the case study. My focus on 
reproduction processes within actual households and how they have 
changed over time requires a detailed and historical analysis that 
no broad survey could provide. The survey simply presents cross-
sentional data to compare with the diachronic analysis of the case 
study to confirm and limit the latter's conclusions. 
The thesis proceeds in the next chapter with a review of the 
relevant theoretical literature an African agrarian development and 
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rural political economy, focussing on alternative analyses of the 
African peasantry. The utility of the focus on social reproduction 
is demonstrated by comparing it with alternative approaches and 
shoving how it can assist to illuminate questions these other 
approaches have raised without fully answering. Chapter 3 provides 
essential historical background on the macro-level political and 
economic changes that produced straddling in tisii and elsewhere in 
Kenya. Chapters 4 - 6 present the findings of the case study: the 
historical rise of straddling in Bomvanda, the response to this 
especially on the part of women in the community, and its effects 
an current and potential agricultural production and development. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the broader survey and past work 
an Kisii to generalize and limit the analysis for the district, 
then concludes with a review of work from throughout Kenya shoving 
the broader utility of the straddling model. Finally, Chapter 8 
concludes by showing the utility of social reproduction as a 
theoretical framework for analyzing the African peasantry, rural 
political economy, and peasant response to state development policy 
elsewhere in Africa. 
CHAPTER 2 
Social leproduction and the 
Agricultural Deve1ppment Debate in 
The debate on African agricultural development implicitly 
involves questions of the nature of the African rural political 
economy -- what usually falls under the rubric of the 'peasant 
debate.' Even those paradigms that do not consciously and 
systematically state their analyses of the structure of the 
peasantry in fact do make crucial assumptions regarding it. In 
examining the theoretical literature on the development questions 
of central importance to this thesis, then, we must peruse both the 
explicit 'development' debate itself and the debate on the social 
transformation accompanying African integration into the 
international market, creating the modern peasantry as it is 
commonly conceptualized. This chapter reviews this dual 
literature, examining what I term the 'developmentaliste paradigm, 
the underdevelopment paradigm and the structuralist Marxist 
paradigm best known for modes of production analysis. As I review 
the literature, I will also criticize it and demonstrate the 
potential utility of the social reproduction framework for helping 
to resolve some unanswered questions. 
An underlying assumption of the framework laid out in the 
previous chapter and my criticisms of alternative paradigms is that 
33. 
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the history of market integration of rural Africa over the past 
century (or longer) has profoundly affected the structure of the 
rural political economy and its development potential. 
Furthermore, this process of integration and structural change is 
one that is ongoing, regardless of what development policy a 
particular state pursues. Thus, analysts of development questions 
must understand the continuous process of change occurring within 
the rural political economy to identify correctly successful 
development options. Ky. focus an social reproduction of the 
household argues that we must understand this integration, and most 
importantly its effects on the process of hosuehold reproduction. 
in order to understand current response to development policy and 
market opportunities. 
The Reo-classical Devel,opuntilatjAndliga 
The unquestioned dominant paradigm informing development 
policy in Africa and elsewhere is that contained in neo-classical 
economics. The sub-discipline of development economics, 
particularly its view of the agricultural sector, gained an 
unprecedented degree of uniformity with the publication of V. A. 
Lewis's 1954 article setting furth the 'dual economy' model of 
economic development. Lewis argued that 'traditional' 
agriculture's only role in development is to be a 'black box' from 
which unlimited supplies of labor were to flow into industrial 
production - the real engine of economic development throughout the 
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world (Staatz and Eicher 1986). In agriculture, this led to a 
nearly complete focus an large-scale agricultural investments using 
'modern' technology and inputs that were assumed to be of much 
higher productivity and efficiency than the backward traditional 
sector. The goal was the 'structural transformation' of all 
developing countries into industrial and large-scale agricultural 
'modern' economies. 
The dual economy model informed virtually all African 
development policy in the 1950s and 1960s. As Eillick (1978) 
demonstrates, this consensus crossed the boundaries of ideology and 
of African nationalist vs. foreign imperialist. While 'mainstream' 
economists working for the major development organizations favored 
a less state-centered approach (though far from a pure free market 
philosphy) than did their more 'radical' colleagues and African 
nationalists (c.f., Amin. 1965), both sides emphasized the need for 
some state intervention in favor of rapid industrial development. 
Inst importantly for our purposes, both tended to view agriculture 
as a sector that was backward and could not be the center of 
development efforts, a sector from which labor would be drawn and 
Little else. 
By the late 1960s, a growing realization that the modal 
contained assumptions regarding traditional agriculture that did 
not match African realities led to its abandonment. The central 
assumption that the traditional sector could provide unlimited 
supplies of labor without adversely affecting its own productivity 
levels proved erroneous. The assumption was based on the empirical 
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observation in Asia (where it certainly was closer to accurate) 
that the traditional sector contained such surplus labor that its 
marginal productivity and therefore marginal cost approached zero. 
Moving that labor to the industrial sector where it would be 
productive would thus increase overall production and begin the 
development process. 
In Africa, the assumption of surplus labor in smallholder 
agriculture is questionable at best. Lele (1975), examining 
Cleaves (1974) data, noted the apparent paradox between the low 
absolute level of labor input into agriculture (particularly 
compared to the much higher inputs into traditional Asian 
agriculture) and the persistent reports of labor shortages in 
particular cases throughout the continent. If the African 
traditional sector could provide labor for industrial development. 
which, given rapid urban growth and high unemployment, seemed to be 
clear, why was there not more labor Invested into smallscale 
agriculture itself? The answer, first argued as early as 1960 
(Jones 1960), was that 'traditional' African farmers were much more 
rational and efficient in resource allocation than Lewis's model 
assumed, and that these resources are far from infinite. Policies 
focussing on the modern at the expense of the traditional sector 
drew labor and capital from the latter to the former and harmed 
agricultural production. This conclusion, stated globally by 
Schultz (1964), directly Challenged the dual economy model as the 
basis of African development. 
Two alternative, though partially congruent, approaches to 
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development policy arose in the 1970s in response to this crisis. 
The less influential of the two came principally fron the 
International Labour Organization: the Basic Human Needs (BEN) 
approach. It argued that development focussed exclusively on 
growth left the poor majority with few if any gains. Alleviating 
this requires a shift from a 'growth approach' to an emphasis on 
provision of basic amenities: clean water and sanitation, health, 
education, nutrition and shelter. Providing these would, in the 
long run, further growth in addition to social justice because the 
=amities are an investment in 'human capital,' a sin, qua non of 
economic success (Streeten 1984, 973-76). Phil. BEN did not have a 
sector-specific focus, the emphasis on preferentially providing 
services to the poorest and the argument that improving the human 
capital of the poor would increase labor productivity and therefore 
development implied greater focus on peasant agriculture than had 
occurred previously. 
Undoubtedly the purest effort to implement the BEN model was 
the Tanzanian socialist development effort of the late 1960s and 
1970s, though the approach informed a number of other development 
efforts. Its relative lack of success, particularly in the 
Tanzanlan rue, led most to argue that BEN was in fact antithetical 
to growth and therefore • recipe for disaster in the increasingly 
stagnant economies of Africa. By the 1980s, it has become largely 
irrelevant to current policy debates within the developmentalist 
paradigm. 
Championed by Hollis Chenery (1974), the second new approach 
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came to be knovn as the 'Growth with Equity' school. It became the 
principal theoretical justification of World Bank activity and 
underlay the work of USAID and many other development agencies 
throughout the 19705. Its greater importance requires us to 
examine it in some depth. Based on the cork of Schultz (1964), 
Jones (1960), and Lipton (1968), the Growth with Equity school 
specifically focussed an agriculture, assuming that smallholder 
African farmers have a high level of allocative efficiency, so 
development policy need not alter existing smallholder resource 
allocation. The former 'traditional' sector came to be viewed as a 
high potential. 'smallholder' base for agricultural development: 
Within the agricultural sector the long-term objectives of growth, poverty alleviation and structural transformation are likely to be best served by concentrating resources and policies in favour of smallholder agriculture, [which) offers the best opportunities for transforming abundant resources of Land and labour into output, while economizing on scarce factors of capital and foreign exchange (Acherya 1981, 131). 
As this statement suggests, the quest for 'structural 
transformation' remains central to the paradigm, though the nature 
of that transformation has changed. The shift from smallscale to 
Large-scale agriculture and industry is no longer desired. 
Instead, the transformation seems to be based an improved 
techniques (improvement in technical rather than allocative 
efficiency) to shift cht subsistence ;actor from 'resource-basne 
to 'science-based' production (Johnston. 1980), premised on the 
applicability of the Green Revolution technology to the smallholder 
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African sector. 
While the assumption of allocative efficiency led to an 
emphasis on smallholder agriculture in development policies in the 
1970s, davelopmentalist analysts continued to recognize and discuss 
various barriers to improved technical efficiency in smallholder 
production. The key barriers discussed fall into three categories: 
peasant risk aversion, labor use, and land tenure. The new 
paradigm recognizes these areas as potential constraints, but 
generally argues that they do not present insurmountable barriers 
that could undermine the utility of the smallholder focus. 
common assumption regarding African farmers is their 
alleged unwillingness to forego personal food production to 
increase marketed production. Some analysts have assumed that the 
risk of not providing one's personal food supply severely limits 
marketed production by African smallholders (Hyden 1980). Given 
the Growth with Equity school's optimism regarding smallholder 
development, it is clear they do not hold this assumption to any 
great degree. But they do recognize that expanding marketed 
production bears risk for the African farmer and view the benefits 
of increased family revenue and the risk of food shortage as direct 
trade-offs faced by all smallholders. The most common approach to - 
this problem is to assume that raising the benefits and security of 
producing for sale, via improved prices and marketing channels, 
will encourage rational smallholders to allocate more resources to 
marketable crops and thus achieve national development goals (Hair 
1962). In the long term, then, the food vs. risk problem is 
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assumed resolvable. 
The question of labor use is more contentious. 
Developmentalists recognize that in spite of low overall labor 
inputs in agriculture, the existence of surplus labor for a given 
household is questionable at best. They suggest this is due to the 
extreme seasonality of African agriculture, the sexual division of 
Labor, and the rise of off-farm labor opportunities for the 
smallholder. Seasonality is perhaps the single most important 
factor, in that households often require 'excessive' labor most of 
the year in order to meet unusually high demand in peak season. 
The sexual division of labor impedes full use of labor when 
particular tasks are defined as specifically 'male' or 'female,' 
making it possible for available labor power and necessary tasks to 
be incongruent. 1 Finally, off-farm activities have drained labor 
out of agriculture, given the greater public and private investment 
and remuneration in non-agricultural sectors (Lele 1975, 23-27). 
While labor is currently recognized as a possible constraint 
on smallholder households, some analysts suggest that this is 
temporary, with labor surplus returning (or having returned 
already) via excessive population growth (Let. 1975, 24; Stevens 
19 77 , 237 ). This position is implied by those who advocate 
avoidance of 'labor-displacing' (rather than 'labor-saving,' the 
'Note that this argument, very common in developmentalist and other largely &historical arguments, contradicts the assumption that smaliholderrs are fully rational in allocating available resources. In fact, as we will see below. smallholders have often significantly altered the sexual division of labor when it did not match new labor needs. 
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phrase used for the identical phenomenon when considered 
beneficial) technological changes (Anthony, et. al. 1979, 27). 
Cleave (1974), in spits of his findings that labor might be 
constrained in certain circumstances, ultimately suggests that 
increased labor mobilization is possible in African agriculture. 
Thus, these Analysts do not consider labor an insurmountable 
constraint an smallholder development. 
Finally, land tenure patterns have been cited as constraints 
on development potential. This received a great deal of attention 
in the 19501 and 19605, forming the basis of the 'agrarian 
revolution' policies of the Swynnertan Plan in Kenya (Clayton 
1964). Hors recently, however, land tenure's importance as a pre-
condition for development has been questioned. The standard 
argument was that communal land tenure restricted individual 
incentive to invest in improving land quality or investing 
permanent cash crops. Hence, policies legally mandating a shift to 
individual tenure were encouraged. Cohen (1980), however, has 
noted that communal tenure does not limit adoption of new crops or 
land improvement, as Kill (1963) and Berry (1975) have shorn for 
the case of Nigerian cocoa. in fact, it seems cash crop 
opportunities often lead to a shift to individual tenure without 
the need for state intervention. (See also the cases in Anthony, 
et. al. 1979.) This potential constraint, then, is seen as even 
Less severe than the previous two. 
The current developmentalist paradigm generally minimizes 
constraints an smallholder development that originate in the rural 
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political economy. That African smallholder households are 
rational. willing and sapahla of increasing agricultural production 
is rarely questioned. Instead, developmentalists argue that 
systemic constraints at the national, or occasionally 
international, levels explain the current agrarian crisis (Lofchie 
1980, 1982). Poor producer prices (de Wilde 1980) and marketing 
channels are commonly blamed for smallholders inadequate 
agricultural investment. Jones (1980) argues African markets would 
function quite effectively without state interference and should be 
allowed to do so. For both prices and markets, state interference 
is blamed for most or all inadequacies (World Bank 1981). 2 
Finally, inadequate administrative capabilities within African 
states, despite 23 years of technical assistance, are blamed for 
the failure of the such heralded Integrated aural Development 
Schemes of the 19701 (the chief policy outgrowth of the Growth with 
Equity school) (Lele 1975). Reaction to this failure led directly 
to the current, more modest efforts at developing food production 
on a regional and sector,' basis, scaling back many of the 
grandiose plans of the integrated approaches (Eicher and Baker 
1981, 61-63). 
The Growth with Equity school based an the efficient 
peasant model is far superior to prior assumptions regarding 
African smallholders as 'backward' and 'traditional.' However, it 
retains the generally ahistorical approach and assumptions for 
2Bates (1981) provides a convincing analysis of the political reasons why African states engage in such seemingly masochistic market interference. 
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which the earlier dual economy model was so often criticized. This 
is perhaps its greatest weakness. It continues to vie, development 
in the earginalist terns inherent in the neo-classical paradigm: 
the existing structure of the rural political economy is taken as 
given and essentially static. There is little or no analysis of 
the ongoing processes of economic change in any particular case. 
Anthony, et. al.. (1979) are a major case in point, beginning their 
chapter on 'Farming Systems and Their evolution' (Chap. 4) with 
section an 'Traditional Systems: General Characteristics,' they 
present a static picture of 'traditional' farming from which they 
begin their analysis. When they admit and discuss past changes, 
they conceive of them as clearly defined events, fully in the past, 
chose effects can be seen in their static picture of the current 
farming system. 
In contrast to this. I argue that past changes ignited a 
process that continues to date. I hope to demonstrate that 
understanding the logic of the ongoing and evolving process of 
social reproduction, heavily influenced by the market integration 
of African peasants to date, is essential to effective policy 
analysis and formulation. Understanding the logic of social 
reproduction allows the analyst to envision likely trajectories 
based on fundamental economic relationships that policy can change 
only slightly in the short term. It thus demonstrates the limits 
within which policy must operate in the short term, and the larger 
problems and opportunities policy will face in the long term. The 
42 
marginalist bent of the neo-classical paradigm provides none of 
these possibilities. 
This ties into a more common criticism of the neo-classical 
paradigm: unwillingness to acknowledge and assess adequately socio-
economic differentiation occurring along with the development 
process. The Growth with Equity and BEN approaches were in part 
responses to radical criticism of development policy for ignoring 
the negative effects of 'development' on the 'poorest of the poor.' 
Both of these more recent versions of the developmentalist paradigm 
clearly acknowledge and attempt to alleviate the growing 
differentiation that is now widely recognized to occur with 
development. indeed. BEN is criticized for focussing exclusively 
on this question, to the detriment of any and all growth. The 
Growth with Equity approach. on the other hand, tries to alleviate 
poverty while pursuing growth by targetting growth toward the 
poorer segments of society. This clearly, at least in theory, 
answers the early critics of the developmentalist paradigm. 
However, I suggest even this fails to assess adequately the 
effects of differentiation, not on the lives of the poor themselves 
(though this is obviously of concern), but on the ability of rural 
Africans to respond to development policy, even when it is 
Itargetted° at them. The Growth with Equity approach asserts it is 
pursuing policies designed to aid the African poor, defined as the 
'average' peasant farmer. This fails to address the question of 
the differential ability of rural African households to respond to 
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even favorably designed policy. Households with relatively few 
mobilizable resources will likely have a lesser ability to respond 
to new opportunities than will either 'average' or 'progressive' 
farmers. Indeed, this assumption lay behind the dual economy 
model's emphasis on progressive farmers, who were seen to be the 
only members of the 'traditional' sector capable of quickly 
developing 'modern' agriculture (see Richards, et. al. 1973; 
Clayton 1964). The more recent rhetorical emphasis on the poor has 
shifted analytical focus to the 'average' farmer. This may appear 
more egalitarian, but it foregoes even the minimal understanding of 
the effects of differentiation an policy response implicit in the 
dual economy model. That is needed instead is a thorough 
understanding of the history of differentiation and of its ongoing 
effects, which I suggest the social reproduction framework can 
provide. 
This oversight is particularly important when we consider the 
issue of labor mobilization. The debate over the question of 
surplus labor assumed, based on Cleave's (1974) data, that unpaid 
family members provide approximately 80% of all labor power in 
African smallholder agriculture. Hovever, the use of hired 
laborers, rather than family members, is often a part of the 
differentiation process in rural Africa (Richards, et. al. 1973; 
Berry 1975; Rill 1972; Kongstad and Hoisted 1980). This element of 
the differentiation process clearly has profound implications for 
household ability to mobilize a crucial resource in response to 
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development policy. The average figure of only 20i of total labor 
power masks the significant effects hired labor may have on both 
the buyers and sellers. To cannot understand the implications of 
this for development policy using an analysis based either on 
average' or 'progressive' farmers. Instead, ve must examine the 
ffects of differentiation an policy responses of households on 
both ends of the scale, which I suggest can best be done using an 
approach focussing an household reproduction. The latter may 
provide an understanding of the role of hired labor in both buyers' 
and sellers' households, which nay be much more significant as part 
of a process of social reproduction than can be gleaned from 
quantitative depictions alone. 
The only type of neo-classical research that attempts to 
analyze both household reproduction and differentiation is 'farm-
systems research' (PSR). 3 It "focus(es] on the rural household as 
a production and consumption unit (and analyzes] both farm and non-
farm activities' (Eicher and Baker 1982, 159). The best FS& 
analysts, such as Norman, et. al. (1982) and Nation (1981), state 
their intentions of including the effects of local political and 
social institutions and differentiation in their analyses. 
However, even these analysts continue to conceptualize the farming 
system in a static manner. They include non-agricultural 
activities (which is a significant improvement over much 
agricultural research), but present only quantitative analyses of 
3See Eicher and Baker (1982, 158-63) for a brief overview of 
I. 17" . 7) . 
P. O. Box 58480 
Nairobi Kenya 
PSR. 
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these activities share in various measures of total household 
income and production. This is important, but alone cannot tell us 
the role such activity plays in household members' decision-making, 
which is based an their conscious efforts to achieve reproduction. 
Furthermore. despite Norman, Simmons and Hays' stated interest in 
analyzing the effects of differentiation, Nation remains the only 
FSR analyst to report data on agricultural practices and 
productivity within a stratification of households based on local 
differentiation. Even this suffers from a lack of historical 
analysis of the process of differentiation, leaving him unable to 
argue conclusively whether non-agricultural or agricultural 
activity caused initial differentiation and the resultant 
differential agricultural productivities. 4 
The developmentalist paradigm, particularly its ?SR 
manifestation, has improved markedly over the early dual economy 
models. But the *historical nature of the marginalise assumptions 
in the neo-classical paradigm prevents a thorough analysis of the 
continuing process of political, social and economic change in 
rural Africa. The farm system is analyzed as a static entity at a 
given time and policy is prescribed based on its predicted effects 
on that entity. I suggest that this often will not accurately 
4He finds a significant relationship between overall differentiation and agricultural practices and notes that differentiation is related to different types of off-farm activities. His conclusion, however, is simply that a wide variety of factors together explain rural poverty and lack of response to policy, the only conclusion he can draw using an thistorical, corrrelational analysis. 
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predict policy effects and peasant response because policy must 
alter a continuously changing rural political economy. An analysis 
that attempts to understand the logic of the ongoing process of 
social reproduction might well reveal constraints that challenge 
the optimising peasant assumptions of the 'Growth with Equity' 
school -- that smallholders have access to adequate resources and 
will allocate them according to short-term cost-benefit 
calculations. Such an analysis also provides the possibility of 
understanding future trends in the structure of the rural political 
economy with which policy will have to grapple. 
Underdevelopun,  The Peasant Debate 
sastautlatlamisuoatim_i&Afaisa 
The rise of dependency/underdevelopment theory in Latin 
America in the late 1960s represented a fundamental challenge to 
the dominant developmentalist paradigm. This new alternative 
quickly affected the study of African rural political economy, 
leading to what can be termed 'the peasant debate.' An attempt to 
analyze African smallholders as 'peasants' within an 
underdevelopment perspective lay at the heart of this theoretical 
re-orientation. Analysts using this approach began to examine 
smallholders in their larger political and economic contexts: their 
Changing relationship to the economic and political units of which 
they are a part and to the international economy. The debate 
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quickly came to revolve around the extent of market integration of 
African peasants, the effects of this on their productive and 
political behavior. and the nature of state influences on them. 
For many, the ultimate questions involve the class position of 
African smallholders. Are they a stable peasantry? Are they being 
differentiated into a dominant and one or more subordinate classes? 
What is the nature and logic of the differentiation process 
occurring? The historical analysis largely absent in the 
developmentalist paradigm took center stage in the peasant debate 
in order to address these issues. 
The underdevelopment paradigm argues that market integration 
and political subordination have fundamentally transformed the 
nature of African peasant households over the last century, 
rendering the concept of 'traditional agriculture' meaningless 
and/or misleading. Tosh (1980) and Bundy (1979) have demonstrated 
African cultivators' very positive response to new economic 
opportunities arising from initial market integration prior to 
political subordination. Commercialization brought with it a wide 
variety of structural changes in rural African society that 
underdevelopeent analysts have examined at length. These include 
changes in food crops and production techniques (Clarke 1981; 
Beimart 1980; Bryceson 1980; Dejean 1980); alterations in 
fundamental intergenerational relationships (Clarke 1981; Mandela 
1982; Beim= 1980; Dejean 1980; Wilson 1977), and changes in the 
sexual division of labor (Fatten and NUkunya 1982; Mandela 1982; 
Etienne 1977; Young 1977; Wilson 1977; Bukh 1979; Guyer 1984; Conti 
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1979). These changes have been far from uniform. Vomen may have 
gained increased independence, as Bukh Suggests, but often at the 
cost of an increased workload limiting their options (Guyer 1984; 
Bukh 1979; Bongstad and Nansted 1980). Others, however, see women 
as increasingly dependent on men, especially where migrant labor is 
a significant factor (Cliffe 1978; Mandela 1982; Etienne 1977; 
Brown 1983). Similarly, elders may have found a means to maintain 
control over juniors in some situations (Lewis 1979), but more 
often sees to have lost control (Billion 1977; Deja= 1980). 
This transformation from pre-colonial to peasant society 
altered the function if not the outward appearance of indigenous 
communal institutions as well. Despite the continuing popularity 
of Byden's (1980) thesis that the 'economy of affection' maintains 
much of its pre-colonial character. Lewis (1979) presents one of 
the few documented cases of this occuring. Using pre-colonial 
institutions to mobilize resources to respond to new opportunities 
in the market economy and colonial polity appears to be more 
common. This can entail mobilization of labor through pre-colonial 
Labor groups (Bill 1963; Berry 1975, 1984;), mobilization of 
surplus labor for the market benefit of a pre-capitalist elite 
(Cliff. 1978; Shen= and Lennihan 1981; Beinart 1985), or the use 
of kin ties to gain beneficial market terms or access to state 
resources (Patten and Nukunya 1982; Berry 1985; McMillan 1986). 
Analysts working within the paradigm agree that market 
integration and political subordination brought fundamental changes 
to rural African society, creating what can best be analyzed as a 
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'peasantry.' The current debate revolves around the question of 
whether African cultivators can still be conceptualized as 
peasants. At the heart of the debate is the definition of the 
African peasantry. The standard reference is Saul and Woods' 
statement: 
Peasants are those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved—in a wider economic system...It is precisely the characterization of the peasantry in terms of its position relative to other groups in the wider social system which has particularly important explanatory value in the analysis of development... (It is] fruitful to view both the creation of an Afircan peasantry, as well as the creation of the present differentiation among African peasantries, as being primarily the result of the interaction between an international capitalist economic system and traditional socio-economic systems, within the context of territorially defined colonial political system (1971. 105-06) 
The key question defining who is and is not a 'peasant' is the 
meaning of 'ultimate security and subsistence.' Blain 
distinguishes capitalist farmers from peasants by suggesting 
'peasants still meet most of their subsistence needs' (1980a. 12), 
arguing that the households Sill (1963) and Berry (1975) referred 
to as 'rural capitalists' qualify for his definition of peasant. 
On the other end of the scale. Bundy (1979) discusses at length the 
transition from peasant to proletarian, arguing that a peasantry 
arose via market integration and fell as it lost its autonomous 
ability to respond to narket forces, even though it maintained some 
subsistence capability. The debate is really one over whether a 
clear peasantry as a social class. with a common identifiable 
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relationship to the means of production -- land and labor -- 
continues to exist in rural Africa. Despite significant 
differences, a wide variety of analysts can be categorized roughly 
by their positive or negative answer to this query. 
The original adherents to underdevelopment theory argued that 
the African peasantry created by early market integration was 
dominated, impoverished, and in many places proletarianized by 
further market penetration and political subordination. Palmer and 
Parsons  The Roots of Rural Poverty (1977) was the first major 
collection of historical essays using the underdevelopment 
framework. The contributors argue that a peasantry in Central and 
Southern Africa arose in response to early colonial market 
opportunities and was 'destroyed' (transformed into a proletariat) 
by the 19305 via discriminatory policies limiting market entry to 
insure adequate labor supplies and/or protect settler agricultural 
interests. 5 Critics have questioned Boots' failure to begin the 
analysis in the pre-colonial period and its declaration that the 
peasantry was 'destroyed' by the 19301 (Ranger 1978). On the 
, latter issue, Ranger (1978) and Cliffs (1978) note that peasant 
differentiation, 'peasant' production, and struggles with the 
market and state continued into the 1970s. Differentiation within 
the peasantry, Cliffs argues, was based partially on wage labor and 
the colonial state that the pots contributors argued completely 
destroyed the peasantry. 
lundy (1979) makes a similar and perhaps more thorough argument for South Africa that situates the start of the process well into the pre-colonial period. 
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The contributors to Klein's (1980) volume make arguments 
similar to those in kola, but do not restrict themselves to the 
1930e deadline for peasant destruction. Though they cast their 
discussion in terms of peasant decline, a number of the 
contributors continue their analysis into the post-colonial era. 
As noted in Chapter 1. Njonjo (1981) makes a similar argument for 
Kenya. claiming that many alleged 'peasants' are in fact 'workers 
with patches of land,' while Bunt (1984) sees the dissolution of 
the majority of the peasantry evidenced in rising 'endlessness. 
Finally, theorists such as Carlsen (1980) or Bongstad and Boasted 
(1980), depicting significant rural stratification, suggest that 
the majority of the peasants, in the 'poor peasant' category, are 
quite possibly losing their subsistence capability and therefore 
their status as peasants at all. In contrast to Root', Bundy, et. 
al., however, they identify a minority of the peasantry that 
remains viable, and thus find soae analytical utility in retaining 
the concept of a peasantry as defined above. 
Scholars from a variety of theoretical frameworks have argued 
that African smallholders remain viable subsistence cum commercial 
agricultural producers and will continue to be viable for the 
forseeable future. Though many of these do not work within the 
underdevelopment framework, their empirical analysis of African 
smallholders is an important component of the peasant debate of 
which the underdevelopment paradigm is a part. One who does work 
loosely within the underdevelopment framework is Michael Cowen 
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(1977, 1981), who portrays a Kenyan peasantry in which a growing 
and viable 'middle peasantry' has been created because of the 
dominance of financial capital in Kenya's integration into the 
international market. As noted in the previous Chapter, analysts 
such as Collier and Lal (1986) quote Cowen approvingly and concur 
with his empirical analysis of a viable peasant sector, in spite of 
their radically differing theoretical orientation. Hunt's early 
work (1978, 1979) using a Chayanovian framework modified to account 
for market integration also suggests that the peasant construct 
remains analytically useful. Al]. these analysts admit that the 
households they examine engage in non-agricultural activities (such 
as wage labor). but claim these are not significant for defining 
and understanding the structure and behavior of the households 
themselves, in contrast to the proletarianization thesis discussed 
above. 
The strongest advocates of the continuing utility of the term 
peasant as an accurate portrayal of most rural Africans' class 
position argue that smallholders continue to be economically 
viable, combining essential subsistence provision with commercial 
production to avoid proletarianization. Some of these, in fact, 
suggest that significant numbers of peasants in certain areas have 
become 'rural capitalists,' transcending rather than losing 
subsistence production capabilities. Hill (1963) and Berry (1975) 
view the rise of cocoa production as a robust response to market 
opportunities, and argue that the smallholders involved should be 
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termed capitalist rather than peasant. West African smallholders, 
they suggest, engaged in capital formation and accumulation via 
cocoa production. Their behavior combines peasant provision of 
subsistence with a capitalist's effort at accumulation and 
expansion. In spite of their different terminology, their analyses 
lend support to an argument that a viable peasantry continues to 
exist within rural Africa and can be the basis of future 
development efforts. They depict 'rural capitalists' who seem able 
to continue to produce much of their subsistence while actively 
participating in the market, pursuing commercial opportunities when 
they appear favorable. 6 A peasantry retaining such vitality, it 
would seem, could be a primary component of future development 
efforts. 
Another contingent of scholars who continue to find utility 
in the concept of a peasantry suggest that the peasantry continues 
to exist and .struggles with market and state forces, with an 
indeterminant outcome. In contrast to Coven (1981). they do not 
present an argument for a peasantry inexorably gaining or losing 
its strength. Cooper suggests that the colonial state's acceptance 
of widespread smallholder production in lieu of large-scale 
capitalist agriculture was a case of 'calling failure success,' 
noting that 'the problem for colonial states was that peasants were 
not predictable. They could not be counted an to stay in the 
6 Weed, Berry later (1980) suggests the term peasant is still applicable, in spite of the significant capital accumulation that has accused. 
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market vhen it vas rigged against them or simply bad, nor vas it 
sure how they would respond to demands to intensify production' 
(1680, 303). What others analyze as partial proletarianization or 
an incomplete transition to capitalist production, Cooper (along 
with Williams (19851) views as peasant struggle to resist outside 
forces. 
Undoubtedly the most influential implicit critic of the 
peasant debate is Goren Hyden (1980). While he, of course, uses 
tit term peasant as a central concept in his analysis, he is, in 
fact, criticizing the very basis of the entire peasant thesis as 
discussed above. His argument that rural African smallholders have 
successfully 'resisted effective market integration and political 
subordination is a direct counterattack to the underdevelopment 
thesis. He rejects the argument that a significant historical 
transition occurred in the rural political economy, claiming that 
pre-colonial communal institutions continue to function to maintain 
collective peasant independence. As noted at the outset of this 
section, in spite of the continuing popularity of his thesis, 
especially within the developmentalist school, Levis (1979) is the 
only scholar rho has provided direct evidence of effective 
resistance to market integration via pre-colonial communal 
institutions that I have found in the literature. 7 
The greatest value derived from the peasant debate is its 
7Hyden's acceptance in the developmentalist school, which in many ways he has criticized, is seen in his solicited contributions to the recent volume edited by Berg and Whitaker (1986) and Hoock's edited volume (1988) on FSR. 
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historical analysis of African smallholders. Even those analysts. 
such as Ryden, who argue that the alleged historical transformation 
is rather unimportant, at least address the question. The best 
works in this debate, such as that of Cliffe (1978), Ranger (1978). 
and Bryceson (1982), focus on the continuing relationship between 
the state, market forces, and peasant households. Those who argue 
for a clear outcome, whether proletarianization or the development 
of rural capitalists, base their discussions on particular regions, 
making generalizations difficult. That Southern Africa is the 
locus of most proletarianization arguments is not surprising; the 
contrast to Vest African analyses of budding rural capitalists may 
be • regional rather than theoretical distinction. 
This lack of generalizability relates to a more fundamental 
problem: the lack of an overall logic driving the 'peasantization' 
of African households and their subsequent trajectories. The key 
question in the definitional and trajectory debates is the 
importance of non-subsistence activities in smallholder households. 
Both subsistence and market-oriented activities exist in peasant 
households; the question is which of these is dominant in 
determining household behavior. Bernstein (1979) attempts to 
provide an overall logic to this question with his 'simple' vs. 
'extended' reproduction models, the former applying to peasant 
households and the latter to capitalists. Similarly, Buch-Bansen 
and Eisler (1983) distinguish between 'formal' and 'real' 
subordination of the peasantry to capital. The former allows some 
peasant autonomy and control over its labor power (allowing 
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peasants to grow subsistence crops if they so desire), while the 
latter does not, essentially transforming the peasantry into a 
proletariat. These tiro analytical frameworks may provide useful 
categorization of rural kfrican households, but do not provide an 
explanation for if, when and hoe peasants shift from one to the 
other. 
Discussions of rural differentiation and class formation in 
the underdevelopment paradigm also lack an overall explanatory 
Logic. That some differentiation has resulted from market 
integration is denied by virtually no one. Any significant 
variation in households' responses to nee opportunities and 
constraints created by the market implies at least short-term 
differentiation at some point. In fact, growing evidence indicates 
that differentiation is quite significant, but analysts have tied 
it to a wide variety of causal factors. Bill (1969, 1972) suggests 
rural Rause differentiation has been caused by life-cycle effects 
that can be overcome and land sales that will be more difficult to 
reverse. She ultimately argues (1977) that differentiation will 
not lead to class formation because wealth is dissipated at death 
and increasing population pressure is imposing a uniform poverty 
that fey will avoid. Spoigel (1980) makes a similar argument, 
viewing differentiation as principally a result of the 
developmental cycle, combined with migrant labor remittances in 
Lesotho. The latter is also seen as an important factor in 
Zimbabwe (Phimister 1986; Cliffs 1978). 
Hill (1963) and Berry (1975) suggest cocoa did not produce 
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significant differentiation in Nigeria and Ghana because of the 
early opportunities for most households in the land abundant 
economy, though Chauveau (1980) argues that differential control 
over labor did in fact produce overall differentiation in coffee 
and cocoa growing regions of Ivory Coast. Berry (1985) later 
argues, along with Cliffs (1977), Nuntemba (1980) and Zonings 
(1986), that differentiation and class formation occur partially 
through access to and control over state resources. Others focus 
an education., generally a pre-requisite of state access, as crucial 
(Zitchings 1980: Beinart 1960: Levin 1980). !Finally. a number of 
Vest African studies point to debt (due to need for cash to pay 
colonial taxes) and resultant vulnerability to drought as key 
factors (Howard 1980; Watts 1983; Shenton and Lennihan 1981; Levin 
1980). 
Analysts arguing specifically that rural class formation has 
occurred suffer from a similar lack of consensus on a coherent 
logic driving the process. While rather blunt attempts to apply 
pre-existing class categories to Africa have proven extremely 
questionable (Shivji (19761 is ane of the more extreme cases in 
point), recent attempts of a more subtle nature, based on 
production processes and access to state resources, have been more 
fruitful. Part of their utility, indeed, is the Limited claims 
they make for the existence, and especially the consciousness, of 
the classes they delineate, aural class formation has been laid at 
the feet of land accumulation (Cliffs 1977; Vercruijsse 1979), debt 
(Howard 1960), market control usually via parastatal marketing 
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cooperatives (Raikes 1978). maintenance of pre-colonial class 
distinctions (Cliffs and Hoorsom 1979) and migrant labor (Phimistar 
1986). 
The underdevelopment paradigm and the peasant debate arising 
out of it have proven quite insightful in their analyses of African 
political economy. Their historical focus is a welcome Change from 
the &historical nature of even the more sophisticated analysts in 
the developmentalist paradigm. Placing African smallholders in the 
broader political and economic environments in which they operate 
and analyzing the effects of those environments over time leads us 
to recognize that development policy must be understood as only one 
of a myriad of forces affecting smallholder behavior. Development 
policy does not act on African households that are passive and 
static recipients of policy recommendations. Rather, policy 
affects households that are constantly engaged in some type of 
process of change. The underdevelopment paradigm, and its critics, 
have at least recognized this and begun to address it. 
That the paradigm has not succeeded in doing is providing an 
overall analytical logic to the processes of change that have been 
identified. Clearly, market integration and political 
subordination have affected different peasantries differently, but 
no central framevork has explained shy these differences exist nor 
how Change occurs within each case. Structuralist Marxists 
developed several concepts to try to provide such a framework; this 
effort is the subject of the next section. I suggest the concept 
of the social reproduction of peasant households may provide a more 
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useful framework; the final section vill attempt to support this 
claim. 
§tructural Analyse's_ Modes of Production 
saiLattmple Commodity  Production 
Harriet scholars have attempted to present a more abstract 
and theoretically rigorous analysis of the historical integration 
of African households into the market economy and centralized 
political units. The effort has many similarities with the 
underdevelopment paradigm but attempts to understand the process at 
a much higher level of abstraction, rejecting the use of 
'peasantry' as a central concept because, as Ennov, et. al. (1977) 
argue, 'peasant is a descriptive rather than analytical category. 
In its place they attempt to use the concepts mode of production 
(MOP). articulation and, more recently, simple commodity 
production. 
Two recent overviews of the 'modes of production debate' 
present strongly contrasting views of the paradigm's viability. 
Byres' (1985) introductory article to a discussion of modes of 
production in South Asia stressed the continued importance of the 
debate in the analysis of underdevelopment. In an Africanist 
review, almost ell authors argue the paradise has provided little 
conceptual clarity, providing few real advances over the various 
components of the peasant debate (Jewsiewicki and Letourneau 
1985). This reflects the continuing controversies over the debate 
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and the 'challenge' Africa has presented to the approach -- 
paradox, in that some of its earliest and most influential 
exponents were Africanists. The debate began among Africanist 
anthropologists over the proper analysis of pre-colonial African 
societies. The best known analysts posited three distinct HOPs in 
pre-colonial Africa: the 'lineage' HOP (Neillassoux 1960; Terray 
1972; Rey 1973), the 'tributary' HOP (Kimble 1985), and the 
'African' MOP (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1978). 8 
Of greater interest to an analysis of twentieth century 
development questions is Ray's (1973) attempt to delineate a theory 
of the 'articulation' of NOPs. He argues we must analyze 'social 
formations' (usually coterminous with society, country, or polity) 
by analysing the articulation of MOP' within them. Articulation is 
borrowed from Althusser and refers to the combination of two or 
more KOPs (or parts - 'instances' - of one HOP) in a given concrete 
situation. An HOP is an abstract concept; a social formation is 
the concrete reality of the effects of a multitude of MOP,. Rey 
argues that capitalism could only arise from feudalism because of 
the common interests of the old feudal and young bourgeois classes 
in preserving ground rent as a means of removing the peasantry from 
the means of production. In any situation other than European 
feudalism, the interests of the dominant classes in the pre-
colonial MOP will differ from those of the bourgeoisie. 
87or criticisms of the lineage NOP, which lies at the heart of the other two, see O'Laughlin (1977) and Harris (1984) an Neillassoux (1981) and Nolyneux (1977) on Torrey (1972). All these critics focus on the analysts failure to provide a more central role for women in their schema. 
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Thus, capitalism does not easily and automatically replace 
other HOPs as it expands around the globe. Instead, when 
capitalism in the form of imperialism entered Africa and contacted 
pre-capitalist HOP, a three-stage process began (see Faster-Carter 
1978, 218). First, capitalism and pre-capitalist HOPs simply 
connect in the sphere of exchange, which 'reinforces' the pre-
capitalist mode; then capitalism 'takes root,' subordinating the 
pre-capitalist modes to it but not destroying them; finally 
capitalism completely destroys the pre-capitalist modes. 
Hey suggests the Third Vorld is currently in the second phase 
of this transition; I will examine this phase to ferret out 
implications of ley's analysis for development issues. Foster-
Carter (1978, 226) asks, show then to tell whether capitalism is 
dominant, has 'taken root'?' The question is central to assessing 
the HOP framework's utility for analyzing development issues, in 
that households subordinated to pre-capitalist or capitalist HOPs 
would presumably have different reproduction processes and 
therefore different goals, levels of integration into the market, 
and responses to policy. Rey, unfortunately, does not provide a 
clear-cut answer. de argues that violence is necessary to 
subordinate pre-capitalist HOPs to capitalism, and suggests that 
transitional' NOPs will arise. 9 Foster-Carter (1978, 226) 
9He has been criticized on both issues by Foster-Carter and Bradby (1975) for generalizing the need for violence based on his own case-study of Congo-Brazzaville and for bringing in transitional NOPs, making his argument appear similar to the colonial' MOP theories of Alavi (1975) and Banaji (1972). 
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suggests capitalism takes root when capitalist relations of 
production are generalized, but notes this presents ley with a 
circular argument (not to mention the added definitional problem of 
'generalized'. Geschiere tries to save the problem using Marx's 
concept of 'formal' vs. 'real" subsumption of labor to capital. 
Harz argued that labor is 'formally' ,subordinated to capital when 
capitalist production processes pre-dominate, but that it is not 
'really' subordinated until capital can interfere in the technical 
aspects of production, fully controlling labor's access to the 
means of production. Gitschiere argues that only at this point does 
a liven class's domination 'take root in the production process' 
(1985, 87)• 10 If we accept this as the relevant criterion. then 
Rey's suggestion that Africa is in stage two is false: clearly, 
capitalist relations do not fully control technical aspects of 
production or access to the means of production in most of rural 
Africa. 
Other analysts have attempted to move beyond Rey in 
formulating an MOP theory of the transition to capitalism in rural. 
Africa. Volpe (1980a) formulates a framework including 
'restricted' and 'extended' HOP. in which the reproduction of the 
former is dependent on the latter. We could thus argue that 
capitalism takes root when various pre-capitalist MOP remnants 
depend on it for their reproduction. According to Kimble (1985). 
Volpe conceptualizes restricted NOPs as 'productive enterprises.' 
102017, in his more recent work (1979), has also adopted the 'formal' vs. 'real' distinction, but has applied it only to relations =him the lineage MOP, not to relations between HOPs. 
63 
Analyzing the reproduction of these restricted MOPs thus requires 
an analysis of the productive enterprises of a given political 
economy. In short, Volpe 's framework requires an analysis of 
household reproduction when applied to smallholder agriculture. 
Liable (1985) goes an to suggest that we must analyze the 'key 
economic institution' to identify the dominant !OP in a given 
situation. This key institution is that institution upon which the 
domination of the production processes 'pertinent to the 
appropriation of surplus labor' rests. She uses an analysis of the 
tributary MOP to illustrate her approach, an MOP particularly 
useful to her since the identification of control of surplus labor 
is rather obvious. In other forms of peasant agriculture, 
including most of those in modern Africa, this identification would 
be extremely difficul,.. 
The recent review of the MOP approach in Africa was almost 
unremittingly critical because of the vexing definitional problems 
I have outlined. Clarence-Smith (1985) suggests the concept 'mode 
of production' is only useful as an abstract model to pose 
interesting questions., while Hitching (1985) argues that it is just 
such an approach that makes the entire MOP debate impossible to 
resolve and unhelpful to empirical research. He suggests that 
everything MOP analysis has provided could have been achieved more 
easily and quickly without the HOP baggage itself. Even when 
definitions of an MOP and articulation are clear, the question of 
'taking root' is crucial and extremely difficult to answer. 
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Perhaps the clearest focus is Volpe's use of 'restricted' vs. 
'extended' BOPs, though these terms seem unnecessary for analyzing 
smallholder households. in that his framework leads directly to the 
concrete issue of household reproduction which does not require the 
abstract MOP terminology. 
As Kitching suggests, we must question whether the HOP 
approach has improved upon the peasant debate. The best empirical 
analyses derived from the effort take the framework as a general 
reference point, perhaps to ferret out a set of interesting 
questions, and then leave the theoretical abstractions behind as 
they proceed with useful empirical analysis (see Cliffe 19771 
Dejean 1985; Beinart 1983). Indeed an earlier paper by Kitching 
(1977). and Bennholdt-Thomsen (1982) in a very different way. 
suggest that all a 'mode of production' analysis requires is the 
recognition of the critical impact of the expansion of 
international capitalism on peasant producers, a position that 
returns us to the peasant debate, simply referring to the 
international economy as the 'capitalist HOP.' It seems the level 
of abstraction in which the HOP debate is placed, which exacerbates 
the definitional and terminological problems, does not provide us 
with any signficant additional insights into smallholder 
development questions. As Foster-Carter notes, 'modes of 
production are not the subject of history, so neither should they 
be the subject of sentences' (1978, 218). I can analyze 
smallholder development without the use of the HOP concepts. so 
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they vill not constitute the subject of sentences in this work. 
An alternative structuralist framework is the debate over the 
notion of 'simple commodity production' . (SCP). Drawing on Ennev, 
Blast and Tribe's (1977) distinction between 'peasantry' as a 
descriptive category and analytical. categories, the SCP approach 
attempts to formulate a logically rigorous analysis of what most 
people refer to as 'peasant' households. Simple commodity 
production is conceptuakized as a 'form' of production (Bernstein 
1977; Friedmann 1980) rather than a mode of production. The 
former, in contrast to the Latter, requires only an analysis of 
actual production processes themselves, thus keeping the argument 
at a much lover and more useful level of abstraction. 
Friedmann (1980) provides the most rigorous and thorough 
delineation of SC?, contrasting it to the peasant or 'natural' 
economy that she assumes logically preceded it." The latter is 
based on reciprocal kinship ties, the ability to limit market 
involvement via these institutions, and subsistence production 
goals. in contrast, pure SCP consists of dependence on marketed 
production for household reproduction, continued family labor use, 
and complete factor mobility in the rural political economy. The 
transition from the natural economy to SCP depends on the 
development of factor mobility in the rural economy, in turn 
depending on peasant resistance to commoditization." 
"Again, see Bates (1984) for a critique of the application of such 'pure' forms of the natural economy idea to pre-capitalist Africa. 
12Smith (1985) questions the necessity of destroying communal institutions, particularly labor relations, for creating SC?. This 
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Bernstein (1977, 1979) is the only direct application of this 
approach to Africa. Be presents a model that includes elements of 
the natural economy within an argument supporting SCP to understand 
smallholder African households. Be argues that the spread of 
commodity relations destroyed the pre-colonial natural economy, 
Leading to the predominance of SCP and the dependence of household 
reproduction on the market. However, he suggests that a 
'subsistence logic' continues to influence simple commodity 
producers because they produce to meet 'the needs of simple 
reproduction.' rather than to accumulate. This allows the state to 
apply a 'simple reproduction squeeze': smallholders, when faced 
with deteriorating terms of trade, respond by expanding production 
and intensifying self-exploitation in order to meet subsistence 
needs. The process continues today, as smallholders and the state 
struggle over control of the labor process (and. I would suggest, 
the reproduction process). 13 
This analysis, however, presents an excessive dichotomy 
between simple commodity producers and capitalists. Chevalier 
shows that the availability of wage labor opportunities and 
point is well-taken, in that throughout Africa pre-colonial institutions have been mobilizad to expand marketed production, as I noted earlier. See Shenton and Lennihan (1981) for an excellent analysis of how such communal institutions are in fact preserved in form only, with their content being fully based on market calculations. 
135oosen (1979) makes a very similar argument within his conceptualization of a petty commodity HOP. Bernstein's Analysis is more useful principally because it avoids the MOP level of abstraction. 
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purchasable subsistence goods causes smallholders to calculate on a 
market basis the costs and benefits of subsistence vs. 'market' 
4 activity in 'a highly.constricted form of economic maximization' 
that he terms 'maximization without capitalization' (1983, 178). 
Simple commodity producers thus make production decisions like 
other producers in a capitalist economy; their production is 
limited to subsistence only by the relatively low worth of their 
assets. 14 From this we can see the possibility of smallholders 
quickly engaging in 'accumulation' given the opportunity (as they 
did in the early years of West African cocoa production). 
Bernstein's dichotomy between SCP's 'logic of subsistence' and 
capitalist accumulative behavior, then, is one of circumstances, 
not behavioral traits. Smallholder reproduction is oriented to 
subsistence because accumulation is not possible. I suggest that 
understanding the dynamics of simple commodity producers' 
reproduction; and thus their response to state and market stimuli, 
requires a less rigid and pre-ordained analysis of change in the 
reproduction process over time than is implied in Bernstein's 
dichotomy. This would allow us to understand the material 
constraints an response to development policy without resort to 
immutable categories that deny the possibility of rapid 
"This does not imply that smallholders do not take risk into consideration when balancing production of food vs. marketed crops. The marketed crops themselves are produced, according to Bernstein, for subsistence purposes (a 'use-value' orientation) and market risk would clearly enter into a decision calculus, as it does with any rational economic agent in a market economy (though probably weighing more heavily in the calculus of most African smallholders than is typical of others in market economies). 
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transformation. 
The SCP approach provides what may be the best combination of 
analytical. rigor, theoretical coherence: and useful concepts for 
empirical research of any approach I have reviewed. Its concepts 
are at a level of abstraction sufficiently low to allow some type 
of empirical verification or rejection. Bernstein is undoubtedly 
right to reject the pure models outlined by Friedmann, yet this nod 
in the direction of theoretical honesty raises familiar and 
difficult questions. One is the nature of the transition to SC? in 
Africa. Vhy and at what point factor mobility becomes generalized, 
as Friedmann requires, is unclear. She mentions peasant resistance 
as central to variations in the generalization of factor mobility, 
but provides no means of understanding patterns in such variation. 
That is lacking, I suggest, is an understanding of the process of 
transformation in social reproduction that allows the rise of SCP 
in place of communal production. 
A similar analysis is needed to address the thorny question 
of a transition from SCP to fully capitalist production. All 
analysts agree that differentiation is likely within SCP and that 
this logically will lead to capitalist production. However, Kahn 
(1878) argues that the modern neo-colonial state throughout the 
former colonies restricts this natural differentiation process, 
preserving SCP at increasingly low levels of productivity in the 
interests of state classes and international merchant capita1. 15 
'Note the similarity of this argument and Cowen's for Kenya (1977, 1981), though the latter does not explicitly use the HOP or 
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This hypothesis could certainly not be applied wholesale throughout 
Africa, given the huge variation in improving productivity levels 
and in levels of differentiation. Again. understanding its 
applicability for a given situation requires an analysis of social 
reproduction in each case. The SCP approach, then, may provide the 
most useful generalizable theoretical orientation, yet some of its 
key unresolved issues require. as do those of other paradigms, an 
analysis of the dynamics of social reproduction. 
Q1121A1122: 
Social  eproduction and the  agareticel Debate 
The literature on African agrarian development and rural 
political economy is extremely rich. Yet it seems that the major 
debates remain quite unresolved. The three paradigms discussed 
herein provide the three major frameworks within which this very 
diversified debate has been conducted. The developmentalist 
paradigm has unquestionably had the greatest policy impact and 
clearly presents the most practical guidelines for policy 
formulation. However. its 'historical nature and marginalist 
assumptions, under which African smallholders are assumed to be 
unchanging recipients of policy and market signals, do not allow it 
to analyze adequately the effects of market integration and 
political subordination on the ability of households to respond to 
even well-designed policy. The underdevelopment paradigm and 
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subsequent peasant debate bring to the field needed historical 
analysis, but fail to provide any explanatory logic underlying the 
myriad variations in historical transformations delineated. The 
structuralist Marxists have attempted to correct this shortcoming, 
only to move too far in the direction of analytical abstraction and 
clear categorization. Even the SCP model, certainly the most 
empirically useful within the structuralist paradigm. assumes • 
uniformity and universality of activity that is difficult to 
reconcile with the diversity identified by the peasant debate. 
In an effort to provide an analytical tool that can be 
utilized for empirical research. while also providing some means of 
comparative analysis and broader explanation of change. / offer the 
construct of the social reproduction of the rural household as 
delineated in Chapter 1. Using social reproduction as an 
analytical tool through which to examine the rural political 
economy does not excessively limit the rich diversity experienced 
by African rural societies integrated into the market economy. 
Instead, it suggests an inductive approach, attempting to identify 
specific processes of social reproduction in rural Africa and then 
apply thee as broadly as is feasible. This recognizes that no 
single pattern will apply throughout the continent, and that 
description of infinite diversity allows neither theoretical 
progress nor practical policy suggestions. An approach based on 
social reproduction begins without the a priori assumptions either 
that the peasantry has been destroyed or that it is viable and 
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expanding: it does not limit the reproduction process to specific 
categories or dichotomies. 
This thesis is an attempt to apply this framework, analyzing 
a specific pattern of int:a-household resource allocation that 
identifies a clear process of social reproduction. I claim neither 
the universality of the developmentalist models nor the historical 
specificity of the peasant study. Instead, I hope the approach 
identifies a clear process that can be applicable, with slight 
modifications, to a wide area of Kenya and East Lfrica, at least. 
Beyond this, focussing an social reproduction requires and 
therefore provides a careful empirical analysis of agricultural 
production itself. within the broader and usually conscious process' 
of household reproduction. This analysis of production, both 
necessary and beneficial to the social reproduction framework, can 
then be used to make specific policy recommendations in specific 
cases. Like PSR, a focus on social reproduction includes 
examination of non-farm and non-economic phenomena of importance to 
production. Unlike !SR, however, fully analyzing social 
reproduction as I have conceptualized it requires a historical 
analysis of the transformation from one reproduction model to 
another. This focuses the analysis on ongoing change in the rural 
political economy, at least partially independent of the effects of 
current development policy, and may provide an ability both to 
recognize the limits within which policy must operate and predict, 
at least tentatively, likely future trends with which policy must 
SCP frameworks. 
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deal. 
The concept of social reproduction will also provide, I 
suggest, a useful theoretical construct that can be used to assist 
in solving some of the remaiming theoretical questions involving 
African political economy. While MOP was far too abstract to be of 
analytical utility, social reproduction focuses on real empirical 
entities -- rural households -- and attempts to understand their 
underlying structure. It thus has clear empirical referents and 
application. It also provides, however, the possibility of 
establishing a 'landfill of clear patterns, applicable to wide areas 
of the continent, that can reduce the dizzying diversity uncovered 
by the peasant debate. This might assist in making broader but 
empirically faithful generalizations about the nature of socio-
economic differentiation and rural class formation. Indeed, as I 
Suggested in Chapter 1 and will demonstrate below, rural class 
formation in peasant societies is an aspect of the transformation 
of social reproduction processes. An ability to analyze clearly 
differentiation and possible class formation in a framework of 
comparative application may well be the most important contribution 
of the social reproduction framework, in that these questions are 
central both to the theoretical debate on African rural political 
economy and the policy debate on improving productivity and 
therefore rural incomes. 
CHAPTER 3 
gistorical Background: 
Wage Labor and Agriculture  
la_bann 
To lay out the essential historical background to the present 
study, I need not present a full history of Kenya from colonial 
domination to the present. It is essential, however, to address 
the key factors that arose during the colonial era creating and 
shaping straddling throughout the high-intensity agricultural areas 
of the country. The development of straddling throughout Kenya, 
focussing on the history of the market economy, wage labor, and 
African agricultural production and development is the subject of 
this chapter. 
1895-1911 
Kenya took an its unusual character as a settler colony when 
British authorities searched for a viable economic base for the 
Uganda Railway, which was begun in Mombasa an the Indian Ocean in 
1895 and ran through the heart of what became Kenya to Kampala, 
Uganda, the 'crown jewel' of British Africa. The long stretch of 
railway through militarily 'pacified' but economically independent 
African territory required some type of cargo to pay for itself. 
Settlers from the UK and South Africa were seen as a solution that 
73 
74 
would provide bath export crops to haul to Mombasa and demand for 
imports to haul into the interior. 
The British crown as early as the 1890s began declaring 
'unoccupied' Kenyan land Crown land. This vas passed on to White 
settlers as an initial inducement for settling. What land remained 
became Native Reserves and all Africans were soon required to live 
within these areas unless employed or accompanying an employee 
elsewhere. Having very limited capital, the early settlers found 
it difficult to develop their land and soon came to depend on 
African, mostly Kikuyu, squatters, who were given use rights to 
pieces of settler land in exchange for a limited amount of labor on 
the settlers' enterprises. As settler agriculture began to develop 
and the number of settlers increased, short-term migrant labor from 
the Native Reserves was added to squatter labor and would 
eventually become the dominant form of labor mobilization in the 
colony. 
The perseverance of these two forms of labor throughout the 
colonial period can be tied directly to the economic benefits they 
provided the settlers, the colonial state itself, and eventually 
multi-national corporations. 'Both systems, migrant and squatter. 
transferred a large share of the costs of reproducing and 
maintaining human labour power to the labourer himself; that is, 
Labour was paid less than the minimal cost of its reproduction' 
(Stichter 1982, 25-27). With the laborer's family continuing to 
provide the bulk of family subsistence through farming either on 
squatter land or in the Reserve, the employer was not required to 
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pay a wage needed to support an entire family. For this system to 
function, however, the land per capita ratio in the Reserves had to 
be maintained at a certain level. If too low, families would not 
be able to meet their subsistence needs; if too high, men would 
have no incentive to search for wage labor opportunities (5tichter 
1982. 28). Thus, land management and migrant labor were intimately 
connected. 
By 1905, the nascent settler community had become something 
of a political force in colonial politics and, through the 1905 
Land Committee, successfully argued that the Native Reserves should 
be limited to their contemporary size, allowing adequate sustenance 
for this population while freeing future population growth for 
migrant labor, thus maintaining a downward pressure on wages Miff 
1974, 98-99). The boundaries set then, with little change, became 
those that would endure until independence. 
Inducing migrant labor from the Reserves initially required 
more than simply alienating land. As long as basic subsistence was 
not threatened, and prior to the widespread introduction of 
imported consumer goods, Africans had no reason to desire a 
monetary income. Frequently, the colonial state turned to brute 
force, requiring a particular African region to provide a certain 
number of laborers, especially for construction of public works. 
This would continue to varying degrees throughout the colonial era 
for public works, though for private settler purposes, the colonial 
state turned to taxation as a more efficient and seemingly more 
humane inducement. A hut tax was passed in 1901, requiring each 
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sale household head to pay in colonial currency a tax for each hut 
he owned. In 1910, in response to Africans limiting the number of 
huts they built, a Poll Tax was added, applicable to every able-
bodied male over the age of 15. Both taxes were consciously 
enacted to encourage labor migration to settler estates (Stichter 
1982, 34-35). 
Migrant labor gained its first systemization with the Native 
Ordinance of 1912, establishing the ekipande° system under which 
all Africans were required to carry an identity pass that stated 
which Reserve they must reside in and their current and past 
employment. The act also allowed up to 50 days per year per person 
in compulsory labor on public works of interest to the colonial 
state, and an additional 24 days per person on 'tribal' works such 
as roads and dams within the Reserves (Stichter 1982, 38). 
Stichter and Bay both argue that initially force or the 
threat of compulsory labor on public works, rather than taxation, 
was the greatest inducement to migrate. Settlers were barred from 
directly recruiting labor in the Reserves, but paid recruiting 
agents were allowed to do so. The latter masqueraded as colonial 
officials to force recruitment, with the implicit consent of the 
local colonial administration. In many cases, chiefs were paid by 
the recruiters to provide a given number of 'voluntary' recruits 
(Stichter 1982, 38; Hay 1972, 161-64). In 1920, the compulsory 
Labor laws were amended to allow exemption for men who had worked 
three of the past 12 months an a settler estate, providing a 
further inducement to avoid compulsory labor via better-paying 
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estate labor (Volff 1974, 124-25). 
Initial African response to taxation did not fully comply 
with settler labor needs. The settler estates and rail workers 
provided African farmers a market and the tax an incentive to sell 
grain. In Nyanza Province, the initial colonial granary, maize 
export vas substantial and expanding from 1909 on. The other 
principal population center, the Kikuyu Reserve, provided grain. 
hides and later wattle to the nearby Nairobi market. According to 
colonial reports, Africans initiated this marketed production to 
pay their taxes without resorting to migrant labor (Kitching 1980, 
25-32). This did not occur only in areas where it was 
agriculturally unfeasible, such as the more marginal areas of 
Nyanza Province or those more distant from the rail or estates (say 
1972, 165). 	The result was a labor crisis as early as 1909 and a 
continously inadequate labor supply an settler estates until Vend 
War I (Stichter 1982, 41; Wolff 1974, 104-10). 
This rapid expansion of grain production was in part produced 
by the initial adoption of maize, which began to be integrated into 
the previous sorghum/millet agricultural regime as early as the 
1890s in western Kenya (Nay 1972, 97). Cotton and other new cash 
crops were also introduced in the early years of colonial rule. 
Colonial policy from 1907 encouraged cotton production in Nyanza 
Province to feed newly established cotton gins there and in Uganda 
(which had produced the crop for some time). Due to low prices 
and conflicts with labor demands for subsistence crops, grain 
export far exceeded cotton through World War I in the area (Fearn 
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1961. 78-80; klila 1984, 16-17). Along with these new crops, the 
iarly period saw the introduction of new iron-blade hoes that were 
rapidly adopted prior to World War I as labor-saving devices (Hay 
,1972. 149). 
The effects of this Incorporation of rural society into a 
market economy were complex. Clearly, the system removed some 
labor from African agriculture, but this was rarely the most 
productive labor, being Chiefly young, unmarried men who provided 
the least input Into pre-colonial agriculture. The new crops and 
technology allowed a significant Increase in marketed production. 
which Witching argues reflected an increase In total production, In 
that Africans had neither the need nor desire to decrease food 
production In order to increase cash crop production at this early 
date. Indeed, he suggests that maize was a more popular crop than 
cotton because it served as both a food and cash crop. Increased 
production allowed the development of African-controlled retail 
trade by 1916 in Kikuyu areas and soon thereafter elsewhere 
(Witching 1980, 14-21 and 32). 
While the further development of migrant labor would put 
pressure on women's labor time. Witching suggests that this early 
period should be characterized simply as one in which underutilized 
male labor was absorbed and employed, resulting In large Increases 
in production in much of the colony. (Labor was underutilized in 
part because colonial conquest largely nullified the juridical, 
political and military role men of all ages played in their 
societies, thus freeing substantial amounts of time for more 
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'productive' labor.) World War I violently disrupted this system, 
forcing large numbers of African into the military or the carrier 
corps and many others into migrant labor on settler estates 
producing food for the war effort. It showed the colonial regime 
the great wealth of labor that could be mobilized for colonial 
purposes (Wolff 1974, 104-110), but took a heavy toll an Kenya's 
'human capital.' At least half of the man returning home from the 
Carrier Corps were reported as not 'fit for hard work again for a 
long time' (Alila 1984, 28). 
1919-1940  
The post-war period began with an almost immediate crisis in 
the migrant labor system. The general and rapid demobilization of 
the Carrier Corps following the Armistice coincided with widespread 
famine in 1918-1919. The large numbers of men unable to engage in 
wage labor upon demobilization and the death and disease toll of 
the famine (conservatively estimated at the time at 155,000) 
produced a severe labor shortage by 1919. Settler coffee growers 
lost half of their crop due to lack of labor; essential services in 
Nairobi were 252 short of necessary labor levels (Van Zvanenberg 
1975, 104-113). It was in this situation that the colonial 
Governor issued instructions to encourage chiefs to increase labor 
recruitment, resulting in widespread use of force. Chiefs provided 
laborers in exchange for small gifts, or on direct order from the 
District Commissioner. Reaction, led by the Anglican church, 
against what was seen as a return to forced labor was swift and 
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strong outside the settler community. The Governor modified his 
circular, couching it in more humanitarian language, but the 
essential labor recruitment system stayed the same, varying 
slightly by district depending an the procedures of local officials 
(Volff 1974, 102-103 and 122). 
In 1920 tames an Africans were doubled to encourage labor 
migration. This lad to the famous 'ThUku riots' of 1922, the first 
Large-scale demonstration against colonial rule since 
'pacification' was achieved. In 1922, the tam was slightly 
lowered, though remained nearly double what it had been prior to 
1920 Man Zwanenborg 1975, 76-77). Customs on imported consumer 
items commonly purchased by employed Africans were also doubled to 
20% in 1921. The combination of increased tames and customs, while 
unskilled wages increased only slightly by the end of the decade, 
resulted in an estimated half of African earnings going to tames 
and duties and an overall decline in disposable income during the 
1920, (Wolff 1974, 118-119). The combined effect was • steady 
increase in the estimated percentage of adult African men engaged 
in migrant labor, from 202 in 1922 to 272 in 1926 before the trend 
reversed as Kenya headed toward the Great Depression. The 
percentages in the heaviest labor-exporting districts were much 
higher, being 302 in 1925 and reaching 401 by 3.930 (Kitching 1980, 
249-251). 
The Depression hit the Kenyan economy hard, chiefly by drying 
up the settlers' export markets. Wages declined by 40% from 1929- 
1935 and overall African employment dropped back to what it had 
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been in the early 1920s (Stichter 1982, 95). The shrinking 
internal grain market resulted in declining grain prices. which 
should have resulted in m decline of African marketed production. 
This, however, was not the case. Colonial taxes remained 
unchenged, requiring Africans to, at a minimum, sell enough grain 
to pay their taxes. Also, &itching shows that the price of 
livestock declined faster than the price of grain. so Africans. 
many of whoa could no longer find employment outside the Reserves, 
increased grain production to pay taxes and buy livestock (Kitching 
1980, 58-59). Repatriation of labor and intensification of grain 
production greatly increased pressure an land. In Western Kenya, 
double cropping -- growing two grain crops per year where the 
rainfall pattern permitted -- was initiated during the Depression 
(Iitching 1960. 88). while in Kikuyu areas fallow periods fell from 
8 . 10 years to 1 years (Stichter 1982, 99). As employment 
rebounded in the late 19301, it appears that the increasingly 
common absence of men began to affect women adversely, as they were 
required to take an a substantially increased share of agricultural 
Labor (Hay 1972, 229-31; titChing 1980. 89). 
Colonial policy toward African agriculture began to take 
discernable shape in the early 1920s. As early as 1920, the 
colonial state began to see the importance of developing African 
agriculture, even though this might directly conflict with settler 
labor demands. Noting this possible conflict, the 1920/21 
Department of Agriculture report nevertheless set a goal of 
increasing African production of export crops (Alila 1984, 19), 
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This translated into a serious push to increase cotton production 
from 1923 onward; falling prices, however, resulted in stagnant 
production (Pea= 1964, 72-76). In fact, colonial efforts, though 
taken seriously by the Agriculture department, had a limited effect 
in the Reserves. The first Agricultural Officers were posted in 
the Reserves in 1923 and even in the 1930. there were only a 
handful to provide services to over one million peasant families. 
The great bulk of resources for agriculture were allocated to 
settler farming. Most importantly, to limit competition with 
settler production. Africans were not allowed to cultivate the most 
Lucrative export crop: coffee (Smith 1976, 116-17; klila, 1984, 
19-20). 
Despite an ineffective development policy, marketed African 
grain production continued to expand throughout the 19201 from the 
Kikuyu Reserve and from Nyanza (Litaint' 1980, 33-39). Alongside 
this, local retail trade became more generalized as the colonial 
pattern of African state employees investing in trade began to 
develop (Hay 1972, 176-177; Stichter 1982, 106-107). In the most 
heavily effected Kikuyu Reserve, land sales began as tenure became 
individualized by the Late 19200 and harvest failures resulted in 
loss of land for some families (X.it:king 1980, 290-292). 
The return of labor to the Reserves and subsequent 
intensification of agriculture during the 1930. forced the colonial 
government to give greater attention to African agriculture than it 
had previously. '11317 the 1930s, there was one overwhelming 
problea which the colonial authorities could no longer ignore, and 
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that was the rapidly growing African population...Creating 
'Landless' people in some areas and causing soil depletion in 
others...' (Smith 1976, 120). The government thus began the first 
semi-comprehensive agricultural development efforts. attempting to 
practice soil conservation and destocking, both of which had 
Limited effects. Beyond this, a 4 Long-range development programme 
for native agriculture' was launched in which economic zones in the 
Reserves were identified, staff size was increased by as such as 
SOK. the Jaen hoe was consciously spread farther, and renewed 
efforts were made to encourage export crops such as cotton, wattle 
and other tree crops (Alila 1984, 29-31; Ray 1972, 194-200; 
Kitching 1980, 102). The result vas increased production of tree 
crops which required very little labor and could be intercropped 
with grain, further adoption of the labor-saving iron hoe, and even 
a slight increase in cotton production despite stagnant to falling 
prices. The problem that remained, however, was population 
pressure on land and declining soil fertility (Kitching 1980, 103- 
105; Hay 1972, 200). 
On the eve of World Tar II, migrant labor and/or cash 
cropping was firmly entrenched as a significant part of many 
households reproductive cycle. K.itching regards 'the late 
twenties and the thirties as the crucial time when the essential 
parameters of socio-economic differentiation among households were 
laid down,' as those with access to better-paid off-farm positions 
invested in education for their children to perpetuate their 
advantages (1980, 146 and 277). In the more extreme cases, such as 
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Central Nyanza, lack of agricultural. opportunities resulted in 
Africans' 'conviction that labor export was the most profitable 
allocation of resources and certainly the most secure' Hay 1972, 
231). The questions left open are: 1) did Africans engage in 
migrant labor solely to provide subsistence in the face of the 
demands of colonial taxation and declining agricultural 
productivity, or mere they able to use migrant labor as a means of 
accumulation and socio-economic advance; and 2) what was the 
overall effect of this on African agriculture? 
To understand the degree to which migrant labor was an 
opportunity for accumulation rather than simply a means of survival 
would require complete data an African earnings per household vs. 
taxes, marketed agricultural production (as an alternative source 
of cash), and other uses of off-farm income. Such data do not 
exist, but the historical record provides sporadic information from 
which a tentative answer can be gleaned. First, it is clear that 
for those households in vhiCh at least one man had a better-paid 
off-farm position, some accumulation was possible. While annual 
taxes remained at Ube. 12 per man over 16 and per hut, earnings 
for the skilled employee averaged 30 to 60 shillings per month from 
1920 to 1940. Since these better-paid positions also tended to be 
more stable, most men would have worked all or most of each year, 
allowing them to pay their tax, even for the head of a large 
household, with a fraction of their annual income (and this does 
not include cash generated by farm sales) (Bitching 1980, 277). 
Hitching thus concludes that this group vas the basis of a wealthy 
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strata of rural society, dependent an relatively well paid off-farm 
positions, whose descendents continue in such positions today. 
For the majority of migrant laborers, however, wages varied 
from 6 to 14 shillings per month. Tares, especially for a large 
household with several huts (usually implying several wives) and/or 
several unmarried adult sons. could thus consume a significant 
portion of off-farm income. If a man worked on a more or less 
permanent basis, however, and if marketed agricultural production 
could provide additional cash, even unskilled migrant labor might 
provide some surplus. A key part of the question is not only wages 
per month, but number of months each wage earner worked per year. 
This is a matter of some dispute. Stichter and Fearn suggest that 
through the 1930s, migrant labor was largely seasonal, as young men 
worked an European estates in the off-season of the African 
agricultural cycle, returning home to help in essential 
agricultural tasks when needed (Fears 1964, 103; Stichter 1982, 84- 
89). Say, however, suggests that in Nyanza even in this early 
period men were engaging in long-term migration, the majority 
staying away for 13-20 years (1972, 172). Her argument is 
accepted and supported by Kitching. who states there is no evidence 
to support the seasonal, 'target worker thesis (1980, 233). 
To support her argument, Stichter presents the most 
comprehensive data on monthly labor recruitment and service from 
1916 to 1930, showing that variations in recruitment coincide with 
variations in the local agricultural cycle. However, her data show 
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this variation to be never greater than 102 and often less than 52 
(1982, 87-88). It is difficult to believe that the agricultural 
cycle controlled migrancy and yet affected only 10% of those 
working. It seems that the majority of workers, as Hay and 
Hitching argue, were long-term migrants. The slight seasonal 
variation perhaps reflects migration of second men from a given 
household, migrating in the off-season but staying home when needed 
while their brothers or fathers remained in migrancy year-round. 
If this is the case, it at least raises the possibility that a 
surplus for attempted accumulation might have been generated Via 
migrancy. Whether a given household could accumulate in this way 
depended on the number of migrants, length of migrancy and how they 
invested or consumed the off-farm income they controlled, subjects 
the case study will examine in the following chapter. 
The effect of increased migration on African agriculture is 
also a matter of dispute among economic historians. Stichter 
argues that the 1920e saw the peripheralization of African 
agriculture and ties this directly to increased labor export. She 
bests this an data showing declining African agricultural exports, 
suggesting that domestic markets could not compensate for declining 
exports (1982, 74-80). Hitching, on the other hand, suggests that 
production continued to expand through the 1920s. He and Hay both 
argue that to 1930, migrant labor had little negative impact on 
African agriculture because women and non-migrant men were able to 
increase their labor time and employ new tools (the iron hoe) and 
new crops (maize, groundnuts, tree crops) to increase productivity 
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(Kitching 1900, 35-50; Hay 1972, 173-74). Kitching cites various 
references by colonial officials and oral evidence of continual 
agricultural expansion. but Could find no hard data to support his 
claim. Stichter, however, provides some data herself to support 
Kitching's argument, showing that in Central Province non-export 
crap production continually increased and in Nyanza it did so by 
and large, except during a 1926-27 drought. She discounts the 
effects of the drought and sticks to her argument, but once again, 
the combined evidence seems to support Kitching and Hay. All agree 
that African agricultural production, especially its marketed 
component, expanded throughout the Great Depression. 
The interwar years. as Kitching notes, provided a 'unique 
opportunity0 access to better-paid off-farm income, which formed 
the basis of modern socio-economic differentiation in rural Kenya 
(1980, 279). Those who gained access to this income and invested 
it wisely became the founders of the modern Kenyan elite, urban and 
rural. For the majority, however, migrant labor provided a means 
of paying colonially imposed taxes and perhaps achieving relatively 
minor levels of accumulation. The rise and expansion of migrant 
labor and cash cropping by the end of the Depression signified the 
transition from social reproduction independent of the market to 
social reproduction that was quite dependent on the market The 
outline of what I have termed straddling clearly began to emerge in 
the interwar period. Its full development awaited a number of 
significant economic and political changes that were to occur in 
the aftermath of World Tar I/. 
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1940-1963  
World War II was a great boon to Kenya, both to the settler 
and the African. War demands, particularly for foodstuffs, 
resulted in increased production and employment an settler estates 
and increased marketed maize production by Africans In the 
Reserves. It also provided incentives for mechanization of settler 
agriculture, which in the long run would significantly alter the 
migrant labor system. Alongside this, the economic boom increased 
demand for skilled Labor from Africans, shifting the structure of 
wages and skill composition of African labor upward while widening 
the gap between permanently employed skilled Africans and less 
secure. lower paid unskilled labor. 
The Increase in skill composition of the labor force began 
during the war and continued unabated throughout the following 
decade. The war-time and post-war economic boom provided an 
incentive for both increased mechanization of settler agriculture 
and the Introduction of significant multinational Industrial 
capital into Nairobi. Skilled and semi-skilled workers (artisans, 
mechanics, etc.) increased their share of the work force from under 
122 in 1942 to 192 in 1948. Conversely, unskilled labor; both 
agricultural and non-agricultural, decreased from 722 to 64% 
(Stidhter 1982, 116). The trend seems to have continued throughout 
the rest of the colonial era. In Nairobi, skilled and semi-skilled 
labor increased from 272 of the workforce in 1953 to 47i In 1957 
(Collier and Lal 1986, 61). Though the Nairobi labor force was 
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undoubtedly of higher skill composition than the rest of the 
country, the trend seams to have been widespread. 
The increasingly skilled labor force reflected a pattern of 
labor stabilization. Turnover rates, particularly in the 
industrial sector, declined significantly in the post-war period as 
mechanization and productivity increased. Wages simultaneously 
increased dramatically. by 90% from 1940 to 1954 and doubling from 
1955 to 1964 (Stichter 1982. 130-145). However, this wage increase 
was not shared equally. From the beginning of World War II, real 
wages for the unskilled are estimated to have declined almost 
continuously to 1954. leading Stichter to conclude that the 
increase in average wages accrued principally to skilled and semi-
skilled labor. Kitching shows that in 1936 a skilled artisan 
earned twice the salary of an unskilled laborer; by 1945 the ratio 
had doubled, with artisans earning four times their unskilled 
brethren (1980, 120). As wages improved among skilled workers, 
who were principally in the formal sector of the economy, the 
percentage of the potential male labor force employed in that 
sector declined, from 26.92 in 1948 to 24.22 in 1962. The trend 
for the era, then, was of a declining percentage of the potential 
labor pool employed in the formal sector, increasing skill 
composition, and increasing wage differentials based on skill. 
This continued throughout the 1950s and 19600 (Colier and LAI 1986, 
59 and 383-392). 
The process of labor stabilization end increasing wage 
differentials, however, did not mean a continuous decline in 
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unskilled earnings. Though unskilled workers' real wages declined 
to 1954, they increased significantly from 1955 to 1964, fueled by 
increases of 55Z in the minimum wage (Stichter 1982, 141-142). The 
issue of government-set minimum wages became important after the 
war, as African unionization and wage demands became a serious 
concern to the authorities and employers alike. In 1946, the 
minimum wage. 'while covering the cost of living of a single adult 
male employee working at unskilled labour would not give him the 
feeling of temple:ant satisfaction in which he would make no effort 
at self-improvement' (Collier and LAI 1986, 41-42). Though it was 
increased in 1947 in response to widespread labor unrest, it 
remained based on the notion of a 'bachelor minimum wage.' In 
other words, it was consciously designed to provide immediate 
support for a single male employee, but not support adequate for an 
entire family, thus assuming that the straddling system would 
support the worker's family. 
In 1953, a major government panel issued a report suggesting 
a new policy for the volatile wage question. Dubbed the 'Carpenter 
Report,' it found that nearly two-thirds of workers in the lowest 
income category could not even provide their urban subsistence on 
the minimum wage and were forced to borrow to survive between 
paychecks. It recommended that all workers should receive a 
'family wage -- sufficient to provide for the needs of an entire 
family (Stichter 1982, 130-136). This, they suggested, would 
enhance the process of labor stabilization already underway, which 
colonial officials viewed as a positive development. mile this 
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has never been accomplished for the majority of workers, the Report 
in the short run did result in significant increases in formal 
sector wages. 
The effects of Labor stabilization, increased wage 
differentials, and rising real wages through the 1950s were 
significant, but did not transform the basic patterns of straddling 
laid down in the pre-war period. Stichter portrays the period as 
one entailing a fundamental shift from a migrant labor system to a 
more stabilized workforce. She notes that a lower turnover rate in 
the 1950s shows that I[e]ven though many full-time workers still 
maintained rural ties and access to plots of land, they now spent 
nearly the whole of their working lives in employment' and argues 
this represents a fundamental shift for arican society, urban and 
rural (1982, 133). The difference between this and the pre-war era 
was probably not as great as she implies. From the perspective of 
social reproduction in the rural political economy, it was mainly a 
difference in the number of jobs a given individual held over his. 
productive lifetime. As noted above, even in the early years the 
best evidence indicates most workers pursued a strategy of working 
as constantly as possible in order to survive and accumulate over 
time. Labor stabilization did not change this fundamental pattern. 
though may have increased workers' security and improved their 
ability to straddle. 
The scant evidence available and my own case study presented 
in the nest chapter show that straddling only fully emerged as this 
relatively stabilized labor force increased its wages and was 
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therefore more able than ever to invest in agriculture and 
education. The Carpenter Report noted that the majority of workers 
remitted only 4.22 of their income in the late 1940s to early 
1950s; by 1957/58 even poorer corkers were remitting 102 of their 
income; by 1970, the vast majority of formal sector employees 
(those earning over 175 shillings per month) were remitting an 
average of 212 of their total income to the rural household 
(Stichter 1982, 146; Kitching 1980, 276). Thus, as Stichter 
concludes, stabilization increased the importance of wage labor in 
African households' reproduction (1982. 147), though she errs in 
suggesting this was a fundamental shift from the pre-war era. 
Rather, it was the full development of a system of social 
reproduction whose outline was evident by the 1920s. 
As the process of labor stabilization proceeded, similar and 
unquestionably more far-reaching changes occurred in African 
agriculture, especially in response to fundamental changes in 
colonial agricultural policy. The chief policy goal of World War 
II was to Jac:wawa ea:hated food production from both settler and 
African producers for the war effort. This led the colonial state 
to intervene in African agriculture to an unprecedented degree, 
including forced cattle sales to enhance meat supply and state 
control aver the maize market to secure grain production (Alila 
1984, 31-34). To encourage African marketed maize production, the 
colonial government established the Maize and Produce Control (HPC) 
as a parastatal organization given a monopoly over the grain market 
of both African and settler producers.' Producer prices for both 
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groups vere technically identical, though a number of ceases were 
placed an African production, resulting in a de facto lover 
producer price than that given to settlers (Pearn 1964. 157-160). 
In spite of this, maize production increased significantly, as 
Africans and settlers responded to the 700% increase in producer 
prices from 1940 to 1952 (Alila 1984. 33-34; Hitching 1980, 152). 
The colonial government used the HFC during and after the var 
as the chief vehicle through vhich it pursued development policy 
toward African agriculture. Part of the cess levied on African 
maize was placed in an 'Agricultural Betterment Fund,' used to give 
rewards to farmers deemed by local agricultural officers to be 
practicing good soil conservation, husbandry, and crop rotation. 
Being selected as a 'better farmer' provided a monetary reward, 
allowed the farmer to sell maize directly to the HPC and thus 
collect the trader's commission himself, and gave access to 
subsidized prices and loans for equipment (Alila 1984, 36; Fearn 
1964, 204-205). In effect, the fund transferred income from the 
average farmer to those vho had adequate land and knowledge to 
pursue .bat the colonial regime considered proper husbandry and 
conservation measures. 
The scheme also fit into the prevailing policy logic of the 
era, which argued that the average African farmer could not and 
should not become purely capitalist. The 'better' or 'progressive' 
ISettler maize was initially marketed through a separate state institution, but was sooan merged with African maize under the umbrella of the HPC. 
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farmers were encouraged to improve their farms, including growing 
coffee under closely supervised conditions in certain districts; 
(Smith 1976, 124). the remainder were encouraged to sell only 
surplus food. Profit maximization. it was argued, would cause the 
average African to misuse his land. resulting in increasing soil 
erosion and declining fertility. 	Lnstead, conservation was 
pursued, by incentive for the °progressive' farmer and by force for 
the remainder: each household was required to provide six days of 
communal labor every three months toward land terracing to prevent 
erosion (Van Zvanenberg and King 1975. 47). 
The post-war policy also involved a substantial increase in 
colonial funds -- 11 million pounds from 1.946 to 1956 -- spent on 
African agriculture (Van Zvanenberg and Xing 1975, 47). An early 
analysis of this period reports that while persuasion techniques 
than undertaken did little to improve African agriculture 
(especially in the face of continued restrictions on cash crop 
production for the vast majority of farmers), forced communal labor 
succeeded in building 'tens of thousands of miles of terraces...on 
overcrowded hillsides...with the policeman standing behind the 
Agricultural Instructor' (Ruthenberg 1966, 6-7). Despite these 
efforts, titching argues persuasively that African smallholding 
still faced the problems in 1952 it had before the war: declining 
yield due to declining soil fertility, restrictions on growing the 
highest value crops, and increasingly unequal land distribution, 
Leading Balmy to conclude off-farm income was a more lucrative 
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pursuit than agriculture (1980, 153-54). 
To solve these growing problems in African agriculture and to 
reduce political tensions surrounding the Kau Mau revolt, colonial 
agricultural policy shifted abruptly in 1.954 with the publication 
of the Swynnerton Plan. At the heart of the plan was a complete 
reversal of the colonial attitude regarding Africans ability to 
maximize agricultural profits without destroying soil fertility. 
Swynnertan argued that improved African agriculture. economic 
growth and political stability required developing an African 
agricultural sector comprised of 600,000 farms of approximately 
equal size, each achieving surplus marketed production valued at 
approximately 100 pounds per year by 1969. This would improve 
customs revenue and the rural Basket for manufactures, absorb 
surplus population. decrease African desire for land in European 
settlement areas, and create an economically prosperous and 
politically stabilizing landed African middle-class. Be recognized 
this would entail the creation of an landless class that would work 
for the landed class and viewed this as a natural outcome in a 
developing economy (luthenberg 1966, 13.14; Smith 1976. 126-127). 
This would all be accomplished by the government creating 
individual, freehold land tenure (replacing what was assumed to be 
dominant -- 'traditional communal' tenure) and allowing Africans to 
grow the lucrative cash crops, principally coffee, previously 
denied them. 
At the time and for many years afterwards, the land tenure 
96 
program was seen as the heart of the Plan. It was assnmed that 
secure freehold tenure was essential to encourage Africans to 
invest in their land to increase long-term productivity, and that 
such tenure represented a significant thane from extant 
'traditional' patterns. In fact, the tenure program had very 
different effects in different districts. In Central Province, the 
Kikuyu homelend, it did in fact radically alter tenure because it 
consolidated fragmented holdings, although individual tenure had 
long been the de facto pattern. In other areas (such as Kisii), 
registration simply codified existing individual tenure. Finally, 
where communal tenure did still exist, registration was a long and 
tortuous process that met with much resistance. In retrospect, the 
tenure program, is seen as less important than the other pillar of 
the Swynnerton Plan: '(lit seems likely that the initial success 
of the Swynnerton Plan was not due to the process of consolidation 
and registration [of land holding] per se, but rather to the final 
removal of restrictions an certain cash crops and the provision of 
the necessary resources to grow them' (Smith 1976, 128). 
The Swynnerton Plan radically altered African agriculture. 
African cultivation of coffee, tea, pyrethrum and dairy-grade 
cattle was freed of colonial restrictions and expanded rapidly. 
From 1958 to 1968 gross smallholder farm revenue increased from 8 
million Kenyan pounds to 34 million (itching 1980, 317). Despite 
these impressive results, the Plan has not produced all the results 
originally intended. This, in part, is due to a misreading of the 
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initial situation, especially in the intensively cultivated areas' 
such as Central Province and Kisii. Svynnerton's initial target of 
600,000 productive farms severely underestimated the number of 
units needed if the smallholder sector vas to re-absorb large 
numbers of urban unemployed. It also failed to consider the future 
effects of population grovth. Ignorance of unequal land 
distribution in the 1950s caused colonial planners to make no 
provision for land redistribution in the tenure program. Without 
this, the goal of 600,000 roughly equal holdings vas an utter 
impossibility, (Smith 1976, 126-127). Indeed, in Central Province 
the initial tenure plans were to identify and register holdings 
over 7.5 acres, considered a minimally adequate size to pursue cash 
crop production profitably. In fact, only 142 of all holdings 
registered in the province met the criterion (Van Zvanenberg and 
Ring 1975, 53). 
By 1970, the results of the plan's failure to recognize the 
severity of its task vere clear. Though the exact extent and 
future trends are in dispute (see Chapter 1), virtually all 
analysts accept that this 'agrarian revolution' has had a limited 
spread and has produced significant inequality. As I will shoe in 
the following chapters, many of those vho were able to adopt the 
new crops did not see their position radically transformed. 
Rather, straddling remained the predominant system of social 
reproduction of rural households, as Kitching indirectly notes: 
*(In the post Svynnerton era] the essential mechanism of using 
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access to large off-farm incomes in order to save and invest in 
land, agricultural production and off-farm busines remained the 
touchstone of accumulation and differentiation (1980,316). The 
auCh-touted agrarian revolution was the culmination of the 
development of straddling, as those with off-farm income began 
investing much more heavily in agriculture and land, in addition to 
education and off-farm business, to increase levels of household 
reproduction. This, rather than the creation of a 'healthy' 
African middle-class farmer, was the outcome of the Svynnerton 
Plan. 
The Post-Independence pe, 
Political independence brought little truly fundamental 
change in the Kenyan political economy, though it did alter the 
pace of various trends begun in the previous decade. The lifting 
of colonial restrictions on African economic activities and the 
enforced Kenyanization of public employment increased the pace of 
trends already underway and accelerated the expansion of straddling 
as the dominant process of social reproduction in the rural 
political economy. This can be seen in employment and wage trends 
in the formal sector, the rise of the 'informal' sector, and 
agricultural performance and policy. 
Perhaps the most significant economic effect of independence 
was the rapid increase in the number of public sector employment 
opportunities for Africans. The rapid expansion of education and 
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the Kenyanization of the-civil service reversed a trend of 
declining numbers of Africans in the public sector that had begun 
in 1955. Africans in- the. publicsector increased their numbers 
from 141.000 in 1963 to 209,000 by 1968 (Collier and Lal 1986, 69). 
Modern, formal sector employment increased at 4.42 per year from 
1964 to 1974, Led by an annual 8.12 increase in the public sector 
(Stichter 1982, 141). Combined with the rapidly growing economy 
(GDP increased at an annual rate of 6.4% from 1964 to 1974), this 
provided significant new opportunities for straddling at relatively 
high levels of income in secure off-farm positions. 
Since 1974, however, the trends have slowly but clearly 
reversed. Overall employment growth has slowed dramatically, 
averaging 3.42 per annum from 1975-1985, significantly below the 
population growth rate of close to 4% por year. Public sector 
employment growth still led the economy. averaging 6.7% from 1977- 
1982 and 4.3% from 1982-1985, but had clearly slowed considerably 
from its earlier rapid pace (Kenya. Sconomic Surveys 1979, 58; 
1983, 56-57; 1986, 35 and 45). Like employment, remuneration rose 
in the heyday of the 1960s and early 1970s, but has stagnateed 
since. Real wages increased on average 4% per annum from 1964 to 
1972 (Stichter 1982, 142), while declining 2% per annum from 1975- 
1985 (Kenya, Iconomic Survey 1979, 58; 1583, 57, 1986, 45). The 
result of this economic slowdown and reduction of non-agricultural 
opportunity has been the rapid expansion of what has been dubbed 
the 'informal sector.' Officially 'discovered' and admitted into 
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policy debate by a 1972 ILO report, the informal sector is a mass 
of non-agricultural economic activity providing both goods and 
services through a myriad of extremely small, often individual or 
family, enterprises that operate without legal sanction and 
continue to be ignored in official economic data. 
The informal sector probably had its origins in the 1950s, as 
colonial restriction' on African movement and economic activities, 
particularly trading, were slowly reduced. It expanded rapidly 
after independence as African entrepreneurs were by and large 
allowed to pursue economic activities and satisfy market demands 
unhampered by government restrictions. Based on the ILO report, 
&itching estimated that by 1969 approximately 252 of all Kenyan men 
earned at least part of their livelihood from this sector (1980, 
399-400) A 1976 survey estimated the sector represented about 322 
of total wage employment and non-agricultural self-employment (Hunt 
1984, 102). The principal participants in the informal sector 
include local beer breweries, services such as small restaurants, 
carpenters, charcoal manufacturers, tailors, cobblers, wood 
carvers. fishermen, and trading establishments, roughly in that 
order of importance. The heads of such enterprises earn a non-
agricultural income three and one-half times that of the official 
minimum rage, while employees in the sector make, on average, only 
one-third of the official minimum (Ghai, Godfrey, and Lisk 1979, 
117 and 120). Thus, it represents a relatively lucrative 
opportunity for the low-skilled but entrepreneurial businessman or 
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woman eh° can establish an informal enterprise, but for the 
majority serves as a poor alternative to the higher-paying formal 
sector. It also represents, as we shall see in Kisii, an outlet 
for the fruition of the straddling model, as those not able to 
straddle in the formal sector pursue the strategy any vay they can 
in the informal arena. 
Available evidence clearly demonstrates that straddling has 
continued and indeed expanded since independence. Continuing the 
post-war trend of labor stabilization, most formal sector employees 
hold a given job for a longer period and tend to spend the vast 
bulk of their productive lives in the urban environment. 
Nevertheless, several studies have shown that approximately half of 
lenyan non-agricultural cage laborers have immediate access to 
agricultural land and most of the rest are due to inherit land at 
some point. Citing these studies, Stichter concludes, *Cpierhaps 
half of Kenya's workers also have a wife or wives and children 
residing on the land, and are separated from them for long periods 
of time' (Stichter 1982, 145). Vorkers of all income levels seem 
to be engaging in straddling, though the particular farm vs off-
farm income mix varies greatly by income level. A 1968 urban 
budget survey found that formal sector corkers earned 93-952 of 
their family incomes from their off-farm positions, while informal 
sector workers earned only 56% of family income from their jobs, 
much of the rest presumably coming from agriculture (Stichter 1982. 
147). 
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This does not necessarily imply that the poor straddle more 
than the wealthy. The more secure and better-paid formal sector 
workers can provide adequate household agricultural productivity 
with a minimal share of their wage (often investing in rural 
businesses or education instead), while the poorer informal 
employees must invest a high portion of their earnings into 
agriculture, which is more important to them than to their formal 
sector compatriots. Data from Central Province show the real value 
of wealthy households' remittances to their rural homes increased 
at a much greater rate from 1963 to 1974 than did those of the 
poorer. Wealthier households' remittance reception climbed 253% 
in real terms, while the poorer majority's remittances increased 
only 3.251 (Collier and Lal 1980, 44). Both among the relatively 
poor and wealthy, straddling appears to have increased since 
independence. Loy levels of remittances by wealthier households do 
not imply a decrease in the straddling pattern; they simply reflect 
the wealthy's greater ability to increase agricultural productivity 
with a small share of their income. The implications of continuing 
straddling for agricultural development remain unclear. 
Agriculture itself has received much more official and 
scholarly attention than has wage labor in the last 25 years. 
Despite this: as Chapter 1 showed, impressive early levels of 
growth have fallen and Kenya faces a Less severe form of the 
'agrarian crisis' afflicting all of Africa. Current response to 
this can only be understood within the historical framework of past 
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Kenyan development policy. The newly independent government 
essentially foliated the Swynnerton Plan and the Lancaster House 
agreement on the transition to Independence. Emphasis was placed 
first and foremost on the various Settlement Schemes transferring 
the former White Highlands to African hands. The settlers and land 
adjudication (which was extended to all agricultural districts) 
received the bulk of government and international investment in 
agriculture (Ley, 1975, 63-102; Leo 1984, 87-120). Smallholder 
coffee and tea production accelerated rapidly, as noted above, the 
latter under a newly created parastatal organization, the Kenya Tea 
Development Authority, with British and World Bank finance. 
Policy emphasis finally began to shift away from the 
Settlment Schemes with the First Five-Year Development Plan of 
1966-1970. In it, the government argued that 'Mt is hardly 
necessary to point out that the potential effect an output of 
investing a given amount of money in the African areas is much 
larger than in the former Scheduled Areas (the former White 
Highlands],' in that s(ilt has been clearly established that 
productivity in the peasant farming sector will respond to economic 
incentives, with the help of agricultural credit and extension 
services.' Consequently, expenditure an settlement and related 
matters was to decline from 78% of agricultural development 
expenditure in 1965 to approximately 50: by 1970, with increased 
expenditure an smallholder credit and land registration making up 
the difference. Credit in particular was viewed as key to 
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smallholder development; the plan spoke of An ambitious world Bank 
funded credit plan that would radically Increase credit 
availability to smallholders (Kenya, Developeent Piga 1966-1970. 
126-127 and 132-133). This followed a World Bank plan outlined in 
their 1962 report an agricultural development in Kenya (Smith 1976, 
131-132). 
Credit was needed, it was suggested, to fuel the adoption of 
the agrarian revolution crops. A significant share of this credit 
was Channeled through the coffee marketing cooperatives and the 
ITDA. Under both, the grower had to provide part of the initial 
investment (crucial to the full development of straddling, as we 
will see in the following chapter), with the rest provided on 
credit by the marketing agency, repayable directly from future crop 
returns. Nothing was provided free of charge other than extension 
advice, which had to be followed precisely in order to secure a 
license to grow and market the crop (Ruthenberg 1966, 19 and 42- 
47). For other crops. the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), 
another parastatal, was to provide smallholder credit. Land 
registration itself came to be viewed as part of the credit 
program, in that the AFC required a land title with a loan 
application (Staudt 1978, 118). As we will see below, with 
experience, credit came to be seen as less and less important to 
the smallholder development effort. 
The first significant agricultural policy innovation of the 
independent government and its international supporters was the 
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Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP), initiated in the late 
1960s. Conceived at an conference of Kenyan development officers, 
international donors, and academics, the SRDP was designed to be an 
innovative, experimental program that would develop and test new 
development project ideas with the aim of creating long-term, 
widely applicable solutions to chief development constraints. In 
selected pilot project areas, the program vas to carry out a base-
line survey identifying development constraints, design pilot 
projects that could be replicated, and implement them through 
existing governmental machinery in order to enhance administrative 
capabilities (Roltham and Eamlewood 1976, 166). After some delay, 
the program was finally begun in 1970, subjected to evaluation by 
the local Institute for Development Studies (IDS) in 1971 and 1975, 
and formally ended in 1976. 
The pilot projects of the SIDP included administrative 
reforms, extension innovations, credit and input schemes, 
irrigation trials, and livestock projects, among others. In both 
its evaluations, IDS reviewed the projects in detail. While noting 
some benefits coming from specific projects, the evaluations 
suggested that overall, the program failed to provide the 
experimental and replicable projects that were its goals (An 
Overall Evaluation of SRDP 1973; $econd Overall Evaluation of the  
iga 1975). This was in part caused by donors, who insisted on 
having direct, local involvement. Each donor agreed to finance and 
be identified with a particular pilot area, insisting on local 
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participation in the form of technical assistance that was 
questionable, given the goals of building existing machinery and 
achieving replicability (Holtham and Hazlewood 1976, 168-169). 
Parts of the Kenyan government also undermined the program. 
Ministry staff in Nairobi viewed the experimental nature as a 
threat to their existing programs and often delayed allocating 
funds to specific projects in a timely fashion. Because of the 
extreme centralization of Kenyan bureaucracy, local level staff 
attempting to implement the program were unable to spend specific 
funds without central approval, thus endangering project success 
(Holtham and Hazlevood 1976, 173). 
Phil, the most enthusiastic review of the program, written by 
a member of one of the donor teams involved, stressed the 
administrative reforms that had been successful, even he only 
asserts that 'all this activity was directed towards the 
smallholder farmer and the small rural entrepreneur end could not 
fail to have same effect an their conditions' (Leach 1974. 360). 
in fact, very fey programs provided any lang-term, replicable 
benefits for their targets or other rural Unpins according to the 
ros reports. One of the few areas that net with some success was 
an extension and input project in South Nyanza introducing hybrid 
maize seed to smallholders. Initally, 702 of all smallholders in 
the area adopted the seed, but this rate dropped back to 42.52 in 
later years, as many farmers could not or would not continue the 
initial investment (Johnson 1980, 20). This success, however, 
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paralleled widespread adoption of hybrid seed in high-potential 
areas of Kenya in the mid-1970s. producing significant increases in 
maize productivity (Gerhardt 1975; Staudt 1978, 139). in all 
likelihood, the SDP may have sped the process in South Nyanza, but 
was not responsible for the resounding success of hybrid maize 
throughout the country. 
Despite the very limited successes of SDP, a similar area-
focussed, complex program became the next focus of Kenyan 
development efforts: the integrated Agricultural Development 
Programme (IADP), a World Bank initiated project. It closely 
followed the integrated rural development focus of World Bank and 
other donor efforts throughout Africa in the 1970e. in Kenya, the 
idea was originally proposed in a World Bank Agricultural Sector 
Report in 1973 suggesting that the SIDP showed simultaneous 
provision of credit and other services was essential. The IADP's 
components Included extension, training, inputs, marketing and 
credit, though it was primarily a credit program, that component 
absorbing 552 of total costs. The original proposal suggested 
implementation in one division within each of two districts, 
arguing that the intensive management needed required limited 
scale. Political pressures from the government, however, resulted 
in the final program plan being for 13 districts, virtually the 
entire high-potential agricultural area of the country (World Bank, 
aoject_Performance Audit gem= 1984, 1 and 24-26). 
The program was to be '[ar special effort. ..to reach those 
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who have not previously benefited from past smallholder credit 
programmes' (Kenya, azmlopment  Plan 1979-1983, 247). As such it 
was presented as the cornerstone of Kenya's war on poverty In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The project, however, required a 
participating farmer to have a minimum of three acres of cultivated 
Land and to be a cooperative member. In effect, this excluded 
approximately the poorest half of all smallholders: those whose 
holdings were too small and/or who did not grow the agrarian 
revolution crops (Bunt 1984. 175-176). In fact, the final World 
Bank report on the program found that LADP credit through local 
cooperatives was treated as identical to other credit programs 
operated by the local cooperatives (which were the channel for the 
vast majority of project credit); thus, it reached the same 
clientele that was served by other credit programme. In the end, 
only 252 of the targeted 70,000 farmers were reached with credit, 
the second phase of a planned four phases was stopped by the World 
Bank midway through and the entire program was dismantled, with the 
final economic rate of return being estimated at approximately 0 
and loan repayments averaging only 21% (World Bank, Zvi= 
ziasumnrsuppiaLt, 	2 and 8). 
The World Bank placed chief blase an the weakness of the 
Local cooperatives, especially in Western Ken/a. Its original 
proposal suggested starting the program only where cooperatives 
were organizationally and financially sound, principally Central 
and Eastern Provinces. Intense political pressure from rural 
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politicians and within the central government resulted in an 
initial scale considered far too wide. Loan distribution was more 
rapid than local cooperatives could effectively administer and 
extension agents could efficiently regulate (World Bank. Wila 
Performance lop= 25. 39-41). The original plan, however, also 
contained significant weaknesses. The final report notes that the 
technical packages of inputs and husbandry that the credit was to 
fund 'overemphasized the use of relatively expensive purchased 
inputs... (that were too risky a strategy, given the low income 
Levels of the project farmers (World Bank, Iroject Performance  
PAP2K1, 4). Another report noted that the drought of 1979-1980 
severely reduced returns from LOP packages to farmers, suggesting 
that any project subject to a high degree of rain-related failure 
would be received with reticence by farmers (Oyugi and Leonard 
1984, 1). 
One ministry official suggested the I.ADP and the 
disillusionment of all involved taught Kenyan and expatriate 
planners that two basic assumptions of the program were wrong: that 
basic government services in the agricultural sector were 
functioning well and that credit was a chief constraint to 
smallholder developeent. 2 The former seemed quite clear to all 
involved and not necessarily surprising to anyone involved in 
development work in Kenya or elsewhere an the continent. The 
2Author's interview, Malcolm Ball, Economist, Project Preparation Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, 12 March 1985. 
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latter, however, challenged one of the working assumptions of 
Kenyan development policy from Svynnerton forward. Throughout all 
development plans and-foreign-financed projects, credit to 
smallholders has been a key component. The World Bank alone has 
funded three major credit projects, in addition to the credit in 
LOP, since the 1960. (World Bank. Wiect Performance IAN= 7- 
8). 
By 1976. one observer suggested that 'Kenya's experience to 
late seems to suggest that [agricultural credit] is a rather 
ineffective weapon for achieving [development)...but a useful 
method of redistributing Income in favour of those who are 
fortunate enough to already own sufficient resources to meet the 
minimum required of credit recipients' (Smith 1976, 132). k World 
Bank consultant, in a preparation report for the LOP, suggested 
that credit was not a principal constraint, a comment that set off 
a major debate among development planners in Kenya that ended with 
a re-affirmation of the importance of credit and the adoption of 
/ADP (World Bank, Ixoject Performance geporl, 27). Aside from the 
special development projects run via cooperative societies, the 
only significant general source of smallholder credit has been the 
AFC. In spite of all its efforts, however, by 1974 only an 
estimated 25,000 smallholders, most of these among the wealthier 
smallholders, had received AFC credit, and of that 50% was in 
arrears (Peterson 1966, 73-74). Including all cooperative credit, 
only 12-15i of smallholders had received any credit by 1972 and 
virtually all of these had been in the wealthiest 252 of households 
in terms of farm size and income (Beyer 1976, 354). Given that 
/ADP and other projects since then have continued the trend of 
Lending to those already served both the total number served and 
their distribution in the rural population probably changed little 
from 3.972 to the end of the LOP. In fact, since the demise of 
LAD?, the only significant new credit program is through the AFC, 
which restricts loans to farmers with 5 hectares of land or more, 
essentially forgoing all attempts to extend general credit to poor 
smallholders. 3 Given this limited role for official credit and 
virtual non-existence of a rural informal credit market, Peterson 
seems justified in concluding that self-financing (through the 
straddling process, as we will see in the following chapter) has 
fuelled most smallholder development in Kenya's agrarian revolution 
(Peterson 1986, 72). 
With the failure of LAD?, development policy has returned to 
earlier concerns with basic institution-building and provision of 
basic services. Essentially, the various components of tADP are 
being developed under separate projects in separate agencies . 4 The 
Ministry of Ariculture is focussing on agricultural extension, 
while credit is to be provided through the AFC and Ministry of 
Cooperative Development. The heart of smallholder development is a 
new World Bank project, the National Extension Project (NEP), begun 
in 2.982 and continuing with a second loan to date. The chief focus 
is on improving maize and beans production, in line with the 
3Author's interviews, Mr. De Lagentaye, Agricultural Division, World Bank, Nairobi, 11 December 1985. 
4Eal1 interview. 
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government's emphasis on regaining food self-sufficiency as 
outlined in the Food Policy Paper of 1981. The NEP is essentially 
a re-organization plan for the extension service, based on the 
World Bank's 'training and visit system' of extension provision, 
developed and implemented in Israel, Turkey and India before Kenya 
(World Bank. ItaLL Appraisal asp= 1983). The World Bank 
suggested the plan to Kenyan officials before the end of IADP and 
had it accepted after USAID provided a trip to India for several 
top officials to amine the system in operation. 5 
At the heart of the project and the T and V system is the 
assumption that farmers can make significant improvements in 
productivity without additional resources or credit, if provided 
the right information in a timely fashion. The focus is on the 
most important food crops in each area and on changes in husbandry 
that require little or no additional capital outlay. Initial 
results of the pilot project in taro districts were quite positive 
and the project was thus expanded to a total of nine districts at 
the end of 1982, several more in 1983 and to all 30 agricultural 
districts by 1984-85 (World Bank, Staff Appraisal bp= 1983. 16-
17 and 20). A December 1985 World Bank report on a possible second 
loan for the project found overall success high, vith estimated 
economic rates of return above initial predictions (World Bank. 
Irjumi_lagansUatimajaramign_Exojw, 1985). Thus, a return to 
a simpler approach to agricultural development policy seems to have 
%all interview. 
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produced more favorable results. (Chapters 6 and 7 contain a 
detailed analysis of the success of the REP in Eisii). 
The NEP as of December 1985 vas-estimated to have provided a 
52 overall increase in national maize production compared to vhat 
it vould dthervise have been, though this has done little to offset 
the limited improvements nationwide and the continuing need to 
import maize. Production remains far below the 6.8% annual 
Increase said to be necessary in the 1981 Food Policy Paper and is 
vell below the 42 annual population growth rate. Part of the 
problem is undoubtedly the continually declining terms of trade for 
agricultural production vis-a-vis agricultural inputs and consumer 
goods. Despite a significant increase in producer prices in 1978, 
agricultural terms of trade have decreased steadily from 104.2 in 
1981 (basd on 1982 levels 100) to 94.3 In 1985 (World Bank. 21111 
Appraisal tem= 1983, 103). Smallholders are particularly hard 
hit by these declines, in that they normally receive a 
significantly lover share of the total value of their crops than do 
Larger farmers (Peterson 1986. 69-70). 
The effectiveness and long-term potential of the NEP and 
similar programs will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7. Suffice it 
here to say that the benefits the NEP has provided are overwhelmed 
by the continuing decline in real producer prices and veak 
marketing position of smallholder food and export crop producers, 
resulting in the continuing inability cf Kenya to be self-
sufficient in maize or to revive its sagging agricultural sector 
despite the large number of heavily financed, foreign designed 
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development schemes that have been implemented with a vengeance 
throughout the country for the past 25 years. 
Conclusiqg 
This chapter has traced the rise of straddling from the 
initial White settlement of Kenya and the subsequent demand for 
cheap African labor to its continuing prevalence as the means by 
which the 'agrarian revolution' was financed. Straddling 
represents the dominant African response to demands for migrant 
labor. Migrant labor by and large defined colonial policy toward 
African agriculture, while African response to colonial rule 
eventually led to Independence and a redefinition of what the 
state's role in smallholder development should entail. The post-
Swynnerton development efforts have assumed the smallholder sector 
can be treated separately from the smallholder's position in the 
larger economy. This chapter has shown the way in which migrant 
labor and African agriculture have been intimately related via the 
rural household since at least the 1920s. The failure to 
understand fully the implications of this, I will suggest in the 
chapters to follow, is a key reason Kenyan development policy, 
after impressive early success, has been largely frustrated in 
recent years. 
The migrant labor system impoverished rural Kenyans in many 
ways; straddling was the best response available to them to gain 
the most benefits possible from the demands of expanding capitalist 
production. As the next three chapters will show, it can be viewed 
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as a conscious system of social. reproduction. As such, it has 
heavily influenced smallholder agricultural production and response 
to development policy. Paradoxically, it fuelled the initial 
agrarian revolution by financing such of the capital costs of 
adopting the new export crops, but more recently has set clear 
Units on further expansion of rural productivity and development 
policy success. 
CHAPTER 4 
The Rise of Straddling: A History 
21-8411111Mill.—Sati 
The district of Risii has been fully involved in the history 
of Kenya outlined in the last chapter. Focussing on a specific 
district, and • specific community within this district, allows an 
examination of the effects of broad historical trends on processes 
of social reproduction. To do this. I will give a brief overview 
of the particular history of Eisii district as a whole, describing 
the pre-colonial society and its process of social reproduction and 
outlining the key political and economic changes of the colonial 
era. I will then examine in depth the history of one community 
within tisii, focussing principally on the changing role of men as 
the community was integrated into the market economy. This will 
demonstrate that the initial result of market integration was the 
creation of a social reproduction process closely resembling the 
classic 'peasant' household modelled by Saul and Woods (1971), but 
that almost as quickly as that peasant community was created, 
further market integration was dissolving it, replacing it with the 
social reproduction process delineated in Chapter it straddling. 
1.16 
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USii in ittn7AA-Aill2r7 
No good social history of Gusii society has been written, but 
from what is available, it appears the Gusii were not an unusual 
pre-colonial East African society. Their social organization seems 
to have bean a rather typical, acephalous, or 'stateless' one in 
which gender distinctions efts of greater importance than classes 
or institutions. This does not mean no forms of supra-household 
political or social organization existed, only that there does not 
seem to have been a clearly and permanently dominant class, caste. 
or state. 1 As a whole the Gusii appeared to have only language And 
culture in coason, with little or no unified political and military 
activity. The largest social unit with a common function was the 
clan or mut/ (pl., skimumg), which was the unit of exogamy, 
occupied a contiguous piece of land, and united for military 
purposes when faced with a common external threat. Within the clan 
were a number of subclans or Aguaga (sing., rjuige) which occupied a 
clearly demarcated piece of land within the clan. The elders 
(ebaturett) of the riiU allocated use-rights to the land to 
individual households, the land itself being controlled 
communally. 2 
lestang one of the seven Gus ii clans, the Getutu, a dominant groups appears to have been emerging rather forcefully at the tine of British conquest, but it was the exception. See P. Mayer (1949, 14-15) 4 `This is a very simplified, schematic presentation of the rather complex and, to date, poorly understood pre-colonial Gusii social organization. In fact, many scholars believe clans, at least large ones, were broken down into several layers of sub-clans or lineages. See P. Mayer (1949, 1950); P. and I. Mayer (1965); 
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The immediate focus of daily social activity in pre-colonial 
Gusii society, however, was the gime (pl., amessea), which was 
'the seminal group of contiguous homesteads which recognized the 
mutual, obligation to exChange work for beer' (R. Levine 1962, 524). 
L :ism consisted of several individual households. They did not 
work the land fully communally, but did unite to provide labor for 
specific tasks for any single household when requested. In 
exchange, the host household would provide beer for the group. In 
fact, women provided the labor in most cases, while their husbands 
were the only members of the community allowed to partake in the 
beer. In addition to these occasional communal labor groups, the 
women of the community often worked in smaller groups, rotating 
from one women's field to another's on a daily basis (Barnes 1976, 
78-79). Each Lana would normally have its own cattle village, or 
iaiLLE111. (pl., akilAX811) , in which initiated but unmarried men 
would live separately from the rest of the community. The cattle 
village protected the community's cattle, the chief store of wealth 
in Gusii society, constituted the principal military unit, and was 
the educational institution for young men, where they learned 
military, economic and social skills needed to take up their role 
as household heads. 3 
In spite of this significant communal organization, 
individual households remained relatively autonomous. Specific 
and B. And B. Levine (1966). 'For mare detail on the ybisarstq, see P. Nyambasora, et. al.. (n.d.). 
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decisions on land use and labor allocation were made within the 
individual, extended households. Each male household head was 
relatively free to control this process, though some rules 
governing his action did apply. Each wife had the right to be 
allocated land adequate to provide for her and her children. land, 
however, was not extremely important in what was a land-abundant, 
Labor-scarce society. Huch more important was control over cattle, 
which were used as brideWealth to bring women into the community 
from other clans. This takes us to the heart of the pre-colonial 
process of social reproduction. 
Very similar to Heillassoues *domestic mode of production,' 
social reproduction in pre-colonial Gusii was based on the exchange 
of cattle for woman who provided biological reproductive powers and 
the bulk of productive labor pover. 4 Households were reproduced by 
exchanging their daughters for cattle which in turn could be 
transferred to another clan in exchange for one of their daughters 
in marriage to the household's son. This process was the heart of 
simple reproduction for all households and the means by which the 
more ambitious could gain greater wealth and power within the 
community. Because land was abundant and labor scarce, household 
productive potential depended on the number of wives and offspring 
available as a labor force. The ambitious household head would 
marry his first wife, using the bridevealth obtained from his 
sister to do so, attempt to produce surplus grain that could be 
4Heillassoues (1981) argument is broadly applicable to Gusii society, though requires some modification to fit perfectly. 
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exchanged for cattle which in turn could be used to marry again, 
further expand grain production, acquire more cattle, etc. While 
no formal ruling class or state existed, men with more wives and 
sons tended to become those with greater influence in the larger 
community, often becoming the •baturett who performed local 
juridical and military leadership functions when needed (Ziangoi 
1977). 
Elder, married men clearly dominated is pre-colonial Gusii. 
They had complete control over the key means of production and 
reproduction -- land and cattle. The bridevealth cattle of each 
wife's daughter could not, in theory, be alienated from that wife's 
sons, and a man's son had 'residual rights' to the bridewealth of 
one of his uterine sisters. In fact, Levine argues that male 
household heads had great freedom of action, with grievances from 
sons or wives ajudicated only after the death of the household head 
(Mayer and Mayer 1965, 70; R. Levine 1964, 67-68). By controlling 
bridevealth, elders had effective control over junior men, who 
required the bridevealth to become eventual elders themselves. As 
Meillassoux has pointed out. however, criticizing P. P. Rey, junior 
men were not an exploited group; they eventually did obtain the 
status of elder (MeilIassoux 1981, 75-81). Their subjugation when 
young was purely a life-cycle phenomenon. 
Women were the group that was subjugated for life. They had 
no independent access to the means of production and did not 
control the surplus product their labor created. As noted earlier. 
they provided the bulk of the labor power in agriculture. Men 
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cleared land that had been fallow, built houses, and provided the 
bulk (though not all) of the labor on their own plot that was 
independent of any wife. But the latter was for their own use in 
the grain-cattle-wife cycle, housing was only a sporadic task, and 
land clearance must have been a small portion of total labor time 
in an agricultural regime in which each piece of land was worked 
two-and-a-half years before returning to fallow. As noted above. 
in the mum communal work groups, women normally worked while 
men legitimized the exchange by drinking the beer. Also, women in 
the community literally fed the young men in the cattle-villages on 
a daily basis. 5 While the latter's education in these villages was 
essential to maintaining the society, they clearly were removed 
from the bulk of productive labor while liming separately. While 
no data exist on this, of course, it seems quite likely that women 
provided the bulk of labor power and controlled little or none of 
the surplus. 
The pre-colonial social reproduction process in Kisii was 
quite typical of many settled societies in East Africa, closely 
resembling Neillassoum's domestic mode of production in which elder 
men controlled the societal surplus via control over land and 
cattle, though they did not form a clear ruling class or state. 
Key to reproduction was not land and agriculture, but cattle for 
bridevealth to marry in order to obtain adequate labor power to 
reproduce the household and community. Nen served the political, 
juridical and military functions in the society; women provided the 
50It Nyabate Nyabende, December 5, 1985. 
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balk of actual labor power. 
British colonization, completed in Kisii in 1908 quickly and 
radically changed this late pre-colonial society. The Gush i proved 
to be one the most difficult of Kenyan societies to 'pacify.' 
Doing so required three Years of sporadic but fairly heavy 
fighting, ending with several 'punitive expeditions' in 1907 and 
1908 in which many Gush i lost their lives and very large numbers of 
their cattle. Because of the fierce military resistance they met, 
the British were understandably concerned with immediately 
disbanding the cattle-villages that were the principal Gus ii 
military units. This was essentially completed by 1914. as young 
men moved back to live in their individual households (Mixon 1971, 
72-74). However, the economic and social life of the community 
probably changed little because of this. Cattle were held 
individually, but undoubtedly still grazed communally, and the 
educational function of cattle grazing certainly continued in the 
lamediate post-conquest period. 
Colonial rule did, however, eliminate such of men's pre-
colonial functions. Their military function was clearly and 
forcefully eliminated, and the juridical process changed rapidly. 
The initial colonially appointed 'Chiefs' in Kisii were generally 
indigenous leaders -- Abaturett elders, herbal healers or 
'rainmakers,' 	who were often the eldest sons of the biggest 
households within a particular clan or sub-clan. to their new 
roles, they rose above their peers with whom they had previously 
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been roughly co-equal. Their enhanced power diminished the 
functions and powers of a broader range of elders, though the 
'latter still had some juridical roles to play (Boganko 1977, 375- 
90). The elimination of the cattle-villages and the diminution of 
judicial functions left Gusii men 'available' for other activities. 
As elsewhere in Kenya, the British quickly encouraged them to take 
up wage labor as an alternative, initially paying Gusii men with 
their own cattle. abducted in the punitive expeditions. 
Simultaneously, the local administration consciously tried to 
encourage the Gusii to purchase imported goods, particular cooking 
utensils and blankets, to encourage wage labor (Maxon 1971, 80-85). 
Such trade immediately followed the arrival of the British, though 
it was dominated by Asian, Somali and Swahili traders, not the 
Gusii themselves. The initial export from the district was cattle 
products. No monetized market existed for the indigenous Gus ii 
grains of finger millet and sorghum, and maize had entered the area 
just prior to the arrival of the British, whose only early 
agricultural policy was to encourage its further adoption (Barnes 
1978, 80-82). 
World War I interrupted these initial colonial efforts. The 
British and missionary personnel were forced to abandon Kisii in 
the face of the advancing German army moving north from Tanganyika. 
After the re-establishment of British control in 1917, colonization 
in full finally began. The missionaries returned and began their 
efforts in earnest. The first converts were madebefore the var, 
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but no appreciable number were converted until about 1920. 
Simultaneously, the Cult of limbo developed among the Gusii. This 
anti-colonial set of religious beliefs prophesied that a giant 
make (Mumbo) would coma to destroy all colonial Chiefs and 
Assistant Chiefs, tames should remain at or below three shillings 
(the actual rate after 1922 vas 12 shillings), and a Gusii leader 
would one day sit in the District Commissioner's office. 6 The cult 
was effectively suppressed by 3,924 through arrest and explusion of 
its leaders, though it arose again in new form briefly in the 1930s 
in face of the economic turmoil of the Depression. Though the 
number of Christians and Christian schools expanded rapidly in the 
1920s, a battle raged between the new converts and more 
'traditional' Gusii, whether followers of Numb° or not; who viewed 
boys at mission schools as 'lazy' -- unwilling to do their proper 
job of herding cattle (Maxon 1971, 139-41; Bogonko 1977, 171-72). 
Economically, the 1920s witnessed the first significant out-
migration of young Gusii men engaging in wage labor, mostly via 
local chiefs coercive recruitment (Maxon 1971, 120-22). Cattle 
products remained the principal exports, though colonially 
introduced crops such as simsim and groundnuts, combined with the 
need to pay hut taxes, initiated commercial agriculture by the end 
of the decade (Barnes 1976, 82-83). All of this economic activity. 
however, was nipped in the bud by the Depression. The early wage 
laborers returned home around 1930, crop and cattle prices fell, 
%axon (1971, 124-126 and 175-78). For the best analysis of Numboism, see Vipper (1977). 
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and finger millet was the only crop whose marketed production 
increased (Maxon 1971, 169-71). The colonial administration 
responded with new efforts to encourage commercial agriculture in 
the 1930e, starting with the introduction of water-powered grain 
mills. These made maize an attractive staple crop and provided the 
first business opportunities available to Gusii men (Heron 1971. 
190). Maize quickly replaced finger millet and sorghum as the 
basic staple. Undoubtedly connected to wage labor and the growing 
market economy, Western education increasingly became accepted as a 
useful endeavor for young men. Indeed, by the 1930. the Local 
Native Council (LNC - the indigenous governing organization 
consisting principally of Chiefs) insisted upon and received in 
1934 a government-operated school. This became a popular political 
demand as the missions education was increasingly accepted, while 
their religious teachings remained controversial (Maxon 1971, 196- 
200). 
The most important change of the 1930s, however, was the 
introduction of coffee into Kisii. The district was one of three 
originally selected to experiment with African coffee cultivation. 
The colonial admAnistration, desperate for revenue during the 
Depression, had little choice but to turn timidly against the 
interests of the settlers and at least attempt African-grown 
coffee. The local administration actively encouraged farmers to 
adopt the crop, though the initial Legal limit was 100 acres for 
the entire district. Fear of government usurption of lArd And 
126 
profits, however, discouraged many. The initial growers were 
mainly chiefs and early businessmen -- principally those who had 
already built maize mills. Of a sample of the earliest coffee 
adopters, Barnes found that nearly half -- an amazingly high number 
for the time -- had had a job outside the district before adopting 
coffee. (Labor migration had recovered from its 1929-1931 slump 
and was expanding rapidly by the mid-30s.) Many others worked in 
the local administration or had businesses (Barnes 1976. 99-101, 
195. 203-04). Straddling had begun. By 1937, coffee had expanded 
to another area of the district, the initial 'block farm' system in 
which coffee farmers had a joint field was abandoned as unworkable, 
and a processing station was built within the district (Maxon 1972. 
374). 
A simultaneous and less propitious trend of the 19301 was the 
and of the land-abundant era in Kisii. During the decade, the 
first real pressure on land was felt. This led households and sub-
clans to pioneer and settle the previously unused buffer land 
between sub-clans and between clans, quickly dissolving whatever 
remained of communal land tenure. The pressure on land led each 
household to claim and retain as much as possible for their own 
use. Powerless under British rule, the indigenous elders could do 
nothing to stop the process, which was essentially complete by 1940 
(Barnes 1976, 202-03; Mayer and Mayer 1965, 61). This rush to gain 
land quickly translated into legal battles, both in indigenous and 
colonial courts. The injection of cash that followed World War II 
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(see below) helped fund an expansion of court cases after the var. 
In the late 1940s, three-quarters of these involved livestock and 
bridevealth, the most common source of inter-household and inter-
clan dispute in pre-colonial society; by 1953, the percentages had 
reversed, with three-quarters of the cases involving land disputes 
(saxon, 1971, 270-72; P. sayer 1950, 3). With the expansion of the 
cash economy, coffee, and the shortage of land, the latter quickly 
became a more important commodity than cattle. By the mid-1950s, 
there were over 3.000 court cases per month involving land, at a 
cost of $50-60,000 per year; almost every adult Gusii male bad been 
in court at some point (Levine and Levine 1966, 73). The final 
result of all this was the complete enclosure of all land, which 
proceeded with little government encouragement prior to official 
ajudication and registration, and was nearly complete by the end of 
the 1950s (Maxon 1971, 312-318). 
Voluntary recruitment for World War II began in 1940 in 
Kisii, resulting in increased labor migration out of the district 
to avoid a possible draft. This, of course, resulted in forced 
conscription by 1942. At the end of the war, returning soldiers 
and men who had avoided war via civilian employment returned home 
and provided a major injection of cash into the district economy, 
rapidly expanded locally owned businesses and dramatically 
increased bridewealth levels. 7 During the war, increasing numbers 
of Gusii began clamouring for permission to grow coffee. The local 
axon, 12 71, pp. 245-46, 258-60. 
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administration successfully gained such permission for selected 
areas (including the area in which the research reported herein was 
conducted) in 1946. Coffee acreage increased from 91 acres in 1938 
to 222 by 3.948 and 271 in 1950. The size of plot per grower, 
however, declined dramatically from just under one acre per farmer 
in 1937 to about one-third of an acre in 1950. At the same time, 
farmers for the first time were required to pay for their seedlings 
directly, further developing what would become straddling (Barnes 
1976, 105 and 159-167). 
The general economic expansion after World War II affected 
all aspects of the lisii economy. As noted above, land litigation 
increased dramatically. The demand for education and more 
government-operated schools also increased Maxon 1971, 258-60). 
Numbers of men in wage labor outside the district rose, as the 
phenomenon became nearly universal. The official estimate was that 
up to one-third of Gusii men were outside the district at any given 
time in the late 1940s (P. Mayer 1949, 3-4; R. Levine 1962, 527). 
In agriculture, food production increased significantly during and 
after the war, simultaneous with increases in coffee production. 
Pyrethrum was introduced into the district in 1945, though not 
grown widely until the late 1950s (Nixon 1971, 235-39; Sager 1980, 
69). In the late 1930s and early 19601, with straddling fully 
developed, the number of court cases declined as cash incomes 
shifted increasingly toward paying for sons' education, and 
acreages of food crops decreased as cash crop production (coffee, 
pyretrum and tea) continued to rise Maxon 1971, 309 and 349). 
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Since Independence, Kisii has been one of the sites of 
virtually all major development efforts. One of the SRDP pilot 
projects was located in the district, and the lower-elevation areas 
(including the site of my research) were included in the ill-fated 
/ADP. Rost recently, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, Kisii was 
one of the earliest districts to receive implementation of the NE?. 
The advance of the agrarian revolution crops in the district 
mirrors that of Kenya as a whole. The number of coffee growers 
increased from 36,140 in 1964 to 52,000 by 1983, while tea growers 
Liscressed from 2,362 in 1964 tu 39,611 by 1984. As in the 
expansion of coffee discussed earlier, acreage per farmer dropped 
as the number of tea farmers increased, from 0.43 hectares per 
grower in 1964 to 0.32 in 1984. Similarly, the number of high-
grade dairy cattle increased from about 10,000 in 1967 to over 
140,000 by 1984. 8 Kisii, then, was a full participant in the 
agrarian revolution and all significant smallholder development 
efforts. It will serve as a useful case for examining the 
transformation of procescss of social reproduction that this 
revolution has wrought. 
auurallaatisaaailrautansk 
The research is based on a case study of 36 households in a 
contiguous area in South Vanjare Location. I shall refer to the 
8Post-independence agricultural data for Xis ii obtained from Kenya Ninistry of Agriculture, Kisii District Annual Reports. 1965- 1985. 
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research area as Bomvanda, after the 'clan' (samate) resident there 
(though the senate , includes many more than the 36 households.) 
Vithin the research area are members of all three 'sub-clans' 
(Wag) in Bomvanda. It is located near the original and main 
Catholic mission station in Kisii and only about five kilometers 
from Kisii town, the district headquarters and original site of 
British administration. Because of its proximity to these early 
colonial enclaves, it was probably unusually heavily affected in 
the early colonial period by both Catholicism and the new 
administration. Its proximity to town undoubtedly gave the men of 
Bomvanda greater contact with wage labor at an earlier period than 
was true for the 'average Gusii man. But I believe the process 
analyze is generalizable with local variations to most of the rest 
of Kisii And a number of other areas of rural Kenya. 9 
Agriculturally, Basvanda lies within the 'Coffee-Banana Zone' 
at an elevation of about 5200 feet. It sits near the upper edge of 
this zone, near the higher elevation 'Tea-Dairy Zone,' and produces 
both coffee and tea. The latter is not produced in nearly the 
quantity of higher elevation areas, but can be grown quite 
successfully. Of the other agrarian revolution crops, pyrethrum is 
not groan at all (a couple of local experiments with the crop in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s proved unsuccessful, and these among 
'progressive' farmers) and dairy cattle can be maintained, though 
few exist within the research area. Hybrid maize is widely used. 
95ee Chap. 7 for generalization of the argument to the rest of the district and other areas of Kenya. 
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and a number of local cash crops not particularly encouraged by 
development policy flourish (met bananas, chewing sugarcane. 
pineapples. and groundnuts). Overall, Homwanda is not as fertile 
as the higher elevation areas of the district, but far more fertile 
than the lowest elevations and immensely more so than most other 
areas of Kenya. 
To analyze the rise of straddling in Homwanda I shall first 
Lay out a categorization of the households based on their history 
to date. This can then be used in a retrospective way to outline 
the transformation that has occurred. The categorization is based 
on the distinct patterns of straddling that emerged as each 
household was integrated into the market economy via off-farm wage 
labor and then used their earnings to invest in expanded household 
reproduction. The differentiation and transformation process in 
Bomvanda is definitely not 'complete.' if such a state could be 
attained. Therefore, we cannot easily discuss distinct classes 
within rural society, such as 'peasant,' 'proletariat,' or 'petty-
bourgeoisie.' Rather, the categories are given descriptive names 
based an man's integration into the market economy and investment 
in the household. However, as I suggested in Chapter 1, I believe 
the increasing differentiation, particularly involving land 
transfers in recent years, will lead to increasing polarization in 
Howland* to a point at which some type of class categories might 
become applicable. 
In, that the categorization and subsequent analysis are based 
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on 'households,' a definition of that term is in order. I define a 
household to be a nuclear or extended family living an and using a 
veil-defined family estate, clearly and permanently distinguished 
from those around it, and making reference to an elder man, living 
or not, as the household head and patriarch. As sons marry, they 
are given parts of their father's land to cultivate, but as long as 
the father or his widow lives, a son 'rill not be given permanent 
use of a contiguous piece of land. Lather, use will be subject to 
the discretion of the parent, at least in theory. 10 Until the sons 
of a family clearly and permanently divide their father's land into 
distinct estates, they remain part of one household. iiithim each 
household are often separate consumption and production units that 
I refer to as 'houses.' A nuclear family that is a separate 
household is also one house. A household that includes parents and 
one or more married sons producing and consuming separately (each 
having his own granary) contains as many houses as there are 
separate production/consumption units. Similarly, polygynous 
households usually contain as many houses as there are wives, in 
that each rife produces and eats separately. The bulk of the 
history of differentiation can be analyzed in terms of households 
alone, though such of the current reproduction data (see Chap. 6) 
can better be analyzed in terms of houses. 
101n pectic*, married sons in households where only the mother remains alive have de facto control over land, though usually give some type of symbolic deference to their mother and her wishes, in that she retains restricted legal control while she lives. 
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In Bomvanda, I have defined households with reference to the 
man who from the 19208 to the 19508 made crucial choices and had 
crucial opportunities and constraints vis-a-vis the market economy. 
Of the 36 households, 26 patriarchs were living in 1985. This 
approach defines the households as the people of Boawanda do 
themselves, with one or two exceptions in which elder sons have 
essentially formed separate households, but my definition preserves 
them as one in order to facilitate analysis. The result is a 
division of the 36 households into five categories. 
This first category, containing only two of the 36 
households, I call pioneert, so-called because they literally 
pioneered the new system of social reproduction beginning in the 
1920s. They combined unusually early and high off-farm income with 
investment in agriculture and education to achieve radically 
expanded levels of household reproduction. They initially 
benefitted from land expansion via their early adoption of 
Christianity, though religious conversion did not automatically 
Lead to expanded household reproduction; other early converts did 
not achieve such expansion. By 1985, these two households were 
reproducing their expanded levels of wealth into the third 
generation, as the grandsons of the patriarchs were coming of age 
and acquiring high off-farm incomes. 
The second category I call the follower because these 13 
households literally followed the lead of the Pioneers. The men in 
these households actively engaged in off-farm labor and invested in 
education and agriculture, but later (starting in the 19300 and at 
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lover levels than the first group. They have achieved expanded 
Levels of household reproduction into the second generation. but at 
much lower levels than the Pioneers. 
The third group I refer to simply as ae.-laborers because, 
despite early and long-term engagement in off-farm labor, they have 
not invested in the household and, therefore, have not achieved 
expanded levels of reproduction. The initial patriarchs and their 
sons remain limply wage laborers, relying on that activity for the 
bulk of their relatively be incomes and achieving rather by 
levels of agricultural production. In recent years these eleven 
households have begun selling land in an attempt to expand 
belatedly, vhich sharply distinguishes them from the Followers and 
Pioneers. 
The last two groups are six ?amen and four female-heade4 
households. 	The former, either out of choice or lack of 
opportunity, attempted to rely principally on farm production for 
household survival. They have been unable to invest in education, 
continue to have Los levels of off-farm income into the second 
generation, and only moderate levels of agricultural production. 
They demonstrate the infeasibility of attempting to maintain a 
purely 'peasant' process of social reproduction in the face of the 
radical politico-economic transformation of the last 50 years. 
The remale-headed households are those in which the patriarch 
died prematurely, leaving a woman as effective household head when 
the sans of the family were coming of age. 11 The absence of a 
"These women did have leviratic husbands. but these men did 
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man's off-farm income left these sans, currently recognized as 
household heads in the community, with little education and 
therefore Limited opportunities in the market economy. By 1985. 
these households broadly resembled Wage-laborers in terms of their 
level of reproduction and the relative importance and type of off-
farm activity in which household members engaged. Classifying only 
these households as female-headed is not intended to imply that a 
number of other households, in the past and present, do not have 
women as de facto heads making daily agricultural decisions. But 
it was only these four in which there were no patriarchs during the 
crucial post-World War II years when full integration of Bomvanda 
into the market economy occurred. 
These categories correspond to the differentiation process 
that has occurred, even though they may not be consciously 
recognized by Bomvanda residents today. The Pioneers have been 
seen as a distinct political and socio-economic elite since World 
War II or earlier. Local residents do not apply the other 
categories themselves, though they clearly recognize the resultant 
pattern of wealth and poverty. They also recognize the process of 
obtaining high off-farm income Ana re-investing that income in 
education and agriculture as crucial to household reproduction, and 
view this as the familial obligation of all men upon which societal 
respect rests. 12 This consciousness of the process is at least as 
not provide any substantial support to the women or their children. 12There are, of course, exceptions to this. The sole remaining survivor of the previous generation of household heads is a quite impoverished Farmer who nonetheless commands a fair amount of respect due to his senior position. 
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important as the socio-economic results themselves in understanding 
household response to development policy, as I argue belov. 
The Early Colonial_ Perio4 
Bomvanda was among the areas of Eisii to suffer most severely 
from initial colonial conquest. Because of its location close to 
the British settlement, its people were actively involved in the 
initial resistance movement and sufferred the consequences: severe 
punitive pacification campaigns. In Bomvanda, oral testimony 
suggests that the mum communities has been living at the time 
as groups in fortified dwelling to protect them from external 
attack. 13 The punitive expedition resulted in rather early 
abandonment of these communal living arrangements. The fortified 
communities were no match for British firepower and, in fact, left 
their residents corralled targets for British control. Like the 
rest of Usti. Bomvanda was not significantly affected by the pre-
World War I era other than the Initial subjugation. The Catholic 
mission station opened in 1911, but no local converts were made 
until after the var. 
With the re-establishment of colonial and missionary presence 
after 1917, Unwinds felt increased effects of the new externally 
1301: Nyabate Nyabende, December 5. 1985. No previous scholars have reported this finding for Kisii. It is possible my source was simply incorrect, or, more Likely, this was a local variant for reasons that remain obscure. 
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imposed order. The most significant of these vas the missionary 
presence and early Christians. The earliest Christians generally 
Lived at the mission stations, forming the new social group of 
'mission boys' common throughout Africa in the early years of 
colonialism. Three young men of Boawanda entered this group in the 
immediate post-war period, living at the Catholic mission until 
approximately 1930. Two of these three became the founders of the 
Pioneer households in the study. While these early converts did 
not receive any significant formal education, they did vork as 
cooks and houseboys for the first colonial adainstrators beginning 
in the 1920s, and were the only Bowmanda men engaged in full-time, 
off-farm employment at the time. (Several other men engaged in 
some short-term seasonal labor to pay the colonial hut tax.) In 
addition to achieving this initial source of income, the early 
Christians engaged in significant land expansion by 1930. Koving 
off mission land proper in the late 19205 and early 1930s. the two 
eventual Pioneers occupied large areas of unused land on which 
their sans continue to reside. The third early Christian also left 
the mission station, settling on nearby land given hie by a fellow 
member of his sub-clan. 
Land expansion was not limited to Christians alone. The 
Wisii land scramble began in Somvanda in the 1920s, probably 
earlier than most of the district due to the influence of the early 
Christians. Until the 1920e, such of the center of the research 
area, lying on the boundary of tic sub-clans, was unoccupied. Two 
men, fathers of household heads in ay study (fathers of three 
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Followers and a Wage-laborer), cleared and settled the land in the 
1920e, soon joined by others. Another man expanded the boundary of 
his sub-clan by settling land on the clan border. This area had 
been an unoccupied buffer zone between the not infrequently hostile 
clans. The settler took advantage of the recent establishment of 
the nearby mission station and subsequent cessation of military 
hostilities between clans to settle the buffer land, thus expanding 
his own family estate and that of his sub-clan. 14 
None of these land expansions created major disputes among 
families or sub-clans, in that they remained within accepted pre-
colonial land rules of expanding within one's own sub-clan or 
opening unclaimed land between sub-clans. Conflict did occur where 
expansion broke established practices. For instance, one of the 
Pioneers moved to land belonging to a sub-clan other than his own. 
This land was given to his by his fellow Pioneer, a member of the 
sub-clan claming control of the land. The original settler invited 
his fellow Christian/Pioneer to settle the land with him. vhich 
created a dispute with neighboring households of the sub-clan, 
eventually resulting in a court settlement in the 1940, by colonial 
officials, who sided in favor of the Pioneer because of British 
Legal customs and the settler's connections with the colonial 
administration) 	More frequent land battles occurred later, as 
14Most of this expansion was accompanied by marriage end in at least one case polygyny, as men used the pre-colonial reproduction system to clear and cultivate the new land. Where polygyny was not used, the new settler would invite relatives to join bps in settling the land. '.20I:Yosabia Capri, Nov. 20, 1985. 
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Land pressure began to rise, but in the 1920s conflict only arose 
when land expansion broke pre-colonial norms. Not insignificantly, 
one of the early Christians and Pioneers was the man who broke pre-
colonial norms in Somwanda. using his superior access to the 
colonial stare to secure the land in question, which in turn 
provided his household with a large asset far beyond that which 
they would have obtained through inheritance. 
As in the district as a whole, education was the arena in 
which greater conflict occurred. Six Bomwanda household heads 
received form one to four years of primary education in the 1920s. 
The most educated was a Follower who later served as sub-chief for 
Bomwands. Be was the nephew of one of the Pioneers and received 
what was then complete primary education and very rare. On the 
other end, five household heads of the appropriate age in the 1920s 
received no education. Several of these were denied by their 
fathers, they.reported, because the latter wanted them to 'stay 
home and grams his cattle,' an obvious reference to a desire for 
them to remain in the pre-colonial educational and economic system. 
This represented a battle between defenders of the pre-colonial 
norms and early adopters of the new order. The latter, by 
abandoning pre-colanial practices earliest, gained for their sons a 
seed of advantage in dealing with the rising market economy that 
would prove significant in later years. 
The pre-colonial system of social reproduction began to 
change from the moment of conquest, but up to 1930 it had not been 
fully transformed. Even though the communal living pattern was 
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abandoned shortly after conquest, young men's cattle grazing 
activities and the use of asaga communal labor groups continued 
to predominate. But a number of precursors of subsequent 
differentiation and the new system of household reproduction had 
developed. Young men began to engage in off-farm employment at 
least for short periods. Production for market began with the rise 
of a market in cattle products. Land expansion also began. 
presaging the end of land abundance that would occur by World War 
II. Some of those who were the earliest and most successful land 
accumulators were also the earliest entrants into wage labor, pre-
figuring the differentiation patterns that would emerge more 
strongly in the later colonial era. 
These modifications principally involved the increased 
individualization of the household within the community. The 
individual family estate arose beside the communal institutions of 
labor groups and cattle grazing. This shift resulted in the 
creation of households that more or less fit the peasant model of 
reproduction, defined by Saul and Woods (1971). by the end of the 
1930s. As men gained off-farm employment to pay their hut tax and 
began to move to new land, they became less dependent on their 
elders' control. Agriculture and livestock rearing began to 
include a slight amount of production for market, especially 
involving cattle products. Reliance on family labor and 
agriculture for household reproduction continued and tribute was 
paid to higher authorities in the fora of the hut tax. ley 
communal institutions remained strong and played a crucial role in 
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the rural political economy. Thus, Somwanda resembled a classic 
peasant community in this early colonial period. This resemblance 
would end by the post-World War II period as the new system of 
social reproduction arose. 
1930 -45: The Rise of Wage Labor 
The period from 1930 to World War I/ in Bomwanda was crucial 
to the eventual nature and extent of straddling. It was in this 
period that :age labor became a common, long-term activity for 
young men and education a legitimate form of investment. 
Straddling as a conscious process of household reproduction began 
to take shape, especially among the Pioneer households, as they 
used their unusually high off-farm incomes to educate their eldest 
sons. 
Unquestionably the most important trend during the period was 
the dramatic rise of off-farm, long-term wage labor. Led by the 
three earliest Christians in their positions as cooks, off-farm 
Labor became commonplace in the lives of young Gusii men by World 
War II. The eldcst of the three began investing in education for 
his sans, giving them the maximum primary education possible, and 
established a butchery - probably the earliest African-owned 
business in the local market. Another also began to educate his 
ldest sons, who went on to be priests and teachers, thus 
stablishing the family as Pioneers in reproducing straddling 
across a generation. 
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About half of the Followers and Wags-laborers entered off-
farm employment. Six men from each category gained off-farm 
positions during the pre-war period. Differences between the two 
categories. however. quickly began to emerge. Eleven of the twelve 
men began work in the tea estates of neighboring Kericho District, 
a common but unpopular and lowly paid position. Five of the 
Followers, however, shifted to more remunerative endeavors within a 
few years of entering the labor force. while only one of the Wage-
laborers did. The three Followers who began in the tea fields 
after receiving some primary education were able to move to skilled 
labor positions. while the other two simply shifted to other 
unskilled positions. The Wage-laborer who escaped the tea fields 
had no education, but was able to gain a position as a barber. The 
three Followers in skilled labor positions gained their advantage 
from their greater education. 
Of the Wage-Laborers one stands out from the others, having 
obtained an unusually highly paid position as a clerk in the 
colonial administration. He was the most highly educated son of an 
early Christian, who was trained as a sale nurse during World War 
II in the military. He is a prime example of the necessity of 
investing a high income in household agriculture and education: not 
having done so, his household became simply Wage-laborer:. dfilpite 
his personally high income over a long period. The other four 
Wage-laborers who began in Kericho shifted to other unskilled 
positions, reflecting limits placed on them by their lower Level of 
education. 
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Finally, only three Farmers engaged in off-farm work during 
the period. one in the tea fields and the other two in a variety of 
short-term unskilled labor. While these three worked as long as 
the Wage-laborers during the period, two of them left off-farm 
employment completely by 1945 and the third followed suit in the 
late 1940e, thus leaking the choices, or being forced to make the 
choices, that would result in their households' eventual poverty." 
Two of the four patriarchs of the Female-headed households were 
alive and employed in Kericho during the period also, leaving 
employment by the late 19405 and dying shortly thereafter. 
37 the 1940s, the Pioneers were beginning to distinguish 
themselves as a distinct social group within Borwanda. Then they 
moved to their new land holdings in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
they serried in order to have wives to bring their new land into 
production, following the normal pre-colonial production system. 
Their wives, however, were young women who also resided at the 
mission station and were daughters of early Christians. Hence, 
though they did pay bridsweaIth, they did not have traditional 
Gusii marriage ceremonies, opting instead for only Christian 
ceremonies. Their lack of a Gusii ceremony meant they provided no 
feast for their relatives and neighbors, despite their already 
apparent wealth. This previously unthinkable abrogation of Gusii 
"Mother their emit from off-farm employment was caused by their conscious choice or lack of opportunity is unclear. One indicated he stayed home because 'he had 'any fruit trees' and sold the fruit from his farm instead of working, while another said he had no 'sponsor' - no friend or relative who would place him in an off-farm position. 
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custom set them apart socially and made them rather unpopular with 
their fellows. 
After settling their new lend in the early 1930s and putting 
it into production, the Pioneers established. with mission 
encouragement, a 'Christian village' on their joint land. They 
invited several other young Christian families to settle an their 
land and join them in a quasi-communal life for Christians only. 
The women organized their own communal Labor groups, probably 
without the use of the local beer, proscribed by the missionaries 
and authorities. The members remained distinctly separate from 
community activities, shunning both communal labor efforts and 
feasts involving the use of the local beer. The village split 
. apart in the early 1940e. after only a few years of existence, amid 
allegations of 'witchcraft' (oborogi) among the members and, 
perhaps, from non-members as well. 17 All bat one of the families 
that had moved to the Pioneers land returned to their original 
homesteads at this point to insure their own land claims. 18 
Despite its short existence, the Christian village clearly 
distinguished the Pioneers from their neighbors. It marked the 
first major rupture in communal institutions that had functioned as 
part of Gusii peasant society until that time. The non-Pioneer 
17The oral evidence on whether these allegations came from within or without the village is unclear. The latter would be a clear and not surprising sign of community dislike and shunning of the new Christians, but the evidence is uncertain. 
18The one who remained, a Farmer, gained a great deal of land over what he would have inherited. However. the household's current poverty demonstrates the limited importance of relatively large landholding without adequate off-farm income. 
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members of the village returned to Gusii society after a few short 
years in the village, and did not have the wealth to set themselves 
apart as did the Pioneers. Combined with the letters' previous 
rejection of all labor groups and feasts involving the local beer, 
the attempted village set them apart as a distinct social group by 
World Tar II. The Pioneer households actually returned to some 
pre-colonial practices such as feasts in later years, but the 
initial rupture of established social and economic institutions 
demonstrates the growing effects the market economy and 
Christianity were having, leading to the end of Bomvandes peasant 
community. 
Another slow transformation in one of the pillars of the pre-
colonial society began to occur in the 1930s, simultaneous to and 
caused by the rise of men's off-farm employment. Young men. 
gaining increased independence from their elders, began to obtain 
their own bridevealth by simply purchasing cattle for the purpose. 
As Table 411 demonstrates, the few pre-1930 marriages in Homvanda 
which are still remembered in detail were transacted with 
bridevealth from the husband's sister, following the pre-colonial 
norm. Off-farm cash Income, though, gave young men the opportunity 
to pay for their own bridevealth. This decreased the role of 
elders In controlling marriages, but by no means eliminated it. As 
long as bridevealth continued to be a pre-requisite for marriage, a 
young man was dependent an his father and classificatory uncles to 
arrange the bridevealth transfer, even if the young man himself was 
entirely financing it. Very fee marriages took place prior to 
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Table 4:1 
Sources of Bridevealth (No. of Marriages) 
Husband's Time 	Sister/ 	Other 	Off-farm 	Land Perioda 	Father ° Relative Income Sale 
Pre-Vorld War II 7 1 4 0 Nal 1946-62 10.5 0 11.5 1 6:29 1963-74 6.5 0.5 4.5 2 N:37 1975-65 3 1 7 1 6:56 
aN's are total number of marriages. Totals across columns do not equal N for all periods because no bridevealth has been paid to date in a number of marriages. bIn other words, brideyealth obtained via the pre-colonial norm: cattle obtained by the household in exchange for a married daughter. Categories with non-vhole numbers represent bridal:eel:1th partially from one source and partially from another. 
brideyealth transfer during this period. Thus, young men remained 
dependent on their fathers for arranging the formalities. However. 
their ability to purchase their own bridevealth and their 
increasing access to marriagable young women in the new local 
markets loosened this dependence. Thus, another of the pillars of 
both the pre-colonial and early colonial peasant society - elder 
control over juniors - began to erode under the effects of men's 
integration into the market economy. 
The period before the ear say the creation of the conditions 
for the rise of straddling as a fully developed system of social 
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reproduction. sale wage labor became fairly widespread and the 
types and remuneration of that labor began to be differentiated. 
The Pioneers by 1945 had fully established themselves as wealthier 
than their neighbors and increasingly came to be seen as a separate 
social category, closely tied to colonial authorities and rejecting 
key tenets of pre-colonial Gusii social and economic customs. The 
Christian village, though short-lived, epitomized this distinction. 
But the fact that many of these pre-colonial practices, such as the 
communal labor groups. wedding feasts and bridevalth, were still 
practiced on a wide scale indicated the degree to which the pre-
colonial system of reproduction had not been completely transformed 
and the peasant community remained partially intact. Land pressure 
had begun, yet subsistence agriculture with communal labor inputs 
continued to predominate. Ken had begun working long term off the 
farm and using their earnings for some household subsistence and 
the purchase of consumer items, but re-investment in agriculture 
and education awaited the post-war era, with its complete 
acceptance of Western education and the introduction of the first 
high-value cash crops into Bomwanda. 
/arid War It to Independence: 
raLitniaLAILL2wintaamminity 
The complete spread of long-term male wage labor off the farm 
and the use of that income in education and agriculture defined the 
full develoment of straddling and the end of the peasant community 
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in the period from the end of World Par II to Kenyan Independence 
(1963). Education came to be accepted as both legitimate and 
necessary and the colonial government introduced coffee as the 
first agrarian revolution cash crop in Homwands, the adoption of 
which was financed by man's off-farm income. Straddling fully 
developed as the dominant and nearly universal model of social 
reproduction. 
The Pioneers continued to lead in men's off-farm activity, as 
both household heads left Choir positions as cooks and opened up 
shops in the local market, as was common in post-war Kenya. These 
operated throughout the period and into the Independence era, 
though not always profitably. Mile both household heads sent all 
their sons and daughters to primary school and several to teacher 
training college, the businesses alone could not support the 
investment. In both cases, the land they had occupied became 
important, being the source of a large fruit-selling business by 
one wife and the site of a rock quarry, providing rent to the other 
household. 19 The combination of these sources of Income provided 
the education that enabled six Pioneer sons to enter off-farm wage 
labor at positions of very high remuneration (teachers, clerks, and 
a tailor). 
Other households, while engaging in extensive wage labor, did 
not produce the Pioneers' level of income or working sons. is 
Table 4:2 demonstrates, twelve of the thirteen Followers worked an 
19The quarry would prove to be • significant economic entity in Bomwanda, providing unskilled employment for a number of Bomwands men off and on from the late 1950s to the present. 
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Table 4:2  
Off-farm Male Employment: 1946-6Za (HouseholdSeads) 
Wage- Pioneers Followers 	[alarm Farmers 11:6 
Female- 
N:4 
rype 3f Job No.of 	Ave. Men 	Years No.of 	Ave. Men 	Years No.of 	Ave. Men 	Years No.of 	Ave. Men 	Years No.of Ave. Ken Years 
Prof..- sional - - 1 4 - - - - - 	- 
:lark - - 1 17 1 17 - - - 	- 
Business 2 17 1 17 - - 1 7 - 	- 
informal - - - - - - - - - 	- Business 
Skilled - - 3 11.7 2 17 - . . 	. Labor 
Unskilled Non-ag. - - 5 9 3 10.7 1 2 - 	- 
Agric. - - 1 7 4 15.75 2 8 - 	- 	- 
Total 2 17 12 10.4 10 15.2 4 6.25 - 	- 
'All men are classified by their principal occupation: the occupation in which they spent the most years. 
average of ten-and-a-half years of the period. Half of these spent 
most of their time in unskilled labor and half in more remunerative 
positions. One young household head ambitiously made the 
transition from 1946 to 1954 from a tea picker in Kericho to a 
trader of local consumer items to the proprietor of a grain 
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grinding mill. This he maintained into the 1970s as a very 
successful business. Be was the exception rather than the rule, as 
most spent the late colonial period in unskilled or lowly skilled 
labor, beginning investment in their sous education and in coffee, 
though not able to do so at the level of the Pioneers. 
The same can be said for the Wage-laborers, and to a greater 
degree. Of the ten working during the period, only three engaged 
in anything beyond unskilled labor, and four worked principally in 
lo, paid agricultural labor. Even though the Wage-laborers worked 
off the farm longer than the Followers, their lower levels of 
income resulted in lower investments in education and agriculture. 
The Farmers engaged in only a little unskilled wage-labor, with 
three of the four working principally in agricultural labor. One 
did manage to open a Local business for five years, but could not 
sustain it. All except one 'retired' by Independence. In contrast 
to the Pioneers, virtually no sons of non-Pioneer households had 
entered the labor force in the colonial era, so an analysis of 
their activity will await the next section. 
During the late colonial period, education became fully 
accepted as an important, indeed essential, household investment. 
The youngest household heads all obtained some education during the 
period, greater in absolute terms than the slightly elder household 
heads, but not in relative terms, as the average level of education 
throughout Denys steadily rose. Table 4:3 shows that a number of 
households also began to invest in education of the second 
generation. Both Pioneer households continued to educate their 
Householda 
Category 
No. of 
Hslds. 
Table 4:3 	Education Costs (Kshs/hsld/yr) 
Ave. 
Cost/Yr 
1975-1985 
Ave. 
Cost/Yr 
1946-1962 
Ave. 
Cost/Yr 
No. of 
Hslds. 
1963-1974 
Ave. No. d 
of Years 
Ave. no. 
of Years 
No. of 
Hslds 
Ave. No. 
of Years 
Pioneer 2 14.5 277 2 10 1327 2 10 3761 
N : 	2 
Follower b 5 8 144 11 9.6 204 11 10.9 1209 
N 	: 	11 
Wage-laborerc 4 4.5 87 9 7.7 144 10 8.9 446 
N : 	10 
Farmer 2 5.5 43 3 8.7 98 6 6.2 110 
N; 6 
Female-headed 
Household 0 1 1 150 3 7.3 124 
N; 	4 
No. of Hslds is the number of households with educational expenses during each time period. 
Only 11 Follower households are included because data were unavailable for two of them. 
Only 10 Wage-laborers are included because one is a lone man who never married. 
No. of Years households had educational expenses. 
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Household Category 	1246-42 
TABLE 4:4 
Coffee Adoption 
127545 
(Humber OrigREolandopting) 
Year of Initial Adoption 1250-55 	1256-62 	1263-74 
Pioneers 2 N 	2 
Followers 3 5 1 1 3. 13 
Vage-laborers 1 5 4 N : U. 
Farmers 1 1 3 1 N 	6 
remale-headed Households - - 1 2 N : 	4 
coffee growing in 1246. The first to adopt the new crop were the 
two Pioneers. three Followers, and one Farmer, as shown in Table 
4:4. The early adoptees among the rollovers were the local sub. 
chief, who hired the first local agricultural workers to care for 
his coffee until it aatured a cook for a colonial official, and a 
half-brother of the sub-chief. The Farmer, while not working by 
the late 1940s, was previously a catechist, obtaining that position 
from his cousin, the sub-chief. The trend for the rest of the 
period to Independence was one of the rollovers adopting the new 
crop earlier than the Vage-laborers and Farmers. The Female-headed 
households were unable to enter this relatively lucrative new 
agricultural endeavor because they lacked a man to become a 
PLEASE NOTE: 
Page(s) not included with original material 
and unavailable from author or university. 
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off-farm income levels via several channels during this early 
period. Membership in the district cooperative society was 
essential to obtain • permit to grow coffee and to sell it. The 
sew coffee grower vas required to purchase a fifteen shilling share 
La the cooperative. added to this in 1949 was a one shilling fee 
to obtain a grower's licence and a five cent per seedling charge 
for the trees themselves. a typical initial plantation contained 
100 trees, resulting to an additional five shilling expense. Thus, 
total initial outlay for coffee would be approminately 21 shillings 
in 1930. This compares to reported saway wages of lomvanda men 
La unskilled positions at anywhere from six shillings for tea 
picking to Xericho to twelve for other migrant agricultural labor 
and 30 for non-agricultural work outside the district. Cooks. 
denoted as 'skilled' in my classification, were earning a reported 
23-50 shillings per month during the period. Thus. 21 shillings 
was a significant investment, especially for the Lowly paid 
agricultural laborers; it is not surprising that adoption followed 
patterns of employment differentiation. 
Beyond this initial outlay, *any households had to raise 
extra labor to harvest coffee. This was dons via the use of 
gkiggaglo (women's daily labor groups) and 'sometimes" &maga (the 
larger, occasional commal labor groups) (Barnes 1976, 166). 
Demand for vomen's labor-tine was simultaneously increasing for 
maize production and for non-agricultural business activities. 
before beginning their off-farm activities. 
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poisangia, therefore, in that they were purely women's labor and 
rewarded each member only the amount of labor she contributed, 
could not provide large labor supplements for coffee harvesting in 
Labor-tight households. Thus, num the key institutions 
designed to provide unusually large amounts of labor upon demand, 
must have been important to many new coffee growers. a household's 
ability to provide beer and meat for mem may have often been 
crucial to harvesting relatively large amounts of coffee. By this 
period. Pioneer and Follower households generally had a greater 
ability to raise MAIM via greater surplus grain production and 
men's ability and willingness to purchase the necessary beer 
inputs. Thus, adoption of the first 'agrarian revolution' crop was 
heavily predicated upon previous patterns of integration into the 
market economy and household differentiation. 22 
By the end of the period leading to Kenyan Indpendence, the 
key elements of straddling were established. Off-farm wage labor 
and/or businesses were no longer engaged in to purchase a few 
consumer items, but had become an integral part of overall 
household reproduction and expansion. They became the basis for 
differential access to education and investment in coffee, the new 
cash crop. The latter was significant, but not revolutionary, in 
terms of income-generation in Kisii. Though the data are sketchy, 
it is clear that any significant long-term off-farm employment 
2 2Chapter S contains a aore detailed analysis of the effects of sarket integration on MAIM and thisinsia, providing data to support the claims made here. 
157 
could provide household revenue well beyond normal coffee sales. 
Coffee production among Homwanda Followers in the early 1930s, for 
instance, equalled 2-3 months' wages as a skilled laborer, while 
production among Vage-laborers and Farmers was worth 3-5 months' 
unskilled wages. Thus, coffee was a significant boost to household 
income, but no replacement for off-farm wages. 23 
However, off-farm employment was never certain. Coffee 
allowed a man to increase the cash-generating potential of his farm 
and his family's labor, providing a cushion to possible loss of 
off-farm income, or an alternative for a man who desired to leave 
off-farm employment temporarily. This cushion was built via 
significant intensification of women's labor in agriculture. 
Combined with the husbandry changes in maize cultivation and the 
rise of commercial beer brewing (see Chapter 5), coffee adoption 
put an increased burden on woman's labor. The decline of mum 
as institutions available to all households regardless of wealth 
level, combined with the increased burden on women's labor time, 
left a number of women dependent on men to provide investment in 
agricultural production and presaged future burdens on women's 
Labor as a key constraint to agricultural development. 
The full spread of men's off-farm employment in the post-war 
era was reflected in all aspects of household reproduction. The 
13These figures are based on the district average value/acre for 1949-50 multiplied by changes in the producer price to 1955 and then divided by the average acreage Bomwanda households were cultivating at the time. These figures may well be too high because the Homwanda area has always produced less coffee and lower quality coffee than the district average. 
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underpinnings of the pre-colonial system of social reproduction had 
clearly eroded severely by Independence and the nev system was put 
in place. Men's off-farm income became the key to long-term 
household expansion and the relationship between men and women 
within the household changed dramatically. Key institutions in the 
earlier peasant community - MUM bridewealth, and the 
inalienable family estate - continued to exist. But the new system 
had replaced the old and began to erode these final remnants of 
that peasant community. Men's off-farm income, its investment in 
agriculture (especially coffee) and education, and intensification 
of women's labor in household agriculture defined the new system. 
Men's enhanced freedom from short-term reliance on the farm and 
women's increased reliance an men to provide investment resulted in 
a silent struggle aver resources. Commercial beer brewing was a 
result of this, as women sought and gained cash income of their 
own, siphoning off a share of men's off-farm income even when 
unable to obtain a portion of their own husband's wages. But the 
long-term effect was increased pressure on women's labor, which 
would put a strain on household agriculture in the future and 
require further investments by men who wished to expand 
agricultural production and adopt the new agrarian revolution crops 
that would become available after Independence. 
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raLliaLattgadLaL_Iaslepsnslitasat 
ainilabatang..A.laroUlarikfts 
The first substantial use of hired labor in local 
agricultural production and the registration and resultant 
alienation of land were the most important new trends of the first 
decade of Independence in Bomwanda. The former tied agricultural 
production ever more closely to men's off-farm income, which was 
essential to hired labor on a long-term basis. The latter, only 
begun in the first decade of Independence, was a significant new 
stage in the differentiation process and would undermine the heart 
of any peasant community: every household's access to land. 
Before examining these new trends, however, we should note 
the continued growth of off-farm wage labor and business for men. 
As seen in Table 4:6, one Pioneer continued with his local retail 
store. The other had died, but his family continued the store in 
operation or rented it to others until the mid-1970s. Almost all 
of the Followers and Wage-laborers worked during the period. With 
Kenyan Independence, many new employment and business opportunities 
arose for Africans as many colonial restrictions were lifted and 
government hiring rose dramatically. Five Followers took advantage 
of these opportunities by opening successful retail shops. They 
obtained the capital to initiate these businesses in a variety of 
ways. One shop was operated by the highest paid Follower, who 
began teaching primary school in the late 19504 and opened the shop 
at Independence. Two others Imre begun after long periods of 
TABLE 4:6 
Off-farm Male Employment: 1963-74a 
(Household Heads) 
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Wage- 	Female- Pioneers Followers 	Laborers 	Farmers 	headed Nc2 	N:13 N:6 N:4 
Type 	iNo.of Ave. of Job l Ken 	Yrs No.of Men 
Ave. 
Yrs No.of Hen Ave. Yrs No.of Ken Ave. Yrs 
No.of Ave. 
Men 	Yrs 
Profes-
sional - - 1 7 - - - - - 	- 
Clerk - 1. 1 1 12 - - - 	- 
Business 2 10 3 11 - - - - - 	- 
Informal Business- - 3 10 1 5 1 5 _ 	_ 
Skilled - - - - 2 7.5 - - - 	- Labor 
Unskilled 
Non-ag. - - 4 8.5 5 12 1 0.5 - 	- 
Agric. - 1 12 2 12 1 6 - 
Total 2 10 13 9 11 11.6 3 3.7 - 
'All men are classified by their principal occupation: the occupation in which they spent the most years. 
'informal' business activity. These two men had not had unusually 
remunerative wage employment, but did have unusually large coffee 
fields, which may well have provided surplus cash to initiate and 
maintain their businesses. Two other informal businesses also 
started, though did not result in formal business activities. Not 
incoincidentally, neither had high previous wages or unusually 
large coffee fields. 
In contrast to the Followers, none of the Wage-laborers moved 
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from their relatively low-paying positions, as the differentiation 
between the two categories increased significantly. Their lack of 
high income and small coffee fields prevented than from taking 
advantage of the opportunities Independence provided. They all 
worked virtually the entire period but only four engaged in any 
activity beyond unskilled labor. Finally, the Farmers engaged in 
relatively little off-farm labor, having almost completely 
'retired.' The Farmers' and Female-headed households' sons began 
to work also, following paths similar to those of the sans of Wage-
laborers. 
After Independence the second generation of straddling men 
began to enter the off-farm labor force. As shown in Table 4:7, 
the Pioneers' continued high level of wealth was translated into 
education for children and, by the 19605, employment for both sons 
and daughters. Note the heavy dominance of professional positions 
such as teaching among Pioneers children (three of whom were 
daughters) and the couplets absence of any position below skilled 
labor. Followers' sons began to work in large numbers during the 
period also. Like their fathers, a number of them began in 
unskilled labor and moved to either skilled positions or, in one 
case, opened a shop. A few of the Wage-laborers' sans also entered 
the labor force in the first decade after Independence. One of 
these banana a teacher, having attended secondary school free by 
entering seminary and becoming a priest/teacher. Another became a 
government clerk, obtaining this position via an education paid by 
his mother and a 'step-father' not from Boavanda with whom the 
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TABLE 4:7 Off-farm Male Employment:1963-74a (Sons) 
	
Wage- 	Female- Pioneers 	Followers 	Laborers 	Farmers 	headed  N:2 N:13 N:11 N:6 N:4 
Type INo.of Ave. 
of Job I Men 	Yrs 
No.of 
Men 
Ave. 
Yrs 
No.of 
Men 
Ave. 
Yrs 
No.of 
Men 
Ave. 
Yrs 
No.of Ave. 
Men 	Yrs 
Profes-, sional° 6 10.3 - - 1 6 _ _ - - 
Clerk 1. 12 2 8.5 1 8 - _ - - 
Business - - - - - - - - - - 
Informal - - 1 8 - - 2 4.5 - - Business 
Skilled 2 10 1 10 - - 1 6 1 8 Labor 
Unskilled Non-ag. - - 4 7.5 1 7 2 5 1 4 
Agric. - - - 4 - - 1 5 
Total 9 _10.4 8 8.1 4 6.25 5 5 3 5.7 All men are classified by their principal occupation: the occupation in which they spent the most years. 
°Includes three daughters. 
mother was living at the time. 24 
The other trends begun in the late colonial period continued 
unabated in the first decade of Independence. The absolute level 
24Th1s woman's husband worked outside Kisii for all of their 
married life and provided her no support of any kind. After a fey 
years of marriage, she left Bomwanda and eventually lived with another man who did support her and her children. Upon the death 
of her legal husband, she moved back to Bomwanda to claim her land 
rights there. This is typical of the increasing marital 
Instability of the time, which I shall discuss in Chapter 5. 
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and disparities in educational investment increased significantly 
(Table 4:3). The Pioneers invested heavily in secondary school 
for their sons: only one Follower household, and no Wage-laborers 
or Farmers, were able to follow suit. Coffee adoption continued 
and acreage expanded as the second generation began to plant their 
own. As in education, the disparity in off-farm income resulted in 
a concomitant disparity in coffee acreage (Table 4:5). Women's 
businesses began to expand rapidly, as sons' wives began to engage 
in these activities in Follower households, and Wage-laborers' and 
Farmers' wives adopted the practices initiated by their Pioneer and 
Follower neighbors (see Chapter 5). Daughters-in-law in Pioneer 
households also entered off-farm labor, working as highly paid 
nurses and teachers, further enhancing Pioneers' levels of 
wealth." 
Cash crop agriculture expanded after independence, with the 
addition of two new crops: tea and sugarcane. The two required 
different levels of investment, so were initially adopted by 
different households and spread at different rates. A key 
distinction between the two was the relative importance of hired 
labor and initial capital for successful adoption. Eight of the 
ten early (pre-1974) sugarcane growers were Followers. The crop is 
usually planted along previously unused river-bottom land, so it 
represented an absolute increase in land use, not a replacement of 
food crops. Government policy hes never particularly encouraged 
"Highly educated Pioneer sons tended to marry equally highly educated women from Pioneer-like families of other clans, who either had or later obtained such professional positions. 
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the crop because the variety grown in Kisii can only serve as a 
snack food of little nutritional value. The seedlings were passed 
from neighbor to neighbor and require no fertilizer, so there was 
no initial capital outlay for the crop. Clearing the previously 
=used land, however, did require large labor outlay. But this 
Labor was principally family labor, not hired labor, in contrast to 
tea. Of the 41 adoptees of sugarcane by 1985, only nine had hired 
a full-time laborer when they adopted. 26 Because no capital 
investment was required, the initial adopts., were mainly Follower 
households that could provide the necessary family labor to clear 
the land. It later spread both to households with hired labor and 
to Wage-laborers, as the market for the crop grew in the late 
1970$. By 1985, 41 of the 65 separate houses 
(production/consumption traits within households) in Bomvanda had 
grown sugarcane at some point. 
In contrast to sugarcane, the Kenyan government strongly 
encouraged tea production through the ITU, as discussed in Chapter 
3. Also in contrast to sugarcane, tea required an initial cash 
outlay to purchase seedlings, fertilizer and other essential 
planting equipment. Beyond this, tea requires three years of 
careful, and constant weeding before production can begin. Without 
this careful attention, many of the plants do not survive and 
26A. 'full-tine' laborer in Millii is one who receives a regular monthly salary and works six days per week, usually four to six hours per day, all in the morning. These hours are the normal maximum hours spent on agriculture by anyone. The laborer may or may not (usually does not) live with his employer's family, depending an distance from his home to place of employment. 
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TABLE 4:8 
(No. Of Houses Initially Adopting) 
Time Period Household Category 	1972-74 	1975-79  
Pioneers 2 2 N:6 
1980-85 
1 
Followers 	1 	 3 N:26 
Wage-laborers 3 	0 N:18 
Farmers N:11 
Female-headed N:4 
' Total 	4 	9 	4 
production plummets. Not surprisingly, the first and most 
successful tea growers in Bomwanda made extensive use of hired 
labor to care for their crop, both before and during production. 
Of the initial four adoptees in Table 4:8, three had full-time 
hired labor when they planted tea. Only the Wage-laborer, a 
Ministry of Agriculture extension agent, did not use hired labor on 
the crop. The first Follower to adopt tea hired a full-time 
laborer specifically for the new crop. Tea has since spread to 17 
growers in 12 households. Approximately 412 of these had hired 
labor when they adopted the crop, and An additional 182 did so 
after adoption. the largest producers have employed labor steadily 
3.66 
and almost exclusively to used and pick their tea. All four 
initial adoptees had relatively well paid employment at the time of 
adoption, allowing them to make the initial capital investment 
needed. Of the other 13 growers, nine had substantial off-farm 
income at the time of adoption. Note also that no Farmer or 
Female-headed household had adopted the crop by 1985; they could 
provide neither the initial capital nor the sustained labor 
required. Tea is the most recent and highly acclaimed addition to 
the agrarian revolution, but in Homwanda its adoption has required 
capital and labor inputs that make off-farm income an important 
pre-requisite to adoption and limit the spread of the crop to 
households without such income. 
Tea arose in an agricultural environment already affected by 
the use of hired labor, undoubtedly the most important new trend of 
the first decade of Independence. Hired labor in local agriculture 
did not signify, however, an immediate and complete transformation 
to some type of 'capitalist agriculture.' Indeed, one can hardly 
call an agricultural regime such as that in Bomwanda 'capitalist' 
when marketed produce alone, as we shall see in Chapter 6, cannot 
pay for the hired labor employed. Instead, such labor was used 
most commonly to replace men who had more highly remunerated 
employment off the farm. Only a relatively highly paid off-farm 
position allowed a household to hire labor not only to replace the 
absent man, but also to provide labor time far in excess of that 
which he would have provided had he stayed on the farm. Hired 
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labor, then. became crucial to relatively high levels of both food 
and cash crop production, though production itself, at least 
initially. remainedfocussed on household reproduction rather than 
on capital accumulation. 
The Pioneers use of full-time hired labor has been constant 
since the mid-1960s, as Table 4:9 demonstrates. This reflects 
their sans' continuous, high level of income obtained in off-farm 
professional positions. For Followers, the average length of time 
that any particular house hired full-time labor was much shorter, 
reflecting the perceived purpose of this labor: replacing men off 
the farm. Vhen a working man returned to the farm or had a 
significant reduction in his income, the use of hired labor would 
abruptly cease. This also occurred when expenditure, particularly 
secondary school fees, increased. For the Wage-laborers, the 
period of hiring labor was particularly short, in that they rarely 
had the income to do so. Only two were able to hire labor for a 
period longer than five years: an extension agent for the Ministry 
of Agriculture and a highly paid male nurse who hired a laborer 
only when he was working And his wife suffered a long and serious 
illness. Note that, like tea, no Farmer or Female-headed household 
has been able to hire a full-time laborer, given their lack of 
significant off-farm income. 
The final important new trend of the post-Independence era 
was the initiation of a local land market. While consolidation of 
land holdings into family estates was complete in Kisii much 
TABLE 4:9 
Full-time Sired Labor on Farm 
a 
1014 3 # of Nelda Ave. Yrs # off Held* Ave. I Yrs I 31='-Ne. aslds i Yrs i InlVe. Hslds 	I Yrs 
Ira 2 20 1 14 - 2 18.3 Z 
sets 7 10 6 7.3 3 3.3 13 7.3 13 
VIVI - - 2 5.5 5 1.5 5 2.4 11 
r8 - - ' - - - . . 6 
e- ed - - - - - - - - 4 
hire labor, but the average length is the total number of years the labor was employed form the starting date. °Totals do not equal the total of each period because the latter include different houses in the same household. 
earlier, official registration following the Swynnerton Plan did 
not occur until the mid-1960s. After registration, a land market 
arose that sharply divided the Pioneers and Followers from their 
neighbors, as can be seen in Table 4:10. Both Pioneers and a 
number of Followers have purchased land. while several Wage-
laborers, Farmers and Female-headed households have sold it. 
Purchased land increased productive agricultural land for the 
household's use and/or provided extra land for a son to settle on 
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19E10.AS Haus Categ 
Pions N 
Folio N 
Wage-labo 
Farme N 
Femal head 
169 
TABLE 4:10 
Land Transactions  (Number of Transactions) 
Householda Category 
WEI 
1965-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 
Purchases 
1981-84 1960-75 1976-8 
Pioneers 1 - 2 N 1 2 
Followers 2 4 1 N : 13 
Wage-laborers 3 3 2 3 - 1 N : 11 
Farmers 3 1 1. N 	6 
Female-headed 1 N : 4 
Total 6 4 3 4 5 
The number of transactions in some categories exceeds the number of households because of multiple transactions in some households. 
to avoid excessive crowding of the original homestead. All eleven 
land purchases were made with men's off-farm income and usually 
accompanied hiring of full-time labor as part of an overall 
expansion of household agricultural production. Land sales, an the 
other hand, occurred as poorer households attempted to 'catch-up' 
to their wealthier neighbors in terms of their children's education 
and improved housing, or as a necessary survival measure. For 
these households, pia of off-farm income made them very dependent 
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an the household Labor force in agriculture. Hence, the absence of 
women an the farm caused two men to sell land to obtain bridevealth 
and four others to do so after their wives left them and they had 
either not worked for a long time or had recently become 
unemployed. This made land sales - and the permanent loss of land 
for the household in future generations - essentia1. 27 Finally. 
three household heads sold land in order to build themselves 
expensive improved housing, a status symbol being built by many 
Pioneers and Followers throughout Kisii in recent years. The rise 
of this land market represents the ultimate dismantling of the 
peasant community, as the most important factor of production and 
source of community identification is transferred from Wage-
laborers and Farmers to Pioneers and Followers. 
The first decade of Kenyan Independence in Homvanda witnessed 
the logical effects of the transformation of social reproduction. 
The trend set in the late colonial period continued and the effects 
of men's off-farm income spread rapidly. Hired labor and the rise 
of a free land market marked the end of two of the last 
institutions of the peasant community. Amiga communal labor for 
woman without access to cash income virtually disappeared, leaving 
such women with reduced options for meeting peak season labor 
27This does not signify that the women were in a dominant position and the men dependent an them. No matter how many years a woman spends away from her legal husband, she will eventually return to claim her rights to his land because she will be given no other land. this and the husband's possible return to off-farm Labor in lieu of agriculture mean a woman is at least as affected by a land sale as a man and, if she has left him. site will probably benefit from none of the proceeds of the sale. 	e 
	
P. a 	:J 
ircki 
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demands. New forms of communal labor arose, but these clearly 
could not fully replace the functions of the amasaaa. Vomens 
businesses continued to expand (see Chapter 5) but with that went 
men's expectations that their wives would employ that income in 
daily subsistence, thereby maintaining women's dependence on men 
for investment in long-term household reproduction and expansion. 
By 1975, straddling had fully transformed the previous peasant 
community. Indeed, land sales and increasing use of hired labor 
hits at a possible transition from straddling to new processes of 
social reproduction. The transfer of productive resources via land 
sales to Pioneers and some Followers, and from all other 
households, raises the possibility of some type of distinct class 
formation, as those increasing their agricultural enterprises have 
at least the possibility of becoming full-fledged capitalist 
farmers, while those losing land lose their ability to straddle at 
all. The outcome of this process, however, remains unclear. 
The Last tim Years: 
1111-16P12511121i2a-SILWASISQ28 
The most recent decade in Bomwanda has seen the reproduction 
of many households from one generation to the next and thus the 
reproduction of straddling across generations. There is further 
evidence of an incipient transition away from straddling in the 
long run. The trends set in the first decade after Independence 
have continued, as sons. and even some grandsons, have begun to 
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obtain off-farm employment, marry and initiate their own food and 
cash crop production. This has reproduced the entire straddling 
system and the differentiation that occurred in the first 
generation. any of the household heads retired from off-farm 
employment in the last ten years, but they did not 'retire to their 
farms' as many analysts of rural Kenya have claimed is common. 
Instead, they retired to their farms and to their employed children 
who provide the crucial off-farm income needed for short and long-
term household reproduction. 
The most important off-farm employment trend is in Table 
14:11: the almost complete entrance of the second generation into 
the labor market. The pattern repeats that of the previous 
generation, with Pioneers heavily represented among professionals, 
Followers among clerks, businessmen, and skilled laborers, and the 
rest working mainly in unskilled positions. Note. however, that a 
number of sons of Wage-laborers were able to obtain clerk positions 
and one succeeded in becoming a teacher. The latter obtained his 
education, as did one of the clerks, via land sale on the part of 
his father. Of the other clerks, one received educational funds 
from his 'stepfather' - the man with whom his mother was living 
while he was young - and then educated his brother who also became 
a clerk. The last obtained his education at no cost by attending 
seminary. Among Followers' sons, there has been a large degree of 
occupational mobility, principally Involving men who began in a 
lower skilled position, such as a clerk, and than obtained further 
education to gain a higher position, such as a teacher. In 
TABLE 4:11 
Off-farm Hale Employment: 1975-85a (Sons) 
Wage- Pioneers 	Followers 	,Laborers 	Farmers 
N:2 N:13 Ntll N:6 
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Female-headed  
N:4 
Type 	No.of 
of Job 	Men 
Ave. 
Yrs 
No.of 
Men 
Ave. 
Yrs 
No.of 
Men 
Ave. 
Yrs 
No.of 
Men 
Ave. 
Yrs 
No.of Ave. 
Men 	Yrs. 
Profes-, 
sionalu 9 8.7 3 6.3 1 7 - - _ - 
Clark 5 5.8 6 7.7 4 7.75 - - - - 
Business - - - - 1. 2 1 7 _ - 
Informal 
Business - - 4 6.75 1 2 - - _ - 
Skilled 
Labor 	2 6 8 6.75 - - . - 1 7 
Unskilled Non-ag. - - 3 3.7 9 5 2 6 2 9.5 
Agric. 1 1 - - 3 6 4 8.75 1 11 
Total 17 6.2 24 6.6 19 5.4 7 7.7 4 9.25 
aAll men are classified by their principal occupation: the 
occupation in which they spent the most years. 
b/ncludes three daughters. 
contrast, only one son (operating a local business) of a Farmer or 
Female-headed household was able to achieve any off-farm activity 
more remunerative than unskilled labor. 
The other trends of the first decade of Independence 
continued unabated. Education expenditure (Table 4:3) continued 
its earlier pattern, as sons and grandsons of the Pioneers and 
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Followers received secondary education, a few Vage-laborers' sons 
received the same, and Farmer's and Female-headed households' 
children receive some primary. None of the latter two categories 
have been able to provide any secondary education for their sons. 
The acreage and adoption of all cash crops - coffee (Table 4:5), 
tea (Table 4:8), and sugarcane - continued to expand. Finally, 
both hired labor and land transactions continued throughout the 
period. In a number of cases, fathers retired and their sons began 
hiring a laborer for their farm, who would work both the sons' and 
fathers' land. Similarly, sons had a crucial role in the 
continuation of the land market. Of the eleven land purchases in 
Bomwanda in 1985, five sere made by sons of the original household 
heads - sons who had obtained off-farm positions as teachers, 
clerks, and highly paid skilled laborers. Finally, one Wage-
laborer's son sold land in order to survive after losing his job as 
a teacher - a job he obtained by his father selling land and paying 
for his education ten years earlier. 
A new trend in land use arose in the mid-1970s, as a number 
of hosueholds began to rent land elsewhere on a seasonal or annual 
basis. As population pressure on land increased, a market in 
short-term, one-field land rental arose, transferring temporary use 
rights form labor-short to land-short households." By 1985, 18 of 
the 26 Follower houses (production/consumption units) and 
"These terms must be used carefully because they are relative. Almost all Boawanda households could be considered land-short relative to complete subsistence needs at current income levels, but some are even more labor-short, with labor being the chief constraint to agricultural expansion. 
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approximately half of the houses in the other categories had begun 
renting land: Only the Pioneers, land abundant at home and with 
purchased land elsewhere, did not rent any land during the period. 
The higher percentage of Followers renting land reflects their 
higher off-farm income, greater re-investment in agriculture and 
higher acreage under cash crops. Hen financed 80% of all land 
rentals. In the few cases where women rented land, they usually 
could not rent as such land as the average man could. Once begun. 
most families rented land more or less continuously, renting a 
different plot each year. Only sudden loss of a man's off-farm 
income or unusually high expenditures would cause a break in land 
renting. Given that rental vas temporary, almost all such land was 
planted with maize. Land rental thus reprsented expansion for 
household subsistence, as cash crops and decreasing fallow periods 
Lowered grain production an homesteads. Once again, this new trend 
increased women's dependence on men for key cash inputs into 
agricultural production. 
The final major trend of the last decade was purely an effect 
of the transformation that has occurred in Bomvanda. This is the 
highly stratified investment in rather expensive improved housing. 
Such a house typically costs 3-5,000 shillings, which can be 
compared to average annual incomes of about 3.000 to 9,000 
shillings for all households except Pioneers. As Table 4t12 shoes, 
the stratification in construction of these houses is extreme, with 
the higher value options being reserved almost exclusively for 
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TABLE 4:12 
Improved Sousing* (Number of Houses Built) 
Time Period 
Household Category M 1960-65 SP 	P 1966-73 M 	SP 	P 1974-80 M 	SP 	P . 
1981-86 ti 	SP 	P 
Pioneers 1 2 	- - 1 	- - 	- 	- 2 1 3 Ns2 
Followers 2 - 	- 7 1 	- 11 	- 	- 7 1 3 8:13 
Wage- Laborers 1 - 	- 2 - 	- 3 	- 	- 6 1 - N:11 
Farmers - 8:6 
Female- Headed - - 	- - - 	- - 	- 	- - - - Ns4 
Total 	4 	2 	10 	2 	14 	- 	- 	18 	3 	6 aThe three categories of improved housing are: M: Mabati, the word for tin - a house with earth walls and a tin roof. SP: A Semi-permanent house: A mabati house with cement overlay on the walls. Significantly more expensive than a mabati house. Pc A permanent house: Cement block mills and a tin or tile roof. Muth more expensive than either of the first two categories. 
Pioneers and Followers. Among the sage-laborers, four of the seven 
Improved houses were build to one unusual household in which both 
brothers are clerks, and two of the others were built by land sales 
-on the part of the household head. All told, only five of the 59 
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improved houses were built with funds other than men's off-farm 
income, and three of these were via land sales. Thus, improved 
housing is simply a recent reflection of the entire history of 
differentiation that has occurred in Bomwanda, with a few poorer 
households trying to imitate their wealthier neighbors by selling 
the very means of production on which they most depend. 
Conclusion 
Bomwanda has seen a nearly complete transformation of the 
process of social reproduction from the pre-colonial system based 
on cattle, wives and grain to straddling based on men's off-farm 
income and its re-investment in household agriculture and 
education. The peasant community and peasant households created 
during the early years of colonial rule were dissolved by further 
market integration, especially in the post-World War II period. 
The community institutions of elder control over juniors, communal 
group labor, inalienable land rights and bridewealth (see Chapter 
5) have been all but dismantled, with only the latter continuing to 
have limited economic importance. In their place has arisen 
straddling, in which men's off-farm income is combined with 
education and the intensification of household agricultural 
production via increased labor input, principally from women. 
Expansion in this system rests an the ability and willingness of 
men to invest their off-farm earnings in labor and land inputs into 
household agriculture and in education for future off-farm income. 
178 
But straddling as a process of social reproduction may also 
be undergoing transformation, from forces inherent within it. 'As 
differentiation has continued via straddling, the relatively 
wealthy have begun to increase their access to the means of 
production -- land and labor -- while the poorer increasingly 
appear to be losing both (selling land and being forced to sell 
faultily labor-power to others). As this trend continues, and there 
is no apparent reason for it to stop, landed and landless classes 
in Lisii seem to be emerging. The final outcome of this process 
remains unclear, in that the nature of the reproductive process the 
landed will adopt is unclear. The latter could evolve into 
relatively highly productive capitalist farmers, or may maintain 
some form of straddling at lower levels of productivity. This 
evolution will be crucial to the structure of the future rural 
society and to the fortunes of the landless and of state 
development efforts. 
This detailed historical analysis has delineated the 
dissolution of the peasant community and the rise of straddling. 
This system now defines household reproduction for All households, 
not only for the elite, as some analysts (such as Cowen and 
Tanyanjui 1977) have argued. What determines overall levels of 
wealth and agricultural production is the relative success of 
households in this system. The next chapter will analyze the may 
in which this system influences both men's and women's decision-
asking in an environment of resource scarcity and insecurity. This 
will allow us to begin to understand the way in which agricultural 
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production itself is currently conducted, the constraints upon it. 
and the response of households and their members to state 
development policy, which will be the subject of Chapter 6. 
CHAPTER 5 
$trantling and Insecurity: 
The Harket Replaces the Community 
The conscious effort at achieving household reproduction and 
expansion strongly influences daily productive activities and 
decisions. This conscious effort, In turn, is shaped by the 
historical process through WIS.& individuals, households, and the 
community have passed. Chapter 4 outlined the transformation of 
the dominant system of social reproduction from the pre-colonial 
era through the creation of the peasantry to the recent rise of 
straddling. This chapter will delineate the insecurity that has 
accompanied that transformation, which has strongly shaped the 
consciousness of rural producers. 	It is difficult to argue and I 
do not intend to imply that overall insecurity is necessarily 
greater now than under the pre-colonial system of social 
reproduction. Rather, that is of significance is the changing 
nature of the insecurity rural households face as the process of 
social reproduction has been transformed. This chapter shall argue 
that the largely market-based insecurity under straddling is 
significant in explaining the pattern of resource allocation 
evident in Romvanda households. 
Straddling alone -- the use of off-farm income to increase 
the productivity of familiy labor power -- could hypothetically 
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result in a variety of patterns of resource distribution vithin 
households. The number and type of agricultural enterprises 
undertaken and the division of household resources between 
agriculture and non-agricultural endeavors (and therefore the 
effects of the system an potential agricultural development) could 
vary. The particular result found in Kisii and much of Kenya, 
extreme resource diffusion within each and every household over a 
wide variety of activities, results from the insecurity that arose 
vith market penetration and the dependence of household 
reproduction on market mechanisms. 
The rise of straddling has resulted in significant levels of 
insecurity and instability for most rural households. The 
penetration of market relations into the community eroded pre-
colonial institutions designed to insure each household access to a 
minimally adequate level of essential resources, intensified pre-
existent intra-household tensions, and created significant new 
tensions and sources of insecurity. Of course, insecurity in the 
pre-colonial era, based to a greater extent an climatic variation 
than is modern insecurity, may well have been mitigated by non-
agricultural market opportunities. Indeed, this is presumably one 
of the attractions of off-farm income under straddling. 
Nevertheless, the nature of modern insecurity allows its effects on 
conscious reproductive processes to be pervasive even shell its 
concrete effects are not significant in a statistical sense. The 
possibility of productive or reproductive disaster for a given 
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household, testified to by a disaster in a neighbor's household. 
leads many to follow some type of minimax strategy -- minimizing 
the possibility of maximum loss. This has resulted in rather 
extreme resource diffusion, as most Bomwanda residents attempt to 
Unit their risk in any given economic endeavor, severely limiting 
productivity and ability to respond to development policy. 
Both Sara Berry and Goren Hyden have suggested that 
diversification of economic activity within kfrican households is 
crucial to an understanding of rural development (Berry 1985; Syden 
1980). Syden suggests that households diversify investment in 
order to maintain pre-existent communal institutions and avoid 
market dependence, while Berry argues that investment in diverse 
communal institutions is an attempt to increase overall assets to 
enhance market power and class position. in contrast to both, I 
suggest that diversification can occur within individual 
households, even when communal institutions have largely dissolved 
as significant investment opportunities and loci of resistance to 
the market. Communel institutions in Hisii no longer serve either 
as buffers against market penetration and market-based 
differentiation or as significant sources of socio-economic power. 
Yet extreme diversification of investment within each individual 
household, similar to that which Berry found in Nigeria, is the 
norm. Though such diversification certainly represents a myriad of 
creative efforts to survive and prosper within the dominant system 
of social reproduction, it also severely limits short to medium 
term development potential of rural smallholders. Modern 
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Insecurity is caused by market penetration and cannot be viewed as 
a source of strength for the vast majority of smallholders, as both 
Byden and Berry argue is the case for much of Africa. 
Fully understanding smallholders' insecurity requires an 
analysis of the way in which straddling has re-defined the 
positions of men and women silbia rural households. In the pre-
straddling era, men and women were both fully dependent upon 
household agriculture for short and long-term needs. In spite of 
the very unequal sexual division of labor, men were required to 
provide essential investment into agriculture to insure their own 
survival. Under straddling, men's access to off-farm income frees 
them from short-term reliance on household agriculture. They can 
choose to invest in household agriculture or non-agricultural 
endeavors, or they can simply consume their wages. Because 
investment in increasing the productivity of family labor (in 
accord with the straddling system) is only one of several 
investment opportunities open to them, they tend to try to maximize 
family labor productivity with minimum investment of their own 
resources. Vomen, on the other hand, provide the bulk of labor 
power for household reproduction, have few economic opportunities 
beyond the limits of the household economy, and are thus almost 
completely reliant on that sector. They therefore often demand 
more investment in household agriculture than their 
husbands/fathers/brothers are willing to make. This has increased 
tension within many households, as members vie with each other for 
control of resources. To understand women's resource allocation in 
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particular, we must analyze their insecurity vis-a-vis the market 
ma vis-a-vis the men on whom they depend for essential capital and 
land. 
This chapter will analyze the effects of: a) the dissolution 
of pre-colonial communal institutions such as bridewealth, communal 
land tenure, and communal labor groups: b) the insecurity of 
individual household reliance an market mechanisms for access to 
essential resources; and c) the personal networks created by both 
man and women to combat this rising insecurity, themselves a 
response (rather than an obstacle) to market penetration. The 
initial section details continued and enhanced tenmion between and 
within households caused by changes in marriage, health and the 
conflicting positions of men and women in straddling. A second 
section examines the insecurity of relying on market mechanisms for 
access to essential resources. The final section delineates men's 
and women's attempts to mitigate insecurity via developing personal 
networks of support of varying degrees of effectiveness. 
aggiudialtliambiajty: 
Imam,  Children,  and Health 
Because rural African households are the basic units in which 
both production and reproduction occur, understanding production 
constraints requires an analysis of phenomena normally associated 
with the reproductive realm. The chief production units, rural 
households, can be strongly affected by all aspects of the 
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reproduction process. Any phenomena vith the potential to cause 
the dissolution of a household threaten the stability of 
smallholder production. For this reason, it is essential to 
examine aspects of rural society not normally considered of central 
relevance to 'development studies. ° In this section, I discuss 
changes in marriage patterns, health and child-bearing, all of 
which have been profoundly affected by market penetration and 
straddling, becoming sources of significant insecurity for the 
smallholder producers of Kisii. 
Despite the radical changes that have occurred with the rise 
of straddling as the dominant system of household reproduction, 
marriage remains a crucial institution for both reproduction and 
production. For a young man, it is essential for establishing and 
maintaining a household, and for making productive use of inherited 
land. Young women require marriage to gain access to land. 
Virtually no women are allowed continuous access to their father's 
land (temporary exceptions occur in the case of divorces in which . 
the woman's father believes his daughter has been wronged by her 
.husband) and alternative economic activities are extremely limited. 
A fey educated (secondary school) women in Bomwanda have not 
married and support themselves via a career, usually in teaching or 
nursing. 1 For the uneducated majority, the only possible 
1Perhape'the extreme case of this type is the daughter of a Pioneer who is a nurse, unmarried and nearing forty, and recently purchased land on which to build a house, eventually marry and settle. In spite of her significant economic support of her parents' household: she has no place there as an elder, unmarried daughter. The community generally admires her educational and career achievements, but does not condone her purchasing her own 
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alternatives are local trading businesses which rarely generate 
enough income to provide complete support, and prostitution. (See 
below for a discussion of women's trading businesses.) Thus. 
women's alternatives to marriage, regardless of their personal 
feelings or potential husbands, are extremely limited. 
Vhilo marriage is much more than a purely economic 
institution, under straddling it continues to have crucial economic 
content and effects. The starting point of a straddling household 
is marriage, when a son is allocated his share of his father's 
Land. Vith the rise of off-farm income, his wife's unpaid 
agricultural labor may no longer be the only input on his land, but 
it remains the first and usually the foremost. The poverty of 
those few who do not marry and the lengths to which others go to 
secure marriage testify to its continued necessity. In Bomvanda, 
three men who never married are social outcasts, dependent on their 
brothers for support, often engaging in low-paid unskilled labor or 
local business to survive and being shunned from the company of 
their age-eates. 2 Two married men whose wives left them (without 
return of bridewealth) are in a similar economic state, though are 
socially accepted because they are 'married.' Two of the poorest 
land or her plans to settle there rather than an her husband's land. 2Several other men from Bomwanda never married and live outside the community, engaged in wage labor to support themselves. They have not even attempted straddling, either selling their land outright (one case) or leaving it for the use of their brothers. They are not true members of the community in any real sense, though remain potential members who theoretically could still marry and begin production on their Land. 
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households consist of Farmers who married rather late in life (in 
one case raising bridewealth by selling land) and are growing old 
while their sons are still quite young, leaving their households 
without an able-bodied adult man for on or off-farm employment. 
Some men have gone as far as selling land to acquire bridevealth 
and avoid such extreme poverty. 
Polygyny is also a common effect of the necessity of 
marriage. Only three of the eleven cases of polygyny involving 
current Bomvanda residents did not have some type of economic or 
reproductive explanation. 3 Of the others, three were due to a 
man's desire to increase family labor power on an unusually large 
amount of inherited land, one to the infertility of the initial 
wife, one to the initial wife's leaving (for reasons unknown to 
we), and three to the husband's (and community's) belief that the 
first wife was a 'witch' (omorogL) and therefore could not be 
trusted as a sole marital partner. 4 Land sales and payment of a 
3Two of these involved leading men of the community in the 19404 and 1950s, who probably married a second wife principally for the 'traditional' social prestige associated with it. The third is a case in which a young man has three wives, only one of whom is officially married to him (with badevtalth transfer). All three frequently leave his for short periods. His case could be one of simple unwillingness to behave in • minimally acceptable manner to his wives (one local rumor) or a case involving witchcraft, in that his father, by his son's own account and that of neighbors, is a witch. His son accuses him of causing the frequent illness of him and his wives, and his multiple marriages could be a means to insure at least one healthy laborer on the farm at all times in the face of his insecurity regarding his health and his father's effect, on it. *As noted in footnote 3, witchcraft (oborogi) can be a very real cause of polygyny. -A man who discovers that his wife is a witch can return bridevealth in the early stages of marriage, but if discovered later all he can do is force her off the land (for as long as he lives) and marry a second. This is what occurred in one 
188 
second bridevealth show the lengths to which men will go to insure 
a marriage, the first and minimally necessary step to begin 
straddling. 
The centrality of marriage for household reproduction allows 
us to understand the importance of marital instability in creating 
insecurity in rural households. Increased tensions in the 
'conjugal contract' under straddling have arisen as the positions 
of men and women in the rural household have been re-defined. This 
has given men greater freedom from short-term reliance on household 
agriculture and increased competition over resource control and 
use, with marital instability often the result. 
One of the most severe causes of instability is the decline 
of the institution of bridewealth, itself a manifestation of the 
decreasing economic importance of subsistence agriculture in 
household reproduction. Philip Mayer wrote at length in the late 
19408 about the problem of Gusii bridevealth inflation, though also 
noted that most Gusii at the time foresaw the decline of the 
institution as a whole (Mayer 1951, 19-30). By the early 1960s, 
the transfer of bridevealth had begun to erode, with the trend 
increasing rapidly in the mid-19708. 5 Table 5t1 shows bridewealth 
case. (Whether the woman was actually trying to poison him, as he argued, or the witchcraft allegation was concocted to remove her so he could sore freely live with the second is unclear.) In the other two cases the first wife remained in the household even though the husband suspected her of being a witch. In both cases, the husband allowed her to stay (he says) to care for her children, and the second wife is constantly fearful of her witchcraft, especially regarding the new wife's Children, a traditional target of alleged witches. On the subject of witchcraft In Kisii, see the excellent article by LeVine (1963). 'This trend seems to hold for most or all of Kisii, not just 
• 
Yearsa No. Who 
Paid 
B-wealth 
No. Who 
Agreed on 
B-wealth 
Table 5:1 	Bridewealth Trends 
Bridewealth Agreed On Ave. No of Yrs. 
Between Marriage and 
IB-wealth Payment 
Bridewealth Paid 
No. 	No. 
Cows Goats Sha. 
No. 	No. 
Cows Goats Sha. 
Pre-1946 10 10 0.4 10.8 3.9 0 10.8 3.9 0 
N : 	10 
1946-1950 8 8 2.0 8.7 5.5 0 8.7 5.5 0 
N : 8 
1951-1955 8 8 0.9 8.5 3.1 0 8.7 3.1 0 
N : 8 
1956-1960 13 13 1.1 8.2 2.1 231 10.3 2.5 231 
N 	: 	13 
1961-1965 8 8 3.4 6.1 0.8 87 7.3 1.4 162 
N : 8 
1966-1970 16 16 4.2 3.9 1.2 682 5.6 1.6 1025 
N 	: 	17 
1971-1975 10 10 4.8 2.0 0.7 700 4.0 1.2 700 
N 	: 	12 
1976-1980 15 15 4.2 1.7 1.0 847 2.5 1.7 1641 
N 	30 
1981-1985 6 8 1•8b 2.0 1.6 1909 5.3 2.7 3750 
N : 26  
A marriage oecurs when a woman permanently moves to live as a wife to a man. 
Includes cases in which no bridewealth has been paid, calculating them from time of marriage. 
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trends from before World War II to the present for all living 
persons of Bomwanda. Note first the general decline in the amount 
of bridewealth and its monetization in recent years. Given the 
average price of • calf at about &She. 600 in 1985, the amounts of 
bridevealth Agreed  upon roughly correspond to the cattle 
transferred in the pre-World War II period. However, actual 
transfer in recent years has not met amounts agreed upon, and many 
of those involved on both sides reported that they never expect the 
full amount to be transferred. In fact, the increasing gap between 
amounts agreed upon and actual transfers probably accounts for the 
rise in the former over the last decade, as young men more readily 
agree to their father-in-law's demands without having any intention 
of fully complying. 5 
Since the early 19608 the period betveen the date on vhich 
the woman moved to the husband's household to live as his vife and 
the data on chick bridevealth vas transferred has increased. is 
Table Stl shows, it was two years or less in the colonial period, 
but increased to approximately three-and-a-half years through the 
mid-19708. 7 Since then, the number of marriages legitimized with 
bridevealth has drastically decreased; only half of all marriages 
contracted in the late 1970s had been legitimized by 1985. In most 
Bomvan4a. as S. LeVine (1979, 27-28) attests to. 
8k number of young men admitted to me that this is indeed their ttrategy. 
/The figures for the colonial period are probably slightly low, in that some informants probably idealized their marriages, stating they had paid bridewealth prior to the marriage when in fact they did not. The general trend, however, remains clear. 
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current marriages, the son simply announces that he has 'married.' 
later returns to his in-laws to seek their acceptance, and perhaps 
agrees to pay some amount of bridewealth. The couple then continue 
to live as man and wife, bear and rear children, and establish a 
household. 8 In the 3.980s, those fey households that did legitimize 
a marriage with bridewealth were generally poor and did so almost 
immediately, in a conscious effort to insure the stability of the 
marriage and thereby the stability of at least minimal subsistence 
production. 
The decline of bridowealth transfer is directly related to 
the rise of straddling. A woman's unpaid labor no longer generates 
the great bulk of subsistence and surplus production as it did in 
the pre-straddling era. As education and off-farm income became 
the keys to household reproduction, the importance of women's labor 
and therefore bridemealth declined. A number of household heads 
due bridewealth and sons who owed bridevealth tied their lack of 
receipt or payment directly to more important uses of the income: 
savings for education, land purchase and improved housing. Some 
amount of bridewealth, however, will almost certainly be 
transferred in all permanent marriages In order to insure the 
rights of the husband's household over the children and the burial 
of the wife, an important event in Ousii religious beliefs. The 
8The exception to the trend of generally declining bridewealth has been the Pioneers. A Pioneer son with high off-farm income who marries a highly educated woman from a similar family is expected to pay a very high bridevealth, which is considered direct compensation for the education the bride's parents have provided her. 
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amount of eventual payment may be quite small. legitimizing de 
facto relationships and insuring rights, but involving no real 
economic transfer. The institution continues to exist in form, 
though not in its pre-straddling content. Its economic import is 
limited to insuring long-term rights over Children and land. The 
earlier economic function, compensating a father for the loss of 
his daughter's labor power, has been eliminated as the importance 
of that labor power vitnin household reproduction has declined. 
The effects of bridevealth changes are important, principally 
in the early years of marriage when its absence frequently results 
in marital and therefore productive and reproductive instability. 
Bridewealth in the pre-colonial era both secured a voman's position 
in her husband's household and limited her options. Her leaving a 
husband who had fulfilled bridewealth obligations was extremely 
difficult (I. Mayer 1975, 275-78). Conversely, her rights to 
access to land were secure, even if she and her husband separated 
and she returned to his land only after his death (as became 
increasingly common during the colonial era). Marital instability 
in a young household results from the absence of pre-marital 
bridevealth transfer. A young wife is now commonly said to be 
'tested' (ggopima) by her husband and parents-in-law for a period 
that can Iasi five years or more. She is tested both in terms of 
her general behavior and her productive and reproductivs capacity. 
If she proves inadequate, she can be forced out of the household, 
even vith one or more children. On the other hand, she also has 
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the option of leaving if she finds her status and treatment 
inadequate. This can be either a permanent separation or a 
tempoarary one used to negotiate better treatment within the 
husband's household. If the couple has borne children, especially 
more than one and/or sans, both viii be reluctant to separate. The 
husband would have to begin the reproductive process anew, while a 
separated woman with multiple children will have difficulty re-
marrying and may well become the second or third wife of an elder 
man, a position few women desire. 
The early years of marriage, then, are often tense. Many men 
interviewed admitted being quite conscious of their second-class 
status in the eyes of their fellows, limited control over their 
wife and insecurity due to the absence of bridewealth. Women also 
felt insecure, desiring their husband to 'pay' something to secure 
their status. Several women in Somvanda reported returning home 
for significant periods in the early years of marriage to try to 
force bridevealth transfer. More common, however, were short trips 
to communicate to the husband their relative freedom and the 
potential for longer-term separation as Lang as brideyealth is not 
transfered. 9 At least half of the 36 Somyanda households have 
experienced some type of marital instability. Four young couples 
'married' without brideyealth have since separated, three after 
children were born. In some cases the 'laves' failed their 'test' 
9Gusii men generally express a dislike for their wives returning home to visit their parents frequently, usually viewing such visits as raising doubts regarding a women's loyalty to her new (her husband's) household. 
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and in others they left of their own volition due to their ill 
treatment. £11 the men involved began the process anew with a 
different woman. en additional six young marriages in which no 
bridewealth had been transfered were in a situation of continuous 
tension and conflict in 1985, as they separated and re-united in a 
continuing battle over bridewealth itself and general conditions of 
the 'conjugal contract.' such as working conditions, use of a man's 
off-farm income, housing or child care. 
Such instability has significant productive effects. Each 
time a young rife leaves her husband to return home, his household 
loses essential agricultural labor, often resulting in drastic 
production decline, especially severe if a man is occupied in off-
farm employment. In such cases, the young man will return to 
eating with his mother, adding a burden to her and his unmarried 
sisters' labor. In 1985 alone, three households suffered 
significant production decreases due to suddenly absent young 
wives. Similarly, daughters returning to their parents' homestead 
present an added burden to that household, especially when they 
bring children with them. In most such cases, the daughters must 
begin a local trading business in addition to supplementing their 
mother's agricultural labor in order to provide their own support. 
Eight Bowe:We households have found themselves in this situation 
in recent years, some several times over. The daughters face 
fairly intense pressure to remarry in order to remove themselves 
from the household's burden, a proposition that is always difficult 
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for a separated woman. especially if she is a mother. 
Marital instability is not caused by lack of bridewealth 
alone. Indeed, where the 'conjugal contract is acceptable on a 
daily basis to both partners, a household can be created. 
maintained and expanded for over a decade without bridewealth. The 
immediate cause of instability with or without bridevealth transfer 
is usually a dispute over access to household resources. 
Bridewealth is necessary for a woman and her children to guarantee 
their long-term land use rights. In the short term, however, women 
must depend on their husbands for capital inputs from his off-farm 
income to achieve successful reproduction. The conjugal contract 
is under constant negotiation in many cases, as husband and wife 
bargain for resource access and control from their different and 
potentially conflicting positions in the straddling household. 
When a man does not pravide adequate inputs, women can and do 
resist his breeching of the conjugal contract. In the extreme, a 
woman may leave her husband to go to another man who will provide 
these resources. Only two such cases in Bomvanda involved actual 
divorce--separation after bridewealth transfer and the subsequent 
return of brideweatih to the woman's father." More common are 
what appear to be permanent separations without return of 
bridewealth. The woman thus retains ultimate rights to her 
husband's land, which she will probably claim after his death (La 
three of these the man has died and the woman returned to take up 
"One of these involved a young man who is rumored to be impotent and the other a case of °witchcraft' allegations. 
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use of her land). While her husband remains alive, such women 
either survive with off-farm jobs (in two Somvanda cases, one 
worked in her brother's retail store and another as a maid in 
Nairobi) or find another man to live with (in one such case, the 
second 'husband' was never officially married to the woman, but 
paid for her sons' education and her support for a number of 
years). in less extreme cases, women resist their husband's lack 
of inputs into the household by refusing to work on what they 
perceive as 'his' crops -- cash crops such as tea and coffee for 
which he receives the income to use as he desires -- or refusing to 
cook for and feed him. Women in these situations must attempt to 
survive on their own (even though still living in the same 
homestead as their husband) and often pay for education and other 
essential expenses with their business earnings or assistance from 
relatives and grown sans. Such cases are rare, however, in that 
women's businesses rarely provide adequate income for pursuit of 
such a strategy. 
Marital instability is a significant component of the 
insecurity of the rural producer in Wisii. Bridewealth, a pre-
colonial institution designed to enhance marital and productive 
stability, has eroded in the face of the rising importance of off-
farm income to household reproduction and the concomitant 
devaluation of women's labor power. The latter remains essential 
to simple reproduction in virtually all households, but is no 
longer the chief producer of surplus with which extended 
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reproduction can be attained. the absence of bridevealth and the 
increased tension between men and women due to their differing 
positions in the straddling household have Increased marital 
instability. This can cause sudden and drastic production 
declines, adding a new element to rural insecurity. In the early 
years of marriage, it can significantly decrease individuals' 
willingness to invest in a given productive activity as it leaves 
them fearful that the production unit itself will dissolve. 
Economically, the immediate need for marriage for a young man 
and his household is to secure a woman's labor power for household 
agriculture. The longer-term objective, however, is to secure a 
woman's reproductive power. The centrality of family labor in 
household agriculture continues to lead Gusii to value children as 
short and Long-term economic investments essential to household 
reproduction. Marriage itself is largely dependent upon a woman's 
reproductive capacity. L woman who proves inadequate in this 
regard vill have failed her early marriage 'test' and will be 
forced out of the household." The labor scarce, land abundant 
pre-colonial Gusii society set a premium upon maximizing family 
size, contained in the common Gusii maxim that roughly translates 
"In only one such case did this not occur in Bomvanda. In a Pioneer household, a couple have been married a number of years without children. The man has a relatively well-paying job on which he can support them, along with a slight amount of household agriculture. He once forced his wife out of the household and 'married • (without bridevealth) another. Me still did not conceive children --presumably he is infertile. though Bomvanda residents continue to assume and assert that she is -- and eventually re-united with his original wife. 
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as 'people are wealth.' Today, Kisii is the most densely populated 
district in Kenya and continues to grow. The post-World War II 
population growth can undoubtedly be attributed in part to improved 
adult life expectancy. Straddling itself, however, leads Gusii to 
continue to find economic advantage in children. Sons and their 
eventual, wives and children remain crucial forms of social security 
in a political economy heavily dependent an family labor power. 
sore immediately, women depend on daughters' labor to relieve the 
severe labor constraint they face." 
As in most smallholder African societies, sons continue to 
represent • form of social security for their parents. In Kisii, 
the youngest son has responsibility for caring for his elderly 
parents and is generally given a slightly larger share of the 
homestead land to compensate for his parents' food consumption. 
The extreme poverty of those without sons caring for them 
demonstrates the continued importance of this unofficial social 
security system. The most impoverished individuals and couples, 
subsisting on the slight agricultural production they achieve with 
their limited labor power, living in nearly ruined thatched houses, 
and without any ability to provide themselves adequate health care, 
are elderly men and women who either never married, never had sons, 
or have sans who refuse to care for them." While these cases are 
"Sans engage in no household chores and relatively limited agricultural activities after circumcision (and therefore adulthood) at about age nine. The contraints on women's labor and the role of daughters in relieving that constraint, particularly in household tasks, will be examined in Chapter G. "The latter involves only one household, in which the son accuses the father of practicing witchcraft against him. The two 
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rare, their obvious extreme poverty is a signal to all others to 
avoid this dire state at virtually any cost. 
The extreme measures Bomvanda residents have undertaken to 
secure sons is testimony to their perceived importance. One pre-
colonial institution continues to exist because of the centrality 
of children: woman-woman marriages. An elderly woman who has no 
children can marry a young woman by providing the necessary 
bridevealth. (This can be provided by the woman herself if 
possible, or by a brother interested in her welfare. Because of 
the crucial nature of such a marriage, pre-marital bridevealth is 
still transfered to insure it.) A young man (often an immediate 
family member, such as a co-wife's son) is selected to father 
children with the young woman: the children are Chen legally the 
grandchildren of the elderly woman, inherit her share of her 
husband's land, and are responsible for her care. Two cases of this 
exist currently in Homwanda. The elder woman obtains assistance 
for her agricultural and household labors and grandsons to inherit 
her land. 
In a slightly different case, a :serried couple had no sons, 
so paid bridevealth for a daughter-in-lav who produced sons with 
her father-in-law's nephew, again providing her agricultural labor 
for the elderly couple and the long-term prospect of grandsons for 
care and inheritance of property. A Farmer couple who had a large 
refuse to speak and the father and his second wife (his first left many years ago -- an additional explanatory variable in his poverty) suffer the economic consequences of not having a son. 
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number of Children die young sold part of their land and moved to 
Tanzania to flee what they viewed as the effects of witchcraft, 
only to return later with their two sons and reside again on what 
land they had remaining. They and another Farmer couple suffered 
unusually harsh poverty over the years because they had no Children 
of an age to support them until they themselves were quite old, 
adding severe labor shortage to their overall poverty. Despite the 
decreased importance of agriculture and the severely limited land 
available to each household, children remain crucial to household 
reproduction because they represent the only system of old-age 
security and essential labor in a labor-dependent economy. This 
leads both men and women to devote significant resources to secure 
children if marriage alone is not enough. 
The desire for Children is not solely a matter of undying 
'tradition abetted by the perverse effects of straddling. Indeed, 
interviews in Domande indicated a changing attitude toward child 
bearing as economic conditions change. The average Kenyan (and 
Gusii) woman has borne eight children. Interviews with 32 couples 
of child-bearing age (29 interviews were done with wives, 2 with 
husbands and 1 with both) found only two women expressing the 
'traditional' desire for an unlimited number of Children. One was 
a daughter-in-law in the Farmer family that had moved to Tanzania. 
The unusual child mortality of the previous generation has left 
them with an unusually land-abundant, labor-short household. The 
other is the wife of a Follower's son who is a successful truck-
driver, yielding an income well above average and allowing 
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household expansion via education of his brothers, land purchase 
and hired labor. Both these women expressed a desire for mare 
children to assist with household labor tasks." The most common 
response (14 respondents), however, was a desire to restrict child-
bearing to the present number, reflecting a growing sense among 
young Boacando households of the severe constraints of land and 
education feels. 15 
This strong sentiment in favor of 'no more' often represents 
the resistance of women to their husband's desire for the social 
status that still cosies with large families. Six of the fourteen 
women desiring to cease child-bearing reported their husband's 
disagreement with them. Only one of these had secretly taken 
birth control measures, though several others threatened to do so. 
woman's strategy in this situation is delicate, in that her 
husband could marry a second wife (though polygyny is increasingly 
rare) if the first ceases to bear children. This would require the 
first wife to yield half of her land to her co-wife, a such worse 
option than simply having one or two more children. This internal 
dispute and the small number of households (two of 29) actually 
stating they practice birth control raises the question of the 
degree to which desire for limits will result in actual reduction 
of growth rates. Still, the fact that perceptions are changing. 
"Four others, with an average of only 2.5 chidren each, 
expressed a desire for an unspecified but not unlimited number of 
Children beyond their present number. Of those giving specific 
goals, most common was four (five respondents), tith an equal 
number of respondents (four each) above and below that number. 
l'These couples currently have an average of just under five 
Children each with a range of 2 to 7. 
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with virtually all respondents recognizing that some limitation is 
necessary and vying it directly to lack of land and education 
funds. shows the extent to which 'traditional' attitudes can 
rapidly change in the face of reproductive requirements. This does 
not change the necessity of having sons for social security 
(preferably two or more to insure that one survives and assumes his 
responsibility of caring for his parents) and daughters to assist 
in household labor. 
Significantly adding to the perceived importance of children 
in Kisii is the havoc that illness can cause almost any household. 
Illness is pervasive in rural Kisii and its effects sometimes 
devastating, always disruptive. Men's and women's labor time lost 
to illness in Bomwanda for seven months of 1985 is shown in Table 
5:2, divided by the socio-economic categories employed in Chapter 
4. 16 Men lost an average of 18.5% of total labor days to illness, 
while women lost 22.82. This in itself represents a staggering 
loss in a political economy heavily dependent on family labor for 
essential agricultural production. Note also the divergence in 
time lost among the different categories, with the poorer generally 
suffering more illness than the wealthier (sans of Female-headed 
households, an unusually young group of current de facto household 
heads, is the sole exception of note). The greatest health threat 
in Kisii is malaria, accounting for about one-third of all reported 
time lost to illness. Although this may be an aver-estimate 
16See Appendix A for details of the methodology of the survey of labor time in which these data were collected. 
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TABLE 5:2 
Time Lost Due to Illness and Funerals (Percentage of all working days) 
Household Category* 
IZ of Days Lost 1 T . of,Total IZ of Sickness II of Days Lost 	IDue to Funeral Days° Sick 	Due to Malaria Due to Pregnancx 	Attendancec Followers 14.8 	16.6 	 4 5 Men 0:15.4 Women 	21.7 21.4 23.7 5 3 N122.3 
Wage-laborers Men 	21.1 17.6 6.6 005 Women 	24.2 42.6 3.3 8.1 00.2 
Farmers Men 28.1 58.2 5.8 Ns8 Women 	23.4 34.0 4.7 019.7 
Etallarluslasi Households Men 	6.9 24.4 7.6 N:4 Women 	23.8 31.8 32.7 6.1 0:6.2 
Total Men 18.5 33.3 5.6 Nt33.4 Women 	22.8 30.1 16.9 4.5 0147.4 
aNumber of workers includes non-integers because some workers were present for only part of the labor use study. The fractions ,represent the fraction of time they were present. °Days equal all days in the three day/meek labor use sample reported in Table 6:7. For methodological details, see Appendix B. cFuneral attendance is an important social obligation that includes not only atttending funerals but also ceasing all work for one to three days after the death of a neighbor or relative. The length of work stoppage and funeral attendance depends on the importance of the deceased and the closeness of each person to the deceased. 
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(malaria is endemic in Eisii and any illness more or less matching 
the symptomatic high fever and euscle ache is assumed to be it), it 
is clearly the principal illness of the area. The second aajor 
cause of lost time is women's pregnancy, which is of greater 
importance to those directly affected than the figure of 17i 
indicates: it represents such more tine to those few who were 
pregnant during the period of data collection. Time lost to 
illness further enhances Gusii desire for children. A sick or 
pregnant mother whose husband works off the farm can call on her 
daughters to fetch firewood, water and cook, and on both sons and 
daughters to replace her labor in the field. A household without 
children will suffer when such tasks are left undone. 
The sudden loss of labor, particularly a woaan's labor, can 
severely constrain household agricultural production. Izaaples of 
this abound in Bomvanda and are a lesson for any households 
fortunate enough to have avoided such problems. A aajor illness or 
problematic pregnancy can cause the loss of an entire season's 
subsistence production, not to mention the expenses of health care 
itself. Ewen more severe are cases of Longer-tern illnesses in 
which household resources have to be fundamentally re-allocated to 
overcome the loss. Not every household has faced such traumas, but 
those that have stand as examples of the importance of guarding 
against the worst effects of ill health. To appreciate such 
examples and the insecurity they foster in others similarly 
situated, I report a couple of representative cases: 
CASE 1: A Difficult Pregaimy: Maria is the daughter of 
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the eldest son in an extended Follower family that has done relatively well at straddling. In 1985 she experienced multiple problems with her seventh pregnancy. Her husband earns an intermittent small income as a carpenter working out of his home. She has a trading business that ceased for six months due to her pregnancy. To pay medical fees and purchase food during her pregnancy they sold one of their three local grade cattle and borrowed from his wealthier younger brother. Her husband was left alone to do the great bulk of land preparation and planting for the second maize season, with some hells from their small children, resulting in a significantly reduced harvest in early 1986. 
CASE 2; g Child's /Ilnesgs Jane is the wife of a son in a remale-headed household. Her husband works daily in the local quarry but gives her virtually nothing toward household expenses. They grow only food crops on their unusually email parcel of land, never having the money to invest in coffee or tea production. Jane supports the family of four small children from her rather successful home brewery, always full of customers two days per week. In 1985, one of her children fell ill and required medical treatment. With no help from her husband, she was forced to use the working capital from her brewery to pay medical expenses. The business did not re-open for several months until she could obtain the necessary capital from a relative from home. Caring for the sick child also required her to quit her communal labor group in aid-season, in turn requiring her husband to quit his job temporarily to help prepare and plant the second season maize crop. 
These cases highlight the problems associated with severe illness 
of various lengths. The effects are particularly egregious when 
the household head either has no off-farm income or invests very 
little of it in the household, leaving an ill or pregnant woman 
with few resources in time of need. 
Both men and women are naturally extremely concerned about 
health and its maintenance. Any illness severely effects a woman 
as she tries to provide the bulk of labor for agriculture and other 
household tasks. Hen are affected when they must divert resources 
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from other uses to hire labor. purchase food, or pay medical 
expenses to insure the immediate survival of their household. 
Children can aid in recovering from illness by providing emergency 
agricultural and household labor. Their own frequent illnesses are 
a cause of much insecurity to Flamands residents and a chief reason 
why virtually all households still see at least four children as 
desirable. Only the Pioneers can mobilize enough resources via 
market channels to maintain fall agricultural production and family 
businesses in the face of a major illness of an adult family 
member, or a child requiring medical assistance or a mother's 
continuous attention. 
Marriage, children and health remain crucial to household 
reproduction under straddling because family labor remains crucial. 
A significant part of the insecurity of Manmade residents is the 
instability their households face via marital instability, health 
problems or the potential disaster of not having children for labor 
and old age security. The decline of pre-marital bridevealth 
transfer and the Increased competition over resources within rural 
households threatens the dissolution of the household itself. 
Thus, men and women invest significant resources in overcoming this 
instability by insuring their marriage with some amount of 
bridemalth (once it has proven agriculturally and biologically 
productive) and having a minimally adequate number of children for 
their long-term security. Those who are unable to do so find some 
institution to secure additional 'family' labor and children (or 
grandchildren), or face the extreme poverty of not having enough of 
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both. Increasing marital instability, combined with the continued 
necessity of secure marriage and children, make insecurity an 
unusually important variable in Bomvanda. This insecurity has not 
been abated significantly by men's and women's market activities, 
which hug increased their incomes but have not necessarily 
enhanced their security. The result of household instability and 
insecurity of market activity is severe resource diffusion to 
minimize reliance on a single sector and the development of 
personal networks to gain support in time of need. 
liggLIAurjaity and Resource Diffusion 
Marriage is not the only pre-colonial institution eroded by 
the transformation to straddling. is discussed in the previous 
chapter, the imposition of colonial government usurped many of 
men's pre-colonial functions -- judicial, political and military 
-- and left them available to provide the migrant labor that could 
later become a key element of the Kenyan political economy. Under 
straddling, this off-farm labor has become the chief 
differentiating factor in the rural political economy. Clearly, 
limiting the effects of high-risk rainfed agriculture is one of the 
chief motivations for and potential benefits of off-farm labor, at 
least if it is reasonably well-paid and secure. However, this has 
been accompanied by an increasing insecurity -- an insecurity men 
did not face in earlier eras. Similarly, as market mechanisms of 
access to land and labor replaced pre-colonial institutions. 
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women's insecurity has been altered. Market institutions require 
market power to insure access, something available only to the most 
successful straddling households: the Pioneers and a few Followers. 
For most of the rest, reliance an the market has not fundamentally 
relieved insecurity inherent in rainfed agriculture and has led to 
a diffusion of resources over a vide variety of productive sectors 
in order to minimize the effects of failure in a given sector. 
Dependence on one or a few sectors would impose total reproduction 
goals to the instability prevalent in those individual sectors, 
something few household members are willing to do. 
Men's insecurity principally involves uncertainty over 
present and future off-farm employment prospects. The successful 
Pioneer households succeeded by combining relatively high wage and 
continuout off-farm employment with agricultural investment and 
education. Securing highly remunerative, stable and continuous 
off-farm employment is thus the elusive goal of virtually all Gusii 
men. However, only nine of the 34 household heads in Bomeanda 
(excluding the Pioneers) fully achieved the objective of continuous 
off-farm employment -- five Followers and four Wage-laborers. The 
majority were forced or chose at same point to return to reliance 
an local agriculture, local part-time agricultural labor or local 
informal sector business. Ryden (1980) argues that the option of 
leaving 'modern sector' employment is one of the key strengths of 
members of the 'economy of affection.' Household agriculture and 
the local informal sector give African peasants their ability to 
resist market penetration. However, as noted in chapter 4, 
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reliance an agriculture alone could not have been a highly 
successful strategy in Bomwanda. given its low returns relative to 
off-farm employment. It may have provided a safety net for men 
without other options, but not a long-term alternative to off-farm 
income. The poverty of the Farmers in 3omwanda bears silent 
witness to this fact. Not surprisingly, excluding the Farmers, only 
3 of the 19 household heads who returned to reliance on some type 
of local activity relied on farming alone. 
Host of those who returned to the local sector after 
signficant off-farm employment (excluding the Farmers) attempted to 
compensate for their loss of off-farm income with local businesses 
or part-time agricultural labor. The latter has consistently been 
the lowest paid 'off-farm e position available to Bomwands men. 
Local businesses, however, have the potential of being relatively 
successful either over the long-term or as a short-term stopgap 
until regular employment can be obtained. klthough about the same 
number of Followers and Wage-laborers returned to local activity at 
some point during their productive years, Followers had a greater 
ability to initiate local businesses during these hiatuses from 
formal employment, giving them greater ability to continue 
educational and agricultural investments. Four of the eight 
Followers opened their own businesses during these returns, while 
only one of the seven Wage-laborers did. Conversely, five of the 
seven Wage-laborers returned to engage in local agricultural labor 
only. This is the lowest paid position readily available in the 
local economy and does not provide a wage adequate for any 
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significant agricultural or educational investment. Of the 
remaining four Followers, two relied on their farms alone, but 
these two were among the earliest and largest planters of coffee. 
giving them unusually high farm income in the 1950s when they were 
not employed off the farm. 17 
The Followers were also more successful at returning to 
regular off-farm positions such as watchmen and cooks than were the 
Wage-laborers. Four of the former were able to do so, while none 
of the latter were. The Wage-laborers in these situations 
generally did not return to stable off-farm employment, relying on 
agricultural labor and/or informal sector trading for the remainder 
of their economically active lives. Followers returned to off-farm 
positions to secure educational fees, especially secondary school 
fees, for which farming and local labor or businesses were almost 
always inadequate. The household economy and related local 
businesses could only serve as fallbacks when formal off-farm 
positions are unavailable. Given the conscious goals of 
straddling, this does little to reduce men's insecurity regarding 
access to viable non-agricultural incomes. 
Such fallback efforts are but a few examples of the many 
short-term businesses attempted in pursuit of expanded reproduction 
via straddling. The 36 Homvanda household heads have undertaken no 
less than 23 small shops or informal sector businesses and their 
sons have tried a further 22. In addition to the two Pioneers. 
170f the remainder, two Followers worked as local agricultural laborers and one Wage-laborer relied strictly on his farm. 
211 
five Followers opened six shops over the years In Bomwanda, Misii, 
and beyond, four of which were sustained for a number of years. 
Host successful vere a retail clothing store opened in the early 
1970s with the assistance of a government development loan, a local 
grain mill. and a teacher who financed butcher and retail shops. 
Other efforts -- three shops and four informal sector enterprises 
were in operation for only a few years each. Their proprietors 
eventually returned to paid employment. Among Vage-laborer and 
Farmer household heads, only five informal businesses were 
attempted (and no shops), all failing after 5-8 years of operation. 
The pattern for sons of the household heads is similar, with two 
Follower sons opening local shops (a carpenter and a retailer) and 
nine operating informal businesses, while 11 sons in poorer 
households operated strictly informal businesses. None of these 
efforts lasted more than eight years, with an average of 3.4 years 
per enterprise. Thus, business success and failure closely 
parallel the overall pattern of differentiation. 
Most rural businesses in Bomwanda, then, are attempts to gain 
off-farm income in the absence of paid employment. Only six long-
term businesses have survived among the 36 households, all operated 
by Pioneers and Followers. Of these, only three have been more or 
less continuously profitable at significant levels. The others 
continued to exist and provided some income for the male 
proprietor, but little surplus to invest in household agriculture 
or education. They maintained only a tenuous hold on viability and 
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were probably not infrequently subsidized by the farm sector or the 
proprietor's educated children (as is currently happening in one 
household). Business generally dots not provide Bomwanda men with 
a secure alternative to paid off-farm employment. The latter is 
itself tenuous, subject to frequent dismissals, the dissolution of 
companies for whom one works, etc. Typical are men, such as the 
Followers described below, who go through a variety of positions 
over their lifetime: 
Samuel worked as a cook for a colonial official in Zisii for a few years in the 1930s, obtaining the position Eros contacts his father had. He then worked as a messenger and gardener for about twelve years until 1930, at which point he obtained a better paid position as a watchman in a neighboring district. Within a year, however, he had a dispute with his employer and returned home, having earned enough to pay bridewealth to marry. Be had planted a relatively large coffee field in the late 1940s, so stayed an the farm working that alone until the mid-1960s. when his eldest son neared secondary school age. Be returned to paid employment as - a watchmen near his home to provide his san's education. Be kept this positions until his 'retirement' in 1980. By that time, his eldest son had become a teacher and began to provide substantial funds for the education of his younger brothers. 
William picked tea in the neighboring Karicho tea estates for a few years in the 1930s. During World War II he joined the Zing's African !Lines as a cook, which provided him with bridevealth upon discharge in 1946. From the late 19405 to the late 1950s he worked off and an for a variety of employers as a cook and restaurant waiter. In the 1960s he established his own business, beginning by selling vegetables in the Zisii town market. With the demolition of the latter in 1910, he built a small mud-walled, tin-roofed building near his home in which he sells local produce. Now elderly, he continues running this small shop at a very low profit, generating enough income to provide his own needs and little else. 
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Thomas began as a 'kitchen boy' in the 19301 for a few months and then spent several years in the Kericho tea estates. Daring the 1940s and 1950s he worked off and on as a cook in five different positions in Kisii and elsewhere. Like William, he began to sell vegetables in the Kisii market in the 1960s, but returned to cooking for most of the 1970s to pay secondary school fees for his eldest children (who remained unemployed in 1965). Since 1977, he has attempted various informal trading businesses, none of which his been significantly profitable. In 1965, his latest was selling sugarcane alongside the tarmac road near his home. 
These cases illustrate the insecure nature of off-farm employment, 
with a given position usually providing an income for only a few 
years and local busines: zerving as a stopgap measure. Only 
positions within the government, most commonly teaching, can 
provide relatively secure long-term employment. Not surprisingly. 
men with the income and inclination invest in education to provide 
their sons with teaching positions. 
The insecurity of men's off-farm income leads them to invest 
in a variety of agricultural, business and educational endeavors in 
order to minimize the damage caused by losing a given off-farm 
position. A son employed as a teacher or a relatively large and 
successful coffee or tea field reduces the effects of the sudden 
Loss of a household head's off-farm income. In this sense, Syden's 
argument has some utility, but the role of the household economy is 
much more limited than he suggests. Both agriculture and local 
business provide poor alternatives to a stable off-farm position. 
Sven when a business might be relatively profitable, its stability 
is far from certain, as the failure of the overwhelming majority of 
Bomwanda's business attempts testifies. News insecurity is 
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clearly not as great as women's, and perhaps no greater than during 
the pre-colonial era, though its nature has changed fundamentally 
and its effects an resource allocation remain quite significant. 
Straddling is recognized as essential by all households, but 
household agriculture and local business remain survival techniques 
rather than sources of strength for the vast majority of rural 
households. 
Women under straddling suffer a two-fold insecurity. Like 
min, they perceive market access to key resources as tenuous. 
Vomen's principal concern is access to key inputs into agriculture 
and their own local businesses, rather than off-farm employment 
(though they are obviously affected by the insecurity their 
husbands face in the latter). Women are also directly dependent on 
their husbands for key resources for agriculture and children's 
education. Because they have a greater short-term reliance than 
their, husbands an household agriculture, they cannot be certain of 
the latter's continuous contribution to that sector. Combined with 
market insecurity, the uncertainty of their husband's support 
causes women to diversify their productive activities and diffuse 
resources to an extent even greater than that of men. They diffuse 
their most important resource, their own labor power. Over a 
variety of agricultural endeavors and local businesses in an 
attempt to minimize exposure and risk in a given sector. 
The dissolution of pre-colonial institutions designed to 
insure each household minimal access to land, labor and food has 
increased the dependence of women an the market and on their 
215 
individual, husbands. The rise of the individual. household estate 
constituted the end of community control of land. with it went 
community ability to allocate unused land to households in need. 
Instead, households with inadequate homesteads (an increasing 
number given population pressure on land) have had to purchase or 
rent additional land. Twenty of the 36 households were doing one 
or the other in 1985. All land purchases and most land renting 
relied on men's off-farm income, making women dependent on their 
husbahds for this crucial input into land-short household 
agriculture. 
In periods of scarcity, women are similarly dependent on the 
market and their husbands for maize purchases. In 1985, only the 
most productive Pioneer household harvested enough grain to meet 
subsistence needs. The rest produced an average of slightly less 
than half of their annual subsistence in an unusually low 
production year. The vast majority of this shortfall was made up 
by direct market purchase. Only 13% of all households reported 
engaging in any non-market grain exchanges during the year, 
representing well under Si of total seize needs. In what may be a 
fairer assessment of such exchanges. 28Z reported 'frequently' 
engaging in them, while 41% reported only occasionally or rarely 
doing so; the average amount of grain involved in all such 
transfers vas reported to be less than 5% of 1985 consumption. 
Overall, access to grain to meet subsistence shortfalls is heavily 
dependent on market purchases, even in a year of unusually poor 
production due to partial drought. While women's business income 
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is often adequate for some grain purchases, men's income is 
typically so much greater that an unusually large shortfall 
requires men to purchase grain to compensate. 
Perhaps the greatest transformation to affect women is in 
communal labor institutions. The key pre-colonial institutions 
designed to insure each household access to labor power during peak 
season, mum were transformed in the 1950s and 1960s into 
essentially market-based institutions, with access dependent on 
cash and other resources unavailable to the poorest households. 
With virtually all adult men working in off-farm labor, the 'mutual 
obligation' of all community members to attend newt could not 
survive. Hen had attended away& principally to consume the 
hostess's beer while their wives provided the requisite labor, but 
their presence assured the availability of their household's labor. 
As men in migrant labor failed to meet their obligation to attend 
mum their wives were free of obligation also. and their own 
access to labor became uncertain in that it was the man's 
responsibility to invite his relatives and neighbors to attend his 
wife's zugga. Only women and younger, unmarried and unemployed 
men remained available. ized-sex groups were called together and 
agreed to perform a certain amount of work for a certain amount of 
beer, in which all members would partake. Group members could 
negotiate with their hostess over an exact amount of work for an 
exact amount of beer, in that both commercialized beer and manual 
labor had clear market values. liminge, ceased to function as 
institutions providing labor to each household based roughly on 
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need and began to be non-monetary, market-like transactions. 
By the 19605, surplus grain production was declining and many 
households began to purchase the inputs for beer brewing. Women 
who could afford these inputs were able to raise more labor via 
num than could poorer women. tying AgAuga access to the more 
general differentiation occurring among households and monetizing 
it. The virtual elimination of mum occurred when the 
wealthiest households began to hire agricultural labor directly in 
the 1960s (see Chapter 4). The option of working as a directly 
hired agricultural laborer led potential magas members to demand 
full market value for their labor in mow, equalizing the cost 
of the two labor forms. Because raising mug& required labor on 
the part of the hostess, who had to purchase the beer or produce it 
herself, it became much easier for those with adequate cash income 
to hire labor directly. Similarly, potential rises& members came 
to prefer working for wages, which they could dispose of as they 
personally desired, rather than negotiating as a group over the 
amount and type of payment. The result was the almost total 
disappearance of mALASA. While eight households reported using 
gnaw in the 1960s, only four did so in the 19708 and only one in 
the 19805. Access to nom-family agricultural labor came to depend 
an access to cash, limiting the ability of. women, particularly in 
poorer households, to obtain such labor. Wouseholds in which the 
man did not have access to adequate levels of off-farm income, or 
in which he chose not to invest in hired labor, were left without. 
Women did not sit idly accepting this increased dependence on 
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their husbands for a crucial agricultural input. Instead, they 
attempted to continue other pre-colonial forms of communal labor 
and readily joined new organizations that arose with Zenya's 
political independence. Disangio, the pre-colonial daily women's 
Labor groups, continue to function in the straddling system. As 
noted in Chapter 4, however, these do not provide quantum increases 
in labor power available to a particular woman, though they do 
slightly increase productivity via the heartening atmosphere of 
working in a group. Prior to the intensification of maize 
cultivation and the adoption of cash crops in the 1950s, ebisanzio  
operated principally in peak season. With the addition of new cash 
crops, a second maize season and a second weeding per season, they 
became virtually year-round activities. Their membership is fluid 
because of alternative demands for women's labor, illness, 
disagreements among members, and husbands' opposition to them as 
organizations in which women 'gossip' about their ill-treatment at 
home. They usually have four-to-eight members, so the loss of one 
or two members can damage or destroy a group. 	When they operated 
on a seasonal basis, their fluidity had less effect, in that a 
group functioned only a few months in any case. Since they have 
become year-round activities, hoverer, instability and small size 
have decreased their popularity because a member has no gaurantee 
that the group will last to the end of a season or year. 
Over the last two decades Bomwanda women have attempted to 
use ehlaaagja to expand their total agricultural labor time (as 
mum did) by creating them in the evening (ebisansio normally 
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function in the morning, when virtually all agricultural labor 
takes place). The pressure of other household tasks, however, 
prevented these from enduring. Half of the respondents who had 
joined an evening group quit because of conflicts with cooking and 
cleaning tasks and/or their husband's complaints regarding the 
same. These evening efforts were often made by women who were 
members of a new type of morning labor group, the 'self-help' 
group, or ekiembe (pl. ebiombe) in Kisii. These groups arose at 
Independence throughout Xisii and much of Kenya. They were 
initially intended to be multi-purpose grassroots development 
organizations. As such, they combined communal labor efforts with 
community investment in a wide variety of self-help development 
projects. 18 
The first skiombe in Bomwanda was started by a Follower 
household head - a primary school teacher - with assistance from 
the Pioneer households and had SO members at its peak. In addition 
to working on each member's field in turn like an egesaneio, it 
pooled community resources to build a nursery school. (Nursery 
school had become an almost essential pre-requisite to primary 
shool entrance and therefore very important.) In addition to labor 
and community investment functions, it and other ebiombe hire 
themselves out 'en masse' to any farmer, often a Pioneer, who will 
pay their price (usually approximately the current market rate). 
The earnings are either invested in a community project or, more 
18See Holmquist (1975) for an excellent analysis of the politics of these groups in Xisii. 
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commonly, divided among members at the end of the year. The 
original group disbanded in the late 19605 upon the death of the 
founder and disagreements between members and the new leader 
(another Follower and businessman) over working time and use of 
funds for community projects. 
Disputes of this type between Pioneer or Follower leaders and 
poorer members became commonplace in ebiombe. Four other attempts 
were made in later years, all of which failed. Problems usually 
involved battles between leadership and members over use of funds 
in the community investment projects. Leaders of all groups to 
attempt such projects have been educated Pioneers and Followers 
because they must be able to work with the Ninistry of Cooperatives 
to receive governmental assistance in the investment efforts. Five 
other Woks, consisting largely or totally of women, rose and 
fell over the last ten years. They failed for the same reasons 
ebisanitio did -- alternative demands on labor time, husbands' 
opposition to them, and disputes over fair division of labor time 
-- and because they could not be used to pick tea (which requires 
specific training and great care that sbiombq members without tea 
are unwilling to do for those with tea). The two groups that 
continued to operate in 1985 were led by Wage-laborers or Farmers 
and were communal labor efforts only. One was almost exclusively 
women and was making plans to attempt communal investment in the 
future. The other was led and consisted of men and women 
relatively equally and was committed to agricultural labor only. 
What began as elite-led, multi-faceted development efforts became 
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simple labor exchange organizations without government affiliation 
but still quite popular among Bomwanda residents. 
tike ebisanalo, ebiombe do not represent a quantum increase 
in labor power. They are a precise, egalitarian exchange of labor 
among members. Why, then, do they remain popular, especially among 
women? First, like ebisanaiq, they slightly increase productivity 
and absolute labor time in agriculture. More importantly, they 
include a savings scheme through which women can physically remove 
money from their homestead and other family members. Each ekiombe 
member pays a nominal (KShe. 2-3) fee each time the group works on 
her fields. At the end of the year. this money and any earned from 
hiring themselves out is divided among the members. This system, 
like similar savings schemes among women traders (see below), 
allows women to remove cash from daily subsistence needs and then 
invest or consume them in a lump sum. This increases their 
bargaining paver in the daily conjugal negotiations over shares of 
subsistence expenses and gives them the opportunity to make any 
investment or consumption that their husband refuses to provide. 
Finally, ebiombq provide a more stable (because larger) group labor 
effort than ebisansio. The former do not, however, completely 
fulfill the former functions of massage. Like ebisanaio, ebiombe, 
operate year-round in strict rotation and therefore cannot meet 
unusual peak season demands in the manner mem once did. 19 
19Mowever, even this function is possible within ebiombe„ though utilizing a roughly market form of access. Each member receives work on her land to turn -- in strict rotation. To receive the group's effort an your land out of sequence is possible -- for an additional fee of 10-20 shillings, a relatively small 
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Their popularity, particularly among women without access to hired 
Labor, rests on the lack of alternatives and the utility of the 
savings schemes, even though they only slightly mitigate women's 
dependence an the market and their husbands, thereby doing 
relatively little to relieve women's overall insecurity. 
Amiga& were transformed into market institutions via the 
commercialization of both agricultural labor and the Gusii beer 
used to compensate musk members. Commercialized brewing was a 
reaction to man's gaining off-farm income and independence from 
household agriculture. As Unwinds men fully entered the wage 
Labor force after World War II, local shops opened, the 
availability of marketed consumer items increased significantly. 
and women began to search for their own sources of cash. 
Commercial beer brewing was an obvious answer, in that it required 
chiefly farm inputs and could be done at home. Men with cash 
income were already frequenting local bars owned by coastal traders 
in the district capital. Woman's entrance into this market allowed 
them to Increase their share of men's Income. Even if a woman was 
receiving very little of her husband's off-farm wages, she could 
receive a share of other men's wages by selling them the local beer 
at a profit. This reduced her dependence on her husband for key 
investments and therefore lessened her economic insecurity. As 
Table 513 shows, three women in Follower households and two in 
Wage-laborer households were the first to brew beer commercially. 
amount though not quite nominal to the poorer households. 
TABLE 5:3 
10111111.1-2111111111116- (Number of women) a 
1946-62 1963-74 	1975-85 
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Household 	Cane Other , 	Cane Other category 'Beer Liquor Trede° Beer Liqqor Trade it Generation Pioneers - 	1 	1 	I 	- N:3 Followers 3 	- 	1 	4 	3 	1 N:14 Wage- laborers 2 	- 	2 	3 	- NO Farmers 	- 	1 	2 	2 	1 N:5 Female; heads° - 	- 	- 	. 	- 
2nd Generatiouc Pioneers - 	- 	- 	1 	2 ff:7 Followers 3 	3 	- N:19 Wage- laborers 	- 	1 N:13 Farmers - - N:7 Female- headed 	- 	1 	- 	- NI4 
Cane Other Beer Liquor Trade  
1 
4 	1 	6 
4 	4 	2 
3. 	1 	3 
a. 
5 	4 	14 
3 	2 	9 
3 	4 	7 
3 	2 	3 
'Number of sawn initiating and/or operating a business in each 
pleriod. b"Other Trade' includes a few women engaged in wage labor, two educated daughter-in-law in Pioneer households and nine others working either as maids or, more commonly, as short-term, temporary agricultural laborers. "First Generation' are the wives of household heads. Second Generation' are household heads' resident daughters and daughters 
°No reliable information was available an first generation women in Female-headed households, who were all either deceased or quite too elderly to recall business activities accurately. 
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They were followed by an explosion of such businesses after 
Independence and an expansion on the part of businesswomen into 
other types of endeavors involving both breweries and trading. 
Commercialized beer brewing began as a farm-supplied enterprise, 
requiring only maize, finger millet, and one large clay pot. With 
growing pressure on land in the 1930s grain surpluses shrank and 
women began to purchase beer inputs. By the late 1950s, the cane 
liquor produced throughout Kenya was introduced into Kisii and 
first adopted in homelands by the junior wife of a Pioneer. This 
gave a larger return to women brewers than did the traditional 
beer, but required purchased inputs of a locally processed 
sugarcane product. Thus, it required greater capital to initiate 
and maintain than did the traditional beer. as brewing became 
increasingly dependent on these purchased inputs, it began to 
reflect the larger differentiation among households based on men's 
off-farm income. The breweries reputed to be most successful (by 
both their proprietors and others) were those of two Pioneer wives 
and one or two Followers. 
Beyond absolute profitability, the women in Pioneer and 
Follower households were able to initiate such production earlier 
(see Table 5:3) and maintain it longer than their neighbors. Table 
5:4 shows the average number of years women in the first (household 
heads' wives) and second (sons' rives) generations engaged in such 
activities. It demonstrates that women in wealthier households can 
maintain their businesses longer because their husbands can and 
will provide needed cash to sustain occasional losses or emergency 
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TABLE 5:4 
Duration of Vomen's Businesses  (Years) 
First Generations 
Bouseholg 
Category ° Local Beer Cane Liquor 
Other Trade Wage-labor 
Pioneers - 20 20 N:4 Followers 21.2 12 4.6 10 N:23 Wage-Laborers 9.9 5.6 5 2 N:17 Farmers 10 5 1 30c Nal Female- Headed 10 - $10 
Second Gene rationd 
Household Category Local Beer Cane Liquor 
Other Trade Wage-labor 
Pioneers - 5 4 12.3 N18 Followers 9.8 5.5 2.25 2 N:29 Wage-Laborers 4.25 1 3 2 N:15 Farmers 7 5.25 3.2 1 N:14 Female-Headed 11.3 8 3.3 N:8 
!Wives of household beads. are numbers of separate enterprises undertaken. cThis woman is a traditional healer who makes very little money from ,this accessional practice. °Wives of sons and adult daughters living at home. 
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household needs without consuming their working capital. For women 
in Wage-laborer and Farmer households. urgent needs such as 
education, illness, or a low harvest can easily destroy the working 
capital of a brewery if their husbands can not or will not meet the 
unexpected expenses. For instance. the most successful beer 
brewery in 1985 was that of the son's wife in a Female-headed 
household (Jane in Case 2 in the previous section) who receives 
virtually no support from her husband. One of her children became 
Ill during the year, forcing her to abandon her gkiombe and use her 
brewery's working capital for medical expenses. It was several 
months later when she finally acquired the relatively small capital 
(approximately 50 shillings, or two days' wages for her husband) to 
initiate her business anew. Women in such circumstances in poorer 
households entered brewing and other trades as often or more often 
than did their wealthier neighbors (see Table 5:3), but they 
frequently could not sustain such participation in the face of 
other crucial and unmet houshold needs. 
Although brewing beer and cane liquor remain the most common 
women's enterprises, in recent years many women have adopted other 
trading enterprises. As early as the 1950s the senior wife of a 
Pioneer had a large business selling fruit produced on her land, 
the proceeds of which she used to help pay her sons' education at a 
time when her husband's shop was not veryprofitable. Such 
endeavors grew substantially in the last decade, as the young wives 
of households' sons tried their hand at entrepreneurship. These 
women, and the wives of household heads, experimented with a wide 
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array of activities with the resultant rise in the 'Other Trade' 
column in Table 5:3. Several women in Follower and Pioneer 
households began unusually profitable businesses such as daily 
fruit and vegetable retailing In the central market of MAU. town. 
These Enterprises, like brewing cane liquor, require significant 
initial and continuous capital to rent the market space and 
purchase stock. Most successful were the widow of a Pioneer's son 
with a market stall and the wife of a Follower who sells porridge 
at the nearby rock quarry. Both women largely supported themselves 
and their families and hired an agricultural laborer. The porridge 
business even paid a signficant part of her children's secondary 
school education. These examples represent the rare success 
stories of women's trade. More common are trading in fruits and 
vesgetables in weekly markets, selling one's own produce, and 
purchasing, fermenting and re-selling finger millet for use in 
brewing Gusii beer, all of which yield quite low profits and allow 
women to purchase little more than their subsistence needs (see 
Chapter 6). 
Given the low return to women's enterprises, we must ask why 
they are pursued. The answer returns us to the centrality of 
women's insecurity in motivating their economic behavior. 
Independent businesses give women access to cash they would not 
otherwise have. The insecurity of fluctuating producer prices and 
man's inconsistent investment in agriculture, education, and family 
subsistence drive women to labor at low real wages to procure an 
independent, non-agricultural source of cash. In addition. many 
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businesswomen participate in savings schemes with their fellow 
traders that are similar to those of ebiombe. Each member 
contributes each week and the week's total contribution is given to 
each in turn. This allows a woman to earn a veekly profit. 
immediately place it in savings outside the household, and draw on 
it perhaps two or three times annually for major investments or 
consumption needs not provided by her husband. Only the relatively 
successful can engage in such schemes, however, in that most 
achieve little more 'profit than is necessary for basic 
subsistence needs, which their husbands expect them to provide to 
the greatest extent possible. Women's breweries and other 
businesses represent attempts to increase their share of off-farm 
income and meet their subsistence requirements. For most women, 
these activities have not alloyed them to overcome their dependence 
on men for investment in education and agriculture for long-term 
household reproduction. As such, they do not fundamentally alter 
power relationships within the rural household or reduce the 
insecurity women face vis-a-vis the market and their husbands. 
As we will examine in Chapter 6, the combination of 
straddling and the predominant insecurity of both men and women has 
produced rather extreme resource diffusion within each rural 
household. The insecurity of off-farm employment and local 
business impels men to invest time and money in both over their 
productive lifetime, in most cases using the latter as a fallback 
when the former fails. They also continue to invest in a variety 
of agricultural sectors, despite the generally low returns relative 
229 
to off-farm endeavors, to secure an additional fallback if needed 
and raise the productivity of family labor as necessitated under 
straddling. any invest in both hired labor and land to be used 
across the agricultural spectrum to enhance income generation from 
their inherited land while minimizing exposure to the price 
fluctuations of a single agricultural market. As a result, all 
households engage in widely mixed farming of extremely small scale. 
By 1985 all 80mwanda households grew substantial amounts of maize, 
all but two grew coffee, all grew bananas for market, and half grew 
tea and sugarcane. Ng household relied exclusively on one cash 
crop or on the staple alone. 
Women also diversify investment of their resources, 
allocating principally their own labor power in both agricultural 
and non-agricultural endeavors. All women combine labor and land 
investment in staple and cash crops. In the cash crop sector. 
women's labor allocation varies with the returns they directly 
obtain from the crop, which in turn depends on their relations with 
their husband. Tea, coffee and cooperatively marketed milk are 
sold via official marketing agencies, payment from which is made 
only occasionally and almost always to the male household head. 
Locally sold bananas and sugarcane, on the other hand, provide 
women with weekly returns via sales in local markets. In 
households in which a woman believes her husband is not adequately 
and wisely investing the proceeds from tea or coffee production, 
she will often partially, or in extreme cases completely, withdraw 
her labor from production of that crop and re-allocate it to food 
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production, other cash crops or her own business, as the following 
example indicates: 
Kristina is the wife of a Vage-laborer with a high income who provides virtually no support to his family. Her husband is now retired, but provides Little help on the land himself. Re planted tea in the late-1970s but now provides no labor for it. When Kristina and her daughter-in-law weeded End picked it, he refused to share the income gained from its sale or to invest in the household. She has thus refused to work on his tea fields. They survive, though the Children of their daughter living with them and their son's children appear severely malnourished. Three of the latter have died in recent years, prompting his wife to desire to have several more in the hopes that enough will survive to relieve the labor burden of both her and her mother-La-law. L viable tea field would be of great help, but that will not occur unless the laborers involved receive benefit from it. 
Finally, women allocate significant labor time (see Chapter 6) to 
their own businesses, gaining a source of cash dependent on neither 
the agricultural market nor a man. Thus, women diversify their 
Labor and land (to the extent they control land) allocation in 
order to avoid the insecurity of reliance on a single market or 
their husbands' income. 
Market penetration has created new forms of insecurity in 
Bomwanda, as pre-colonial institutions designed to guarantee 
minimal resource access to all households have dissolved. The 
absence of bridevealth and the continuing need for children make 
marriage essential but often unstable, while the necessity of using 
market mechanisms to secure essential resources leaves both men and 
women in very insecure positions. The result, as we will analyze 
in detail in Chapter 6, is extreme resource diffusion over a vide 
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array of productive activities within each household, despite the 
at least initially increased incomes derived from cash crops and 
wage labor. Only the wealthiest -- the Pioneers and a few 
Followers -- can escape this insecurity and resultant resource 
diffusion. Before turning to the purely economic effects of 
insecurity, however, I will examine the social reaction of Bomvanda 
residents to insecurity: the development and maintenance of 
extensive support networks to attempt to mitigate the worst effects 
of market dependence under straddling. 
personal NetworXL: 
Nen and Women in Search of Security 
Men and women in Bomvanda have attempted to limit their 
exposure to the insecurity of the market and climate by developing 
and maintaining personal social networks through which they might 
gain access to productive resources. Because they engage in 
different types of market activity in their distinct positions 
within straddling, men and women develop distinct social networks 
for distinct purposes. Men focus primarily on developing social 
networks that will yield access to off-farm economic opportunities, 
while women use such networks to raise additional family labor 
power, provide emergency food assistance, health care, tad child 
care. In both cases, we should not aver-emphasize the importance 
of such networks. While they do provide important assistance in 
emergency situations, they do little to mitigate the overall market 
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dependence that Bomwanda households face. 
Furthermore, I suggest that such networks are not, as Ryden 
would argue, pre-colonial institutions operating to prevent market 
penetration and dependence. Rather, they are recent reactions to 
such dependence. The chief pre-coloniAl institutions similar to 
current social networks were marriage networks providing child care 
and emergency food support. Modern-day networks have little 
relation to these earlier institutions. While they do provide some 
of the same support, they focus to a greater degree on providing 
security against the market and access to resources demanded under 
straddling. lather than successfully resisting the market from the 
pre-colonial period an, they attempt to limit its worst short-term 
effects with little influence on its longer-term consequences. 
When a Kisii man obtains a new off-farm position or opens a 
new business, acquaintances will almost immediately ask one another 
who his 'sponsor (in English) was for the new endeavor. By this 
they mean, who was his contact who assisted in obtaining his 
position or helped provide the capital, building, and permits for 
his new business. Virtually all Bomwanda residents assume that a 
'sponsor' is necessary to obtain any significant off-farm 
opportunity, whether employment, business or choice higher 
education. Table 5:5 reports the results of asking Bomvanda men 
who their sponsor was for any off-farm employment or business they 
have had, categorized by relation to the beneficiary and household 
type. These data probably underestimate the current importance of 
the sponsor. Many men seemed uncomfortable admitting they received 
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Table 5:5 
Llponsors:'  Men's Employment and Businesses  (Number of Sponsors) 
Household Category Immediate Household Eamate Member Mother's Family Unrelated In-law 	Friend 	Total" 
Pioneer 5 2 a N:25 (32) 
Follower 5 23 3 4 6 41 N:118 (35) 
Wage- 5 19 1 4 28 laborer (38) N:73 
Farmers 14 3. 6 26 N:42 (62) 
Female- z 5 - 1 a Headed (62) N:13 
Total 17 56 4 5 19 111 N1271 (41) 
'Numbers in parentheses are percentages of all positions obtained via a sponsor. 
assistance from others, prefering to assert they obtained certain 
positions solely on their own initiative and qualifications. Also, 
most agree that the necessity of a sponsor, due to the very tight 
labor market, is greater today than it was 20 or 30 years ago. 
Hence, the data under-represent both the history of household heads 
and the current needs of their sons. 
Despite this underestimation, personal contacts were reported 
important in obtaining 412 of all off-farm positions, with fellow 
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clan (lamate) members being most important in almost all 
categories. The substantially higher percentage of positions 
obtained via sponsors for Farmers and Female-headed households 
reflects the disproportionate number of sons and therefore 
relatively recent positions in those categories. The importance of 
clan members supporting one another reflects the nature of men's 
personal networks. which are closely tied to clan membership and 
supporting those whom many now term shomemates" (fellow clan 
members) in English. Though the clan in fact had no real jural or 
military purpose today, the bonds of trust that develop among 
homemates as they grow up together lead them, not surprisingly, to 
support one another. They are bound more concretely by their life-
long ownership of contiguous land (though in strictly individual 
estates), almost requiring them to remain on amicable terms to 
minimize local conflicts that can often absorb significant time and 
capital to resolve." 
The Pioneers are the sole exception to this trend, relying 
principally on their immediate families for gaining off-farm 
positions, a reflection of the better positions their family 
members obtained over the years. Indeed, a significant number of 
men in the other categories obtained their jobs through the 
sponsorship of men in the Pioneer families. Together with more 
"It is alleged that the clan continues to have real political purpose, in that politics in Eisii (Parliamentary and local elections) are said to be very 'clanish,° with each clan voting strongly for a particular candidate. It is impossible to verify the rumor, but if true could easily be interpreted as a further ramification for the entire district of the type of clan based networks found in Bomwanda. 
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prominent Follower men (such as the local colonial sub-chief), the 
Pioneer men are the chief (though not exclusive) 'sponsors' for 
their fellow clam members. They have both the off-farm positions 
from which they can secure positions for their relatives and the 
desire to do so to enhance their own prestige and position in the 
community. 
Ken's networks are also useful for obtaining emergency loans 
for business, school fees, or health problems. While most men were 
rather reticent about discussing financial flows among themselves. 
enough reported lending money to others (though rarely admitted 
borrowing), that it is clear the practice is not uncommon. 
Approximately 25 loans were reported over the years 1982-85 by only 
twenty respondents. This quite probably represents the tip of an 
iceberg that cannot be exposed. Again, immediate family and fellow 
clan members were the most common sources of loans, with school 
fees, health emergencies, housing expenses, business investments, 
and legal costs constituting the principal purposes. Only one man 
reported a loan to purchase food. Usually, women's networks meet 
emergency food needs, in that food is considered generally a 
woman's responsibility. Ken's loans can vary from the paultry sum 
of SO shillings for school fees to very substantial medical 
expenses of 1000 shillings or more. While it is impossible to 
ascertain the exact amount of such transactions, it is clear that 
they are significant for assisting in an emergency, but do not 
fundamentally alter the distribution of wealth and resources 
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created by straddling. 
Men maintain their networks of supporters and sponsors 
principally through social contact. This occurs principally 
through consumption of the local beer and liquor at women's home 
breweries. There is no clear social obligation to attend, but a 
young man who desires off-farm employment (as virtually all do) 
normally considers time spent drinking and chatting with his 
felines as useful to maintaining contacts and searching for 
employment. 21 Conversation at breweries frequently revolves around 
farming techniques and potential employment opportunities. Those 
who do not participate in these social gatherings are the 
exceptions that prove the rule. One young Bomvanda man has had 
little success finding employment. He shuns the company of his 
fellows and dislikes drinking the local beer. They in turn find 
him unfriendly and probably make little effort to assist his 
employment search. Another has devoted, himself solely to farming 
(the only case of this type I vas aware of) and spends little time 
in such social gatherings because he does not need them. Still, 
the social utility of the breweries cannot justify the inordinate 
amount of time some spend, or even the average time many spend, at 
them. That such a large amount of time is spent in such activity 
is testimony to the continued colonial legacy of surplus male labor 
and men's position in household agriculture, appropriating the 
a 'This aspect of the system is not resented by most men. That is resented is the not infrequent need to pay large sums for drinks, meals, and entertainment for a potential employer or supervisor whom you are attempting to convince to hire you. 
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surplus production of women, for whom no equivalent 'pastime' 
exists (see Chapter 6). Drinking and socializing constitute 
important, albeit inefficient and unproductive, methods of 
searching for paths to success and limits on insecurity under 
straddling. 
Women's networks serve different purposes, involve different 
people and are maintained in different ways than are men's. Most 
importantly, women's networks principally involve connections 
within a woman's native clan, not her husband's. A woman will 
rarely turn to her neighbor (the rife of her husband's brother or 
cousin) if she can gain assistance from her own sister or cousin 
from her home clan. Women married into a given clan, and 
particularly wives of brothers, are said to distrust one another 
because they compete over the resources of their husbands and his 
brothers and cousins. 22 Networks develop among sisters and cousins 
who are dispersed throughout Zisii as they marry into various 
clans. This gives women's networks greater geographical spread, 
complexity and diversity than men's. A woman may well obtain 
emergency assistance to cover hospital fees or a young girl to care 
for her sick child froe her mother's mother's brother's 
granddaughter, involving a 'path' of connections covering four 
clans and four distinct location's. Most commonly, women's networks 
22Such a statement cannot be blanket of course. any women, after living in close proximity to each other, become very trusted friends and colleagues. The general rule, however, especially for younger wives who have not developed close relations with their neighbors, remains. 
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are used to provide child care, food assistance, health assistance, 
and serve to Locate land and labor for hire in distant locations. 
A new wife is usually 'tested' for her productive and 
reproductive abilities for the first several years of her marriage. 
She is expected not only to farm effectively and produce children 
(sons in particular), but also to rear her new Wants without 
demanding resources from her husband's household. Host women. 
especially for their first two or three children, use the services 
of a young girl, an omorer4 (pl. gbarar t), to assist them in child 
care while they continue their agricultural tasks. An omorer& 
cares for young children and does substantial portions of the 
gruelling housework associated with the early years of marriage, 
providing invaluable support to a young wife's strained labor. 
(Typically, a young wife vill be attempting to start some cash 
crops she can market locally, attempting to start her own trading 
business, cultivating maize, and assisting in the cultivation of 
her husband's or father-in-law's tea or coffee.) A woman's 
personal network is crucial in providing this type of support. 
Twenty-three of 38 Abarert in Bomvanda came via these networks. 
All 23 originated in the women's native clan, 16 being sisters of 
the wives. Of the 15 not from women's networks, eight were 
husbands' aged mothers (employed as gbareri, only when their own 
children are adults and they can no longer perform agricultural 
labor), and five daughters of her husband's close relatives. The 
latter were used as abarert principally when the wife had no 
younger sisters available, requiring the husband's household to 
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provide them. In three cases, young wives lived without abarert 
because no younger sister was available and the husband's household 
would not provide one. 
Vomen's networks can be important in contracting marriages 
also, in that a younger sister serving as an omorert not 
infrequently marries a nearby member of her sister's husband's 
clan. Women find such marriages beneficial because they bring a 
trusted sister near for assistance and emergency support. Finally, 
networks are important if a young woman has a difficult early 
pregnancy. Again, she is expected not to demand her husband's 
household's resources until she has produced sons and been 
legitimately accepted into the family. She will turn to her home 
for assistance, often returning to her mother's care during the 
final months of pregnancy and delivery. A woman must establish 
herself as reproductively valuable to be accepted into her 
husband's household. Her presonal network, both her immediate 
family and her extended contacts from her native clan, are crucial 
to this effort. 
When a family needs emergency food assistance, whether due to 
absolute shortage or refusal of a husband to purchase grain, a 
woman turns to her personal network. As noted earlier, such 
assistance is not great enough to limit market dependence 
significantly, but it can be crucial for immediate survival. Of 
the 27 households who reported assisting or being assisted with 
food at some point, 20 did so with members of the wife's family, 
not the husband's. The geographical spread of women's networks can 
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be particularly advantageous when climatic variation causes lov 
production in particular locations. The geographical factor is 
also important for using women's networks to locate land for rent 
and labor for hire, both of which are at times difficult to find. 
In very rare cases (only two or three exist in Bomvanda) a woman's 
network, especially her immediate family, may produce land or labor 
power for the woman's use at no charge. 23 More commonly, a woman 
can locate good land that is known to be fertile (requiring a 
trusted local resident to verify) and available at a reasonable 
cost for a season or year, and sometimes obtain labor power (such 
as a brigade of young boys) to bring it into production. 
Similarly, a woman can use her personal network to search a wide 
and diverse area to locate long-term agricultural laborers, while a 
man has only the resources of his clan clustered in one location. 
When a woman needs assistance in paying for medical care. 
whether caused by an absolute lack of funds or a husband unwilling 
to assist, she turns to her extended network, usually seeking out 
her parents or a sister's or cousin's husband willing to help. Of 
35 major illnesses reported by Somwanda respondents, 19 were 
resolved with the immediate family's resources (off-farm income, 
Land or cattle sales, or farm sales), 13 by the wife's family or 
clan members, and only 3 by the man's extended family. When a 
household's resources are inadequate to solve a medical crisis, 
23The most significant case of this was in a Follower household in which the mother's family and cousins provided land for free use to the family, extremely land short an their own homestead, for over a decade. This was an extremely rare case, however. 
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women's networks appear to be crucial. They can provide cash, 
labor for child care when a child or mother is ill, or personal 
case for an ill wife if she cannot receive it from her husband's 
household. Several cases of each have occurred in Bomvanda in 
recent years. Again, the immediate family's resources are the most 
common source of cash for medical expenses, highlighting women's 
dependence on men's off-farm income, but a woman's network is 
important when her husband's support is not forthcoming. Rather 
than reduce the structural dependence of women on their husband and 
his off-farm income, they slightly reduce the insecurity this 
dependence causes. 
Finally, women's networks can assist women establishing 
trading businesses, which can serve to lessen slightly women's 
dependence on men. While we have seen that women's businesses do 
not fundamentally alter their dependence an their husbands, they do 
provide some limited independent income that is highly valued by 
virtually all Bomvanda women. A young wife starting a new business 
can sometimes acquire her initial capital from her personal network 
if her husband will not provide it. When sickness destroys the 
fragile base of such businesses, a woman may be able to initiate 
her business anew via assistance from family or kin even when her 
husband is unwilling to do so. Because of this slight increase In 
independence, a number of husbands quietly attempt to limit the 
degree to which women can use such networks. While valuing the 
ability of women to obtain emergency food, some men, as noted above 
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in the discussion of marriage, attempt to limit a wife's visits to 
her home and other family members. This is more than just a 
'traditional' desire to limit a woman's movement; it is often an 
attempt to limit economic independence that might threaten the 
conjugal contract as the husband has been able to negotiate it. 
Unlike men's networks, maintenance of women's networks 
requires little more than some degree of reciprocity. Women 
attempt to maintain close contact with their native families and 
clan members who might be willing to help when needed. However, 
simple reciprocity is all that is needed to maintain these networks 
because women constitute a dependent and vulnerable group due to 
their structural position in straddling. A woman's network 
consists of those she has known and trusted for a lifetime who are 
in the same position she is with respect to their husbands and the 
market, and do not compete with her for resources. Reciprocity 
alone will maintain a network in this situation, doing little to 
alter fundamentally the structurally dependent and insecure 
position in which women find themselves, but helping to reduce the 
consequences such insecurity might entail. Both men's and women's 
networks serve this purpose and are therefore highly valued. 
Bomwanda residents thus consciously invest resources, particularly 
time, into maintaining them. These networks do not alter 
straddling as the basic system within which simple and extended 
social reproduction occur, but do mitigate the insecurity implied 
by a system in which reproduction is dependent on the market rather 
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than the community and the vagaries of climate and fertility 
continue to have import. 
Conclusiog 
Straddling in Bomwanda has been accompanied by a shift in the 
nature of the insecurity households face. Understanding the impact 
of the two together is important for an analysis of agricultural 
potential and response to development policy. Inherent in 
straddling is the increasing dependence of household reproduction 
an the marksit. The latter penetrated pre-existing communal 
institutions designed to insure all households access to a 
minimally adequate level of basic resources, eroding and largely 
dissolving them. While the pre-colonial institutions clearly did 
not function exactly as their ideal form suggests, and would not 
have eliminated all Insecurity in any case, their dissolution 
clearly altered the nature of household insecurity, resulting in 
numerous household responses. In the place of community 
mechanisms, both mon and women must rely on market mechanisms to 
obtain essential resources. For those without an abundance of 
market power -- relatively high and secure off-farm income -- this 
entails significant risks of losing resource access. In Bomwanda, 
only the Pioneers and the wealthiest members of Follower households 
have secure off-farm incomes that provide this power and mitigate 
the insecurity the majority faces. 
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Straddling represents a limited transformation of the pre-
colonial rural political economy. Most importantly, family labor 
remains crucial to simple reproduction, regardless of resource 
allocation in a given straddling household. This makes marriage 
and Child-rearing essential to all production units. Straddling 
has also, however, eroded the institution designed to enhance 
marital stability: bridevialth. The decline of women's labor as 
the principal source of surplus production caused the decline of 
bridevealth, as men and women recognized that alternative 
investments were economically more beneficial. The importance of 
marriage end children for basic reproduction, however, necessitates 
the eventual transfer of some bridevealth and heightens the 
insecurity inherent in its absence. Furthermore, the increasingly 
distinct positions of men and women in straddling, principally 
their differing dependence an household agriculture, increases 
marital instability and conflict over intra-household resource 
allocation. The terms of the conjugal contract are not firm, and 
are often under almost daily negotiation. This can and does lead 
to household dissolution, both before and after bridevealth has 
been transfered, as one partner or the other rejects the implicit 
contract. The result is increased household instability that 
heightens the insecurity of market dependence. 
Insecurity in the face of the market has arisen as communal 
Institutions have declined. Men's pre-colonial political, military 
and judicial functions were eliminated and replaced with off-farm 
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employment and business, both subject to instability beyond the 
control of Bomwanda men themselves. Only the most secure, post-
colonial government positions provide stability adequate to 
dissipate household insecurity. For the vast majority, off-farm 
activities are essential to achieving reproduction under 
straddling, but are part and parcel of overall insecurity. 
Informal sector businesses and cash crop agriculture have provided 
relatively low-income, highly unstable alternatives to formal 
sector employment, acting as stopgap income sources but not sources 
of strength from which Boewanda men might gain control over secure 
non-agricultural income. 
Women face the double insecurity of their dependence on the 
market and their husbands. The dissolution of communal land tenure 
and communal labor groups has left women dependent on the market 
and therefore their husbands' superior sources of cash income. 
Women's own businesses represent their conscious effort to capture 
what non-agricultural income they can, but do relatively little to 
reduce their dependence on their husbands. Both men and women have 
developed extensive social networks to mitigate the worst effects 
of market dependence and the concomitant insecurity. These provide 
emergency support in a number of valuable ways, but do little to 
Limit overall market dependence. They demonstrate Bomeanda 
residents attempting to maintain personal and community control 
over resources to the greatest extent possible, but unable to 
change the essential nature of straddling and market dependence. 
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tosecurity results in attempts to limit risk and exposure in 
a given endeavor. The overriding goal of Bomvanda residents 
remains simple and eventually extended household reproduction. 
Production or profit in a given sector is beneficial to the extent 
it furthers the larger effort. Thus, almost all Bomwanda residents 
diffuse the resources at their disposal over a vide array of 
productive activities. The wealthiest, who control the largest 
number and most secure resources in the community, diffuse these 
reources to a lesser degree than do the majority. Still, 
straddling implies resource diffusion between agriculture, non-
agricultural employment end/or business, and education. The 
insecurity that accompanies straddling results In extreme diffusion 
within each of these sectors, as distil man and town Invests in an 
array of agricultural enterprises to guard against fluctuating 
prices. businesses to secure personal access to non-agricultural 
income, and employment (for men) to gain stable and minimally 
adequate off-farm income. The productive effects of this system 
are substantial. Household ability to respond to market 
opportunities or policy initiatives in a given agricultural 
enterprise is often limited because their limited resources are 
spread thinly across numerous sectors. These effects. on Immediate 
production and past and future household response to policy, will 
be explored in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 6 
=Wallis,  insecurity and Agriculture: 
PausiggcSausiggiatajnsulaat_mjayiloplent Policy  
Chapters 4 and 5 depicted the rise of straddling in Bomvanda 
and the market dependence and insecurity that have accompanied it. 
This historical analysis is important to our understanding of past, 
present and potential agricultural production and development. The 
extreme resource diffusion straddling and insecurity produced is 
central to both the initial success of the Kenyan 'agrarian 
revolution' and recent limits it seems to be facing. The overall 
goals and process of soc41 reproduction set the parameters within 
which daily agricultural activity occurs and markedly influence 
rural response to government development policy. This chapter viii 
examine the state of the household economy in Bomvanda in 1965, 
resource flows in agriculture, reasons for the patterns found, and 
the extent to which these can change in response to development 
policy or market signals. 
Chapter 4 followed the history of the rise of straddling to 
the most recent decade, portraying the Bomvanda household economy 
as one in which significant differentiation has occurred. 
Successful households have begun to expand their agricultural 
estate by hiring labor, hiring or purchasing land, and investing 
capital in me, and continuing cash crop enterprises. The 
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unsuccessful sell land to survive, frequently sell their labor 
power at low wages to gain some cash income. and appear to be 
surviving on dwindling current income and long-term assets. In 
short, some households are achieving extended reproduction, 
investing in increased production, enhancing their labor skills, 
and diversifying investments to increase future income and 
stability; others struggle to achieve simple reproduction, provide 
their immediate subsistence and attempt to pursue minimally 
adequate investments to maintain current subsistence levels. In 
the former category are the Pioneer households and 11 of the 13 
Follower households. Within the Follower households, only certain 
sons, usually the eldest, had clearly achieved higher levels of 
reproduction by 1985. The future of their brothers remains 
uncertain. Some will undoubtedly follow the eldest in obtaining 
relatively highly remunerated and stable off-farm income with which 
to invest in agriculture and education, while others may not. The 
Latter will probably see some benefit from their successful 
brothers, such as school fees and emergency assistance, though by 
no means enough to insure themselves the higher standard of living 
and long-term reproduction their brothers will achieve. 1 Finally. 
1The limited benefits accruing to the brothers of successful men is quite clear in the elder generation. Within Bomwenda, two Followers and an unusually poor Wage-laborer are half-brothers, while two other sets of four brothers include a Follower, two Wage-laborers and a Farmer in each sot. The limited assistance men receive from their brothers was protrayed in Chapter 5. This trend is certainly not diminishing as market competition increases, though some Bomeanda men expressed a desire to assist their younger brothers and cousins to obtain viable off-farm positions in order to minimise conflicts among themselves. This, indeed, is one of the factors behind the development of men's social networks 
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only one Wage-Laborer family has achieved a significantly higher 
Level of reproduction on the basis of stable off-farm income and 
investment from two sons, both of whom were educated by men other ' 
than their father. 2 For the other Wage-laborers. Farmers and sons 
of Female-headed households, simple reproduction continues to be 
their only likely achievement. 3 
The division between those who have achieved or are likely to 
achieve expanded reproduction and those Who are not is reflected in 
current and potential levels of agricultural production. The 
former not only have more viable overall agricultural enterprises. 
but also more security against market instability, allowing them to 
Limit the degree to which they diffuse their resources over a wide 
variety of sectors. This gives them greater ability to produce at 
economically viable levels and the security to adopt new 
cultivation methods quickly, knowing they can withstand the 
consequences of failure in a given enterprise. This chapter will 
investigate the effects of straddling, differentiation, and 
resource diffusion on current agricultural production and 
development potential. I will first examine total household 
reproduction in order to place agriculture within the context in 
discusted in Chapter 5. 'The eldest was educated by the man with whom his mother was living after she left his father because of the latter's refusal to support her in any way or invest in the household. The eldest in turn provided the younger's education. 
3This does not, of course, eliminate the possibility of extended reproduction for any young household. Good fortune in a market economy and wise investment can always result in surprising upward shifts in status and income, though such cases will inevitably appear as the exceptions that prove the rule. 
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vhich Bommanda residents perceive it. I will then explore current 
resource allocation and diffusion over a wide variety of 
agricultural endeavors, some promoted by state development policy 
and others not. Finally, I will compare current government 
development recommendations for smallholder agriculture in Kisii 
with Bozianda potential in order to demonstrate the limits with 
which the prviously successful development policy must grapple. 
The Household 
Straddling has transformed the role of agriculture in the 
process of social reproduction. Agriculture is no longer the chief 
source of surplus production available for investment in household 
expansion. It remains central to simple reproduction -- basic 
subsistence -- and can be, in the most successful households, a 
secondary source of surplus. It is eclipsed, however, by men's 
off-farm income as the driving factor in expanded reproduction and 
education as a key investment for future expansion. Furthermore, 
agricultural production has become intimately intertwined via 
resource flows with men's off-farm employment and women's 
businesses. The three are interconnected, though not equally 
interdependent. Understanding this provides us with an appropriate 
perception of the relative importance of agriculture to Bomwanda 
residents, which will allow us to view potential household response 
to development policy in a realistic manner. 
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All Bomwanda households are inter-sectoral units engaging in 
a variety of productive activities. Table 6:1 provides a schematic 
analysis of the relative importance of different economic endeavors 
in immediate household reproduction, stratified by the categories 
employed in Chapter 4. 4 The differentiati= tutlined earlier is 
clearly evident. Pioneers remain a distinct rural elite in terms 
of total income, chiefly due to their unusually high, male off-farm 
incomes. On the opposite and of the spectrum, the general failure 
of the Farmers strategy of foregoing off-farm income is evident in 
their poverty, despite relatively high levels of agricultural 
income. The other categories fall in between these extremes of 
total and men's off-farm income. Note that Followers and Wage-
laborers have nearly equal off-farm incomes, yet the former 
generate such higher agricultural revenue, reflecting their greater 
past agricultural investment. For all categories except the 
Farmers and Female-headed households, agricultural revenue is over-
shadowed by off-farm income. 5 Women's businesses are of even 
lesser monetary significance than agriculture, though are quite 
important for the two poorest categories in which men's off-farm 
4Not all households engage in all types of economic endeavors in Table 6:1, nor consume and invest in all areas shown in Table 6:2. The data are calculated as average amounts for a 'house' -- a production and consumption unit within a household (though a nuclear family can be both a household and a house) -- in each category. The Female-headed households are an exception because the economically active men -- sons of the Female head -- are unusually young and therefore have unusually low income. Their status as fatherless, though, has undoubtedly hurt their chances of obtaining good off-farm positions, in that they have no fathers searching for positions for them. 
Householda Tea Coffee 
Agriculture 
Table 6:1 
Sources 
Household Income 
Women's 
Businesses Misc. Total 
(Kshs/capita - 1985) 
of Income 
Ag. 
Total 
Men's 
Off-farm 
Sugarcane/ 	Maize 
Bananas 	Subsistence 
Pioneers 115 36 321 374 846 3415 305 163 4729 
N: 6 
Followers 44 32 293 139 526 975 284 26 1811 
N : 26 
Wage-laborer 9 41 85 94 241 807 115 25 1188 
N : 	16 
Farmer 57 293 112 503 21 267 113 904 
N 	11 
Female-headed 
Household - 18 190 130 341 236 287 130 994 
N : 4 
N is a "house": a production and consumption unit within a household. 
Maize subsistence was calculated by using an estimate based on the number of months each 
house provided their own maize multiplied by the amount of maize they purchased during those 
months they did not provide their own, priced at average annual local prices. 
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income is unusually low. Taken as a whole. Table 6:1 clearly 
demonstrates the important but distinctly limited role of 
agriculture in total household reproduction. 
Table 6:1 also shove the limited impact in Bomwanda of 
Kenya's *agrarian revolution* crops. For . all categories, tea and 
coffee revenues are eclipsed by sugarcane and/or sugar bananas, the 
latter two being cash crops for the local market that have never 
received particular government emp1asis. 6 For sons of Female-
headed households in particular, sugarcane has been a relatively 
easy enterprise to initiate with no capital an contrast to coffee 
or tea), reflected in their unusually high sugarcane revenues 
(nearly equalling that of Followers). Pioneers and Followers have 
recently undertaken sugarcane production on a substantial scale 
also. Among the agrarian revolution crops, resource-rich Pioneers 
and Followers have increased their allocation of land. labor and 
capital to tea, often at the expense of coffee, to take advantage 
of unusually high producer prices, resulting in their relatively 
low coffee revenue and substantial tea revenue. Subsistence maize 
itself, translated into market values, rivals tea and coffee for 
potential revenue generation (though little if any of this is 
actually sold). In particular, the Pioneers' unique ability to 
provide their own subsistence completely is reflected in their high 
maize production. 7 Thus, the agrarian revolution has had a very 
6The limited spread of tea (see Chapter 5) and the unusually low producer price of coffee in 1985 yielded this result, though even with a return to normal coffee prices, the relative importance of the two types of cash crops would not be signficantly altered. 
7Indeed, the estimate in Table 6:1 for Pioneers' maize 
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significant impact an household agriculture in Bomwanda, but has 
certainly not totally transformed or dominated it. 
The complete reproduction status of Bounranda households can 
be gleaned by comparing Tables 6:1 and 6:2. The last columns of 
the two tables reveal the Pioneers and Followers' expanded 
reproduction and the majority of households' bare maintenance of 
simple reproduction. The Pioneers achieved significant savings 
levels with which they might purchase land, invest in education, or 
initiate additional business activities.° Both the Followers and 
Wage-laborers achieved a slight amount of savings, though the 
figure for the latter category principally reflects the savings of 
one unusually successful household: for the majority of Wage-
laborers, little if any savings are possible. The poorest two 
categories had negative savings rates, reflecting the very real 
process of loss of assets, principally land, that they are 
undergoing. Immediate subsistence for these households is achieved 
via land sales, perhaps slight borrowing from neighbors and 
relatives, and consuming past savings. 
Expenditure on daily subsistence and housing reflects the 
much higher standard of living achieved by Pioneers and, to a 
Lesser degree, Followers. The latter, however, do not engage in 
production may be too low, in that they generally give a larger share of produce to relatives than do poorer households, which was impossible to account for fully in these data. Their actual level of savings is probably below that indicated in the tables because certain expenditures, particularly funds spent by men in their own social/business activities, could not be fully included. 
Household 
Categorya Land 
Table 
Agriculture 
6:2 	Household Expenditures 
Housing Misc. Total 
(Kshs/capita 
Livestock 
- 1985) 
Daily 
Household 
Educ. 	Subsistence Labor Ca ital 
Pioneer 570 56 333 1585 508 27 3079 
N : 6 
Follower 25 111 28 34 210 977 . 122 42 1549 
N : 26 
Wage-laborer 20 23 25 18 47 790 57 58 1038 
N : 	16 
Farmer 18 11 33 - 12 955 13 8 1050 
N 	: 	11 
Female-headed 
Household 21 9 20 71 18 797 107 14 1057 
N : 4 
a: N is a "house": a production 	consumption unit within a household. 
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immediate consumption at levels significantly higher than their 
less successful neighbors. Instead. Followers are distinct from 
Wage-laborers and others by their relatively heavy investment in 
education mod agriculture, reflecting their past and continuing 
pursuit of the Pioneers' reproduction model. Fully understanding 
intra-household resource flows, however, requires an analysis of 
the source of each type of expenditure. Which household members 
have physical cantrol over which resources, cash or otherwise, is 
crucial to investment patterns, particularly in agriculture upon 
which men and semen have different levels of dependence. 
Women's control of investible resources is severely limited 
by the use of most of their income for basic subsistence. Men 
expect women to attempt to provide as much of the household's daily 
subsistence as possible, even though, as the tables clearly 
demonstrate, women's businesses and farm sales (women earn 
approximately half of all sugarcane revenues and most or all sugar 
banana revenue) cannot provide all daily subsistence for any 
household category. Women find it difficult to avoid using all of 
their available cash an basic subsistence because of the timing and 
nature of their income generation and their ultimate structural 
dependence on their husbands for access to land. Women's income 
from local trading businesses, breweries and farm sales accrues on 
a more or less weekly basis, as they participate in one or more 
local markets. Their earnings are generally returned to the 
household via subsistence purchases in the same market in which 
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they sell. For instance, a woman may sell sugarcane and use the 
earnings to buy sugar, tea and bread. An average Follower woman, 
then, will sera approximately X She. 28 per week from her local 
business, and use the bulk of this to purchase part of the family's 
weekly subsistence bill of about K Shs. 91. Vomea thus have very 
little ability to save for large investments, though almost all 
admitted to same savings for emergencies. L full. 41 of 66 
economically active women in Borwanda engage in some such business, 
attempting to provide as such of their family's immediate 
subsistence as possible. Indeed, only five Bomwanda women received 
complete subsistence provision from their husband's off-farm 
income, while 16 provided their own subsistence with very little or 
no assistance from their husbands. 
Vaasa are left with relatively little ability to invest in 
education or agriculture regardless of their investment priorities. 
Hen. in contrast, typically receive income in large sums over 
greater intervals. Biweekly or monthly payment for off-farm 
positions is quite common. Similarly, earnings from tea, coffee or 
sugarcane sales in the long-distance market all accrue to men in 
unusually large sums at irregular intervals. This gives them 
greater ability than women to invest lump sums of cash, which is 
further enhanced if their wife is successful in providing for the 
bulk of daily subsistence. In Chapter 4, I noted that 801 of land 
rental and virtually all land purchases are funded by men's off-
farm income. Lead and housing are the extreme cases of men 
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controlling imvestible surplUs because of the nature and timing of 
the income they control. Education is another area in which men's 
investment pre-dominatet, as shown in Table 6:3. Nearly half of 
both primary and secondary costs were funded by men's off-farm 
income alone, while the bulk of the remainder came from a 
combination of this and farm income or women's business income. 
Women had some limited ability, via their businesses and/or farm 
sales, to finance relatively inexpensive primary education, but 
expensive and all-important secondary education remains beyond 
their ability in almost all cases. This is reflected in the 
complete absence of secondary education among Farmer and Female-
headed households in which men's off-farm income is inadequate. 
Agriculture is another area of investment in which men pre-
dominate. In addition to land, households invest in hired labor 
and direct capital inputs in agriculture, as shown in Table 6:2. 
Of the three, labor is by far the most significant investment, and. 
as I will show below, the most important determinant of production. 
Nen provide the bulk of funds for hiring agricultural labor for all 
but the two poorest household categories. In Follower and Wage- 
laborer households, men fund almost all hired labor, Ai women 
rarely have income adequate to hire labor in a quantity sufficient 
for a particular task. (Though often men and women together hire 
labor, with men providing the bulk of the needed cash.) This is 
less true in Pioneer households because their agricultural 
production provides its own surplus cash for hiring labor. This 
Men's Off-farm 
Household 	Income 
Tabler 6:3 	Source of Education Cost (no. of Students) 
lWomen/Farm 
j Farm 	Only 
Land 
Sale Othere 
Hen's Off-farm +IMen's Off-farm/
Only I 	Women's Bus. 	1 Farm Sales 
Pioneers 23 1 9 0 2 0 1 
Primary 23 1 9 0 2 0 1 
N : 36 
Secondary 11 0 7 2 0 0 3 
N : 	23 
Follower 
57 13 39 1 4 0 1 Primary 
N : 	115 
Secondary 17 3 7 0 2b 0 3 
N : 32 
Wage-laborer 
30 2 11 10 6 2 4 Primary 
N : 65 
Secondary 2 0 1 0 1 c 3 1 
N : 8 
Farmerd 
0 0 2 10 20 0 0 Primary 
N : 32 
Female-headedd 0 2 3 4 0 0 0 
Primary 0 2 3 4 0 0 0 
N : 9 
No. of students includes both children and grandchildren of the household head. 
These two students were paid by tea sales of the area's largest tea producer. 
This student was paid for by milk sales from a grade dairy cow. 
Neither Farmers nor Female-headed households had any secondary students. 
Includes 5 students educated via land rental (3 - secondary), 4 by relatives (all primary), 
and 4 free by missionaries (all secondary). 
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often originates in tea production at levels few other households 
can attain. For the poorest households, the absence of men's off-
farm income makes women's income and farm sales crucial to the very 
limited labor they hire. Seventy-eight percent of Farmers' slight 
amount of hired labor was purchased from farm revenue and the 
remainder from women's businesses, while the latter paid for all 
hired labor in Female-headed households. Households in both these 
categories, however, hire very little labor at all because of their 
Lack of adequate income to do so. 
Vomen's income is more important for purchasing capital 
inputs. in all categories, women's businesses provide significant 
amounts of the funds allocated to capital Investment. Such 
investment, as shown in Table 6a, is extremely limited relative to 
labor and about equal to that of land hire. Capital investment in 
&mends consists chiefly of purchasing hybrid maize seeds, small 
amounts of petro-chemical fertilizers and occasional small amounts 
of pesticides. Vomen's income is often adequate for these 
purchases and is so allocated. Overall, women provide 361 of 
capital investment in agriculture. Hen provide the bulk of the 
rest in Pioneer, Follower and Wage-laborer households, while farm 
revenues do so in Farmer and Female-headed households. Thus, women 
have some ability to invest in capital, a significant but certainly 
not the central agricultural input in Bomwanda. 
A complete depiction of social reproduction in Bomwanda 
demonstrates the current effects of the differentiation that has 
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accompanied straddling and agriculture's surprisingly limited role. 
While it remains crucial to simple reproduction and basic 
subsistence for all households, it is no longer the source of 
significant investible surplus. Men's off-farm income, as argued 
in Chapter 4, is the key force behind expanded levels of 
reproduction. It also gives men control of the built of investible 
surplus income. Women's dependence on men for access to land and 
the nature and timing of the limited cash income available to them 
severely limits their ability to make any significant investments 
in expanding future production. Men are in a strong bargaining 
position vis-a-vis women due to their control of land and 
independence from short-term rsliance an household agriculture. 
This allows them to insure that women spend the bulk of their 
income on subsistence, in effect giving men control over the bulk 
of investment. We have seen this reflected in men's pre-dominance 
in investment in all areas of household reproduction, especially 
the crucial sectors of education and agriculture. What remains to 
be analyzed is the effect of this system of social reproduction on 
production and resource allocation within agriculture. 
rag_easarimintav 
Lug,  Labor and Capital in Household Agriculture 
I have examined the place of agriculture in the household 
economy and its dependence on men's and women's non-agricultural 
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activities for key inputs, highlighting the important role of men's 
off-farm income. The central development question, however, is: to 
what extent does this dependence on purchased inputs affect actual 
production? To answer this, I will first examine men's and women's 
current resource control and diffusion within agriculture to 
demonstrate the concrete effects of the insecurity highlighted in 
Chapter 5. This provides the context within which agricultural 
production and productivity must be analyzed. I will then examine 
actual production in 1985 to show the central role played by 
purchased and family labor in determining productivity in a 
smallholder. low-technology agrarian regime. Combined, these two 
discussions will allow an analysis of the severe constraints facing 
current Lay= development policy in Bomeanda, the subject of the 
subsequent section. 
Before analyzing resource diffusion, we must question the 
degree to which we can discuss 'household' resource allocation 
rather than men's vs. women's resource allocation. is demonstrated 
above, men control the bulk of investible funds, and dominate in 
purchasing capital Inputs, hiring land and labor. Ultimately, of 
course, men also control access to homestead land. Women, however, 
often exercise effective decision-making power. Like the household 
budget, control of seasonal land use is subject to frequent, 
informal negotiations within the conjugal contract. Generally in 
MAU., women control decision-making on land under food crops and 
men control that under cash crops, though this varies widely. In 
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Bomvanda, in 59 'houses' interviewed, women controlled land under 
food in 26, men in 12 and joint decision-making was claimed in the 
remaining 21. For land under cash crops, men controlled in 35 
cases, women in 9 and both together in 16. Hen's absence due to 
migrant labor often gives women greater control over daily land 
use. Of the nine cases of women controlling cash crops, five were 
houses in which no man was present. Normally, the divisions 
between 'men's' and 'women's' crops are not strong, though 
occasionally disputes arise and usually involve a man's desire to 
increase a given cash crop at the expense of maize. Frequent 
disputes only occur in households in which the woman feels she does 
not receive an adequate share of the income generated from cash 
crops. In a few cases, women have resisted their husband's tyranny 
by interplanting food crops in 'his' cash crops, such as planting 
maize or beans in between rows of coffee or tea. The norm, 
however, is a rough consensus over the share of land allocated to 
cash crops and to food; both partners recognize the Importance of 
both activities, and of spreading risks widely, under straddling. 
Both men and women, of course, control their labor power to 
the extent they ultimately decide its daily use. Women, however, 
because of their overall dependence on men for access to land, can 
be subject to their husband's dictates regarding labor allocation. 
A woman might be able to deny her labor to a 'man's' crop if he 
does not re-invest the proceeds thereof in the household. Bar 
success in such a denial depends on their relative strengths in the 
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conjugal contract. Each depends on the other for certain inputs 
into reproduction; the extreme solution of dissolving a household 
over a given issue only occurs when one party is confident the 
other can be replaced. Normally, a vegan exercises control over 
the bulk of her labor power, and will provide labor for cash crops 
whose revenue accrues to her husband as long as she perceives 
herself and her children benefitting from her labor. The cases in 
which husband and wife maintain a household but continue to 
allocate labor in conflicting ways are rare. Almost all women, of 
course, must fulfill their basic roles providing household 
subsistence and child care. which limits their flexibility in 
allocating their labor time. These essential tasks and vomon's 
dependence on agriculture lead them to demand more of their 
husbands' resources than the latter usually desire to give. Within 
the limits imposed by their reliance on men's land, however, most 
have negotiated a minimally acceptable compromise over both land 
and labor allocation. These resources are the subject of nearly 
constant informal negotiations that, under normal circumstances, 
produce either rough consensus or independent but minimally 
acceptable decisions. 
The allocation of land -- i.e., the selection of acreages of 
particular crops -- partially determines subsequent allocation of 
capital and labor, so I will first turn to land in order to set the 
context in which other resource allocation occurs. Straddling 
combines off-farm income and agricultural production, but does not 
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dictate which crops to cultivate. Insecurity, however, influences 
all households to diversify production, severely constraining the 
productivity of individual crops due to the minute land allocated 
to each. Table Gill provides data on overall land use in Bomwanda 
by household category. Once again, the unique position of Pioneers 
is evident in their large landholdings, acquired via close 
association with the colonial government and missions. Accounting 
for family size, however, shows land differentials among all 
households much smaller than they are in absolute terms. Keasured 
on a per capita basis, Pioneers average 0.5 has./person. Followers 
0,18, Wage-laborers 0.16, Farmers 0.19. and Female-headed 
households 0.36. The Pioneers land advantage thus diminishes 
significantly. 9 lather- than serving as the basis of their wealth, 
Pioneers' large estates served as a backdrop, allowing them to 
expand their families with fey of the economic repercussions other 
households faced. This allowed them to use their off-farm income to 
educate a large number of sons, giving them their current high 
incomes. 19 
9The unusually large landholding per capita of the Female-headed households is caused more by their small size -- all nuclear families -- due to their disadvantaged past history than by their large holding, which in absolute terms are the smallest of all 
categories. "Pioneer households averaged 14.75 adult equivalents (using 
2 children ■ I adult) each. while Followers averaged 9.7, Wage-laborers 7.8, Farmers 6.7, and Female-headed households 5.25. the nearly direct, positive relationship between large current family size and wealth reinforces the continuing Gusii desire for children, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Household 
Category 	Size 
Holding 
(Has) Agric. 
Table 6:4 	Land Use 	(Percentage) 
Land 
Fallow 
Rented/Purchased Land Overall Use 
Pure 
Food 
Z of Ag. 
Livestocka 
Pure 
Cash Intercropb 
Percent of 	No 
Size Home Land Holds 
Pioneer 7.4 48 10 33 35 13 20 0.58 7 1 
N : 	2 
Follower 1.7 64 14 41 30 24 4 0.45 25 10 
N 	: 	13 
Wage-laborer 1.25 65 15 49 28 14 8 0.41 33 3 
N 	: 	11 
Farmer 1.3 64 15 41 30 21 0.12 13 3 
N 	6 
Female-headed 1.15 53 19 69 19 13 0 0.09 9 2 
N : 4 
Total 1.9 62 15 46 28 19 6 0.36 22 19 
N : 36 
Livestock includes grazing land, household compounds used for grazing and fodder crops. 
Intercrop includes land on which cash and food crops are mixed. 
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pwfteining land allocation within the household estate, we 
find some trends that are easily explainable and others that are 
not. One of the latter is the apparent by intensity of overall 
land use. Agriculture consuaes only 622 of total land area, 
including fallow land. Livestock, consumes another 15%, leaving 
23% of total land area 'unused' in the most densely populated 
district in Kenya. This 'unused' land is in fact allocated to the 
basic infrastructure of a densely populated area: housing, foot 
paths, kitchens, fences and hedges. Virtually all of the easily 
cultivable land is under cultivation. That which remains either 
will never be cultivated as long as current population densities 
are maintained, or requires excessive labor to clear. Much of this 
'unused' land, in fact, is woodcower providing firewood for the 
community, yet another effect of high population density. Many 
households do not have their own firewood supply and collect wood 
wherever they find it. It has become increasingly common in recent 
years for households to sell (rather than give away free) trees 
they no longer want, as wood becomes an increasingly scarce 
commodity. 
Not surprisingly, Pioneers and Female-headed households use a 
miller percentage of their land for agriculture than do their 
neighbors, both categories benefitting from relatively large 
Land/capita. Pioneers are also the only households to fallow 
regularly a significant percentage of their land. Others fallow 
only when forced to by precipitous decline in yield from a given 
plot." Pioneers also allocate a significantly smaller portion of 
268 
their land to pure food crops than do other households, again due 
to their relative land abundance. 	For the other categories there 
is no discernible relationship between land size and allocation to 
food vs. cash crops. There is also no relationship between 
household category or land size and intercropping rates, though 
significant differences among the latter exist. Finally, land size 
appears to have no relationship to frequency or relative importance 
of renting land. (Followers rent land far more frequently than 
others, again related to their current land size, ability to 
mobilize labor, and off-farm income.) Al]. of these patterns seem 
inexplicable. One would assume land size and/or wealth would be 
positively correlated with renting land, fallowing, and cash crops' 
share of land. These anomolous patterns will be clearer after an 
analysis of the key factor of labor mobilization. 
To appreciate fully the extent of resource diffusion in land. 
Table 6:5 presents land use in hectarage. Of greatest significance 
is the uniform smallness of holdings under a particular type of 
crop. Only Pioneers' food production covers more than 1 hectare 
(2.47 acres). V. must remember that these figures represent total 
average holdings under a given crop. Within any household, they 
11These households are well aware of the advantages of fallowing on a regular basis, especially in the absence of chemical fertilizers, but simply do not have adequate land to forego this year's subsistence to increase future production. 12Again. Female-headed households have an unusually high percentage of land under food alone because of an absolute lack of cash crops. They are the most recent households to adopt cash crops and their holdings remain relatively small. 
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TABLE 6:5 
Land Us,  (Hectarage) 
Household Category 
Overall Use Use within Agriculture  Pure& 	Pure Food 	Cash 	lntercrop_ Fallow Agriculture Livestock 
Pioneers 3.4 0.74 1.5 1.2 0.5 0.7 N:2 
Followers 1.1 0.24 0.8 0.15 0.26 0.04 N:13 
Wage-laborers 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.22 0.11 0.06 N:11 
Farmers 0.8 0.2 0.36 0.15 0.17 0.05 N:6 
Female-headed 0.6 0.2 0.45 0.11 0.08 0.0 4 
*Includes rented and purchased land under maize. 
are divided among the various 'houses' and often divided among 
different fields under the control of each house. Finally, the 
categories themselves aggregate actual crop divisions. 'Food 
crops' consists overwhelming of maize, though includes sorghum. 
finger millet, and yams. 'Pure cash' crops include coffee, tea, 
sugar bananas, sugarcane, groundnuts, and pineapples. All this 
illustrates the minute acreage one household might have under one 
crop. tio household cultivates all possible crops, but virtually 
all cultivate maize, beans, bananas and coffee, and many cultivate 
either sugarcane. groundnuts, or various types of fruit. Thus, for 
example, the 0.15 hectares (0.37 acres) under Pure Cash crops in a 
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typical rollover household would be divided betveen tvo houses and 
then among tea to four crops, resulting in land area of a given 
crop of 0.04 of an acre or less. Individual plots often measure 
only a fee hundred square meters, making significant capital 
investment in a single crop extremely difficult. Larger plots 
would be entirely within the technical possibilities of most 
households. Insecurity prevents this from occurring as households 
minimize market exposure in any one sector. 
The anomalous patterns of land allocation in Table 6:4 can be 
understood only through an explanation of labor allocation. 
Despite market penetration of the rural political economy, family 
Labor remains sn important factor in basic subsistence. In 
addition, under straddling hired labor has become the most 
important determinant of household productivity and development 
potential. Table 6:6 reports the results of a weekly labor-use 
study involving a random sample of 20 Bomvanda households. (See 
Appendix A for a description of the method of the study.) The 
data represent the average number of hours per day each person 
engaged in each activity, segregated by household category and 
family member (neither of the Pioneer households were included in 
the study). Note first the final section, summarizing labor use 
for all households. The average woman provides significantly more 
labor in the household economy than does the average man, and there 
are more women than men available (due to men engaging in migrant 
labor), making womon's overall labor contribution much greater than 
men's. Indeed, women work almost a nine hour day on average, while 
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TABLE 6:6 Overall Family Labor Use (Sours/Person Household 	Live- 	Marke- Child, Busi- Off-farm 	Total Category* Agric. stock Held ting  care° nese Labor Educ Labor lillaiix Han 	1.3 N:15.4 Women 	2.3 
0:22.3 Boys 	0.4 N:7.6 Girls 	0.6 
N:14 1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.4 
* 
0.7 
2.9 
0.1 
1.2 
0.1 
0.8 
• 
0.1 
• 
1.6 
0.2 
1.1 
1.7 
1.3 
0.1 
0.1 
2.8 
- 
- 
- 	6.7 
- 	9.1 
7.4 	8.6 
7.0 10.1 
Wage-Laborers° Hen 	0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 * 0.7 4.3 6.4 N:6.0 Women 	2.0 0.1 3.3 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.1 7.6 Nt9.2 Girls 	0.6 2 1.4 • 2.7 0.1 4.4 	9.2 N:3.0 Asanic Hen 	2.8 0.3 0.9 1.0 * 0.3 0.1 - 	5.4 001.0 Women 	2.6 * 3.4 1.1 0.6 0.8 * - 	8.7 N:9.7 Boys 	0.4 - 1.1 * - 0.3 0.6 	3.4 N11.0 
F.121.1L-..1111AIRR Hen 	2.5 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.5 2.4 - 	6.9 N:4 Women 	2.2 * 3.5 1.3 1.6 1.0 9.6 N:6 Boys 	0.5 0.9 0.1 * 0.3 7.0 	8.5 N:3 Girls 	0.3 • 1.2 4.1 1.0 * 6.5 	9.1 N: =al. Hen 	1.7 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.0 2.4 6.3 N:33.4 Women 	2.3 0.1 3.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 .. 	8.9 H:47.4 Boys 	0.4 0.5 0.2 * 0.2 0.1 • 6.7 	8.1 N: 11.6 Girls 	0.6 * 1.2 0.1 1.3 0.1 - 6.5 	9.8 11-19.1 alio. of laborers is the average per week. Partial integers represent ,movement of persons in and out of the household. °Only  one woman per house at a given time was calculated as providing child care. Relaxing this increases the category by 0.2 bra/day. °There were no working boys in Wage-laborer households and no girls in Farmer households. 
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men work only a 6.3 hour day. 
. Long working days do not automatically imply the availability 
of large amounts of labor power for agriculture, for both men and 
women allocate a small percentage of total labor time to farming 
(though women provide the largest contribution in this sector 
also). Agricultural labor time is so limited because household 
'chores' and child care consume half of women's total labor time, 
while off-farm employment and business 'consume 342 of men's time. 13 
Livestock care and marketing consume additional shares of labor 
time. leaving both men and women with little labor for agriculture. 
Hen could increase their agricultural Labor by lengthening their 
working day. This option seems extremely difficult for women, 
given their almost nine hour day. Children's labor is a limited 
supplement for adult labor, in that school attendance is 
universally recognized as more important than farm labor except in 
extreme emergencies. Thus, family labor appears to be a rather 
strained resource, with the possible exception of male labor. which 
could be applied in greater amounts to agriculture if adequate 
incentives existed. 
To connect these overall limitations on agricultural labor 
with varying productivity we must examine the labor data for 
different categories. Vomen's total working day varies greatly 
among the four categories, from 9.6 hours per day for the unusually 
13The figure for men' off-farm labor time is for only those men resident an the farm. Nan-resident migrants were excluded from the study, so total time in off-farm labor for men in Boewanda families (including those not resident when the survey was conducted) is significantly higher than the figures given here. 
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young and active women in Female-headed households to 7.6 for women 
in Wage-laborer households. This variation is principally caused 
by variation in childcare time, a function of age and the number of 
women in a household. Examining variation in agricultural labor 
itself, it appears younger women (Female-headed households) and 
women in households in which men Lowest capital and/or their own 
labor in agriculture (Followers and Farmers) provide higher than 
average agricultural labor. The only significant variation in 
men's labor time is the unusually short hours worked by Farmers, 
due to their virtual absence from off-farm employment. However, 
they provide the most agricultural labor, reflecting their 
historical choice of reliance on that sector alone. Finally, note 
that Wage-laborers, as we would expect, allocate very little labor 
time to agriculture, in turn leading their wives also to limit 
their agricultural labor. The utility of a large family is seen in 
Followers children's unusually large labor input. Hose children 
per household frees more labor from school, household chores, and 
Livestock care for use in agriculture. Overall, Wage-laborers 
allocate the least amount of family labor power to agriculture (3.3 
hours per day), Farmers (5.8 hours) and Female-headed households 
(5.4 hours) the most. These data are crucial to explaining 
production variations, as we will see below. 
First, however, we must add in the important effects of 
seasonal variation and non-family labor. Table 6:7 presents total 
agricultural labor per household per week, divided on a monthly 
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TABLE 6:7 
Total Agricultural Labor (Hours /Week) 
Labor Category May June July August Sept. Oct. Nav./Dec.b Average 
Family Men 6.35 6.4 5.75 7.85 6.75 5.45 4.75 6.25 N:37 Women 16.25 11.05 8.75 14.65 14.55 12.55 10.35 12.80 V:38 Boys 1.0 1.0 0.1 3.1 1.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 K: 22 Girl, 1.9 1.8 0.5 6.7 1.6 0.9 1.6 2.3 N:22 Total 25.5 20.25 15.1 32.3 22.9 19.6 17.7 22.65 
Ii.zikilat Hire4 16.25 14.4 13.2 14.1 16.2 20.1 21.8 16.7 N:7 
Occasional 0.8 3.8 4.7 5.1 2.7 0 2.6 Hired 0.9 6:16 
UAW 6.4 0.4 1.9 4.1 0.4 0 0 1.9 N:4 
11611 data are average hours per week each labor categor provided, per month. bNovember and December are combined because the study was concluded in the first week in December. 
basis. For the seven households employing labor on a full-time 
basis, 14 the addition to average labor input is enormous, 
increasing total agricultural labor by 881 for households without 
working children and 73! for those with children. Hired labor, 
141 define 'full-time' labor as a laborer working 3-5 hours per day, six days per week, paid a monthly salary. This is the normal maximum working time in agriculture in Kisii. 
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usually 'replaces' the labor of men working in off-farm positions, 
but the difference between average male family labor (6.25 hours 
per week) and hired labor (16.7 hours per week) illustrates the 
extent to which the Latest is much more than a replacement of the 
former. lelatively high wages in off-farm positions allow a man to 
replace his labor and provide a significant supplement to total 
Labor. Six of the seven households in the sample employing labor 
were Followers. 15 Although their land is not significantly larger 
than their neighbors, Followers' greater ability to hire labor is 
the chief cause of their much higher agricultural revenue shown in 
Table 621. 
The ability to hire labor can be particularly crucial in 
seasons of peak demand, when delaying an activity for a few days 
can drastically cut production. As Table 60 illustrates, seasonal 
variation in agricultural labor use can be as such as 502. In peak 
season, all family and hired labor increases significantly. The 
greatest increase is from children, who in the peak season of 
August are not attending school and therefore available to assist 
in the harvesting, land preparation and replanting of maize 
fields. 16 The effects of peak season demand are more apparent when 
we combine the data from this table with that of the previous one. 
15The seventh was the unusually successful Wage-laborer household mentioned in the introduction -- the only one to achieve expanded reproduction. 
16A similar, though not as severe, peak season occurs in February or March, right before and during the start of the long rainy season. Children are not available during this period. so  pressure on other family labor may well be greater. This period was not covered in the Somvanda labor study (see Appendix A). 
276 
If we adjust women's daily agricultural labor on a seasonal basis, 
we find that in the peak season of August. their working day 
increases from 8.8 to 9.7 hours. Few of women's other tasks can be 
reduced, in that marketing, household chores and childcare are. 
constant. Business endeavors can be shortened, though only in 
extreme emergencies because of women's desire to maintain their 
weekly cash flow. Thus, in peak season, women's labor is extended 
to an extremely lengthy working day. The ability to hire regular 
and short-term labor to assist in these periods is a great benefit. 
both to insure the agricultural activities are completed promptly 
and to allow household members, particularly women, to continue 
other income-generating activities without interruption. 
The ever-present possibility of incapacitating illness and 
difficult pregnancy (see Table 5:2 in Chapter 5 on labor time lost 
to illness) is • final factor in overall strain on labor. Again. 
this is particularly severe for women, whose own illness is more 
common than men's and who have primary responsibility for caring 
for sick children. The latter, combined with normal child care 
duties and time lost to difficult pregnancies, severely cuts into 
women's labor availability. Overall, women lose nearly 23% of 
potential labor time to illness. This increases to over 24% for 
the relatively poor women in Vage-laborer households, and is least 
for the wealthier and healthier Follower households. The ability 
to hire labor, particularly daily labor during seasons of peak 
demand, can compensate for family labor lost to illness, giving 
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households with relatively high off-farm incomes greater security 
and productivity. 
Women's working day of 8.8 to 9.7 hours (depending on the 
season), the fixed nature of most of their non-agricultural tasks. 
and the substantial labor time they lose to Illness reveal the 
overall strain they face in fulfilling agricultural and other 
household tasks. Children's labor is of limited assistance because 
of the recognised importance of school attendance. Hen's labor is 
not as strained and presumably could be employed to a greater 
extent in the household economy. Their limited agricultural effort 
must in part be explained by their desire to find non-agricutural 
income, the kay to straddling success. On top of the 6.3 hours per 
day men work, they spend an additional 0.9 hours per day drinking 
with their friends in local breweries and engaging in other social 
activities. Women view most of this activity as wasted leisure 
time, and much of it clearly is. On the other hand, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, some of it say be useful to men's efforts to secure 
off-farm income by maintaining contacts vith their informal social 
networks. However, even with this *socializing time included. 
men's labor remains underemployed and is perhaps the only labor 
resource available for increasing agricultural production in 
Bosmanda. 
Straddling and resource diffusion are important to 
development to the extent they influence productivity. Bomvanda 
households spread land and labor over a wide variety of activities. 
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TABLE 6:8 
Agricultural Returns per Hectare (Kenyan shilingsfhectare) 
Household Costs Category Land" Capital 	Labor 	Total 	Revenueb 'Profit' 
Pioneers 0 308 	3113 	3421 	4622 1201 N 	2 
Pollowers 220 252 	1015 	1487 	4821 3334 N 	13 
Wage-laborers 195 265 	246 	806 	2542 1736 11:13. 
Farmers 154 291 	98 	543 	4495 3952 N : 6 
Female- headed 183 173 	75 	431 	2985 2554 N : 	4 
'Includes only land under crops in the long growing season of 1985. 
biased an agricultural income data, including market estimate of subsistence maize production, in Table 5:1. 
These resources appear to be nearly fully employed (with the 
exception of men's labor), with little idle capacity available for 
development purposes. While this is true for all households except 
the resource-rich Pioneers, significant variation in agricultural 
income (Table 6:1), land use (Table 6:4) and labor allocation 
(Table 6:6) exists among other categories. A key development 
question is explaining this variation and its effects. This 
requires an analysis of the overall revenue generation and 
profitability of household agriculture, presented in Table 6:8. 17 
17The data in this table must be interpreted carefully and in a limited fashion due to timing of collection. The data an income 
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The distinction between Pioneers agricultural production and 
others' is immediately evident in the formers' much higher costs 
per hectare, representing their heavy investment in hired labor. 
Indeed, agricultural costs decline directly as one moves down the 
categories, reflecting the decreasing ability of each category to 
purchase important inputs. However, these investments do not 
directly result in higher values of production per hectare; 
Followers have higher revenue /hectare than Pioneers and Farmers 
have nearly as high as their much wealthier neighbors. Pioneers' 
apparent performance drops further when monetary profits are 
calculated. Table 6:8 shows their profits/hectare to be the lowest 
of all categories. In fact, from household members' (and 
especially women's) vantage, these figures are misleading. Because 
Pioneers have replaced the great bulk of their family labor with 
hired labor, their 'profit' does in fact represent nearly absolute 
profit as calculated by any capitalist firm. The 'profit' level of 
the other categories includes massive amounts of unpaid family 
a limited fashion due to timing of collection. The data on income in Table 611, which are the basis of the revenue data in Table 
6:10, include income from coffee and tea harvested over the 1984-85 seasonal year established by government purchasing agencies. The data on costs are for the calendar year 1985 when the research was conducted. Thus, the direct revenue from the investments represented by these cost data accrued to the households in the first half of 1906 for coffee, tea and the maize crop that was harvested in December 1985 to January 1986. There is no reason to suspect that obtaining actual investment and production data for all crops within the season pertaining to each would significantly alter the results shorn herein. However, because of the limited accuracy of the data and timing of its collection. I attempt no statistical analysis, which would imply that the data indeed represent an actual production year for each crop. 
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TABLE 6:9 
Returns to Family Agricultural Labor* (Kenyan shillings per hour) 
Household Total hours 	Total 	Returns Category 	of Labor Profits 	per Hour 
Followers 	1325 	2127 	1.6 8 
Wage-laborers 950 	1114 	1.2 : 4 
Farmers 	3.670 	1179 	0.7 11:4 
Female-headed 1584 	1512 	1.0 : 4 
alncludes only the 20 households in the labor use study described in Appendix B. 
labor, shown in Table 6:9 for the 20 households in the labor study. 
Thus, their monetary profit is actually return to labor rather than 
actual financial profit. 
Table 6:9 shows the dramatically low return to labor their 
'profit' represents. Family labor receives in abstract terms 0.7 
to 1.6 Kenyan shillings per hour. 18 This contrasts with average 
wages of 1.5 to 2.0 shillings per hour for hired agricultural labor 
and 2.5 to 3.0 shillings per hour for non-agricultural manual 
labor. The surprisingly high 'profits' obtained by the Farmers in 
particular represent massive investment of family labor on limited 
laThis does not imply that the actual agricultural workers 
receive this income. As noted throughout, a disproportionate amount of it probably accrues to men, who provide a minority of total labor. 
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land, translating into extremely low returns to their Labor power. 
Female-headed. households present nearly an equally extreme case. 
Their massive investment of family labor per hectare receives very 
low returns due to their unusually low past and current (Table 6:8) 
agricultural investment. Followers' profit translates into 
significantly higher returns to family labor due to their past 
investeent in high-value cash crops and current investment in hired 
labor to insure continuous production from these crops. These 
data, not monetary profit, represent the actual wealth of the 
respective households as they perceive it themselves. They may 
also explain the unwillingness of Bomwanda men to increase labor 
input into agriculture, despite their relatively short working day. 
can now analyze the agricultural production process for 
each household category, including land, labor, capital and 
productivity. Pioneers clearly have the only truly 'profitable' 
agricultural enterprise in the sense of actually creating a clear 
surplus beyond return to family labor. They generate the greatest 
revenue per capita of any household category. Sommer, they do not 
generate the highest revenue per hectare, the chief goal of state 
development policy. They are clearly the wealthiest households and 
are seen as the successful models to be copied by their neighbors. 
But both Followers and Farmers generate higher revenue per hectare 
by investing massive family labor on limited land, driving up 
current production while reducing returns to labor, which remain at 
or below the lowest paid local wage labor. For all households, 
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increasing family labor input an limited land might further 
increase immediate production per hectare; it could certainly 
reduce even further returns to that labor, making it of 
questionable benefit to those involved, even though policy-makers 
would define the increased production per hectare as a development 
SUCCOSS. 
Followers and Farmers generated the highest revenue per 
hectare (and presumably the highest production per hectare 
neither grew higher value crops than the Pioneers) and the highest 
revenue and monetary 'profit* per capita of the non-Pioneer 
households. They did so by combining high family labor input with 
some past and continuing investment of capital. For Followers, 
this represents an energetic effort to succeed at straddling in 
combination with constant off-farm economic endeavors. For 
Farmers, it represents a survival strategy based essentially on 
self-exploitation, surviving on their limited land without 
signficant off-farm income by working it as intensively as 
possible, driving real returns to their own labor power to 
extremely low levels. Female-headed households also invested 
unusually large amounts of family labor in agriculture, but their 
returns were limited by low levels of high-value crops and very 
Little current investment of any sort. Despite this, they still 
maintained returns to labor higher than those of the Farmers. 
Vage-laborers invested the least amount of labor in agriculture and 
achieved the lowest returns and profits, despite a fairly high 
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level of current investment (Table 6:8). 
That begins to emerge is the centrality of labor power to 
overall production. Capital investment, particularly initial 
adoption of high-value cash crops, is significant, as the cases of 
the Pioneers (high returns per hectare with a significant profit 
rate) and the Female-headed households (large labor input but low 
returns due to limited high-value crops) demonstrate. But capital 
alone cannot explain the productivity differentials among Domande 
households. The highest rates, those of the Followers and Farmers. 
are achieved by continuous, large labor inputs after adoption of 
cash crops. Initial adoption is essential; continuous capital 
investment to maximize production per acre is not. Self-
exploitation of labor power is a more common alternative, 
especially for those without significant and secure off-farm 
income. Such households' primary goal is to maximize monetary 
return per capita, even when this implies declining rates of return 
to their own labor power. This also accounts for the anomolous 
high rates of intercropping engaged in by Followers and Parsers, as 
they attempt to maximize current returns, fully aware that so doing 
will decrease future soil fertility in many cases. 19 Their 
consistent pursuit of intercropping is due to more 'mediate goals: 
survival in one case and expanded overall household reproduction in 
the other. Similar awareness of the consequences and inability to 
19Vithrhe exception of a few of the eldest, virtually all respondents recognized both the illegality of intercropping (in the common case of coffee and maize) and the deleterious soil effects it causes. 
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alter their circumstances causes all non-Pioneer households to 
fallow land only when absolutely essential (Table 6:4). The only 
variable that might alter the apparent centrality of labor is 
management -- husbandry techniques -- which will be discussed in 
the following section. 
The agrarian regime in Bomwanda is rather complex. 
Understanding it requires an analysis of the place of agriculture 
in overall household reproduction and the differing reproductive 
roles agriculture plays in different households. In all households 
except the Farmers, agriculture has an essential but clearly 
United role in household reproduction. For all but the Pioneers. 
it provides subsistence and assists simple reproduction, but plays 
little role in expanded reproduction efforts. Pioneers' past 
investment and currant off-farm income allows them to invest in 
enough wage labor and capital to generate a real agricultural 
surplus, beyond an adequate wage for their own labor power. They, 
and a few of the most successful Followers' sons, have begun and 
vill likely continue on a path of expanded reproduction that others 
will have great difficulty achieving. 
Differences in productivity, then, depend not on the 
importance individual households assign to agriculture, but on the 
resources they can or are forced to employ in cultivation. Land 
size varies little, so cannot be the basis of the significant 
variation in productivity among households. In all households. 
insecurity causes allocation of minute patches of land to a vide 
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variety of crops, eradicating any opportunity for economies of 
scale that might exist if each household cultivated a given crop 
exclusively. Labor must be allocated in a similar fashion to 
insure minimally adequate production on all land. The most 
productive cultivators are those whose past off-farm income and 
foresight led them to invest in high-value cash crops at relatively 
high levels and/or those who can mobilize large amounts of labor. 
Combined with significant off-farm income, this strategy assists in 
achieving expanded reproduction, as a number of Follower households 
demonstrate. Vithout off-farm income, the strategy is simply one 
of survival, involving extreme levels of self-exploitation because 
of lack of alternative employment and limited past investment in 
agriculture and education. The only way such households have been 
able to maintain relatively high productivity and insure their own 
minimal survival without access to off-farm income is via self- 
exploitation and • life of poverty by any standards. 
This points to the possible distinction between state and 
cultivator goals. Households such as the Farmers are fulfilling 
immediate state development goals of maintaining a relatively high 
value of production per hectare, but represent the clearest model 
of reproductive failure in the rural community. Pioneers, on the 
other hand, are the community success stories, the 'progressive' 
farmers, and the rural elite, yet their production per hectare is 
lower than some of their much poorer neighbors. Followers perhaps 
represent the best that is possible for the majority and also 
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°success' for state policy-makers interested in maximizing 
production per hectare. Only those households with access to off-
farm income, however, can achieve this. Women's labor is strained 
on a daily basis without any additional input into agriculture, and 
men undoubtedly find the returns to labor so low that they question 
the value of employing their surplus labor time in agriculture. 
Land is fully employed, if current population densities are 
maintained and even the current, inadequate fallowing is continued. 
For those without off-farm income to hire additional land, labor 
and invest in cash crops, the only path to increased productivity 
is self-exploitation of labor power and relative poverty, a path no 
Bomwanda residents care to follow. Thus, access to off-farm income 
sill continue to determine the level of land and labor productivity 
achieved, fundamentally influencing response to policy and policy 
Success. 
IluslopaiaLlaiicy_aasi-lusuraSisurailau. 
The heart Of the Kenyan government's current smallholder 
agricultural development policy is a World Bank funded extension 
project, the National Extension Programme (NEP), operated by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (NoA). Placing an extension management 
project at the center of development policy is quite significant, 
in that it assumes smallholder knowledge is the chief constraint on 
increased production. Extension services exist to provide farmers 
287 
with information regarding improved husbandry techniques. As such. 
they have been part and parcel of agricultural development efforts 
the world aver, and not infrequently the target of reform efforts. 
In the past, however, they have generally been supplemental to core 
programs designed to provide additional resources to smallholders: 
land reforms, irrigation schemes, and credit provisions for seed, 
fertilizer and machinery. The NEP, in contrast, is based on the 
assumption that significant production increases can occur via 
simple changes in husbandry techniques within smallholders' 
resource limits. 20 It is accompanied by no credit or other 
resource-focussed projects. 
With the rather spectacular failure of Kenya's previous 
development effort, the Integrated Agricultural Development Program 
(IADP), which focussed on credit provision, both the World Bank and 
the NoA concluded that the most immediate constraint on development 
was not lack of smallholder resources, but inadequate provision of 
basic services, particularly extension information. After a 
significant effort on the part of the Bank to convince Ministry 
officials of the value of the Bank's new extension system. the NEP 
was designed and adopted. 21 It began with a pilot project in two 
districts and was expanded over a period of three years to include 
all high-value agricultural districts in the country. Its chief 
focus is an improving maize husbandry, though other food and cash 
"For a general description of this type of World Bank program, being initiated in a number of countries throughout the world, see /Senor and Harrison (1979). 
210/: Malcolm Hall, Economist, NoA, March 12. 1985. 
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crops are also included. In Kisii, the NEP has been operational 
since 1982. Extension personnel have focussed principally an 
maize, bananas, and coffee. (A separate tea extension service is 
operated by the Kenya Tea Development Authority gam], a 
parastatal body administering all smallholder tea production.) 
I argued at length that resources are severely constrained in 
Bo:mends due to the nature of straddling and the insecurity of most 
households. If this assessment is correct and the NEP is well-
administered (i.e., Flamands residents receive proper husbandry 
information from the HoA), the program's success in Bomvanda would 
be limited to the degree that resources are a greater constraint 
than the policy assumes them to be. Household response would 
presumably vary in relation to the resources each household could 
mobilize to take advantage of the new techniques learned from 
extension agents. This section analyzes the degree to which 
extension recommendations and proper husbandry techniques have been 
adopted, not only for maize, but also for coffee and tea, in order 
to assess the impact of resource constraints on response to 
development policy. 
Haim is unquestionably the central focus of the KEP in 
Kisii. Extension work schedules and personnel are oriented around 
assisting farmers in maize husbandry. The recommendations given 
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the greatest emphasis involve nothing more than changing planting 
techniques. instead of the 'traditional' Gusii method of planting 
maize and beans seeds in the same hole (maize is almost universally 
intercropped with nitrogen-fixing beans). Ho& recommends planting 
each an separate rows, preferably with two rows of beans in between 
each row of maize. Extension personnel also give farmers specific 
spacing recommendations, rather than the random traditional method. 
recommend using hybrid maize seeds to any farmers not already doing 
so, and using petro-chemical ferilizers. The planting techniques 
themselves, however, are the heart of the program and are claimed 
by !WA to increase production significantly even without hybrid 
seed and fertilizer. 
Adoption of at least one of these recommendations is 
relatively widespread. Hybrid maize has been widely grown 
throughout western Kenya since the mid-1970s. 22 Twenty-four of 69 
Bomwanda farmers planted exclusively hybrid seed in 1985, and a 
further 26 planted hybrid on at least part of their land. 
Generally, hybrid is used more regularly in the longer season of 
February - June and 'local' seed is used for the shorter August - 
December season because the latter matures more quickly and, 
according to Domande farmers, is more resistant to the hailstones 
and high winds common in the second season. any of those who did 
not purchase hybrid cited lack of cash as their reason. Virtually 
all recognize that, despite its slightly higher risk of failure in 
228te John Gerhardt, The Diffusion of  Hybrid Haire in Wester  
WWI+ (ICCYT, Mexico City, 1975). 
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bad weather, hybrid will provide higher returns than local maize. 
Those not purchasing, often women whose husbands could not or would 
not provide the seed, lacked resources, not knowledge. Most 
Bomwanda farmers could plant most of their maize land with hybrid 
by purchasing one large sack at & cost of 72 shillings. While this 
is not extremely expensive, for a woman using her weekly market 
earnings (amounting to 30-50 shillings) to provide the bulk of the 
family's subsistence, it can be a cost beyond the possible. 
Fertilizer use is much less common and such more expensive. 
Only five farmers, four of the six Pioneer cultivators and a Wage-
laborer who is an !WA extension agent, applied approximately the 
proper amount of fertilizer to their maize both seasons of 1985. 
further 19 applied some fertilizer at least one of the two seasons, 
though many of these used only a small sample packet given free to 
farmers by the Kea. Fertilizer use is rare for the same reason 
hybrid seed is not universal: cost. A bag adequate for one hectare 
of maize cost approximately 200 shillings in 1985. Given current 
maize hectarage among Somvanda farmers, this would require per 
household expenditure of approximately KShs. 160 for Followers, 100 
for Wage-laborers, 65 for Farmers and 90 for Female-headed 
households. Comparing this with current capital expenditures 
(calculated from Table 6:2 on a per household basis), this would 
represent a 702 increase for Followers. 512 for Wage-laborers, 362 
for Farmers, and 87% for Female-headed households. Given the low 
to negative savings rates of all non-Pioneer households and men's 
291 
control of investible capital, it is not surprising that these 
significant increases in capital input are rarely provided. Most 
women would have great difficulty saving adequate cash for such a 
purchase, and man generally prefer to invest in cash crops. 
depending an Increased input of women's unpaid labor to maintain 
adequate food production. 
In addition to the cost, Bomwanda farmers are not convinced 
of the benefit of fertilizer use. Many suspect that application of 
petro-chemical fertilizer one season necessitates future 
application to prevent a decline of soil fertility. They fear that 
even if in a given season they manage the fertilizer investment, 
they will not be able to repeat it in the future. Only the 
wealthiest are confident of their ability to make such a 
significant investment continously. The maize officer at the local 
!WA research station assured me this was an incorrect but very 
common belief in UAW that extension work had not yet overcome. 
He also noted, however, that the most recent research shows that 
profit rates from fertilizer application peak at about 100 kgs. per 
hectare and drop as fertilizer is increased to 125 kgs. and beyond. 
Extension agents were recommending 125 kgs. to maximize output per 
hectare, even though this was not the most profitable option. In 
this context, it is not too surprising that Bomwanda farmers were 
reluctant to follow NoA.advice fully. 23 Expansion of land and/or 
Labor input is a safer, non-continuous and proven alternative to 
23011 
 
Mr. Nurori, Nyanza Agricultural Research Station, Eisii, May 29, 1985. 
292 
fertilizer and thus given priority. Most farmers also apply cow 
dung to their maize fields, which is recognized as beneficial by 
the HoA, though the erect amount that should be applied and 
accompanying husbandry techniques are not known. 24 
This heart of the Hoe maize recommendations involves neither 
hybrid seed nor fertilizer. Officials recognize the wide 
acceptance of the former and the lack of capital for the latter. 
Instead, the alternative planting techniques are the central focus 
of the extension program, based an the assumption that any 
additional lahor required is available within smallholder 
households. Extension agents are quite active in Bomwanda and the 
new techniques are fairly widely known. Of 44 respondents, 34 were 
aware of the new techniques and could correctly describe the basic 
methods suggested." Of these, 12 planted all of their maize using 
the new techniques in 1985, 18 experimented with the techniques on 
part of their crop at least one season, and only four did not use 
them at all. While this represents quite good response, it is 
certainly far from universal for something that was to be such a 
minor Change in husbandry with no additional 'expense to the 
farmer. 
The single most important factor limiting adoption was the 
240/: Hr. Histori c op. cit. "This represents only a rough measure of knowledge. Respondents were asked to describe the basic planting method -- maize and beans in separate furloved lines. Their knowledge of spacing between plants and between lines was roughly correct, though they were not asked to state the exact distance in feet and inches. 
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obvious need to increase labor input. Planting maize and beans in 
separate rows requires measuring and furrowing the land before 
planting and makes weeding difficult because the space between rows 
is quite narrow and the beans can be easily uprooted. Seven of 
those who did not fully adopt cited the increased labor input as 
their chief reason. It is =CM= to hear farmers discuss the 
increased workload the new techniques require for both planting and 
weeding. In fact, initial recommendations were two rows of beans 
between each row of maize, but the additional labor proved too such 
and virtually all farmers refused to adopt. Extension agents then 
switched to only one , row of beans and gained much greater 
acceptance. 
Still, the additional labor is clearly seen as a burden. 
Planting and weeding are the periods of greatest seasonal demand 
for labor, so the additional burdens of the new techniques can 
weigh heavily. Planting must be completed as quickly as possible 
to avoid harvest losses of as much as 2.52. Delayed weeding can 
lower production by 102 or more. 26 Farmers are well aware of this 
and unwilling to follow new techniques if they cannot raise 
adequate labor to insure that these tasks are accomplished 
promptly. Several who did adopt were not able to do so fully 
because they Lacked time to complete planting using the new methods 
and reverted to the much faster traditional ones. Furthermore, in 
comparison to the production loss from delayed planting and 
260E: Mr. Nurori, Nyanza Agricultural Research Station, May 29, 1985. 
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weeding, the production increase from the new techniques is rather 
insignificant, amounting to less than 10Z over traditional 
techniques when fertilizer is applied at the HoA research station. 
Bean production increases dramatically, but is of relatively little 
concern to Bomwanda households because seize is the essential 
staple food while beans are an important but clearly secondary 
additional nutrient. This was not, however, the chief factor 
Limiting adoption. The vast majority of Bomvanda farmers, seeing 
the higher production of the resource-rich farmers who did adopt 
the new techniques (and who usually also purchased hybrid seed And 
at least some fertilizer), believed the Hoe recommendations to be 
sound. They did not adopt chiefly because of a resource shortfall. 
Those who adopted the new techniques could mobilize =usually 
large amounts of labor. Among the households in the labor study, 
10 farmers adopted the new techniques fully. Their total family 
agricultural labor input was 6.5 hours per week, against 5.0 for 
the sample as a whole (Table 6:6). Adopting households could 
mobilize greater labor power because of their greater wealth and 
size. Two-thirds of those who fully adopted were Pioneers or 
Followers, many of whom hire additional labor to meet seasonal 
demands. They also had more women available for agriculture (1.5 
per 'house') than the average (1.2 per 'house'), making labor 
mobilization 'in peak seas= significantly easier. Overall, it 
appears that knowledge as such was not the chief constraint to 
additional production. The new techniques were widely known and 
generally accepted as increasing production. That limited adoption 
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was lack of resources, particularly labor, for the new techniques. 
However, Inadequate yield increases from the new techniques could 
in the future limit adoption even further. 
Coffee and Tog 
Chapter 4 delineated the great differentiation among Romwanda 
farmers in coffee adoption rates, timing, and acreage. The 
previous section briefly discussed the question of intercropping. 
undoubtedly the HoA's principal concern regarding coffee husbandry. 
Contrary to what one might expect, intercropping (most commonly 
coffee and maize) is 221 practiced by those households with the 
least amount of available labor. Rather, the reverse is the case. 
Litercropping is illegal and detrimental to coffee production. and 
Somwanda farmers are almost universally aware of this. Most 
continue the practice in order to mazimize immediate overall 
production an a given plot, knowing that by so doing they lower the 
production of both coffee and the maize with which it is 
intercropped. The practice was particularly widespread in 1985 
because coffee prices had been low for several years. any farmers 
both intercropped their coffee stands and neglected to prune their 
coffee because of the low prices. Some went so far as to abandon 
coffee husbandry completely, while one Pioneer 'pruned' her coffee 
to approximately 2 feet high stumps and planted maize around it." 
271t is illegal in Kenya to uproot healthy coffee trees once planted, so this was her creative means of sidestepping the law while at least temporarily abandoning coffee production. 
2.96 
In a situation of general land scarcity, no plot of land can 
be left idle or under a low-yielding crop. With coffee prices low, 
many farmers with the necessary labor made use of their lend to 
maximize short-term output, knowing they were going against sound 
extension recommendations and Kenyan law to do so. This allowed 
them to gain a return (non-monetary) from maize even though both it 
and the coffee produced less than they would in pure stands. It 
also means that the coffee is weeded when the land is prepared for 
maize planting and allows joint weeding of both crops during the 
maize season, insuring that the coffee is much better weeded than 
is pure stand coffee in most households. But intercropping also 
means the coffee does not receive needed pesticide spraying, 
provided by the local cooperative society on all coffee stands that 
are properly cared for: well seeded, pruned, And pure stand. Only 
a few coffee plots of households with large amounts of labor 
qualify. 
Tea is the most recent addition to Kenya's agrarian - 
revolution repertoire. Its adoption, however, have been even more 
heavily affected by socio-economic differentiation than that of 
coffee. As noted in Chapter 4, no Farmer or Female-headed 
households and only four Wage-laborers produce it. Of these, only 
one, the NoA extension agent, earned significant income from it in 
1985. The other three earned very little because of their low-
yielding, ill-cared-for plots. Tea, especially when prices are as 
high as they were in 1983-85, can represent a significant increase 
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in labor productivity if a minimally adequate capital and labor 
investment is possible. Planting requires building a nursery and 
obtaining necessary equipment to create a greenhouse to insure the 
seedlings survive their first year. during which they must be 
constantly watered by hand. They are then replanted and must be 
weeded regularly for two years before they will begin to yield a 
harvest. The labor and capital demands result in rather limited 
initial field sizes. Indeed, only the largest grower in Bomwanda 
cultivates a full acre of tea, the minimal size recommended by the 
ETDA for an 'economically viable' plot. Harvest after the third 
year is continuous, varying in quantity with the rains. It still 
requires frequent weeding and immediate picking when leaves are 
ready in order to maximize yield. When properly grown, there is no 
space between bushes for intercropping. Only one grower who was 
not harvesting his tea and mother whose wife refused to provide 
labor for it (and instead interplanted it against her husband's 
wishes) were intercropping tea and food crops. 
Yields from tea vary enormously. The most successful grower. 
a Follower, earned almost 3000 shillings in the 1984-85 season, 
while the second highest. a Pioneer, earned approximately 1500. 
The average for all Pomwanda growers, however, was only 678. 
Earnings vary with labor and husbandry practices. The largest 
grower hired a regular laborer exclusively for his tea plot. When 
initiating cultivation, he was able to use funds from his retail 
shop and/or his son's government clerk position to do hire the 
2913 
Laborer. Once the tea matured, especially with prices so high, it 
generated far more revenue than needed to pay the laborer. When 
prices fall, however, this margin shrinks. In an extreme 
situation, his steady off-farm income could allow him to continue 
caring for his tea field in spite of temporarily low prices or late 
payments from the TDA. His two wives, • son, two to three 
daughters, and a daughter-in-law help with picking as needed. 
Altogether, the household provided an incredible 40 hours per week 
for tea alone. (Compare this with the average total, agricultural 
labor in Table 6:7 of less than 30 hours per week.) In contrast, 
all tea growers in the labor study averagedonly 9.7 hours per week 
cultivating tea. The two Pioneers and another Follower who produce 
tea in substantial amounts also hire regular laborers using off-
farm funds to do so, supplementing this labor with day-laborers 
and/or some family members as needed. The less successful growers 
attempt to harvest and weed the crop with their limited family 
Labor, which is reflected in their low yields. 
The four largest producers and the local agricultural 
extension agent are the only of 13 Bomwanda tea cultivators to 
apply fertilizers regularly as recommended by the KTDIA. All but 
the largest buy one 175 shilling bag per year (the largest grower 
buys two), the cost of which is subtracted from annual earnings. 
It is not surprising that most growers choose not to consume nearly 
one-quarter of their 676 shillings in earnings on fertilizer. Of 
course, if they did their yield would increase substantially IL 
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they could provide adequate labor to weed and pick the crop .28  The 
average working day for these households is already rather 
lengthy. 29 /accessing it substantially to produce tea without 
reducing it elsewhere would be difficult. 
Because of high tea prices, nine additional Bomvanda farmers 
had built nurseries and were attempting to initiate production by 
the end of 1985. These included one Pioneer, four Followers, one 
Wage-laborer,. two Farmers, and one son in a Female-headed 
household. Of these, only the Pioneer and one Follower had off-
farm income adequate to hire labor to care for a relatively large 
plot of young tea for three years until harvest can begin. Most of 
the rest work under the normally strained situation of most 
household labor in Bomvanda; it is difficult to imagine how they 
will be able provide the labor adequate to produce tea on a 
significant scale." Most also lacked the capital (580 shillings) 
to invest in the KTDA package of seedlings and equipment for a tea 
"The District Tea Officer reported that yields from well-cared for tea plots doubled at least from application of adequate amount of fertilizer. 
490f the eight tea growers not using fertilizer, three were in the labor study. The men worked unusually long days of 7.3 hours and the women worked exactly the overall average of 8.8 hours. Of the eight, only two had hired labor to assist part-time with tea. None could hire labor exclusively for tea production as the lafgest growers do. "These cultivators may be able to mobilize some labor exclusively for tea, in that the men in these households cork an unusually short average day of 5.5 hours. On the other hand, the women work an unusually long day of 9.7 hours. Tea production on any significant scale requires, at minimum, the regular labor of several family members, as the example of the largest grower demonstrates. Thus, production an any scale other than minute seems problematic. 
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nursery. Instead, they borrowed cuttings from neighbors, built 
their own nursery, and when possible borrowed a neighbor's plastic 
cover to create the greenhouse. When a cover was not available, 
they planted seedlings without it, knowing that most would not 
survive. Several of these households have transplanted the 
surviving seedlings and intercropped them with Baize. This, too, 
will lower eventual tea yield, but is seen as necessary to maintain 
some production from the land in question while the tea matures. 
Bence, it is unlikely that more than two or three of the nine will 
achieve the potentially large income that led them to invest in the 
crop. 
Both coffee and tea have had important roles in straddling in 
MAUI., providing significant agricultural income for a number of 
households. !Weever, husbandry and resulting production Levels are 
much lower than the Hot. and KTDA would like to achieve. Lack of 
knowledge of proper techniques, however, is not the chief 
constraint. Proper husbandry is generally widely known. It is not 
followed either because the returns to the labor and capital 
required are not adequate, as is the case for coffee, or households 
cannot mobilize the needed resources without shifting them from 
other productive activities, thereby reducing their overall 
diversity, increasing their dependence an a given market, and thus 
their risk and insecurity, as the case of tea illustrates. 
Iisii has seen massive agricultural transformation over the 
past several decades from the introduction of high yielding cash 
crops and hybrid maize. Bovever, in Bomwanda only a small minority 
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has achieved the full benefits of these crops because they are the 
only households able to mobilize adequate resources to take 
advantage of the opportunities present. Insecurity causes most to 
continue to grow substantial amounts of their own food while 
producing several cash crops, thus limiting their dependence on any 
single market. Their resources, however, are inadequate to allow 
them to practice the best husbandry techniques and thereby achieve 
reasonably high productivity in all crops. Knowledge of those 
techniques ia generally quits good. Lacking is the ability to 
mobilize resources and/or the economic incentive to do so. Given 
eue consistently and dramatically low return to family agricultural 
labor, it is not surprising that non-agricultural endeavors and 
reducing insecurity take precedence over Increasing production in a 
given sector. The REP has performed sell in conveying knowledge of 
better husbandry techniques to Bomwanda farmers. Their limited 
adoption of those techniques, however, reveals the limited 
resources they have available and their need to diversify the use 
of those resources to pursue straddling and minimize Insecurity for 
long-term reproduction. 
Conclusion 
Straddling and insecurity shape the structure of the 
household economy in Kisii. Agriculture plays a significant role 
providing a base for simple reproduction, but is not an important 
factor in households' attempts to achieve expanded reproduction. 
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Hen's off-farm income and their ability to insure that women use 
the bulk of their earnings on daily subsistence give Chem control 
over the vast majority of investible surplus. This they diffuse 
over a variety of agricultural and non-agricultural activities to 
minimize risk. Women also spread their limited resources, chiefly 
their labor, over a number of activities. Overall household 
resource allocation is usually the result of more or less constant 
negotiation between husband and mile. Both, however, recognize the 
necessity of straddling and feel the insecurity of market 
dependence. 
The initial adoption of the high-value cash crops an which 
tanya's 'agrarian revolution' is based was part of the rise of 
straddling. Insecurity, however, causes men and women to invest in 
as many different cash crops as possible, while also maintaining a 
significant level of food production. The result in recent years 
is ever-shrinking individual plots of each type of crop in each 
household, negating the ability of most to invest in capital inputs 
for a given crop and spreading household labor so thinly that 
proper husbandry techniques are difficult to follow. Most farmers 
are aware of proper husbandry and accept' the bulk of the 
recommendations made by Kok extension personnel. They, do not, 
however, adopt them uniformly because they often lack the resources 
to do so. 
Labor is currently the key resource limiting improved 
husbandry. Family labor is generally strained because it is 
diffused over a wide variety of activities. Hired labor is 
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available only to those with adequate off-farm incomes. Such 
households engage in overall agricultural expansion, purchasing or 
hiring land, hiring labor, and investing in capital inputs to 
increase their production per hectare and per capita. This 
provides a significant part of their simple reproduction. allowing 
a greater share of off-farm income to be used for investments in 
expanded future reproduction. Returns to unpaid (largely women's) 
Labor remain low, but well above those of their neighbors who 
cannot make such investments. The other extreme is those who, due 
to lack of alternatives, labor harder and harder an their limited 
land to maximize immediate production in order to survive, 
simultaneously driving the return to their labor power to very low 
levels. These two models provide the major options available to 
Bomvanda households. The agrarian revolution and current 
development policy have had a significant impact, but the full 
benefits have accrued only to a minority of the participating 
households, and the resource barriers to the remainder seen 
formidable. Development policy, even when effectively implemented, 
as the NEP appears to be, can have only limited impact without more 
fundamental changes in the ability of rural households to mobilize 
resources to respond to development opportunities. That then 
should more appropriate policy be? Tentative guidelines and 
theoretical conclusions await the final chapter. 
CHAPTER 7 
purther Evidence: 
Though the case study presented in the Last three chapters 
has been essential to explicate and analyze straddling as a model 
of social reproduction. its limited scope makes confident 
generalization difficult. Past research has shown that Kenyan 
rural households have a history of combining agriculture and off-
farm activities (set Chapter 3). This chapter will argue that this 
hiStorical pattern continues, via straddling, throughout Kisii and 
elsewhere in Kenya. I will present data from a survey of 305 
randomly selected Kisii households, a previous labor use study in 
Kisii, and secondary literature from elsewhere in Kenya to verify 
the widespread nature of straddling and draw attention to 
variations within it. 
gesults of a ffousehold Survey 
111212112—LIZILLAild-125i1111 
To compare the Bomwanda results with a broader sample of 
Kisii households, I conducted a survey of 305 randomly selected 
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households from three locations (sub-district administrative areas) 
in Zisii. The survey sought to establish levels of household 
income, sources of that income, economic and agricultural history, 
and current agricultural practices and response to government 
development policy. (See Appendix B for a complete description of 
the survey and methodology.) The three locations were chosen to 
provide a cross-section of the district. One was generally 
acknowledged to be one of the most 'progressive' area of the 
district, situated in the higher side of the district (5200-7000 
feet in elevation) and practicing unusually intensive tea, coffee 
and dairy production). 	The second, in which Bomvanda is 
situated, is perceived as less wealthy than the first, but clearly 
actively engaged in the agrarain revolution, growing extensive 
coffee and engaging in tea and dairy production to the extent 
possible at their lover elevation. The third, in the lowest area 
of the district, is considered relatively 'backyard' in all 
economic, social and political terms and was assumed to be 
significantly poorer than either of the other two. I will refer to 
them as Locations 1.. 2 and 3 in the order presented to avoid use of 
the awkward Gusii names for them. 
Selecting the three differing sub-locations alloys us to 
examine the extant, stage and effects of straddling under 
1It was also the area of the district from whence came the most important 'Paramount Chief' under the colonial regime, whose grandsons and nephews are today important businessmen and/or government officials. Gusii throughout the district recognize it. though grudgingly and with a sense of injustice, as the unquestioned leader of the district in terms of economic and political power. 
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presumably differing conditions. In addition to checking the 
representativeness of Bomvanda, this raises a number of interesting 
questions, such as: does the higher elevation and agricultural 
potential of Location I allow for more independent agriculture and, 
hence, less straddling? Does the relative poverty (if it indeed 
exists) of Location 3 mean that straddling has not developed and 
social reproduction in those communities remains closer to the 
classic peasant model? Are the short- and long-term effects of 
straddling -- limited response to development policy, possible 
class formation and 'endlessness 	occuring in the other areas, 
and to chat degree? 
Answering these questions with a 'one-shot' survey is 
difficult, but we can discern key indicators and interpret them In 
Light of the straddling argument developed in Samwanda. I viii 
first present a broad array of descriptive statistics detailing 
income levels, the extent of apparent straddling, and its apparent 
effects on adoption of cash crops, use of hired labor in household 
agriculture, and land transfers. Finally. I viii present the 
results of several regression analyses attempting to link 
variations in off-farm income with variation in maize husbandry, 
investment in agricultural intensification, and current 
agricultural income, in order to demonstrate the significance of 
straddling for current agricultural development efforts. 
That the initial assumptions regarding the three locations 
were accurate is demonstrated in Table 7:1. Starting at the first 
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TABLE 7:1 
Imlay Household Characteristics  
Total Laratilat 1 2 3 
Household Pop. 5.0 5.23 4.49 5.24 
Land per Person 1.26 1.55 1.03 0.96 (Acres) Held Income 2774 3621 2223 1729 (13bx/capita) Off-farm Income 1689 2241 1289 1070 (EShs/capita) Cash Crop Income 413 716 170 107 (Ins /capita) Voesn's Business Income 498 353 703 516 
(EShe/capita) Veekly Subsistence Expenditures fltSheicanita) 19.8 
18.8 26.0 12.0 
row of the table, we see total household cash income varies widely 
by location, with the predicted wealthier Location 1 having roughly 
twice the per capita income of Location 3, and Location 2 in 
between, though closer to Location 3 than to 1. On average, then, 
Location 1 must be seen as significantly wealthier than Bomwanda 
and Location 3 as poorer. However, the single largest source of 
household income in all three areas, as in Bomwanda, is non-
agricultural, overwhelmingly composed of men's wages. Variation by 
location is only slight, with off-farm income representing between 
582 and 62% of total income in all three. This suggests that 
straddling, at least in terms of participation in non-agricultural 
activities alongside agricultural ones, exists in all three 
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TABLE 7:2 
Average Cash Crop Income, 1983 (Percentage of Households end Kenyan Shillings/Capita)a 
Location Total 	1 	2 	- .3 
Crop 1 of 	Mean Blade Income 1 of 	Kean gelds Income i of 	Kean Buds Income I of 	Kean Holds Income 
Milk 
Tea 
Coffee 
23 
33 
67 
732 
1390 
73 
37 
60 
61 
816. 
1550 
84 
11 
8 
77 
564 
549 
60 
5 
9 
65 
324 
208 
76 aPercentage of households is percentage of all households surveyed reporting crop income. Mean income is on • per capita basis for those households reporting crop income only. 
locations. -I should note, moreover, that these figures are 
averaged over all households, while in fact only two-thirds of them 
actually had off-farm income in 1985. We must remember that these 
averages, then. mask • high degree of variation; in households with 
off-farm income, that income is even more significant than these 
data suggest. It should not surprise us, then. if attaining off-
farm income is a major goal of those without it. 
Variation in cash crop income follows a similar though more 
extreme pattern. Location l's past history of adoption of tea and 
coffee is reflected in its crop income being 4 to 5 times that of 
the other areas. This reflects the spread of tea and dairy 
production in Location 1 that is barely present in the other areas, 
as shown in Table 7:2. In a year in which tea prices were up and 
309 
TABLE 73 
1,ivestock Ovnership (Average Number of Cattle per Bald.) 
;atecniry* Total 1 L22811211 2 3 
All Cattle 2.51 3.3 1.6 2.18 
Local Zebu 1.49 1.46 1.21 2.0 
Balf-Grade 0.47 0.76 0.24 0.15 
full-Grade  0.55 1.1 0.15 0.03 
1' Half-Grade' is mixed local and exotic stock; 'Full-Grade' is pure exotic stock. 
coffee down, we see that tea and milk both provided vastly greater 
Income than the much more widespread production of coffee. The 
first two were grown almost exclusively in Location 1. Farmers in 
the other areas, as in Bomvanda. have recently adopted these when 
possible. This movement began in about 1973, after the Location 1 
sample already contained about 40 tea growers, and did not 
accelerate noticably until the 1980s. Their numbers and tea Income 
remain dwarfed relative to that of Location 1. 
Location l's high level of dairy production reflects their 
past investment in high-grade dairy cattle, investments made 
possible by their prior adoption of tea and/or their off-farm 
incomes. Number of cattle per household presented in Table 73 
varies significantly by location. Interestingly, cattle ownership 
does not vary directly with income. Location 2, the 'middle-
income' of the three. has the fewest cattle per household. The 
310 
higher numbers in Locations 1 and 3 are comprised principally of 
milk-producing, high-grade stock in the former and local grade 
stock in the latter. The large number of local stack in Location 3 
reflects the 'unrevolutianized• (in the sense of the agrarian 
revolution') nature of its farm enterprises. In Location Z. 
adoption of coffee and to some extent tea has increasingly taken 
grazing land from local grade cattle (as was the case in Bomwanda), 
while significant investment in grade cattle remains difficult. In 
Location 1, grade cattle are a profitable part of the agrarian 
revolution. In Location 3, however, unusually large numbers of 
local cattle remain, in spite of the small amount of land per 
capita available in that area (see Table 7:1). because profitable 
alternatives have not been feasible. 
The final component of total income in Table 7:1. women's 
market income, also does not vary directly with total income. This 
income is principally local weekly sales of farm produce such as 
bananas, vegetables, or surplus seize. As noted in the table, 
accurate estimates of this income are extremely difficult. Income 
is generated weekly, but may not necessarily be generated every 
week, depending an season and availability of crops for sale. The 
survey asked women to provide an estimate of weekly income from 
market activities. Because these activities do not take place 
every week and the data were significantly higher than local 
knowledge and observation led me to believe, I divided them in 
half, an what I think is an accurate assumption that most women had 
produce to sell only Ulf of the weeks in the year. Thus, the data 
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represent rough estimates, at best, of women's actual income. 
Surprisingly, women in Location I have lower incomes from 
these activities than women in the poorer areas. I suggest this 
can be explained with the straddling model. Recall that success in 
straddling and hence the agrarian revolution depended on the degree 
to which men re-invested off-farm income in agriculture and women 
were willing to provide the labor necessary to make that Investment 
profitable. Put simply, in Location 1, where the agricultural 
potential and early government development efforts were greater, it 
has worked. Women have not diversified their labor allocation into 
Loci. market activities, which are relatively poorly paid in terms 
of real hourly wage, because their households have successfully 
pursued straddling, with men's Investment and women's labor 
combining to create relatively highly profitable agricultural 
enterprises. In the other locations, where overall income is lower 
and the development of the agrarian revolution less advanced, women 
have diversified more widely, resulting in the relatively high 
levels of local market income. 
Market income data are also surprising in that, overall, this 
source of income is greater than cash crops. This reflects the 
former's much wider spread across all households. Few if any 
women reported earning more money than what could be gained from a 
profitable tea field, for instance. Comparing producers' average 
income from tea or milk (in Table 7t2) with market income, we see 
that the former, when pursued successfully, are significantly more 
profitable than the latter. Women pursue market trade more 
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actively when their household's access to off-farm income or their 
husband's unwillingess to invest in household agriculture and share 
the returns therefrom prevents them from applying their labor in 
profitable cash crop enterprises. This explains the only 
discrepancy in what is otherwise a widespread income advantage for 
Location 1. 
Income advantage has been translated into better housing, 
education and food self-sufficiency. Distribution of improved and 
'traditional housing in Table 7:4a demonstrates the income 
differentials across locations. Two-thirds of all housing in the 
Location I sample is improved, while only one-third in Location 3 
is, the difference being split evenly in Location 2. Similarly, 
education differences, which will probably be translated into 
future income differences, are quite pronounced and vary directly 
with current income (Table 7:4b). Finally, wealth and cash crop 
production does not translate Into loss of food self-sufficiency. 
On the contrary, Table 7:4c shows that Location 3 households had to 
rely on the market for a longer period to provide their annual 
maize needs than Locations 1 or 2. As in Domande, the common 
assumption that there is a direct trade-off between food and cash 
crop production within households is false. Rather, it appears (as 
the straddling model would predict) success at both occurs 
simultaneously. Each, I suggest, is tied to overall income, in 
turn reliant on off-farm income. 
The picture of income distribution and its immediate effects 
in tisii is not significantly different from that painted by 
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TABLE 7:4 
Housing.  Education. and Subsistence  
Table 7:4a 
Housing (Percentage) 
Type of Housing* Total 1 
,&ocation 
3 
Permanent 5.9 9.8 4.0 0 N:24 
Semi-Permanent 7.9 8.2 10.5 3.2 N:32 
'Nabati° 42.8 50.0 41.1 30.1 N:176 
Thatch-roof 43.5 32.0 44.4 66.7 N:179 
a A 'Permanent' house has concrete walls and tin/tile roof; 'semi -permanent' has mud walls with plaster overlay and tin roof; 'flabati° has mud walls and tin roof. 
Table 7:4b 
Education Expenditures  (Kenyan Shillings per capita per year) 
Total 1 Locations 3 2 Percentage of Hldsa 76 83 71 65 N:305 
Mean gzp. b 455 575 416 178 
!Percentage of all households surveyed reporting education expenses. °Mean expenditure for those households reporting education expenses. 
314 
Table 7:4c  
Subsistence  (Months per Year) 
cation Months teputIng..23mckujagjata 
All 1.55 
Loc. 1 1.13 
Loc. 2 1.84 
Loc. 3 2.13 
KitChing (1980) in Central Province. That is, advantages in a 
variety of economic endeavors seem to accrue to the same 
households. Off-farm income, cash cropping, cattle, education, 
land per capita, and housing all vary together -- what Kitching 
calls 'bundled advantages.' The survey also shows the limited 
extent of the agrarian revolution, even within a district that is 
one of the leaders nationwide. Significant income generation from 
the agrarian revolution is restricted to limited areas of the 
district, areas in ehich off-farm income is also high, as predicted 
by the straddling model. The importance of off-farm income, even 
in the highly developed Location 1, is clear, giving necessary but 
not sufficient support to the straddling model. To show straddling 
exists, the data must demonstrate that off-farm income has been a 
significant catalyst to agricultural activities, and that it 
significantly affects current agricultural production and 
practices. 
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The Role of Off-farm /ncomq 
The straddling model *tits that off-farm income is a key 
source of investible funds for adoption of high-value agricultural 
endeavors, hiring labor to break seasonal constraints, and purchase 
or rental of land to expand overall household operations. Table 
7:5 presents percentages of households that used agricultural, 
wage, and other income sources to initiate coffee and tea 
production. Rage Income was a significant source of both tea and 
coffee cultivation. Note that a higher than average percentage of 
tea cultivators in Location 1 (a large majority of all tea 
cultivators in the sample and the wealthiest among them [set Table 
7:2]) initiated cultivation with wage income. Thus, among the more 
successful tea growers, 43! relied on off-farm income to provide 
the essential initial investment. The same data for coffee, which 
requires a much lover initial investment and was on average adopted 
much earlier, are much lower, though even here 281 used wage income 
to enter the agrarian revolution. 
Further examination of the data reveals a clear trend toward 
a higher percentage of adoptees using wage income to adopt both tea 
and coffee in recent years. This is especially true in the 1980s, 
as straddling has become nearly universal. Finally, when recent 
adoptees (post-1980) are excluded (because they have unusually low 
crop incomes, having just begun harvesting in the year before the 
survey), those who used cage income to invest in either coffee or 
tea have significantly higher current crop incomes than those who 
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TABLE 75 
Off-fAlm Income as Source officonomic Activity (Percentage)a 
10.211Iiall cIoP 	Source_ 	Total 	1 	2 	3  
&grit. 	50.6 	48.1 	62.5 	66.7 
Off-farm 
	
Income 	41.9 	45.6 	25.0 	33.3 
Other 	7.5 	6.4 	12.5 	0.0 
Sala& kgric. 	65.0 	61.1 	64.9 	74.2 
Off-farm Iacono 	28.1 	29.2 	26.4 	16.1 
 
OVAL, 	 6.9 	9.7 8.7 	9.7 
   
'Percentage of households from whom information vas available. 
used farm income to adopt. In other words, it would appear that 
those with off-farm Income, while not a majority of adoptees, were 
initially and/or have become the bigger producers, again in accord 
with the straddling model. 
Table 7t6 shows the importance of off-farm income to the 
purchase of cattle, which in tutu determines income from commercial 
mill production. While wage income provided all or part of only 
29: of purchases of local grade stock, it provided 472 of half-
grade and 562 of full-grade dairy cattle purchases •2  This again 
shove the importance of non-agricultural income in providing cash 
261alf-grades cattle are cross-breeds of local stock and improved 'exotic' imported stock. while 'full-grade' stock are pure exotic. 
317 
TABLE 7:6 
Sources of Cattle Purchases (Percentages of Purchases) 
Cattle Typea Agric. 11211211L191112L-12L-23=ABI. Off-farm 	Combination Other 
Local Zebu 56 25 4 5 N:109 
Nalf-Grads 50 37 10 3 N:30 
Full-grade ' 	45 43 13 0 1447 
"Half-Grade' is mixed local and exotic stock; 'Pull-Grade' is pure exotic stock. 
for initial entrance into the 'agrarian' revolution. 
I argued that in Bomwanda, straddling advanced as the more 
duccessful first hired labor to replace male labor an the household 
estate and later purchased land to expand their already successful 
agricultural enterprises. The extent to which these are phenomena 
general to the rest of Kisii can be gleaned in Table 7:7. Nearly 
25Z of all households in the sample hired labor, with this figure 
being significantly higher in Location 1 and drastically lover in 
Location 3, shaving this aspect of agricultural commercialization 
and straddling to be much more developed in the former. Beating 
Land was also undertaken by nearly one quarter of all households, 
and varied only slightly by Location. Purchase was undertaken by 
fever, though still a significant number, and also varied 
relatively slightly. 
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TABLE 7:7 
Dabor Hire and Land Market (Percentage of Households Surveyed) 
Activity Total 1 Locatioa 2 3 
Hiring Labor (Pull-time) 24.6 35.2 20.0 7.7 
Renting Land In 24.6 22.8 26.3 26.2 
Leasing Land Out 10.2 9.0 13.7 7.8 
Purchasing Land 18.4 17.9 • 20.0 17.2 
Selling Land  11.8 6.2 16.8 17.Z 
Note that land sales were more rare than land purchases and 
Land rental f2 others more rare than land rental Lgga others. This 
could be explained by a net outflow of land investment from these 
three locations to others in Elsii. However, given the degree to 
which these locations seem to represent the range of agro-economic 
environments in the district, I doubt this is the case. Rather, I 
Suspect the difference lies simply in the strong cultural 
approbation still placed on land sales or renting to others, in 
spite of its increasing frequency. Numerous informants suggested 
this to me, and even some farmers whom I knew quite well in 
Bomvanda initially lied to me regarding land sales they had made. 
I suspect this translated into unusually by data for land sales 
and rental to others in the survey, and that the figures for 
purchases and rental from others more accurately reflect the true 
extent of the Eisii land market. 
In comparing land trends across locations, we note relative 
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uniformity except for a slightly more active land market (measured 
by purchases) in Location 2 than elsewhere. I suggest this is 
caused by the relative wealth of the area (not the highest, but 
clearly well ahead of the poorest), combined with low Levels of 
overall land per capita (see Table 7:1). The other significant 
difference across locations is in land sales. It is safe to assume 
that all data on this under-represent reality, but there is no 
reason to assume that the cultural approbation against land sales 
is greater in one location than another; the locational data 
probably accurately reflect the comparative frequency of sales in 
the three areas. Note the much greater frequency (more than 
double) of land sales in Location 2 and 3 than in Location 1. 
Agricultural commercialization (greater in Location 1) does not 
produce land disparity within a particular small area. Rather, in 
the high potential area, a much higher percentage of households 
have been successful at pursuing the agrarian revolution (and 
straddling), and thus purchased land in other areas. Those in the 
less succesful areas have provided that land. 3 
The role of off-farm income in pursuing both of these 
investments (hired labor and increased land) can be seen in Table 
7:8. Nearly 56% of all households hiring labor used off-farm 
income to do so. In Location 1 this figure is significantly lower 
3If anything, one could hypothesize that Location 3, generally farther from government and other 'modern' activities and less involved in high-value commercial agriculture, would be the area in which the 'traditional' cultural forces held sway the most. - If this is the case, however, then the differences between locations in terms of land sales are actually greater than depicted in the data. 
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TABLE 7:8 
Sources of Hired Labgr and Land Purchase  
(Percentage of Households Reporting Such Activities) 
lialatliga 
Activity 	Source Total 1 2 3 
Sired Labor 	Agric. 42.7 51.0 31.6 0 
Off-farm 42.7 31.4 57.9 100 Income 
Combination& 13.2 17.6 5.3 0 
Other 1.4 0 5.3 0 
Land Purchase Agric. 39.3 30.8 36.8 63.6 
Off-farm 42.9 46.1 57.9 27.3 
Income 
Combination& 9.0 22.9 0 0 
Other 8.8 0.0 5.3 9.1 
Land Rental 	Agric. 59.0 57.5 64.0 53.3 
Off-farm 28.8 30.3 24.0 33.3 
Income 
Combination* 9.7 12.3 8.0 6.7 
Other 23 0.0_ 4.0 6.7 
"Combination is some combination of agricultural and off-farm 
income. 
321 
(31.42) because of the importance of tea and milk income. The 
latter two sources accounted for over half of the labor hired by 
agriculturally generated income in the overall sample and in 
Location I specifically. Note that in the other locations, off-
farm income was used in the overwhelming number of cases. While 
the total number of cases of hired labor in Location 3 was rather 
small, all were provided by off-farm activities, again denoting the 
absence of highly profitable commercial agricultural activities in 
that location. 
The role of off-farm income in the purchase of land is less 
extreme, but no less clear. Again, a majority of all land 
purchases were made with funds from off-farm income. in contrast 
to the case of hired labor, land purchase from off-farm income is 
more prevalent in Location I, less so in Location 2, and even less 
so in Location 3. A reasonable question is why in the 
agriculturally rich location, agriculture can fund its own hired 
labor but not fund land purchase. The answer lies in the amount of 
land purchased. Land purchases using off-farm income were 
generally significantly larger than those using agricultural 
income. The wealthier households of Location 1, the most successul 
straddlers in the sample, had agricultural enterprises that were 
fully self-sustaining and profitable, including paying for their 
own hired labor. These same households, however, still used of 
 income to expand the base of their agrarian enterprises, 
buying relatively large new fields for further production. Less 
wealthy land purchasers in Location 3, on the other hand, used some 
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agricultural surplus to buy such smaller pieces of land at lover 
prices. 
Finally, the role of off-farm income in rental land does not 
conform to the general trend. Indeed, we see that off-farm income 
provides yell under half of all land rental (and the amount of land 
rented does not vary greatly for those using or not using off-farm 
income). Explaining this anomaly is important for the straddling 
model. The ansver lies in the purpose of renting land as opposed 
to purchasing it. I argued that in Bomvanda renting land vas done 
principally to overcome temporary or long-term land shortage vhen 
purchasing land vas not affordable. Households renting land sore 
characterized by particularly low levels of land per capita and 
thus vere overcoming this burden, not expanding their overall 
agricultural enterprise. The mount of money needed to rent is 
also much less than that needed to purchase. The situation is 
similar for the surveyed households as a whole. Table 7:9 shows 
the purpose of renting land also to be different from that of 
purchasing. Those renting land from others had significantly less 
land per capita than those not renting. Conversely, Chose renting 
their land 12 others had significantly more per capita than those 
not doing so. Clearly, renting land is an adjustment by unusually 
Land-poor households unable to afford purchasing land outright. 
Note that those buying land had greater initial land prior to 
purchase than did those not buying. Thus it is clear that land 
purchase is not a response to inadequate land per capita, but 
instead is an expansion of a successful household's agricultural 
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TA8LE 7:9 
Load pex_;spita Prior to Land Purchase or Sal' (Acres per capita) 
Land Purchased Land Sold and Rented LI Land Leased Out 
Yes 	Na 	Yes No 	Yes 	No 	Yes 	No  
1.61 1.05 	1.15 1.19 	0.85 	1.26 	1.60 	1.11 
enterprise. 
As in Bomwanda, the obverse is also true. Those selling land 
had no excess of it relative to those not selling (see Table 7:9). 
Their reasons for selling also parallel the Bomwanda findings. Of 
the 36 reported land sales, 10 were caused by domestic financial or 
health crises, 10 by the need to pay school fees, 7 to provide 
bridewealth, and the remainder for improved housing (8), starting 
local businesses (2) and miscellaneous other attempts to expand the 
household economy or improve the standard of living in the short 
tara. 4 Thus, a full 75% (27 of 36) of land sales were caused by 
immediate reproduction crises or attempts at belated expansion via 
education (and hence straddling), and only 252 by belated attempts 
at economic diversification or 'luxury' consumption (such as 
improved housing). As in Bomvanda, land sales were permanent 
losses of land by those with no over-abundance of the resource, and 
undertaken mainly out of necessity due to unsuccessful past efforts 
4The total of the parts sums to more than 30 because some respondents gave two distinct reasons for selling land, or sold land more than once, each reason or sale being counted separately. 
324 
TABLE 7:10 
Sources of Housing  Construction  
(Percentages of Houses Built) 
;ncome Source fK  Purchase 
Housing Type& Agric. Off-farm Combination° Land Sales Other 
Permanent 	8 	71 	21 	0 	0 
N:21 
Semi-Permanent 11 	66 	6 	3 	6 
N:24 
Mabati 	40 	49 	6 	3 	2 
N:140 
Thatched Roof 	53 	33 	8 	1 	5 
N:116 
14. 'Permanent house has concrete walls and tin/tile roof: 'semi 
-permanent' has mud walls with plaster overlay and tin roof: 
'Mabati' has mud walls and tin roof. 
"Combination' is any mix of agricultural And off-farm income. 
at straddling or belated attempts to straddle more successfully. 
The final area in which off-farm income should be examined is 
not directly productive, but no less important. Housing, as noted 
earlier, varies greatly across the locations, with the wealthier 
being much more able to build improved houses, a key symbol of 
status and wealth, in addition to an important investment in 
improved family health. Table 7:10 shows the extreme importance of 
off-farm income in building such houses. A full 92: of 'permanent' 
houses, the ultimate symbol of membership in the rural elite, were 
built at least in part with off-farm income. Seventy-four percent 
of 'semi-permanent' and 562 of the such more common 'mabati' (tin-
roofed) houses were also built at least in part with off-farm 
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income. Farm income built a majority of traditional. thatch houses 
only. 
These data are significant for understanding the overall role 
of men's wage income in hosuehold reproduction. The apparent role 
of off-farm income in housing is greater than it is in agricultural 
investments. I suggest, because of the long-standing cultural 
definition of housing as a male responsibility. Off-farm income 
that might otherwise be used for agricultural investment is at 
least identified as being used to build whatever improved housing a 
family can afford. Because agricultural income is not 
automatically and consistently defined as a man's or a woman's, it 
is rarely identified as the source of housing. Thus, the true 
overall importance of men's off-farm income to household 
reproduction probably lies somewhere between the figures for its 
role in agriculture (around 502 of investments in most activities) 
and the higher figures for housing. Improved housing, particularly 
the concrete, glass and metal 'permanent' house, is unquestionably 
the principal sign of rural elite status, and is built almost 
exclusively by male professionals. Achieving this status, and the 
entre to political power and social position that goes with it, can 
assist in the overall economic project of a household as such as 
purely productive activities, and is almost completely dependent on 
off-farm income. The importance of men's off-farm income in 
building this housing thus belies its great importance to social 
reproduction as a whole. 
The descriptive data from the three-location survey broadly 
326 
confirm the straddling model as applicable, with slight variations, 
to all of Kisii. The significance of off-farm income to total 
household income is clear and consistent across locales. Off-farm 
income is also the source of roughly half of all significant 
agricultural investments and improvement, with the partial 
exception of coffee adoption (and that has changed for recent 
adoptees). Hiring labor and purchasing land, key parts of the full 
development of straddling, are widespread and dependent on 
significant amounts of off-farm income. Land sales are made not by 
land-rich households, but by those of low income and in need of 
emergency assistance or assistance to begin straddling, as the 
model suggests. Finally, rural elite status, as represented by 
housing, is almost completely dependent on off-farm income, 
explaining the general desire to attain such income that the 
visitor to Kisii sees all around. 
Within this model of straddling, however, there exist 
important variations in extent and timing. The locale that is of 
greater inherent agricultural potential and was an early recipient 
of colonial education and the agrarian revolution is today, as 
local knowledge maintains, significantly wealthier than other 
areas. On the other end is the low-lying area in which relatively 
little coffee and tea adoption has occurred. The former has more 
income and advantages from almost all sources, confirming 
Kitching's results from other areas of Kenya. Surprisingly, 
however, the data do not present the 'backward' area as one in 
which little market activity exists and 'traditional' or 'peasant' 
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households continue to exist on self-sufficient agriculture. On 
the contrary: Location 3 households are currently more dependent on 
off-farm income to adopt agrarian revolution crops, purchase land, 
hire labor or build improved housing than wealthier areas. it 
strong land market, both purchases and especially sales. also 
exists in the poorer area, which is known elsewhere in Kisii as an 
area in which the ambitious and wealthy can acquire land relatively 
cheaply. 
Thus it appears that as straddling has been born and is now 
fully developed in some areas, households in poorer areas are left 
to attempt to mimick it. They require off-farm income to gain 
educatian, agricultural improvements, or land to expand their 
limited reproductive capacity. It seems key aspects of straddling 
-- dependence on off-farm income for other activities and Land 
sales -- are arising without the area passing through the history 
of adoption of the high-value cash crops that blessed wealthier 
areas. A number of the current problems straddling faces in 
Bomvanda, for instance, are arising in Location 3 without the 
concomitant wealth successful straddling provided. The continuing 
population: pressure on land (see land per capita rates and 
household size in Table 70.) makes it likely that these trends will 
continue, forcing increasing 'endlessness without the wealth that 
accompanied the process elsewhere in Kisii. 
Conversely, in Location 1 straddling developed early, as off-
farm income led to cash crop adoption, education, improved housing, 
hiring labor :nd finally land purchase. For this area of unusually 
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high-potential land and weather, straddling and the agrarian 
revolution produced Less apparent internal differentiation than In 
Bomwanda. Because of past straddling, current agricultural 
production is of such high profitability, it is actually less 
dependant on a daily basis on off-farm income than that in the 
other locations. Tea and milk production in particular provide 
income that is constant and high enough not only to hire full-time 
labor, but even to purchase some land and improved housing. More 
households in this location, then, resemble the wealthy 'middle 
peasant' the Svynnerton Plan intended to create than is true in 
other areas. Even among these, however, the largest producers 
initiated cultivation with off-farm income. That is significant is 
the limited area that supports such households, even within a 
district that has always been in the forefront of the 'revolution.' 
Straddling appears to be a useful framework for understanding all 
three Eisii locations. Given the variations between areas, 
however, it is not clear whether straddling's constraints on 
current agricultural production and development potential will be 
the same as in Bomwanda. This final question, of utmost importance 
to the utility of the model for explaining development patterns, is 
explored in the next section. 
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lyaja 
The causes of a households agricultural practices and 
productivity are many and complex, as we saw in Bomwanda. But the 
straddling model posits that certain factors are unusually 
important for understanding household agriculture and response to 
development policy. In particular, the level and use of off-farm 
income and labor availability, either family or hired, are crucial 
variables. To assess this argument using the broader survey data, 
Z conducted regression analyses on three dependent variables using 
a total of eight independent variables, together measuring income 
level, land size, agricultural investment, labor availability and 
knowledge of government-recommended husbandry techniques. 
The independent variables measuring income were total 
household income or total non-agricultural income, depending on the 
regression, as discussed below. Land size was measured simply as 
household land per capita. Agricultural investment was measured as 
the monetary total of reported expenditure on seeds (principally 
for maize) and fertilizer. Labor availability involved two 
measures. The first is a measure of family labor input into maize 
(unquestionably the principal use of family labor in MAU) that 
weighted equally the number of family members reported to work 
regularly in maize fields (with children measured as half of one 
adult) and the number of tasks in which each family member was 
reported to have assisted (planting and weeding). The second is 
the total monetary outlay an casual and full-time hired labor per 
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household. Knowledge was measured by the father's years of 
education (often positively correlated in Africa with agricultural 
knowleage and improved husbandry) and a direct measure of 
respondents knowledge of currently recommended husbandry 
techniques for four key crops and cattle. The latter was included 
in regressions as five distinct 'dummy' variables, the first 
dividing those who knew the correct techniques for at least one 
crop from those who knew none, the second dividing those who knew 
correct techniques for at least two crops from those who did not, 
etc. 5 (See Appendix B for full details and discussion of both 
dependent and independent variables.) 
Using these independent variables it is hoped that the 
effects of income and labor can be isolated from those of land size 
and knowledge. Finally, a 'dummy' variable was included for 
location, bifurcating the sample into those in Location 1 and those 
in Locations 2 or 3. The latter were Lumped together because on 
most indicators, as shown above, they are closer to one another 
than they are to the wealthier and more productive Location 1. 
Thus, the effect of local environment was controlled for. 
The first dependent variable analyzed is a composite measure 
of seize husbandry practices that weighted equally application of 
5The dummy variables were used instead of a composite ordinal scale of agricultural knowledge becuase using ordinal level variables in 'regressions is a highly disputed technique (See Aches.) Many argue it is acceptable in that results vary little whether one uses an ordinal level variable or divides it into several dummy variables. In the regressions below, however, the ordinal level variable proved insignificant in all cases, while different levels of knowledge, represented by dummy variables, proved significant in different regressions, as I discuss below. 
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improved planting techniques, timing of planting. year in which 
improved practices were begun (if in fact they had been). use of 
fertilizer on maize, and type of fertilizer used (if any), with 
each being either '0° or '1' and the scale running from 0 to 5. It 
Is thus an ordinal-level variable with a relatively small amount of 
variation. Actual variation, in fact, was less than it might have 
been, given the relatively uniform answers given to the question of 
what planting method was used. The °T and V° method described in 
Chapter 6, the principal focus of the government's current 
agricultural development effort in Kisii, was reporte4 to be used 
by the vast majority of respondents. Casual observation and 
discussions with NoA field staff, however, led me to conclude these 
figures were inaccurate. It is clear an sight that the majority of 
fields do not use the new row-planting techniques. At best, as in 
Bomwanda, a majority of farmers are experimenting with the 
techniques an a small part of their fields and reported this 
because they are fully aware it is the 'approved' method desired by 
the government. As always, respondents are unsure of an outside 
interviewer and possible reprisals from local officials if 'wrong' 
answers are given, thus they tended to give the 'right' answer. 
What this does show is the rapid spread of the correct information 
regarding the new methods, as I found in Bomwanda also (see Chapter 
6). In any case, in combination with the other part of the maize 
husbandry variable, I concluded the data did vary enough to allow 
analysis, though results, especially explained variance and 
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parameter estimates. would undoubtedly be low. 
The results of two regressions using the maize husbandry 
independent variable are given in Table 7:11. The first presents 
the entire, eight variable model. Given the nature of the 
dependent variable, the explained variance (12) of 24.8Z is rather 
impressive. Examining the beta weights (which standardize all 
variables to the same scale, thus showing the variation measured in 
standard deviations from the mean of the dependent variable, given 
a variation of one standard deviation from the mean of the 
independent variable, we see that hired labor is the most important 
factor explaining maize husbandry, followed by agricultural 
investment, the agricultural knowledge dummy variable (which in 
this regression separates the five respondents who had essentially 
perfect knowledge from the remaining 300) and total income. 
However, a number of the independent variables estimated 
parameters are not statistically significant at the .05 level (95Z 
certainty that the estimated parameter from the sample accurately 
represents the actual population parameter) commonly used as 
minimally acceptable. Removing these leaves only four 
statistically significant independent variables, shown in the 
second regression. Hired labor remains by some distance the most 
important factor in explaining maize husbandry, followed by total 
income, agricultural knowledge and land per capita. These four 
alone explain 21Z of the variation of the dependent variable, and 
at least mildly confirm the straddling model: labor (in this case 
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TA3LE 7:11 
Regression Results: Maize Husbandry& 
First Regression 
Dependent Variable: Maize Husbandry Adjusted R2 -- 0.248 
Independent 	Beta 	Beta Variables Eltlatte 	Weight 	1-statistic 
Held Income/Capita 0.00004 0.106 1.724 Hired Labor (She) 0.0034 0.364 6.25* Ag. Knowledge Dummy° 1.268 0.111 2.01' Father's Educ.(Yrs) 0.022 0.070 1.15 Ag. Investment (She) 0.0007 0.152 2.575' Family Labor in Maize 0.025 	- 0.070 1.22 Hold Land/Capita 0.040 0.084 1.536 (Acres) 
Second Regression 
Dependent Variable: Maize Husbandry Adjusted R` -- 0.21 
Independent 	Beta 	Beta Variables Estimate 	Weight 	1-statistic 
Hold Income/Capita 0.00007 0.186 3.37 * Hired Labor (She) 0.0033 0.355 6.47' Ag. Knowledge Dummy° 1.115 0.120 2.28' Held Land/Capita 0.053 0.107 2.03' (Acres) 
* Significant at the 0.05 level. 'See Appendix B for details an construction of variables and survey ,methodology. °Dummy variable dividing those with perfect knowledge of proper husbandry techniques on survey from those without. 
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hired) and household income explain husbandry practices such more 
than knowledge. I suggest, as is the case in Bomwanda, respondents 
adopt the improved husbandry techniques only when they have the 
labor to implement them effectively, which requires higher off-farm 
income to hire labor because the new techniques are more labor 
intensive than previous practices. 
The second dependent variable used was an independent 
variable in the first set of regressions: monetary measure of 
annual agricultural investment. The results using the same 
independent variables of the seven variable model and then reducing 
it to only those variables that proved significant are presented in 
Table 7:12. Again, not all variables are significant in the more 
complex model. Explained variance (R2 ) is lower than in the 
previous regressions, showing the relatively weak explanatory power 
of the overall model. Within this, however, the beta weights show 
total income and location, not surprisingly, have the strongest 
relationship with agricultural investment. Farmers in Location 1 
have higher production levels and, within this group, those with 
higher incomes can invest in more inputs than others. 
Removing the statistically least significant variable --
father's education -- results in all other variables becoming 
adequately significant, as seen in the second half of Table 7:12. 
Once again, income levels appear to determine investment more than 
any other variable, with the remainder -- labor, knowledge, land 
TABLE 7:12 
Regression Results: Agricultural Investmenta 
First Regression 
Dependent !triable: Agricultural Investment Adjusted 1.4 -- 0.173 
Inds:pendant Variables Beta Estimate Beta Weight 7-statistic 
Riad Income/Capita 0.016 0.209 3.31" Hired Labor (She), 0.237 0.118 1.93 As. Inowledge Dummy° 100.1 0.114 2.00" Father's Educ.(Yrs) 6.703 0.102 1.62 Family Labor in Maize 8.236 0.109 1.81' Held Land/Capita 11.55 0.113 1.98" (Acres) Location Dummyc 90.86 0.174 2.94* 
Second Regression 
Dependent Variable: Agricultural Investment Adjusted R2 -- 0.182 
Independent 	Beta 	Beta Variables Estimate 	Weight 	7-statistic 
geld Income/Capita 0.019 0.231 4.02' !fired Labor (She) 0.321 0.152 2.59' Ag. 'Knowledge Dummy° 134.0 0.153 2.79' Family Labor in Maize 11.73 0.151 2.69' Held Land/Capita 13.47 0.123 2.26" (Acres) Location Demme 75.72 0.140 2.45+ 
' Significant at the 0.05 level. aSee Appendix 8 for details an construction of variables and survey methodology. bDivides respondents with knowledge of at least four of the five husbandry techniques surveyed from those with lesser knowledge. 
cDividts Location 1 households from Locations 2 and 3 households. 
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and location -- roughly equally important. 6 Note however that the 
combined effect of hired and family labor is greater than even 
income. Given the limited explanatory power of the model as whole, 
we can conclude that income levels and labor availability are 
notably more important in determining levels of household 
agricultural investment than are knowledge, land area or location. 
The final and most important variable analyzed is total cash 
crop income, which is the best measure of crop productivity 
available. Clearly the differing income potential of different 
crops makes this an inadequate measure of productivity. But given 
farmers' propensity to shift production among their diversified 
agricultural portfolio in response to current price, it does 
measure farmers overall levels of well-being and agricultural 
development reasonably well. Only those vith significant and 
diversified past investment can shift production to crops currently 
profitable and thus maximize income in any given year. Finally, 
keep in mind that these data are not an actual statistical picture 
of crop production for 1985 when the survey was conducted. Though 
variation in the independent variables from year to year is 
undoubtedly slight, crop income data sere for the most recent crop 
year (running June 1984 to June 1985), while off-farm income, labor 
availability, etc. were measured at the time of the survey 
6Note that the dummy variable for agricultural knowledge used in this regression divides those who knew recommended techniques for at least four of the five subjects surveyed. Only **** respondents were in this category, representing an unusually knowledgable minority. And yet the importance of this knowledge in explaining investment remained relatively slight. 
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(November 1985). Thus, the statistical picture is only one of 
Likely status and overall relationships among the variables. not an 
accurate portrayal of a given year. 
Table 7:13 presents the results of these regressions. 
Explained variance of this model is much higher than the others, 
confirming the importance of straddling in determining overall 
agricultural income. Location is a significant and strong factor 
in determining crop income, as those in Location l are notably 
distinct from others. More important than Location, however, is 
family and hired labor, especially when the effects of the two are 
mentally combined (see the relevant beta weights in the first 
regression). Surprisingly, with hired labor and Location 
controlled for, the relationship of non-agricultural to 
agricultural income is statistically insignificant and extremely 
weak. However, given that I have argued that the most important 
link between off-farm income and agricultural production is via 
hired labor, the model still provides significant confirmation of 
straddling. Actual knowledge, at any level (any of the five dummy 
variables) did not have a significant relationship with crop 
income. The strongest relationship among the agricultural 
knowledge variables is presented in the first regression, and is 
both weak and insignificant. 
The second regression in the table presents a revised model 
including only those variables for which statistically significant 
relationships exist. Explained variance remains a strong 33Z using 
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TABLE 7:13 
Regression Results: Cash Crop  Income per Capita' 
First Regression 
Dependent Variable: Cash Crop Income per Capita Adjusted RZ -- 0.331 
Independent 	Beta 	Beta Variables Estimate 	Weight 	I-statistic 
Non-ag. Income/Capita 0..005 0.019 0.34 Hired Labor (She) 	, 1.065 0.173 3.20 * Ag. Inowledge Dummy° -169.0 -0.094 -1.82* Father's Educ.(Yre) 21.71 0.108 1.92 Family Labor in Maize 109.0 0.468 8.78 * Held Land/Capita 16.11 0.051 0.99 (Acres) Location Dummyc 374.8 0.234 4.385* 
Second Regression 
Dependent Variable: Cash Crop Income per Capita 
Adjusted RZ -- 0.330 
Independent 	Beta 	Beta Variables Estimate 	Weight 	I-statistic 
Hired Labor (Shs) 1.110 0.181 3.41* Father's Iduc.(Yrs) 25.42 0.127 2.43 * Family Labor in Haire 109.0 0.470 8.915* Location Dummyc 411.9 0.259 5.015* 
Significant at the 0.05 level.aSee Appendix B for utails on construction of variables and survey mothodology. ,D
• 
ivides respondents with knowledge of at least three of the five husbandry techniques surveyed from those with lesser knowledge. cDivides Location 1 households from Locations 2 and 3 households. 
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only four independent variables, and the beta weights show labor 
availability is clearly the most important factor, followed by 
location and father's education as a loose measure of agricultural 
knowledge. 
These regression analyses present a weak, albeit clear, 
confirmation of the straddling model. Given the difficulties of 
collecting accurate data via a 'one-shot' rural survey in Africa. 
the results should not be taken lightly. Agricultural investment 
was relatively strongly related to household income, while maize 
husbandry and total crop income are most strongly related to labor 
availability. Significantly, knowledge of proper agricultural 
techniques proved to be such less important. Only the most 
knowledgable minority differed to a statistically significant, 
albeit weak, degree from the entire sample in its maize husbandry 
practices; only a slightly larger and less knowledgable minority 
differed from the pack in their agricultural investment. No 
measure of knowledge had a statistically significant relationship 
with crop income. This lends support to the thesis developed 
earlier for Someanda that knowledge of new techniques, the current 
focus of tanya's NIP and overall agricultural development strategy, 
is not the primary determinant of agricultural production or 
income. Indeed, the survey revealed, via the obvious 
misinformation given the enumerators regarding maize planting 
techniques, that knowledge of the improved techniques is quite 
widespread. Improving income, however, seems to depend more on 
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labor availability (with agro-ecological environment controlled 
for) than on knowledge. The overall picture is one of household 
income (of which the major component is off-farm income) and labor 
playing crucial roles influencing agricultural practices, 
investment and income, as straddling would suggest. 
Other Evidence of Straddlinc in isit 
The survey of three locations showed that the likely 
indicators of straddling -- off-farm income and labor playing 
crucial roles in determining income, cash crop adoption, and 
improved husbandry -- are present in a population much broader than 
just Bomwanda. There remains the question of whether this argument 
can be expanded to all of Kisii and beyond. Earlier studies of the 
district confirm the representativeness of the sample areas in most 
terms, but limit the apparent spread of straddling within the 
district. They also show, however, that without straddling, the 
Income effects of the cash crop revolution are less than they are 
often assumed to be. 
An extremely detailed aerial land survey conducted in late 
1983 in Kisii provides the best information on. among other things, 
the spread of cash crops, cattle and improved housing (Lake Basin 
Development Authority 1983). I wish to analyze the latter because, 
as discussed earlier, it is a key indicator of overall income. 
Assuming an equal propensity to invest in housing, an area with 
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TABLE 7:14 
Land Use in Kisii (Hectares per Square Kilometer) 
Modern Location 	Roofs& Cash Crops Tea Coffee 
Grade Cattle 
Kisii District 112 7.18 3.61 1.49 13.0 
Location 1 	149 6.6 2.10 3.30 13.40 
Locations 2/3 	136  2.0 0.11 1.30 4.70 
*Tin or tile roofs per square kilometer. 
more improved housing will have higher overall income levels. The 
survey counted metal roofs, the first step in improving housing in 
lanya. 7 
Table 7:14 presents the data for Kisii as a whole, Location 1 
from my own survey and Locations 2 and 3 combined (the only way in 
which the land survey reported them). Surprisingly, all three 
locations in my survey are below average in cash crops per km2 , 
especially low in tea per km, and only Location 1 is above average 
in coffee cultivation. Fully 42.6Z of the district's population 
resided in locations with heavier cash crop adoption than that of 
7Th. possible Alternative to higher income as an explanation of the presence of more metal roofs would be a local shortage of thatching material. The land survey, however, shows great uniformity in thatching grass availability thoughout the district. Given the nearly universal reports, from Kenya and throughout Africa. of the high propensity of rural Africans to build improved housing when they obtain increased household income, the latter seems the only likely explanatory factor for variation in numbers of metal roofs per acre noted in the land survey. 
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Location 1, while Location 2 and 3 had the lowest rate of adoption 
in the entire district. It would appear that the locations are 
unrepresentative in the sense of being 'backward' In the agrarian 
revolution. The only exception to this is grade dairy cattle, in 
which Location 1 is slightly above the district average, while the 
poorer locations are far below it. Overall, the locations were 
quite representative in terms of improved cattle stock. 282 of the 
district population residing in locations with more dairy cattle 
per km2 than Location 1 and 352 in areas with fever than Locations 
2/3. 
In contrast to this initially 'backyard' image of the 
locations I surveyed, note that they all had more metal roofs per 
km2 than the district average. Indeed, only one location in the 
district had more metal roofs than Location 1. If the hypothesized 
correlation between improved housing and income is accurate (and it 
is in ay survey and many others from throughout the continent), 
then all three locations would appear to be among the wealthiest in 
the district, in spite of their relatively limited adoption of cash 
crops. 
Several lessons can be drawn from this brief discussion. 
First, vs can conclude that it is possible, in contrast to the 
straddling model, to have significant cash crop adoption without 
current high levels of overall income. Twelve locations (of 17) 
had cash crop adoption levels well above that of Locations 2 and 3, 
and yet also had fever improved houses per km 2 than did those 
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Locations- This means, first, that either straddling is not the 
predominant model of social reproduction in those areas, or their 
off-farm income is not enough to invest in improved housing and can 
only provide minimally adequate inputs into household agriculture. 
It also means, however, that the 'agrarian revolution' by itself is 
not enough to provide the income levels often associated with it. 
Only via straddling can household reproduction levels increase 
adequately to provide such amenities as improved housing. Thus, 
these data limit the extent and degree of straddling, though how 
severely is unclear. Clarifying this would require current income 
and/or agricultural production data from the other locations of the 
district. The data also re-affirm, however, the importance of the 
model in explaining the overall wealth levels seen in Kisii and 
often attributed to the agrarian revolution. 
On the question of labor use, the survey and Bomvanda seem 
more representative of the district than they are in terms of cash 
crops or income. A labor use study conducted by the Kenyan 
Ministry of Agriculture of a random sample of households from 
throughout the district, using data collection techniques quite 
different from mine, yielded results quite similar. The survey 
shoved the average Gusii male farmer (not including those men who 
provide no farm labor) worked just 3.6 hours per day in agriculture 
end the average woman 3.2 hours. This is actually slightly greater 
than my Homvanda findings, but is taken from a sample of 
development loan recipients who probably are 'better' farmers, with 
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more labor to expend on the farm than the average. 8 In any case, 
the low level of overall labor input in agriculture is clear. (The 
survey did not collect data on non-agricultural labor use.) The 
average household was reported to have 1.82 adults available for 
farm labor and overall about two-thirds of all such labor was 
provided by women. Both of the figures confirm my Bomwanda 
findings. 
More important than overall labor input, however, as I argued 
in Chapter 8, is seasonal demand. The government survey found that 
for maize and beans production, peek season labor demand was 75% 
higher than average demand for the lower-elevation agro-ecological 
zone in which &Rwanda is situated and nearly three times above 
average demand in the higher elevation zone in which Location 1 
from my survey is located. Because only one season of maize 
cultivation is possible per annum In the latter zone, overall maize 
labor input is lower, but peak demands become even more extreme 
than in Bomwanda. Similarly, peak demands were approximately 802 
higher than average for tea and over three times higher than 
average for coffee. The survey concludes that peak season demand 
is a crucial variable that must be considered in farm planning and 
notes that the most effective way farmers can overcome this key 
constraint is through hiring labor. This confirms the trends 
8The sample was of 75 households taken from registered recipients of the Small Holder Credit Scheme, of which 2000 Kisii families have partaken. Generally, recipients of such loans tend to be more educated, wealthier and presumably more agriculturally productive than the average smallholder. 
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explained by the straddling model in Somwanda. The centrality ot 
labor in the agrarian regime, even in densely populated Kisii, is 
clear: access to hired labor, obtainable principally from off-farm 
income, is crucial. It would appear that the labor trends found in 
Homwanda are confirmed by other available data. 
No other research on Kisii has fully explored the connection 
of off-farm income, agriculture and socio-economic differentiation. 
However, what evidence exists seems to suggest straddling is common 
in areas of the district not covered by my research. Moody (1976. 
64-65) shows that off-farm income provided 562 of average total 
income in a sample of households in Kitutu, a location of higher 
elevation than Bomeanda and not covered by my survey. For the same 
area, Carlson (1980, 180-89) argued that off-farm income increased 
differentiation, and off-farm business opportunities represented 
the principal focus of investment of surplus cash in the late 
1970s. He also found (163-65) that hired labor was unquestionably 
the most important and expensive purchased agricultural input. 
Finally, Wilson in the early 1970s noted that in another area of 
lisii ICt]hose with the financial resources to purchase land 
frequently have regular employment away from the family farm' 
(Wilson, 1972, 134). 
Straddling, as a process of social reproduction that provides 
the non-agricultural income needed to overcome labor shortage, is 
likely to exist in all of these areas. The only feasible 
alternative is that pre-straddling communal labor groups continue 
to operate elsewhere in the district and provide needed boosts in 
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peek season input. Kongstad and Honsted, however, found that such 
groups are used only slightly in their survey over a number of 
locations throughout Western Kenya, including one location in Kisii 
not included in either my survey or South Vanj are, where Boawanda 
lies. 9 Given the general paucity of such groups in all areas 
surveyed, it is safe to assume they are of minor consequence, 
Leaving off-farm income and straddling as keys to agrarian success 
in a much wider area. The areas of lisii with extensive cash crop 
adoption but apparent low levels of income (based on low levels of 
Improved housing) may well be testimonies to this connection. They 
either do not straddle at all, or do so on average at a relatively 
Low level, alloying for cash crop adoption and maintenance, but not 
significant improvements in overall household income and 
reproduction levels. Further research in these areas is needed to 
resolve this issue fully. 
Variations in Straddling  in Kenya, 
In Chapter 3 I presented macro-level data indicating the 
continuing connection between urban wage-earners and rural 
households via remittances from the former to the latter. This 
suggests straddling is a quite common phenomenon. However, 
households active in both sectors are not necessarily straddling 
9In addition, my survey found very slight use of communal labor groups, especially the amasaga best designed to meet unusual peak demands throughout the three locations. See also Kongstad and 
onsted (1980, 56-58). 
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households. To be defined as straddling, households must be using 
their urban income to invest in education and agriculture, 
principally via improving labor productivity and hiring additional 
Land and labor. k review of recent research from various 
agricultural districts of Kenya reveals both the breadth of what 
appears to be straddling, and the variations within the model. 
Presumably the areas of greatest similarity to Kisii are the 
districts of Central Province, the Kikuyu heartland in which the 
Mau Mau arose and for which the Swynnerton Plan was initially 
designed. Today, Central Province is widely acknowledged to be the 
heart of the agrarian revolution and the most successful and 
powerful, region of the country. Cowen (1976, 7) has shown that 
initial cash crop adoption in Murang'a District (Central Province) 
was financed by off-farm wages well before the develoment of the 
Swynnerton Plan. Indeed, he argues that the latter and subsequent 
international involvement limited what could have been a more rapid 
development of capitalist production processes and land transfer to 
the wealthier and more productive. That off-farm Income remains 
crucial is clear from the Integrated Rural Survey (IRS) conducted 
in 1975, showing that for Central Province as a whole, non-
agricultural income represented approximately half of all household 
income, this figure being slightly higher for tea growing areas 
than for (lower elevation) coffee areas (Geist 1981. 191). 
Njonjo (1977, 375-76), using data collected by G. Lamb and by 
Cowen, shows that 452 of all coffee income in Murans'a is gained by 
one-third of one percent of Murans'a smallholders, suggesting a 
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high degree of socio-economic differentiation. Hired labor in the 
same district, along with others immediately adjacent to it, 
represents a larger share of total labor input than anywhere else 
in Kenya, indicating what appears to be a relatively advanced 
process of socio-economic differentiation arising from straddling 
(Guyer 1972). In neighboring Nyeri, Wilson found in the early 
19705 that 102 of all land had been transfered via the market at 
prices beyond the reach of anyone without significant off-farm 
income (Wilson 1972). Another survey showed that 372 of all lend 
in Central Province was owned by the wealthiest 1i of the 
population (Moody 1976, 54). Njonjo notes that as early as 1960 in 
Kiambu, the immediate hinterland of Nairobi, the smallest 4% of 
Land holdings had been abandoned by their owners -- left in the 
hands of relatives to use -- as they were inadequate for any viable 
agricultural production (Njonjo 1977, 334). 
Comparing these areas with Kisii provides some interesting 
insights. The ras data were grouped not according to District, but 
according to agro-ecological zone. Overall, IRS showed that the 
value of Central Province coffee regions' agricultural production 
was 10% higher than that of the egro-economic zone in which Kisii's 
coffee growers lie, while the difference in tea growing areas was 
as much as 50% in favor of Central Province. They also show that 
production was concentrated on the main cash crops -- coffee and 
tea -- in Central Province to a greater degree than In Kisii." 
10Data in Deist (1981, 168). The data are divided into 'Tea - East of lift,' 'Coffee - East of lift,' 'Tea - West of Rift' and 'Coffee - West of lift.' 'East of lift' represents Central 
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SimilerI7, Central Province incomes, in both coffee and tea growing 
regions, were significantly higher than those of the agro-
ecological zones in which Kisii lies (Geist 1981, 195). Geyer 
(1972), analyzing labor use data for 1971-72, shows that Kisii 
farmers used very little hired labor compared to those in Central 
Province and neighboring districts. Overall. however. Ktsii 
farmers used more total labor on food crops and tea, though less on 
coffee, than their counterparts in Central Kenya._ 
This greater output, greater use of hired labor, but lover 
overall labor input in Central Province could be explained by 
several factors. As noted above. socio-economic differentiation in 
Central Province appears well advanced and, based on land market 
and use of hired labor in agriculture, may be greater than in 
Kisii. However, the rits data indicate greater income equality in 
Central Province areas than in the agro-ecological zones in which 
Lisii is situated. The latter zones include districts other than 
Kisii, so accurate comparison is not possible. The apparent 
greater equality of Central Province compared to areas west of the 
Rift Valley, however, must be explained. The most likely answer 
lies in the combination of very favorable agricultural environment 
and proximity to the Nairobi labor and produce markets. Central 
Province farmers, especially those of Klambu, are undoubtedly well- 
Province and neighboring Embu and Meru Districts. while West of Rift represents Kisii (coffee and tea), Kericho (tea), and Nandi (tea) Districts. Unfortunately, data were not published on a district by district basis, so these represent the best estimates of the differences between Usti and Central Province. 
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advanced straddlers. A higher percentage of them have been 
successful at straddling than in Kisii because of the small amount 
of land needed for successful intensive cultivation and, more 
importantly, their early and constant access to the Nairobi labor 
market. Following the straddling model, this would result in 
greater use of hired labor, as successful straddlers hire the labor 
of the less successful, whether other Kikuyu or migrants from 
elsewhere in Kenya. 
Second, Geyer shows that the cultivation of hybrid maize is 
greater in Kisii than in the more 'advanced' Central Province. As 
noted above, overall agricultural production is more concentrated 
on cash crops in Central Province than in nail.. Overall, Kisii 
farmers appear to be diversifying production to • greater extent 
than those in Central Province. Hybrid maize production draws 
Labor away from the higher-value cash crops in Kisii, thus lowering 
overall agricultural income relative to Central Province. 
Straddling and access to Nairobi appears to have produced 
relatively wealthy Kikuyu farmers hiring large amounts of labor and 
being secure enough to diversify less severely than similar Gusii 
farmers. The formers ability to specialize (relatively) is 
undoubtedly due to their greater ability to hire labor, and to 
their continued access to Nairobi, providing the essential off-farm 
income at levels that are undoubtedly above those obtainable by the 
average Gusii man. These more favorable environmental factors and 
further development of straddling probably mean that fewer 
households in Central Province must follow the high-labor- 
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intensive, low-returns-to-labor option of the poorest households in 
Bomwanda (see Chapter 6). In Central Province, the poorest have 
most likely moved their labor further into off-farm positions, for 
which Nairobi provides much greater opportunities than are open to 
many in Kisii. 
An interesting final comparison in central Kenya is Embu 
District. Haugerud (1988. 168-69) describes the district in terms 
virtually equal to my conclusions from Kisii, including the role of 
off-farm income, socio-economic differentiation, crop 
diversification, and eventual class formation. Eighty-five to 
ninety percent of households in her survey had some source of non-
agricultural income. Ls in Kisii, the one quarter of all 
households with a regular, salaried employee were in the best 
position, the average salary being five times the income generated 
by the typical 350-tree coffee stand. Gwyer's data show that 
although Embu farmers cultivate very little hybrid maize, their 
focus an overall grain production is greater than In Central 
Province. Embu's use of hired labor on coffee is close to that of 
neighboring Central Province, but hired labor for other crops is 
extremely low (in contrast to Central Province, in which hired 
labor's share of total labor input is uniformly high) and quite 
similar to Kisii. Embu, at a lower elevation and slightly less 
accessible to Nairobi than most of Central Province, appears to 
resemble Kisii. Overall labor input is significantly greater than 
in Central Province (though not quite as high as UAW, while 
hired labor is not as important. Further investigation would be 
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needed, but it appears that Embu may be in a stage of straddling 
very similar to that of Kisii. 
A significantly different situation is found in Nandi and 
Kericho Districts, both participants in the agrarian revolution and 
straddling, but with further local variations. Both produce tea 
and surplus maize, have much lower overall labor Input than Kisii. 
and hired labor at a rate approximately halfway in between the be 
level of tisii and high level of Central Province (Gayer 1972). A 
key to understanding the distinction of these districts is their 
much greater land abundance. tone/. (1981, 113-22) found that tea 
adoption in tericho was more heavily dependent on hired labor at an 
earlier time than any cash crop in Kisii. The role of off-farm 
income in providing this initial labor (crucial for tea, In that 
the crop does not produce profitably for several years after 
planting), however, was not universal. While she does not provide 
any systematic evidence, miscellaneous oral histories showed 
significant numbers of early adopters using off-farm income. while 
others were able to hire labor by selling surplus cattle or maize. 
The latter had unusually large estates, much larger than virtually 
all in Kisii and could thus generate greater agricultural surplus. 
Oboist (1985, 160) reports that initial commercial maize production 
increased greatly in Nandi at the end of World War II with the 
investment of returning men's severance pay, an example of early 
straddling, even in a land-abundant area. Part of the explanation 
for land abundance in Nandi was the twenty-five percent of the 
entire population that became squatters on the neighboring 'White 
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Highlands° land (Oboler 1985, 157-58). Nandi And Kipsigis, the 
residents of Kericho, were well-represented Among squatters and in 
the post-Independence transfer of settler land to Africans. This, 
along with pre-colonial land abundance, have had a significant 
impact an the effects of straddling. 
Relative land abundance combined with tea production have 
given these two districts unusually high household incomes with 
relatively fey of the negative side effects of advanced straddling. 
Straddling, however, does appear to be occurring. Undoubtedly due 
to higher soil fertility, and to their having only one maize season 
per year. Kericho and Nandi farmers expend less labor on their 
farms than do Gus ii farmers, while receiving higher agricultural 
incomes. Data collected at approximately the same time by Carlson 
in Kisii (1980) and Oboler (1985) in Nandi reveal the latter had 
agricultural incomes over three times the former. As noted above. 
Nandi and Kericho farmers use hired labor much more heavily than do 
Gusii farmers. Oboler (1985, 219) reports that in Nandi this labor 
is often provided by tenants from other ethnic groups. Nandi give 
tenants rights to cultivate some of their excess land in exchange 
for labor an the landlord's crops, especially tea. This labor is 
also usually paid a small cash wage. She reports that significant 
socio-economic differeniation is occurring in Nandi and the poorer 
households are unable to hire laborers or maintain tenants, leaving 
them with longer working hours, lover incomes and lower 
productivity than their wealthier neighbors. Men in poorer 
households actually spend more time in off-farm wage labor or 
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business than do wealthier men. The latter, from land abundance, 
are able to avoid heavy wage labor. 
However, straddling is still present. Non-agricultural wage 
employment or business is the principal use of men's labor time, 
and sons' education is seen as an important investment: the 
pressure of the end of land abundance is beginning to be felt. 
which will presumably increase male wage labor activities and 
further differentiation as the land rich are better able to place 
their some in off-farm employment. Oboler (1985, 229) concludes 
that differentiation is increasing, resulting in land sales and 
probably eventual class formation. While she does not discuss the 
extent to which this is directly tied to off-farm income, the 
process appears essentially the same as in Kisii. In Kericho, 
Buch-Hansen and Kieler (1983, 32) report a similar process of 
differentiation and land sales, in which the wealthy have hired 
labor, purchased additional land, and invest in off-fare 
businesses, while the poorer increasingly sell land and labor. 
Clearly, the relative land abundance of Nandi and Kericho reduces 
the current role of off-farm income, but the trends suggest the 
eventual emergence of a pattern similar to !WU. 
Areas of less fortunate agro-ecological make-up and/or access 
to off-farm income remain to be investigated. Examining the low 
Income, lov agricultural productivity Coast Province, Geist (1981. 
60) argues that: 
'The successful smallholdings involve all three income sources [food crops, cash crops, and off-farm activities]. Central [Province] smallholders are doing 
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the same things as coastal smallholders but such more successfully... (k] central contributing factor Cis] the nature of the relationship of the peasant household to the non-agrarian sectors of the economy. Viable smallholder agriculture seems increasingly dependent on off-farm income of a regular sort.' 
She found that involvement in wage labor long-preceded investment 
in cash crops and continues to define income levels within Coast 
Province and between the coast and wealthier regions such as 
Central Province. Migrant men heavily support Coastal families on 
the land, providing principally subsistence, while only those with 
the highest off-farm incomes are able to invest in cash crop 
production. The latter are the regions' 'progressive farmers and, 
she notes, are better able to obtain and utilize development 
resources than are their poorer neighbors (Geist 1981, 166,580). 
Hunt (1984, 168-79) found similar, though slightly less 
extreme, conditions in semi-arid Meru. as in the other areas, she 
reports differentiation based on access to off-farm income, notes 
that the average regular salary is worth five times the income of a 
typical coffee field, and found that 85-90Z of all households have 
some type of off-farm income. She also describes farmers' 
inability to respond to maize husbandry recommendations that 
appears identical to that found in nail, labor shortage being the 
crucial variable. In both these areas, straddling seems to exist 
and be accompanied by the familiar socio-economic differentiation 
and limited policy response. The lower agro-ecological environment 
and, perhaps, less political integration into the colonial state 
(especially on the Coast) have meant that the wealth accompanying 
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early straddling in Kisii and elsewhere was extremely limited and 
overall levels of poverty significantly higher. 
The final situation in rural Kenya we must explore are those 
areas combining high population density and a low-potential agro-
ecological environment. Here, households engage in both 
agriculture and non-agricultural activities, but the latter are 
even more important than they are in any of the previous areas 
examined. This produces more extreme socio-economic 
differentiation, based overwhelmingly on off-farm income. However, 
most households in such areas do not technically straddle as I have 
defined it. Agriculture is of such low potential that it serves as 
• partial support for basic subsistence and little more. 
Households do not invest in improving agriculture. and appear to 
seek ultimately to leave agriculture entirely. 
Most similar to Kisii is Kakamega District in Western 
Province, nearly as densely populated, and long known as a source 
of migrant labor. Patterson (1980, 17-18) shows that cash crop 
production is extremely limited due to small land size and 
environmental limitations, the average household satisfying only 
one-third of a family's staple food needs. This results in men's 
off-farm income being overwhelming important. Indeed, over 90i of 
households have some type of off-farm income. Education, he 
suggests, has for some time been dependent on a father's or 
brother's steady, off-farm income; secondary education seams to be 
particularly heavily dependent an relatively high and constant off-
farm income (Patterson 1981, 18-19). Differentiation In the form 
357 
of land sales is relatively slight in the community and land 
borrowing at no charge is frequent. This snomolous situation, 
however, is explained by the significant (152 of all originally 
resident households) complete out-migration. Because Kakamega land 
is of relatively low productive potential and parcels are so small, 
men with the ability and desire have invested in land elsewhere, 
principally in the Settlement Schemes of the 1960s, and left their 
parcels at home for use by neighbors or relatives. By the late 
1970s, however, land in the Settlement Schemes had become 
prohibitively expensive for all except the most highly paid civil 
servants or businessmen (Patterson 1960, 10-13). 
similar situation is found in Iisumu, where 912 of cash 
income derives from non-agricultural sources, while the average 
household can provide only half of its staple consumption. an 
entire season's cotton production (the most significant cash crop 
with the exception of a sugarcane development scheme) is often 
worth little more than one month's average off-farm wage (Moody 
1976, 25,67-71). In sum, these areas display an extreme form of 
dependence on off-farm Income: 'People.. see their economic well-
being tied to income derived not from their land but rather from 
employment or self-employment. It is a reality which receives near 
univeral acknowledgement among village households' (Patterson 1981. 
6). AgricultUre is of such low potential that household goals 
appear to be pure abandonment of the land if non-agricultural 
income sources are secure and adequate. 11 Unfortunately, no 
11Interestingly, while living in Kisii I was frequently told 
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economic histories of these areas exist. They have long been 
sources of migrant labor. At some point, presumably, some type of 
law-income straddling was more feasible and was pursued. While 
further investigation would be required, it is entirely possible 
that these areas have moved beyond straddling entirely, with 
relatively few farmers emerging as successful rural capitalists 
because of extreme environmental limits. Today, such areas 
represent • worst-case scenario of the eventual outcome of 
straddling. 
Conclusion  
This review of survey data in Kisii and case studies from 
throughout Kenya shows the significant variation within straddling. 
However, it also shows the common element in most areas. As Geist 
(1981. 18) notes in comparing the impoverished coast with wealthy 
Central Province: 'The penetration of market forces and the 
disruption of subsistence modes have been equally as marked in the 
coast as in central rural Kenya. but the outcome has been much less 
fortuitous.' This market integration has produced the social 
reproduction model I have termed straddling. In such of Central 
that the Luo, the residents of Kisumu tad neighboring districts of low agricultural protential and extreme out-migration, are very different from the Gusii. The former prefer to take their wives with them when moving to the city if at all possible, which Gusii men generally consider quite objectionable and irresponsible. This 'cultural' difference in local parlance appears to have clear economic roots a- reflecting the difference between the Gush's straddling and the Luo's inability to do so. 
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Province and some of the higher elevation areas of Kisii, 
straddling has produced relatively wealthy households, whose wealth 
is based on superb access to the Nairobi labor market and/or an 
extremely favorable environment. These households employ wage 
labor and achieve agricultural productivity levels surpassed by 
none in Kenya. Whether this has produced more extreme socio-
economic differentiation remains unclear. Survey data based on 
income would suggest it has not, while land purchases suggest it 
has. Further research is clearly needed to understand the 
implications of straddling In such areas. 
Areas of land abundance also appear to fair well under 
straddling. However, even in these, socio-economic differentiation 
and land sales appear to be emerging as the land abundant era 
inevitably ends." They may soon resemble areas such as Bomwanda 
or Naugerud's research site in Embu, in which initial wealth 
generation via straddling has given way to increasing socio-
economic differentiation and probably agricultural stagnation, as 
the transition to new models of social reproduction progresses. In 
areas of even lower agricultural potential, the negative effects of 
straddling seem clearer, with differential income and differential 
ability to respond to policy greater, even at lower regional income 
levels. Finally, in those areas of Kenya combining high population 
density and law productivity most households have lost the ability 
this inevitability, as I discussed In Chapter 5, is a product of straddling, as households benefit from increasing the number of children they have, even more true in a land abundant situation than it was in Kisii. 
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to straddle entirely, and the shift to a more purely *working class 
with pitches of gardens (Njonjo 1977, 337) social reproduction 
process seems nearly complete. 
This chapter has shown, then, both the breadth of and the 
variation in straddling in Kenya. Local agro-ecological 
environment, proximity to labor and produce markets, and Initial 
land abundance obviously matter to the immediate effects and 
development of straddling. In the long term, however, it appears 
that in only the most blessed pockets can straddling perhaps be 
maintained as a social reproduction model. More common appears to 
be the frequent reports by researchers of budding class formation 
via land sales that. / suggest, will produce a transition from 
straddling to a new social reproduction process. This trip around 
Kenya, I hope. has shown the utility of the straddling model. The 
final chapter will attempt to defend and tentatively demonstrate 
the utility of the broader focus on social reproduction for 
explaining variation in peasant market integration and policy 
response. 
CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
Having developed the social reproduction framework and used 
it to analyze and explain development patterns and contradictions 
in Bosswanda, Eisii, and Kenya. I must now summarize the utility of 
the framework and tentatively suggest its applicability in a wider 
context. This chapter will defend the utility and importance of 
the social reproduction framework for explaining the phenomena we 
have examined in Eisii, discuss the broad policy-related 
conclusions that come from this analysis, demonstrate the 
theoretical importance of the framework vithin the broader 
political economic debate on rural Africa, and tentatively attempt 
to apply the approach to other situations on the continent. 
I have argued that focussing analysis on processes of social 
reproduction as conceptualized at the outset of this thesis is 
useful for a number of aspects of the African agrarian debate. The 
framework is centered on the clear identification and analysis of 
distinct patterns of intra-household resource flow. This provides 
a model of household and individual behavior that is neither so 
broad and abstract as to be of little practical utility nor so 
narrow and precise as to deny all possibilities of comparative 
analysis and theory building. Examining social reproduction 
requires the analyst to include the effects of the larger political 
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ecanamy on the rural household, but not to assume those effects 
will be uniform. It allows for variation in peasant responses to 
market integration; yet by concentrating on resource flows that are 
essential to a rather broad range of households, it provides the 
possibility of delineating widely applicable models of social 
reproduction that will facilitate comparative analysis. Finally, 
conceptualizing social reproduction as a historical process, rather 
than a static 'snap-shot' of the rural political economy, provides 
an understanding of the dynamics internal to household reproduction 
if the external environment is left unchanged. 
Aa we have seen in Kisii, the framework provides an analysis 
of household response to policy and market signals, and an 
assessment of development potential. Indeed, I suggest the 
framework gives a more complete analysis of agricultural production 
and potential than do narrower analyses of agriculture alone. The 
social reproduction approach places agriculture within household 
reproduction in the same way that household members themselves do. 
In Kisii, there are a number of examples of how this can aid 
development policy analysis. Historically, straddling describes 
how the agrarian revolution developed so quickly, largely self-
financed by peasants, and where the limits of this expansion are. 
Market integration, as has been the case elsewhere in Africa, 
introduced rural households to market insecurities. Straddling in 
particular left women in positions of rather extreme Insecurity. 
This, combined with straddling's emphasis an education and off-farm 
income (which the agrarian revolution cash crops never overcame), 
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Limited the degree to which Kenyan peasants were willing to become 
specialized commodity producers. 
The result is the rather counter-intuitive discovery that in 
the most densely populated district in Kenya, labor is the most 
severe constraint on increasing agricultural productivity. The 
absolute amount of potential labor power is clearly not inadequate, 
but seasonal agricultural demands under the resource diffusion 
characteristic of straddling leave women in particular with little 
Labor available to respond to market or policy changes. Hen could 
provide additional labor to agriculture, and undoubtedly would to 
some degree if returns were higher. But the necessity of off-farm 
income in straddling means all men will continue to expend time and 
resources trying to obtain off-farm employment or business 
opportunities. Greater returns to agriculture could modify this 
behavior, but the probable magnitude of any changes in agricultural 
profit would not be adequate to alter the general pattern 
fundamentally. 
Perhaps more important than the immediate constraints is the 
analysis of an ongoing process that straddling reveals. The 
internal dynamic of the model creates significant socio-economic 
differentiation that appears to be entering a phase in which it 
will become basic class formation; the key resources of land and 
Labor are shifting from those who have not succeeded at straddling 
to those who have. Clearly, this varies from area to area within 
Kisii and differs for other districts in Kenya, but the logic of 
the process remains the same. Hunt (1984) has shown the degree of 
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landlessness to date in rural Kenya. The question is whether the 
process vill continue or has stabilized; the answer requires an 
understanding of the process underway. Straddling suggest a it is 
will proceed in almost all areas of the country, though with 
varying rapidity and degrees of severity. 
Ss this occurs, the ability of households to respond to a 
given policy, aimed at all rural households, will increasingly 
diverge. The developing landed class will have the resources to 
increase production in response to improved technology, knovledge 
or market conditions. The increasing numbers of effectively 
landless eh° also sell their labor power to their wealthier 
neighbors will not be able to mobilize any significant resources in 
agriculture, no matter how favorable the environment. Lang-term 
agricultural productivity depends on the nature of the reproduction 
process the landed are able to adopt. To the extent they have the 
incentives, resources, and security to invest in increasing 
agricultural productivity individually. Long-term development 
prospects in Kenya may not appear as bleak as some, such as Hunt, 
have suggested. However, the ability of this landed class to 
absorb continuously growing numbers of laborers is open to 
question. The latter may well represent the ultimate developmant 
challenge to Kenya, as rural households transcend straddling. 
Where does this leave Kenyan policy options? This thesis has 
not been a detailed examination of Kenyan policy and cannot provide 
a blueprint for the future. However, broad guidelines for policy 
can be suggested from the analysis straddling has provided. 
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Focussing an resources as the chief constraint on Kenyan 
smallholder production does not imply that a resource-based policy 
is Kenya's best option. Such a policy would inevitably involves 
some type of credit program, the results of which have been shown 
to be marginal at best throughout Africa. Raikes (1968) is only 
one of the more recent authors to demonstrate the myriad ways in 
which African smallholders 'misuse' (i.e., do not use as creditors 
request) development loans. Sis research in Kisii shows, in fact, 
the effects of straddling on Kenyan credit programs. Straddling 
households used credit, as they do any monetary income, within the 
confines and logic of the straddling process; education, land 
purchase, and housing received priority over specific agricultural 
uses for which the credit was earmarked. As long as straddling 
remains the dominant process of social reproduction, agriculture 
will not be given priority, and any monies from development loans 
will be used to achieve success within the straddling framework. 
My analysis suggests a different kind of 'resource-based' 
policy would be more beneficial. The resource that is the single 
most important constraint on agricultural production is labor. 
Men's labor, at least at the margin, can presumably be induced back 
onto the farm by increased producer prices; women's labor, however, 
is not in surplus and cannot be increased noticably regardless of 
prices. A new resource-based policy effort could focus on freeing 
women's labor. Especially combined with higher producer prices, 
this would undoubtedly increase agricultural production. Women 
have fewer non-agricultural alternatives than men and are therefore 
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more likely to expend any added Labor time available to them in 
agriculture. Therefore, an important 'agricultural' development 
policy would include improved health care, especially preventative, 
to lower women's time lost to illness and pregnancy, or technology 
that saved women time in gathering firewood, cooking, and/or 
fetching water. Improvements in any of these areas would free 
women's labor for agriculture. Combined with higher producer 
prices, the effects would be more significant for most households 
than any directly agricultural development efforts, especially In 
the short term. 
In essence, straddling suggests that at least certain aspects 
of the Basic Humans Needs approach, when directed specifically at 
women in Kenya, could have clear short-term benefits for 
agricultural production. These may not, however, show up directly 
in increased marketed production, unless accompanied by higher 
market prices. The now familiar argument that low prices are a (if 
not the) principal constraint on agricultural development in Africa 
is clearly of relevance here. Though Kenya is far from the worst 
offender on the continent in these terms, any increases in producer 
prices would undoubtedly induce some labor -- mainly men's -- back 
into agriculture. However, increased prices alone would not 
fundamentally alter straddling or the trends it is currently 
producing. Smallholder security is the last area that should be of 
immediate policy attention. 
The insecurity of market involvement and rainfed agriculture 
is one of the chief causes of the resource diffusion found under 
367 
straddling. To counter this diffusion and thereby increase 
productivity would require greatly enhancing the security of 
agricultural commodity production in Kenya. While the history of 
state-organized marketing boards, allegedly designed to minimize 
producer price fluctuations, is checkered at best, some type of 
extra-market protection of the farmer would be required to induce 
specialization and increased productivity. Unless the natural 
market (domestic and/or international) for • particular crop is 
strong enough to support significantly higher prices and allow the 
financing of some type of control of producer price fluctuations. 
this option would probably prove prohibitively expensive from the 
state's viewpoint. 
Increasing prices, security and women's labor availability 
are only short to medium-term solutions. They represent stopgap 
:ensures that will preserve a maximum percentage of the population 
in smallholder agriculture until other employment opportunities are 
strengthened. In the longer term, straddling households are 
inherently unstable production units. They will Increasingly be 
differentiated into a landed farming minority and an effectively 
landless majority that will have little or no agricultural 
development potential. The process is well underway, though varies 
from area to area around the country. Hunt's (1984) solution of 
massive land transfer from the large-scale African bourgeoisie to 
the landless would also provide only temporary relief, in addition 
to being politically unfeasible. Without policy changes to enhance 
radically the security of agriculture and the availability of 
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women's labor on the farm, Land reform would simply create more 
straddling households. Given the history that the new land 
beneficiaries have lived through elsewhere in Kenya, it would be 
Likely that the process of differentiation and declining 
productivity of the majority would occur faster than it has 
elsewhere. (Also, the land available for any such transfer would 
be of the lowest usable quality in the country and would therefore 
Lead, as in Kisumu or Coast Prvince. to rapid shifts out of 
agriculture.) 
This leaves only one feasible Long-term policy alternative: 
shifting focus away from smallholder agriculture, as currently 
defined, as the center of development efforts. That is, the 
incipient class divisions in Kisii, if further developed and 
generalized to the rest of Kenya, may well have to be accepted to 
increase long-term development. The new landed class will, in many 
areas such as Kisii, remain 'smallholders' and may well eventually 
improve productivity levels of smallholder agriculture. However, 
the sector as a whole will support far fewer households as 
'peasant' producers. This will force Kenyan development policy to 
turn to the dilemma of employing those who are no longer viable 
smallholders. Agricultural policy under this scenario should 
explicitly focus on those who have the resources to respond 
favorably, attempting to insure them adequate returns and security 
to encourage Investment in further productivity improvements. In 
fact, these are the households who have benefitted most from Kenyan 
policy in any case (Guist 1981). For the rest -- the vast majority 
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-- non-agricultural employment opportunities will be needed. 
Finding such activities, either in a growing rural, non-
agricultural sector or in the urban areas, will be far from easy, 
and is beyond the purview of this thesis. The straddling model and 
dynamic within it, if accurate and as widespread as they appear. 
will necessitate such an effort. 
Thus, the straddling model of social reproduction leaves 
Kenyan policy with a two-pronged challenge. In the short term, 
improving prices and security against market fluctuations (which 
will be economical only if world prices over the long term can 
support the effort), and increasing women's available labor through 
improvements in health care and household-level technology, will 
maximize the number of people who can continue to be supported by 
the smallholder sector. For the majority, this will provide only 
temporary relief from the long-term effects of straddling. Non-
agricultural employment generation, whether urban or rural, will 
inevitably became Kenya's principal policy pre-occupation. The 
degree of severity of the problem will vary widely from one 
district to the next, based on agro-ecological potential and access 
to agricultural commodity markets. Only the most favored areas, 
containing a small percentage of Kenya's total population, will be 
able to avoid the long-term problem. 
In a broader context, the social reproduction framework 
employed herein can provide significant assistance to answering 
some of the unresolved questions in the theoretical debate on rural 
African political economy. All three of the frameworks delineated 
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in Chapter 2 assume or assert certain propositions regarding 
household reproduction. The current consensus in the 
developmentalist paradigm, represented by World Bank positions over 
the last five to ten years (World Bank 1981,1983), argues that a 
liberalized economy with free-floating market prices will allow 
maximum development and benefit the bulk of the African peasantry. 
This assumes that smallholder households can and will be viable 
agricultural producers, supporting approximately their current 
share of the population, if prices, markets and other government 
policies are corrected. As we have seen with the straddling model, 
this assumption may well be incorrect for many African 
smallholders. Despite proper pricing and marketing policy, 
straddling reveals that most Kenyan smallholders will not remain 
viable commodity producers and have little long-term development 
potential. Examining social reproduction processes throughout the 
continent is an essential pre-requisite to assessing the accuracy 
of the assumptions made in the devolopmentalist argument and 
therefore the utility of their policy recommendations. 
Scholars working in the loose underdevelopment paradigm and 
carrying on the 'peasant debate' also assume or assert a wide 
variety of possible reproduction models. While a complete review 
of these is impossible here, suffice it to note the importance of 
social reproduction to the debate. Though some of these scholars 
do empirically delineate clear processes of reproduction, they too 
often argue for their generalizability throughout the continent. 
Pirthermore, for the all-important question of class formation, an 
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explicit examination of social reproduction is essential. Defining 
class under the common rubric of relationship to the means of 
production, transitions from peasants to rural capitalists or 
proletarians can only be fully understood by examining social 
reproduction. This process -- households using resources they 
control to survive and improve their standard of living -- is at 
the heart of the definition of the peasantry and must be analyzed 
before proclaiming any rural smallholders as having shifted from 
peasant status to any other. The straddling model demonstrates 
that African smallholders are often neither fully peasant nor 
proletarian. Defining exactly what they are, and therefore how 
they behave and react to market and policy signals, seems to 
require the social reproduction framework. 
Finally, the structuralist Marxist school, both its modes of 
production and simple commodity production components, also 
requires a focus an social reproduction to resolve remaining 
disputes. Most Africanists have come to the conclusion that the 
MOP framework is of extremely limited utility, yet the phenomena it 
attempted to deal with -- households that appear neither truly pre-
capitalist nor fully capitalist -- are apparent to all. The social 
reproduction framework allows an analysis of such households 
directly, laying the foundation for broader theorizing that is 
based on clear empirical referents rather than excessively abstract 
deductive models incapable of ope rationalization. 
Perhaps more important for future research is the simple 
commodity production (SCP) framework. which I suggested in Chapter 
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2 is the most sophisticated and empirically useful approach 
developed to date. Friedmann's (1980) pure model of Sc? 7s. 
peasant households is of little empirically utility in Africa, in 
that many (probably most) African households seem to fall between 
these two theoretical polls. She suggests the cammoditization that 
accompanies the complete dissolution of communal mechanisms of 
resource access will, increase competition among the newly 
individualized households, thus increasing productivity, and 
forcing a transition to the pure, specialized commodity producers 
of the SC? paradigm. Hy focus on the actual processes of social 
reproduction, however, has shown that commoditization and 
dissolution of communal institutions does not necessarily lead to 
specialization and continuously increasing productivity. 
Bernstein's (1977,1979) application of the SCP approach to 
Africa is of much greater utility, but remains at a premature level 
of universality. My less rigid social reproduction framework 
allowed ma to show that under straddling initial market integration 
improved productivity and incomes, in contrast to Bernstein's 
'simple reproduction squeeze' model. His hypothesized self-
exploitation of rural households in the face of declining terms of 
trade may or may not occur. Under straddling, a significant 
alternative has been non-agricultural activity, some of which is 
better remunerated today than agricultural labor was earlier in the 
century, when household estates were larger and soil more fertile. 
The reaction of households to market integration is more complex 
than Bornstein's model allows for, involving as it does conscious 
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models of social reproduction that are reactions to particular 
environments. 
klternatives to self-exploitation on the farm may exist, as 
they have in Kenya, and this can radically alter both the immediate 
standard of living of the rural poor and the process of social 
transformation that market integration initiates. Bernstein 's 
model leads the SCP household to indebtedness and produces the 
familiar tripartite 'rich, middle, poor' differentiation schema. 
The social reproduction framework applied to Kisii has shown that 
land sales and off-farm income are two of a number of possible 
alternatives to indebtedness. It also suggests that 
differentiation is at once more complex and quite possibly more 
far-reaching than Bernstein'i model admits. This variation in 
rural response to market integration and state policy is what the 
social reproduction framework attempts to model, enabling the 
analyst to capture the essence of a complex reality while remaining 
clear and concise enough to allow eventual comparative analysis. 
While Bernstein's modal is quite uueful, and undoubtedly applies in 
a number of situations, his assertion that it is applicable to the 
entire continent without theoretically significant variation seems 
difficult to support. 
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Social. Reproduction Processes: 
A Tentative Comparative Analysis 
To show very tentatively and schematically the utility of the 
framework for broader application, this concluding section gill 
attempt to delineate other possible social reproduction models in 
Africa. This effort is based on a selection of secondary sources, 
among them some of the finest empirical research done in rural 
Africa, using and re-interpreting these within the social 
reproduction rubric. These models, vhich remain extremely 
tentative and are outlined principally for heuristic purposes, Are 
drawn from the Vest African cocoa belt, Gambian rice and groundnut 
• farmers, Hausa dryland farmers, and Malian grain producers. 
The cocoa region stretching from Ivory Coast to Cameroon is 
one of the more intensely studied areas of rural Africa. Several 
major works will be used to demonstrate that the roughly common 
history of introduction and expansion of a popular (currently the 
leading) African export crop did not produce identical reactions 
from the smallholders involved and has not resulted in identical, 
or even similar, processes of social reproduction to date. Sara 
Berry's work in Western Nigeria is perhaps the best available in 
the secondary literature for re-interpretion in terms of social 
reproduction. Once cocoa production was fully established, but 
unutilised land remained available (thoughout the 1950s and 1960s 
in many places), cocoa-growing households passed through three 
distinct models of social reproduction relatively rapidly. If 
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successful, a household moved from being non-cocoa growers to being 
succeosful cocoa farmers with significant non-agricultural income, 
to shifting out of cocoa altogether. 
In the initial stage, a young family would migrate from a 
non-cocoa area to cocoa land and probably become tenant farmers on 
unused land of an earlier successful settler. While the 
immigrant's new cocoa trees were maturing, the husband would hire 
himself out as an agricultural laborer on established farms 
(probably the one an which he was a tenant). thus securing an 
income for family survival and often credit for his new cocoa 
investment. After his own farm was mature, he would increasingly 
shift his labor-time to his own farm. His wife at this point would 
probably begin her own independent trading business. Eventually, 
he would enter the second model, hiring labor and accepting tenants 
himself, and using his profits to buy more cocoa land and educate 
his sons (Berry 1975, 54-69). 
In her earlier work, Berry conceptualized these farmers as 
self-sufficient agrarian capitalists (1975, 3-11). She noted. 
however, that successful cocoa growers educated their eons, who 
tended to leave cocoa cultivation for urban positions in the state 
apparatus or private enterprise (1975, 193-95). The sons, her more 
recent work suggests, shifted into the third model of reproduction. 
The degroe to which this third model -- moving most resources out 
of agriculture -- was a conscious goal of cocoa farmers in the 
19501 and 1960. is unclear. It would appear that it was combined 
with the goal of continued cocoa production, in that farmers 
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invested in both new cocoa land and education (1975. 116-17). Thus 
something similar to straddling, though not necessarily including 
the investment flow of non-agricultural income into agriculture. 
had emerged by the 19608. 
This second model -- the successful, independent smallholder 
cocoa grower -- vas becoming increasingly difficult to pursue as 
Land became scarce (1975, 207-08). It was radically altered by the 
oil boom that hit Nigeria in the 1970s. The shift to an oil-based 
economy and the rapid growth accompanying it, particularly in the 
public sector, increased the relative value of education, off-farm 
income and access to state employment. This produced a new model 
of social reproduction; politics and trade replaced cocoa as 
principal economic activities. access to state resources, public 
employment, and the oil-induced tertiary sector drew labor and 
capital out of agriculture. 
This new model of social reproduction focussed on maintaining 
and enhancing one's position within kin-like social networks. 
These were used as the principal paths to trading opportunities and 
state access. Farmers, traders and professionals began investing 
heavily in social goods such as large homes, schools, or small 
development projects in their town of origin in order to enhance 
their position in their own kin network (Berry 1985, 78-83 and 
106). Traders intentionally kept the scale of their businesses 
small and productivity low because of the necessity to spend 
valuable management time cultivating customers and investors via 
kin-like mechanisms (1985, 137-65). Cocoa farms were often drained 
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of resources as farmers shifted to trade, educated their children, 
or used farming capital to make social investment in accordance 
with the new model of social reproduction. Diversification of 
access to resources became an all-important goal, and production 
became subservient to it. This. I suggest, represented a basic 
shift in the conscious model of social reproduction pursued in 
Western Nigeria. While there were familiar elements in both the 
cocoa based and the recent kin-network based models, priorities and 
relations between various economic and political activities 
shifted, and the place of agriculture fundamentally changed. 
In other areas of the cocoa belt, radically different 
reproduction models were developed. In Ghana, Bukh's work (1980) 
suggests a model of reproduction combining cocoa production and 
migrant labor not unlike straddling. Early cocoa profits were used 
to educate sons to Move into highly paid off-farm employment 
throughout the colonial era. Since Independence, the overall 
decline in the Ghanaian economy, and of cocoa prices and production 
in particular, have sent young men into migrant labor as an 
alternative to low cocoa prices. Unfortunately, Bukh provides no 
data on resource flows within households to show whether or not 
. migrant labor supports food production and/or cocoa as in 
straddling. In any case, the model is significantly different from 
any of those delineated by Berry for Western Nigeria. 
Finally, Guyer (1984) depicts two further possible models in 
the history of cocoa production in Cameroon. Prior to World War I, 
Beti Chiefs managed to utilize the indigenous institutions of 
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polygyny and male clientage to raise huge amounts of labor and 
enter large-scale cocoa production, while those men not involved 
entered migrant labor to flee high colonial taxes. Higher cocoa 
prices and stable taxes in the inter-war period, combined with 
changes in matrimony laws, resulted in dissolution of the chiefs' 
huge estates and the adoption of cocoa as a smallholder crop. The 
result by the 1970$ were relatively undifferentiated smallholder 
households that did indeed resemble the classic peasant household 
model. Most households were self-sufficient for basic subsistence 
(even though Guyer suggests overall levels of nutrition have 
declined from earlier in the century) and produced cocoa and 
perhaps other food crops for sale. This self-sufficiency was 
possible because of adequate land per household, government-
increased cocoa prices in the 1970s, and the nearness of Yaounde, 
which lowered transport costs for cocoa and provided an ample 
market for surplus foodstuffs. She notes, however, that parents 
increasingly view education as crucial to their children's future, 
as land scarcity begins to arise. Large-scale education expenses 
cannot be supported by agriculture alone as currently practiced, 
raising the possibility that a form of straddling may well arise. 
Margaret Haswell presents less clear but nonetheless 
recognizable processes of social reproduction in her 25 year, 
triple study of a Gambian rice and groundnut producing village. 
Her three studies, conducted in 1947. 1962 and 1973, clearly show 
the agricultural intensification and market integration common to 
almost all of Africa. Out of her data a somewhat vague model of 
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social reproduction emerges. In 1947, the village appears to have 
been a rather typical West African Moslem village with significant 
distinctions in social status based on birth and religious 
training, though only moderate economic distinctions. Food 
production and communal labor groups were crucial. Production of 
groundnuts for market was well established, but not essential to 
household reproduction (Haswell 1975, 28-69). By 1973, socio-
economic differentiation and individualization of most economic 
activities at the household level were well advanced. Those 
households who had become wealthy were those whose heads were .able 
to maintain relatively large households Intact as economic entities 
and who had Invested heavily in a diversified base of human 
capital. They educated or otherwise trained their children in a 
wide variety of fields -- trade, professions, crafts -- and used 
these to maintain a steady off-farm income to supplement and invest 
In agriculture. The strong and steady income allowed them to avoid 
indebtedness and, In several cases, become local moneylenders, 
adding this enterprise to their diversified household portfolio 
(Haswell 1975, 173-72). While the precise relationship between 
agricultural and various non-agricultural activities is not clear 
In her work, it is clear that the large, diversified household 
became the model of success by the 1970s. 
An alternative process of social reproduction, also well 
established, was one of indebted agricultural production combined 
with male labor export. Agricultural production was not self-
sufficient in 802 of village households. This poor majority relied 
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on seasonal indebtedness and sending sons elsewhere to work. 
Unlike straddling, however, these sons were rarely able or willing 
to invest their wages in household agriculture. They represented 
pare labor export (Haswell 1975, 185-206). Haswell does not 
discuss the conciousness of the poor majority so it is unclear if 
this represents a failed attempt at straddling or a recognition 
that landlessness and a completely non-agricultural process of 
reproduction is inevitable for most sans of the poor. What seems 
clear in this case is the impossibility of making the transition 
from the reproduction process followed by the poor to the 
successful model, Indicating that some type of class formation, 
with two distinct processes of social reproduction, is well 
established. 
Polly Hill's pioneering work in Northern Nigeria can also be 
used to map out a tentative depiction of social reproduction 
processes in modern Hausa society. Her earlier work depicts, as 
does Haswell's, stratified peasant communities in which subsistence 
agriculture and marriage are the lynchpins of social reproduction, 
with market activity representing a supplement, especially for the 
wealthy. She suggests that socio-economic differences were not 
cumulative and, therefore, class formation unlikely to occur (Hill 
1972). Her second study, comparing the village of the first study 
to a much more densely populated area elsewhere in Northern 
Nigeria, suggests that population pressure resulting from the 
internal dynamics of the peasant community induced new processes of 
social reproductionl. 
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The model of successful and expanding reproduction, as in 
Kenya and Gambia, combines successful agriculture with trade or 
sons' off-farm incomes. As in Haswell's case. Rill's data do not 
allow us to understand the relationship between agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities, though she asserts that agriculture in 
wealthy households continues to be largely self-sufficient -- not 
reliant an non-agricultural injections of capital. Land purchase 
and labor hire are key components of the model, however, and it is 
unclear how especially the former could occur without external 
support (Rill 1977, 127-29). 
A second model, pursued once again by the poor majority, 
focuses on maintaining the pre-colonial social institution of the 
gandu (pl., gandaye) as a survival strategy. The gandu is a father 
and his married adult sons who pool their resources under the 
father's management in order to enhance reproductive capability. 
In her earlier study, Rill depicted rising tensions between elders 
and juniors in ganders, as sons desired to obtain independent 
status as early as possible (Rill 1972, 167-68 and 184-85). 
Increasing population pressure and limited outside employment 
reversed this trend in the second village she examined. Fathers 
'This is my interpretation. The peasant reproduction process, based as it is on low-productivity family agricultural labor in areas of high infant mortality and rising out-migration of sons, encourages very large families to insure adequate productive labor power and old-age security. Response to improved health and decreasing farm size is inevitably delayed, often by as much as a generation, resulting in the near universal 'over-population' of most peasant areas at some point in their development process. 
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kept sans in gandaye by promising to retire and re-distribute land 
early. Preserving a larger economic unit intact improved the 
Chances that some member of the group would have an income on any 
given day and thus be able to provide for the others (Sill 1977, 
138-44). With unemployment and underemployment extremely high, and 
near landlessness prevailing, the gandu was successfully 
resurrected and maintained as a social institution, now transformed 
into essentially a survival mechanism. 
Though sill argues class formation is not occurring because 
many of the sans of wealthy households will themselves be poor, it 
seems difficult to imagine how the reverse would occur. As she 
notes, it is exceedingly difficult for the son of a poor man to 
become rich -- to make the transition from the gandu based model of 
social reproduction to that of the successful farmer/trader (sill 
1977, 141). As such, rigid stratification, at minimum, seems to 
have occurred as the previous peasant model of social reproduction 
has been transformed into two distinct models, with movement 
between them extremely difficult. 
J. V. W. Levis (1979) presents a final example in which a 
clear model of social reproduction exists. In contrast to most of 
Africa, Lewis' study in Mali is an example of a village that 
successfully limited market dependence. Once again, it appears to 
be a fairly typical peasant village, providing the bull of its 
subsistence and some limited marketed production. Some sons also 
migrate temporarily to cork an plantations to the south in Ivory 
Coast. This case is unusual because village households have 
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insured that their sons migrate only temporarily, returning to 
develop subsistence agriculture as their fathers have. They 
succeeded in doing this by intentionally using production 
techniques known to be less productive than available alternatives, 
but that use large amounts of labor. Maintaining these low-
productivity techniques, they have successfully insured that their 
sons return to provide the labor necessary for household and 
village survival. The sons are uncertain of their future as 
migrant laborers and thus agree to return to insure their 
households survive as smallholders. As Lewis puts it, this model 
of social reproduction has 'two poles of production': agriculture 
and (male) descendents. within it there is clear differentiation 
based on household size and composition, religious status, and land 
size, but all households are structurally similar and pursuing a 
Largely identical descendent-based model of social reproduction. 
Unfortunately, Lewis provides little data or speculation on the 
dynamics of this model or its chances for long term survival. 
Undertaking a comparative examination of these cases and my 
own from tenya, certain similarities are apparent. These are based 
on the underlying process of market integration of peasant 
communities and the insecurity and risk this entails for peasant 
social reproduction. Alternative models of social reproduction 
represent differing peasant responses to market integration. 
Variations among them depend on differing characteristics of market 
integration and differing peasant ability to utilize social 
institutions to ease the integration process. After initial 
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integration, the internal dynamics of a given social reproduction 
model and/or new external stimuli can produce still other models. 
The chief similarity among the cases is the increased 
diversification within successful peasant households. This 
diversification is In response to economic insecurity caused by 
market, weather or political uncertainty. Its specific character 
and degree vary from case to case, with Important Implications for 
peasant response to policy and state-peasant relations. In the 
extreme cases of Western Nigeria under the oil boom and Kenya under 
straddling, diversification can have severe negative productive 
consequences. In reducing the importance of any single factor for 
social reproduction, diversity may also enhance political 
quiescence, as peasants are lass likely to focus political activity 
around state infringement on 'a key resource or sector of a strong 
and clearly conceptualized reproduction model. 
A relatively strong and clear model of social reproduction, 
such as that in pre-ail boom Western Nigeria. the Yaounde 
hinterland of Cameroon, or in Kisii, can sharply focus peasant 
activity and expectations. This, on the one hand, may mike it 
easier for policy-makers, if they understand the model, to 
anticipate peasant response and design policy accordingly. Zu 
Kenya. Increases in women's agricultural labor Input will only come 
via substantial Increases in rewards to that labor and Increased 
security that future rewards will be forthcoming. In Western 
Nigeria, when the state lowered cocoa prices significantly In the 
late 1960s, peasants responded with a rare occurrence La Africa: 
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open and aggressive resistance and public demands for policy 
change. i‘t the time, cocoa prices were crucial to the established 
and accepted model of social reproduction. Berry notes that when 
real cocoa prices fell in the 1970s, there was essentially no 
peasant response because activity had shifted to trade and 
competition for state employment (Berry 1980). Once the model of 
social reproduction had shifted, peasant response to agricultural 
policy changed significantly. Similarly, those knowledgable of 
Kenya would, I think, agree that a threat to access to education 
would be much more politically destabilizing than deteriorating 
agricultural producer prices. 
Peasant ability to utilize pre-existing social institutions 
also produces variation in models of social reproduction. Where 
social institutions can be maintained, the worst effects of extreme 
poverty may be avoided and political stability may be greater. The 
gandu based reproduction process among the rural poor in Northern 
Nigeria. for instance, may well be politically stabilizing, in that 
it provides at some minimal level for most or all members of the 
society; if required to survive in the market as individual 
households, many would face disaster. In Kenya or Bukh's research 
site in Ghana, on the other hand, few if any social mechanisms 
exist to mitigate the effects of increasing landlessness in areas 
Like Kisii. Most observers see the long-term political stability 
of Kenya severely threatened by the growing landless problem, which 
might be mitigated if gandu-like institutions existed. 
Current models of social reproduction and households' varying 
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success in following them profoundly influence ability to respond 
to even the best designed development policy. In Mali we see the 
only case I am aware of in which the kind of activity Hyden posits 
actually occurs: conscious limiting of productivity in the 
Interests of maintaining a peasant community with limited market 
dependence. State influence probably will be far from total as 
long as this peasantry remains suncaptured.' In Western Nigeria, 
the current model of social reproduction based on maintaining kin-
like social networks, and thereby access to resources, channels 
capital and labor out of productive activity and Into 
'unproductive' social expenditure. Inducing capital flow back to 
cocoa, for instance, will probably require raising producer prices 
high enough not only to overcome the greater profitability of non-
agricultural activities, but also the risk involved in a 
significant shift away from investment in kin networks. 
Finally, where multiple social reproduction processes exist 
in a given peasant community, and moving from one to the other is 
extremely difficult, rural class formation is clearly underway and 
future response to policy will be different for the households in 
differing classes. In Gambia and Northern Nigeria, the wealthy 
success stories may be able to mobilize additional resources to 
respond to agricultural development policies or new market 
opportunities, but those barely surviving, whether by indebtedness 
or gandaye, will find such response beyond their meager 
capabilities. Indeed, Nation (1981) has presented compelling 
evidence from elsewhere in Northern Nigeria showing the poor have 
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Lower agricultural productivity and potential than their wealthier 
neighbors. The question is whether the poor can ever hope to 
mimick the wealthy, or whether such a transition from one model of 
social reproduction to another is forever beyond the possible. to 
Kisii, this development is in its incipient stages, but promises 
the same dilemma for African states: how to pursue development 
objectives of increased agricultural productivity while also 
providing some type of income and survival for 'peasants whose 
reproduction process no longer allows them to respond to even well 
designed and implemented agricultural policies. 
This comparative analysis is quite tentative, intended 
principally to suggest the possible utility of the social 
reproduction model applied to a variety of settings. The chief 
problem, it seams, will be to delineate models of social 
reproduction that are as widely applicable at is straddling. The 
extreme variety of possible peasant responses to market integration 
and the political and policy effects these differences might have 
are crucial. For development of theory, however, we require social 
reproduction models that apply widely. This will allow 
development of theories explaining the broad differences found 
among the models. Infinite variety, which much work in economic 
anthropology and economic history has provided, does not allow 
comparative anlaysis. Excessive generalization, however, loses 
crucial complexity and makes the resultant models theoretic:11y 
over-developed and irrelevant to policy. Though not a fully 
developed comparative theory, the social reproduction framework 
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allows the analyst to observe directly production processes. policy 
response, rural differentiation, and class formation, shoving the 
crucial connections between the latter two and the first two. The 
framework is in this sense pre-theoretical, providing initial 
models that can then be used for theorizing the ever-present 
political economy questions of the nature of arican peasant 
integration into the market economy and subordination to national 
states. h. comparative analysis of different reproduction processes 
is necessary to develop such theory, a task that this thesis has 
shown the importance of but cannot seriously undertake. 
APPEIWIX A 
Case Study  Methodology 
Research Site 
The selection of the research site within Kisii Included a 
significant element of chance, though it was far from a random 
process. I began my study of Kisii in Nairobi by enrolling in a 
local language school to learn at least the rudiments of Ekeiguil, 
the Gus ii language. Vhile this effort was a long way from 
completely successful, it did yield me entre into rural Kisii. Ky 
language teacher eagerly °Hatred to have me live with his family. 
After visiting them for a Cow days I realized that the reoearch 
location was too close to a tarmac road and Kisii town to be ideal 
in the sense of being 'typical,' and that his family was clearly 
wealthier than average. (They were one of the Pioneer families in 
the study.) &mover, the local connection and what I hoped would 
be immediate acceptance by the local community led me to decide to 
accept the offer and make that community the basis of my study. 
This decision was quickly rewarded. In my first week in 
residence the family had a feast welcoming the spirits of their 
ancestors and their neighbors to their recently completed permanent 
house. The entire community was present. The father of the family 
used the occasion to introduce me, explain why I was living with 
them and what I would be doing, and requested all his neighbors to 
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accept me openly and help me in my research. This introduction 
proved invaluable. Only one person out of several hundred members 
of the households I interviewed initially feared my presence, 
suspected me of working with the government and being interested in 
taxation or land, and initially refused to cooperate. Be was soon 
convinced by his neighbors that his initial fears were unfounded 
and eventually became a good friend and excellent informant. 
few other community members remained reticent and not completely 
forthcoming throughout my stay, though these were generally people 
who were also for one reason or another estranged from the 
community as a whole. Their reticence did not significantly 
jeopardize my results. The most severe of these was a sister-in-
law of the family I was living with, who was engaged in a long-
standing land dispute with my family and used her refusal to 
cooperate with me as a weapon in her war against the family. Other 
members of the extended family did cooperate, however, so most 
essential information about that family was available to me. 
I chose to pursue an in depth case study of one small community in 
order to understand the historical evolution of the development 
process, involving all aspects of household reproduction over time. 
While such current economic information can be gleaned from a 
cross-sectional survey, historical and social/cultural information 
cannot. One of my initial assumptions was that both of the latter 
would be crucial to full understanding, requiring a case study. I 
was resident in the community, except for brief trips back to 
Nairobi when essential, for eight months. I feel the detailed and 
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historical knowledge gained was well worth the loss of 
generalizability and/or representativeness, which the larger survey 
was intended to correct. (See Appendix FS and Chapter 7). 
Basearch Procedures  
Upon arrival in Wisii I hired a full-time research 
assistant/translator. Though I was attempting to learn Ekegusii, 
my tiro months of language training and one year to complete the 
project made full language ability impossible. Hy attempt to learn 
the language, however, and my ability to greet my new neighbors and 
carry out basic conversations, gained me a great deal of 
credibility. For most Somwanda residents. I was the first White 
other than a missionary they had ever known who took the time at 
least to try to learn their rather difficult, tonal language. 
Though quite fully capable in Swahili. I did not use the 'national' 
language for my research because most Somvanda residents speak 
Swahili for purposes of trade and business, but are not comfortable 
enough in it to carry out what were often long interviews on very 
particular local subjects. This was especially true of women and 
elders. Hy research assistant proved a true 'natural' at his job 
and invaluable to me in a number of ways. In addition to an 
engaging personality and natural curiousity, he was from a 
neighboring clan (gamete). Therefore, he had no particularly 
strong friends or enemies in Bomvanda, though he had kin-ties to a 
number of wives of Somwanda men in the community. This assisted 
our entre without endangering our relations with any particular 
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households. 
Virtually all interviews were conducted by us jointly, him 
asking the questions that I requested and translating the answers 
into English, me writing the answers (I did not use a tape 
recorder, finding it an obstacle and not necessary for the type of 
data I was collecting) and asking him the next question. Each 
interview began with a set of basic questions on key information. 
but was open-ended enough to explore any interesting subjects that 
emerged. The latter increasingly occurred as time vent on. In 
each household, we tended to develop a close relationship with a 
particular member, who essentially became a key informant. This 
was neither a formal nor intended process, but provided much 
information. While possibly bias*: the results in the direction 
of the key informant's perspective, it had the advantage of 
developing trust and eventually allowing us to ask and receive 
honest answers to numerous sensitive economic and social questions, 
such as 'witchcraft,' marital problems, birth control, and 
household income uses. Eventually, key informants began to 
volunteer information they thought I would be interested in, and 
usually their guesses about ay interests were quite accurate. For 
particular subjects an which I thought my normal household 
informant might be biased or not knowledgable, I made a special 
effort to talk to the moot relevant household member. 
The subjects of the interviews were many and varied. For 
each subject, we conducted at least one interview In each household 
(or each house, depending an the subject) in turn before turning to 
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the next subject. Thus, we interviewed each household a number of 
times, visiting each at one-and-a-half to two week intervals, each 
time arriving with a new and exhausting set of questions. We began 
with a household census and basic genealogy, though we did not 
complete the latter with wives in households, in that I found the 
information not terribly useful in understanding social 
interactions. We proceeded with interviews on land use, off-farm 
economic activity and its history, housing, education, marriage, 
agricultural inputs and sales, non-family labur use, illness, 
contact with MoA extension agents and knolwedge of extension 
recommendations, and agricultural history, not necessarily in that 
order. 
Land use was directly approximated by measuring the parcels 
of land under each crop for each house in each household. This was 
completed during the long rains season of 1985 and information on 
changes in land use over the previous two years and the later 
season in 1985 was gained via interviews. Questions were also 
asked about Land market activity and control over land-use 
decision-making. Similarly, interviews were conducted regarding 
men's and women's off-farm work and business, current and in as 
much historical detail for each household member as possible. 
Sousing construction costs, methods and sources of funds were 
queried. Another series of interviews asked about adults' and 
children's current and past education, its cost, and how it was 
paid for. We recorded marriage histories for each household: 
dates. bridewealth agreed upon, bridewealth paid, bridewealth 
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sources, marital disputes and separations. For each of the two 
agricultural seasons we recorded agricultural inputs, both capital 
and labor, for each crop in each house. We also gathered 
information on the history of adoption of all cash crops, costs of 
adoption, sources of funds, and previous use of land. Non-family 
Labor use interviews included current and historical information on 
communal labor group participation, reasons for joining or quitting 
such groups, and use of full-time and casual hired labor. Finally, 
interviews on local. loans, contact with and knowledge of extension 
recommendations, major illnesses and their effects were conducted. 
The labor-us, and household budget data were collected in 
essentially a separate study. Twenty of the 36 households were 
randomly selected and I hired a separate research assistant, an 
unemployed secondary school leaver (as was my principal assistant) 
and son of a Vage-laborer in the community. Be visited each house 
in each household once per week, recording from the informants' 
memory all activities of all economically productive house members 
for a three day period (the day of the interview and the two 
preceding). He also tended to develop key informants, but made 
sure he talked to individual members if necessary to obtain the 
necessary data. Ns also asked the key informant, normally the wife 
in the house, what expenses she had incurred over the past week and 
what income had been earned by weekly market sales. We developed 
as complete a list as possible of all consumption items and income 
sources in the community, which he read to each respondent, asking 
them if they bought each item and how much they spent on it. 
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Often, on items such as milk, this involved simply recalling the 
number of times the item was bought over the last week and 
multiplying by the fixed price of the item. I collected the 
responses from him daily and checked for inconsistencies or 
omissions, but this was hardly necessary, in that he was extremely 
diligent (indeed. more so than I would have been had I spent seven 
months doing this very tedious but important work). Thus, those 
households in the labor-use study were normally visited twice each 
week, once by my assistant and me for an extended interview, and , 
once by my second assistant on his own, gathering the labor-use and 
budget data. Needless to say, great forbearance on the part of the 
community was needed, received, and greatly appreciated. 
APPENDIX 3 
Survey Methodology_al 
Regression 7ariable Construction  
Sample Selection 
The three locations surveyed were selected to be 
representative of the district as a whole. The extent to which 
this turned out to be true is discussed in Chapter 7. They were 
relatively accessible and represented what in local knowledge were 
thought to be wealthy, moderate and poorer areas of the district. 
They also represenowd the two major religious groups within the 
district, Seventh Day Adventist and Catholic, 4 distinction that 
man/ Gusii view as explaining the differences In wealth between the 
different areas. Location I was Nyaribari Chache, Location I South 
Vanjare (in which Bomwanda lies) and Location 3 North Vanjare. 
The households surveyed within each location were selected in 
two ways. A random selection was made from MoA lists for the 
locations of 'Contact Farmers' -- those farmers that are visited at 
regular fortnightly Intervals by agricultural extension agents as 
part of the NEP (see Chapters 3 and 6 for discussion of the NEP). 
These were an easy group to locate because their names were given 
an the lists and the MoA maintiained detailed maps to their 
households as part of the T and 7 system. Sixty one of these 
farmers were randomly selected, half from Location 1 and and a 
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quarter each from Locations 2 and 3, this being the relative sizes 
of the locations last recorded populations. 
For each Contact Farmer, four neighbors were randomly 
selected, based on distance from the Contact Farmer to the right 
and left of his or her household. Homesteads in Kisii lie on 
hillzidas, each running in a strip from top to bottom. Thus it is 
easy to look at a hill, identify the Contact Farmer, and count 
homesteads to the right and left. h. random selection of households 
running from five households to the left to five households to the 
right was made using a random number table. Thus, the sample 
ultimately included 61 Contact Farmers and 304 'neighbors.' The 
two groups are mutually exclusive because the T and V system of the 
MEP is designed to spread the Contact Farmers evenly geographically 
across the population. The sample over-represented the Contact 
Farmers relative to the entire population, which was necessary to 
obtain statistically significant results for both the Contact 
Farmers and the neighbors as separate groups. The results in 
Chapter 7 are not reported in this way because differences between 
the two were not significant -- attesting to the representativeness 
of the Contact Farmers as a group and the proper implementation of 
the NEP in Usti. This also implies that over-representation of 
the Contact Farmers did not significantly bias the overall results. 
Survey Methodology 
The survey was conducted by five enumerators over a two week 
period. I trained them in using the survey, which was a 'one-shot' 
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survey of each household, interviewing the most knowledgable family 
member present at the time of interview. (Rarely if ever is a 
Mai household completely devoid of people at a given moment.) 
The form on which answers wer: recorded is reproduced at the end of 
this appendix, with Ekegusii words translated into English at the 
end. The questions themselves were written by me and translated 
into Ekegusii by a university graduate who assisted me with the 
project. The enumerators were all secondary school leavers, one a 
secondary school teacher himself, and fluent in English. 
The form is fairly self-explanatory, but I will attempt to 
elucidate the more complicated segments of it. The first page 
represents a household census, educational data gathering, and 
marriage data gathering. The census and the entire form attempted 
to account for relatively complex extended households with several 
'houses' within them. The latter are listed as 'Family' 1 to 3 on 
the form. This effort, which is rare in rural surveys of Africa, 
was less than completely successful. It relied on the respondent's 
definition of his or her 'household' (omochie), which often did not 
include what I would have probably considered a household. For 
instance, in a number of cases young families with only two or 
three children, all under age five, identified themselves as 
separate households. This is extremely unlikely. Most of these 
probably had living parents and were at least partially still part 
of a larger household. The enumerators, working quickly and trying 
not to tax the patience of respondents, could not engage in an 
extended dispute over the definition of the household. 
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The result was an under-representation of extended 
households, though not an extreme one; most households in Kisii 
today are nuclear, with perhaps a single, economically inactive 
grandparent living with the family. In analyzing the results. I 
tested the difference between those that appeared to be false 
households, such as the young ones described above, and the rest on 
a number of key responses for which I thought they might 
significantly bias the results, with the intention of excluding 
them from the final results if necessary. I found no signficant 
differences. Unfortunately, this did mean that I did not receive 
as complete data as I might have regarding work history and 
original cash crop adoption. Often younger respondents did not 
know fully the household history, lived by their fathers or 
fathers-in-law, so data were missing. On the other hand, marriage 
and bridevealth history was more complete, in that all family 
members have been told this information at one time or another, no 
matter how far in the past it might have occurred. an extended 
household, in any of its several forms, is an extremely complex and 
fluid entity that cannot be easily identified and surveyed rapidly. 
Few have tried; I tried, but did not fully succeed. 
The second page addresses issues of land size, market, and 
use. Land size was simply piked of respondents and recorded. 
Undoubtedly, this is not completely accurate; the only alternative 
would have been to record full names and land plot numbers and 
*arch the land register. This would have raised great suspicion 
and been flatly refused by many respondents I'm sure, and would 
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also not have been complete accurate, in that many land transfers, 
especially generational sub-divisions, are not recorded in the land 
register. 
The third page recorded basic cash crop history. The final 
two questions on decision-making for food crops received what I 
would tom ideological answers: the vast majority of respondents 
identified men as the chief decision-maker, as is the ideal norm in 
Gusii culture. I am sure this was a highly inaccurate portrayal of 
actual daily decision-making, so the results were ignored. 
The next page recorded information on basic crop husbandry, 
principally for maize. Practice of Mot. extension recommendations 
was only tested in its basic form: planting in lines rather than 
randomly and using hybrid seed and fertilizer. Knowledge and 
practice of precise line spacing was not queried, being 
impractical. Even farmers who know the proper spacing would in 
most cases hold up their hands to show the enumerator or show him 
on a stick, rather than stating the exact amount in feet and 
inches, leaving the enumerator to judge the knowledge level 
himself. 
The labor use section on page five was perhaps the most 
difficult to design. I wanted some comparison with my detailed 
labor-use data in Komwanda, but could not come close to this in a 
one-shot survey. I settled on asking how many and which family and 
non-family members regularly engaged in each of the major 
agricultural activities that consume most labor time. Hired labor 
was divided into monthly, salaried workers, who normally work six 
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days per week, 3-5 hours per day, and casual workers normally 
called 'contracts' in Eisii, hired for a specific wage to do a 
specific task on a short-term basis. 
Data on work history on page six were also incomplete. its 
stated earlier, many young respondents did not know complete 
histories. Bence, I believe I obtained good data on current jobs 
and some on major, long-term past employment, but nowhere near 
complete past employment records. Doing so would, again, have 
tested the patience of the respondents and greatly lengthened the 
time needed to conduct the survey. 
The final page was printed in two versions, both of which are 
re-printed herein. The first is the survey of Contact Farmers. 
The first eight questions on this were taken from the Moe surveys 
of Contact Farmers as part of its ova evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the NIP. The rest, which is identical to that 
given to non-contact farmers, asks for general information on 
knowledge level and practice of Mos recommendations on key crops. 
(Maize is covered earlier, on page four.) These questions were 
left relatively open-ended, asking each farmer what he or she knew 
about current government recommendations regarding each crop 
without having the enumerator state what the recommendations were. 
This allowed me to try to guage active knowledge of 'modern' 
cultivation practices but left the possibility of many respondents 
simply stating they knew nothing in order to and the interview 
quickly, for instance. It also meant that the measurement of 
knowledge was necessarily rough. The enumerators did not quiz 
402 
respondents on knowledge of exact names and amounts per hectare of 
fertilizer, precise spacing of crops, etc.. though occasionally 
such detail was volunteered by the unusually well-informed. In 
most cases, respondents stated their rough knowledge of correct 
measures, whith were counted as acceptable knowledge in my tallies 
and in construction of the 'agricultural knowledge' variables used 
in the regression analysis (see below). genre, this to some extent 
over-measured knowledge, accepting rough-knowledge as correct. when 
respondents often did not know exact details. 
The questions asking for respondents' actual practices . were 
less successful and were not used in the analysis in Chapter 7. 
Saving enunciated the 'correct' practices, farmers nearly 
universally stated they engaged in them regularly. Ever fearful 
that a 'wrong' answer would be used against them, they gave what 
they believed to be the 'right' answer. As I stated in Chapter 7, 
this I found to be obviously an inaccurate measure of actual 
practice, but a clear indication of knowledge of recommended 
practices, not to mention an interesting insight into relations 
between farmers and Ho& staff. 
Regression Variable Construction 
Most of the variables used in the regression analyses 
reported in Chapter 7 are self-explanatory, though some need 
further elucidation. Among the independent variables, the measure 
of family labor use on maize is problematic. As noted above, 
measuring labor use In a one-shot survey is extremely difficult. 
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The variable constructed used the data recorded for family members 
only on the first two lines of the labor use section of the survey 
report form -- on page 5 of the form. These asked respondents how 
many adults and children regularly prepared land, planted, and 
weeded maize (virtually always intercropped with beans). The 
variable weighted equally the number of laborers (with children 
counting as one-half of an adult) and the number of tasks they 
participated in. The result is a variable that is difficult to 
classify clearly as ordinal or interval. In many respects it is 
interval, assuming equal energy in work by different adult-
equivalents and weighting the different tasks equally. While these 
assumptions are problematic, they seem the only workable ones 
available. Even if this is rejected and the variable is considered 
ordinal (which it clearly seems fair to do -- a higher score 
presumably means overall more labor available for maize than does a 
Lower score), use of ordinal variables in regression analyses is 
accepted by many, especially one that might be considered interval. 
(See, Achen 1982 for a discussion of this.) 
The other difficult independent variable is that for 
agricultural knowledge. The data used for this are the responses 
to the five questions on knowledge of extension recommendations on 
the last page of the survey report form. Responses were scored as 
0 or 1, depending on whether the respondent could correctly 
identify at least one recommended practice for each crop. Again, 
this provides only a very rough measure of knowledge, but seemed 
the only one feasible. The scale on this thus ranged for 0 to 5 
404 
and is clearly an ordinal level variable. Schen (1982) suggests 
that such variables can be used as one ordinal variable or divided 
into discrete 'dummy' variables, ranging from 0 to 1 and sub-
dividing the sample into those with positive or negative scores on 
the variable. In this case, five dummy variables were used because 
the single ordinal variable proved to have a non-significant 
relationship with all the dependent variables. The first dummy 
divided those who knew at least one correct response from those who 
knew none, the second those who knew at least two correct responses 
from those who only knew one or none, etc. Each regression was run 
using each dummy variable; only the dummy that had the most 
significant and strongest relationship with the dependent variable 
in each regression was reported in Chapter 7. 
Finally, the dependent variable measuring maize husbandry 
practices was constructed in a similar fashion. It weighted 
equally whether or not a farmer planted at the correct time (at or 
before the rains started), planted in separate rows (again, only a 
rough measure of use of the 'T and V' method preached by Moz 
staff), the year in which use of the recommended planting technique 
had begun (dividing the responses as pre- and post-1983 and thus 
measuring the impact of the NEP itself), the use of fertilizer, and 
the type used (dung or purchased petro-chemical, the latter being 
assumed superior and clearly part of MoA recommendations). 
The variable is thus ordinal and has a range of only 0 to 5, 
virtually guaranteeing that explained variance in any model using 
it as the dependent variable will be slight. Also, because 
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respondents gave what they viewed as 'correct' responses to these 
questions in the survey, variation was especially slight. Use of 
hybrid seed was ignored altogether, in that it was nearly 
universally reported as being used. A better measure was the cost 
of the seed, showing how much each farmer applied, which was 
included in the agricultural investment variable. Because the vast 
majority stated they did use the T and V planting method (An 
obvious falsification in many cases) and most do plant at the 
correct time, variation in 'maize husbandry' mainly represented 
variation in fertilizer use and year in which improved planting was 
claimed to have begun (again, this probably reflects knowledge of 
Kok recommendations more than actual cultivation practices). This 
was seen as the best measure available, given the limits inherent 
in a survey of this type. 
In conclusion, I hope I have shown to the reader the extreme 
difficulty of constructing and conducting this type of survey in 
rural Africa. I did this at the end of eight months of full 
residence In the area. Without this detailed knowledge. I would 
not have even known many of the correct and interesting questions 
to ask. Even with this knowledge, I found no way to obt:iin 
accurate information on all sensitive subjects, due to the inherent 
suspicion of an outside enumerator entering a household to conduct 
a one-shot survey. Hy results, I think, are reasonably accurate 
and could not have been improved an without a significantly more 
detailed and time-consuming effort, in which I personally would 
have had to participate in each interview and visually verify as 
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much information as possible. 
The survey was designed in a number of instances to ask for 
the same information in a number of ways. I personally coded the 
entire thing, thus insuring that if I noticed discrepancies I made 
a judgement about which response was correct. For instance, very 
few households admitted operating home breweries, which are 
universal but illegal. However, the same household would often 
note that a wife's business was the source of funds for a 
particular activity. Thus, I could make an intelligent assumption 
in such cases that a brewery, or black market import-export trade 
(not common. but certainly one option in a district only a two hour 
ride from the Tanzanian border). existed, even though I would not 
know the income generated therefrom. Such is the roughness of data 
collection and inherent problems of doing a survey in rural Africa. 
In the end, it proved useful to compare with the case study, but no 
substitute for the latter, without which I would not have even been 
able to construct a survey asking the right questions. 
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